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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Dodd-Frank Act — Chiarman Ben S. Bernanke

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shelby, and other members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the first anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).1

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Shelby, and other members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the first anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).1

On this anniversary, it is worth reminding ourselves of why the Congress passed sweeping financial reforms a year ago. The financial crisis of 2008-09 was unprecedented in its scope and severity. Some of the world's largest financial firms collapsed or nearly did so, sending shock waves through the highly interconnected global financial system. Critical financial markets came under enormous stress. Asset prices fell sharply and flows of credit to American families and businesses were disrupted. The crisis, in turn, wreaked havoc on the U.S. and global economies, causing sharp declines in production and trade and putting millions out of work. Extraordinary actions by authorities around the world helped stabilize the situation, but, nearly three years later, the recovery from the crisis in the United States and in many other countries remains far from complete.

In response to the crisis, we have seen a comprehensive re-thinking and reform of financial regulation, both in the United States and around the world. Among the core objectives of both the Dodd-Frank Act and the global regulatory reform effort are: enhancing regulators' ability to monitor and address threats to financial stability, strengthening both the prudential oversight and resolvability of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and improving the capacity of financial markets and infrastructures to absorb shocks. I will briefly discuss each of these objectives.

First, to help regulators better anticipate and prepare for threats to financial stability, legislatures in both the United States and other developed economies have instructed central banks and regulatory agencies to adopt what has been called a macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation--that is, an approach that supplements traditional supervision and regulation of individual firms or markets with explicit consideration of threats to the stability of the financial system as a whole. Under a macroprudential approach, regulators are enjoined not only to look for emerging financial risks but also to try to identify structural weaknesses or gaps in the regulatory system, thereby helping the regulatory framework keep pace with financial innovation and other market developments.

As you know, the Dodd-Frank Act created a council of regulators, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to coordinate efforts to identify and mitigate threats to U.S. financial stability across a range of institutions and markets. The Council's monitoring efforts are well under way, and this new organization has contributed to what has been a very positive atmosphere of consultation and coordination among its member agencies. The Council is also moving forward with its rulemaking responsibilities, including rules under which it will be able to designate systemically important nonbank financial institutions and financial market utilities for additional supervisory oversight, including by the Federal Reserve. For its part, the Federal Reserve has also made organizational changes to promote a macroprudential approach to regulation. Among these changes is the establishment of high-level, multidisciplinary working groups to oversee the supervision of large, complex banking firms and financial market utilities, with a strong focus on developments that have implications for financial stability. We have also created an Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research to help coordinate our efforts to identify and analyze potential risks to the broader financial system and to serve as liaison with the Council.

A second major objective of financial reform is to mitigate the threats to financial stability posed by the too-big-to-fail problem. Here the Dodd-Frank Act takes a two-pronged approach. The first prong empowers the Federal Reserve to reduce a SIFI's probability of failure through tougher prudential regulation and supervision, including enhanced risk-based capital and leverage requirements, liquidity requirements, single-counterparty credit limits, stress testing, an early remediation regime, and activities restrictions. The Federal Reserve and other agencies face the ongoing challenge of aligning domestic regulations with international agreements, including the Basel III requirements for globally active banks. These efforts are going well; in particular, the Federal Reserve expects to issue proposed rules on the oversight of SIFIs later this summer and, working with other banking agencies, is on schedule to implement Basel III.

Ending too-big-to-fail also requires allowing a SIFI to fail if it cannot meet its obligations--and to do so without inflicting serious damage on the broader financial system. Thus, the second prong of the Dodd-Frank Act's effort to end too-big-to-fail empowers the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to reduce the effect on the system in the event of a SIFI's failure through tools such as the new orderly liquidation authority and improved resolution planning by firms and supervisors. In particular, the Federal Reserve is working with the FDIC to require SIFIs to better prepare for their own resolution by adopting so-called living wills. A joint final rule on living wills is expected later this summer.

Reducing the likelihood of a severe financial crisis also requires strengthening the resilience of our financial markets and infrastructure--a third major objective of the Dodd-Frank Act. Toward that end, provisions of the act improve the transparency and stability of the over-the-counter derivatives markets and strengthen the oversight of financial market utilities and other critical parts of our financial infrastructure. We and our colleagues at the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and other agencies are moving this work forward, in consultation as appropriate with foreign regulators and international bodies. The U.S. agencies are also working together to address structural weaknesses in areas not specifically addressed by the Dodd-Frank Act, such as the triparty repo market and the money market mutual fund industry.

To be sure, any sweeping reform comes with costs and uncertainties. In implementing the statute, the Federal Reserve is committed to the promulgation of rules that are economically sensible, appropriately weigh costs and benefits, protect smaller community institutions, and, most important, promote the sound extension of credit in the service of economic growth and development. A full transition to the new system will require much more work by both the public and private sectors, and no doubt we will learn lessons along the way. However, as we work together to implement financial reform, we must not lose sight of the reason that we began this process: ensuring that events like those of 2008 and 2009 are not repeated. Our long-term economic health requires that we do everything possible to achieve that goal.

Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions.

Appendix (PDF)

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jul 21, 2011.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJun 21, 2011Publication referenceJul 21, 201130 days laterAug 20, 2011
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®4.50%Observed 4.52%Observed +2 bps vs. earlier reference4.15%Observed −37 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the TreasuryUnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Apr 21, 2011 – Oct 21, 2011
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jul 21, 2011Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%4.25%5.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 4.80% · Apr 21, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.78% · Apr 28, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.71% · May 5, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.63% · May 12, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.61% · May 19, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.60% · May 26, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.55% · Jun 2, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.49% · Jun 9, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.50% · Jun 16, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.50% · Jun 23, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.51% · Jun 30, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.60% · Jul 7, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.51% · Jul 14, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.52% · Jul 21, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.55% · Jul 28, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.39% · Aug 4, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.32% · Aug 11, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.15% · Aug 18, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.22% · Aug 25, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.22% · Sep 1, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.12% · Sep 8, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.09% · Sep 15, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.09% · Sep 22, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.01% · Sep 29, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Oct 6, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.12% · Oct 13, 201130-year fixed mortgage: 4.11% · Oct 20, 2011Apr 21, 2011Jul 21, 2011Oct 21, 2011
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,523.62/month

4.52% · Jul 21, 2011

At the later reference$1,458.31/month

4.15% · Aug 18, 2011

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $65.31 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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