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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Credit Ratings Agencies — Mark E. Van Der Weide, Senior Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation

Chairman Neugebauer, Ranking Member Capuano, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act). To help achieve…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Chairman Neugebauer, Ranking Member Capuano, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act). To help achieve the important objective of reducing governmental and private sector reliance on credit ratings, section 939A requires all federal agencies to review their regulations for references and requirements related to credit ratings, remove such credit rating references and requirements from their regulations, and replace them with appropriate alternative standards of creditworthiness.

In my testimony, I will first describe how the Board has used credit ratings in its regulations. I will then discuss the problems associated with credit ratings that were observed during the recent financial crisis and how section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act attempts to address those problems. Lastly, I will discuss the most important considerations in developing alternative standards of creditworthiness and describe the Board's efforts to develop these standards.

A credit rating is an assessment by a third-party rating firm of the credit risk of a financial instrument--that is, whether the issuer of the instrument (the borrower) will meet its contractual obligations to pay principal and interest to the holder of the instrument (the creditor). As detailed in the report the Board submitted to the Congress last week, in accordance with section 939A,1 the Board has reviewed its regulations for references to and requirements regarding the use of credit ratings. In all, we identified 46 references to or requirements regarding credit ratings in our regulations.

Most of these references to credit ratings are in the Board's risk-based capital rules for state member banks and bank holding companies. For example, under the Board's risk-based capital rules, a banking firm's capital requirements for certain securitization positions and trading positions are in whole or in part a function of the position's credit rating.2 Other references appear in regulations governing transactions between banks and their affiliates, in regulations on international banking operations, and in regulations governing state member bank investments in financial subsidiaries. For example, whether a foreign branch of a U.S.bank may invest in a foreign government debt obligation may depend on the credit rating of the obligation.3

For many years before the introduction of credit ratings in banking regulations, investors had used credit ratings to assist them in making investment decisions. Credit ratings provided a uniform, market-driven, third-party assessment of the creditworthiness of countries, state and local governments, and companies. Federal agencies later incorporated credit ratings into their regulatory frameworks in part because of these same positive attributes.

The recent financial crisis, however, made manifest serious flaws associated with the methodologies and processes used to determine credit ratings, particularly ratings for structured finance positions. For example, the rating agencies used untested models that were revealed to be based on flawed assumptions and that relied on limited and unverified data about underlying asset pools to predict default frequencies of structured finance positions. The rating agencies also provided insufficient transparency to market participants about those models and about how their ratings of structured finance positions differed from ratings of unstructured debt. In addition, the rating agencies suffered from potential conflicts of interest due to their "issuer pays" compensation arrangements and other factors.

These flaws contributed to the issuance of credit ratings that severely underestimated the credit risk of many mortgage- and asset-backed securities. Investors, for their part, relied too heavily and uncritically on these ratings in making investment decisions. Indeed, downward revaluations of many of these securities by market participants between 2007 and 2009, and the resulting loss of confidence in the accuracy of credit ratings, contributed meaningfully to the destabilizing dynamics of the recent financial crisis.

Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act is one of a number of provisions in title IX of the statute intended to address the various problems associated with credit ratings and the rating agencies that became evident during the crisis. Section 939A was intended to help address these problems by removing credit ratings from federal regulations, thereby helping eliminate any government-induced demand for, and reliance on, ratings. In place of ratings, under section939A, the Board (and each other federal agency) generally must substitute appropriate alternative standards of creditworthiness that are as uniform as possible.

The level of difficulty associated with removing credit ratings from the Board's regulations varies considerably from regulation to regulation. Complete removal of credit ratings from the Board's risk-based capital rules for banking firms poses the greatest challenge. To protect the safety and soundness of individual banking firms and of financial stability more broadly, we are striving to develop alternative standards of creditworthiness for use in our risk-based capital rules that possess the virtues of credit ratings but not the vices.

There are several key characteristics of a good alternative creditworthiness standard. Most importantly, the standard should be reliably risk-sensitive; it should effectively measure the relative credit risk of various types of financial instruments and counterparties. Reducing the risk sensitivity of the risk-based capital rules would make a banking firm's risk-based capital ratios less informative of the firm's capital adequacy and would make the capital rules easier to arbitrage. In addition, the standard should result in a consistent and transparent application across different types of financial instruments and counterparties. Moreover, the standard ideally should auto-adjust on a timely basis to reflect changes in the credit-risk profile of an instrument or counterparty and should auto-adapt to cover new financial market practices. Finally, the standard should be relatively simple to implement and should not increase the regulatory burden for banking firms, especially small banks. Obviously, credit ratings themselves do not meet all these criteria, and developing good replacements for credit ratings is a particularly difficult task.

Since the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law last July, the Board has been working with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to carry out the 939A mandate. To further this effort, in August2010, the Board and the other banking agencies issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking requesting public comment on alternative standards of creditworthiness to be used in the risk-based capital rules. In addition, in November 2010, the Board hosted a roundtable discussion with the other banking agencies, academics, and industry experts to solicit views on how to replace credit ratings in our capital rules.

Public commenters on our 939A efforts have expressed concern about the statutory mandate of section 939A and have suggested it could lead to competitive distortions across the global banking system and the domestic banking landscape. Most commenters have emphasized the need for alternative standards of creditworthiness to be risk-sensitive. In addition, commenters representing less complex banking firms have indicated that any alternative standard should be reasonably easy to implement, should allow banks of varying size and complexity to arrive at the same assessment of creditworthiness for similar exposures, and should take into account the costs and burdens imposed on small firms. We are particularly sensitive to the difficulties of constructing effective, low-burden replacement standards for smaller banks, which have less credit-risk assessment resources than large banks.

The Board continues to work closely with the other banking agencies to develop appropriate alternative standards for banking firms to use to meet regulatory requirements for assessing the credit risk of financial instruments and counterparties. We are considering a number of approaches, including approaches that rely on market-based indicators, such as bond spreads; approaches that rely on balance-sheet financial ratios; and approaches that rely on internal assessments of credit risk by banking firms. Each of these approaches, like the use of credit ratings, has strengths and weaknesses. The Board anticipates that it will propose amendments to remove references to credit ratings from its regulations in the near future, including through proposals to implement recent international agreements on capital by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

The Board also has been active in the international efforts to encourage reduced dependence on credit ratings across the global financial system. Such efforts include the development and publication of principles by the Financial Stability Board in 2010 for reducing reliance on credit ratings by supervisors and market participants as well as work that is currently being conducted by the Basel Committee to revise the Basel capital framework to reduce reliance on ra tings.4 Although the international financial regulatory community is working to reduce reliance on credit ratings, the Basel capital framework (including several components of the recent Basel III agreement) continues to incorporate credit ratings in material ways. Accordingly, we will need to find ways to synchronize our 939A changes with the global bank-capital accords.

The Board welcomes input from the public and from members of the Subcommittee on this important issue of public policy. Thank you for the opportunity to describe the Board's efforts to date to implement section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act. I am happy to answer any questions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jul 27, 2011.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJun 27, 2011Publication referenceJul 27, 201130 days laterAug 26, 2011
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®4.50%Observed 4.52%Observed +2 bps vs. earlier reference4.22%Observed −30 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the TreasuryUnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Apr 27, 2011 – Oct 27, 2011
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jul 27, 2011Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%4.25%5.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 4.78% · Apr 28, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.71% · May 5, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.63% · May 12, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.61% · May 19, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.60% · May 26, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.55% · Jun 2, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.49% · Jun 9, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.50% · Jun 16, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.50% · Jun 23, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.51% · Jun 30, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.60% · Jul 7, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.51% · Jul 14, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.52% · Jul 21, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.55% · Jul 28, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.39% · Aug 4, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.32% · Aug 11, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.15% · Aug 18, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.22% · Aug 25, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.22% · Sep 1, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.12% · Sep 8, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.09% · Sep 15, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.09% · Sep 22, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.01% · Sep 29, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Oct 6, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.12% · Oct 13, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.11% · Oct 20, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.10% · Oct 27, 2011Apr 27, 2011Jul 27, 2011Oct 27, 2011
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,523.62/month

4.52% · Jul 21, 2011

At the later reference$1,470.56/month

4.22% · Aug 25, 2011

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $53.07 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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