Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Liquidity Resiliency, Financial Stability, and the Role of the Federal Reserve — Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle W. Bowman

Good morning. It's a pleasure to be with you this morning to open our discussion on the bank liquidity framework. Hal and his team have assembled a series of excellent panels that will further inform our approach as we consider…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Good morning. It's a pleasure to be with you this morning to open our discussion on the bank liquidity framework. Hal and his team have assembled a series of excellent panels that will further inform our approach as we consider adjusting this framework. The panelists' perspectives—including academics, market participants, and fellow policymakers—will enrich our understanding of these complex issues and, importantly, challenge us to think critically about whether the framework we have in place works as intended.

Bank liquidity ensures that the banking system remains resilient.1 Regulatory requirements including the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) were designed to ensure that potential cash withdrawal and repayment obligations could be met with on balance sheet holdings. Internal liquidity stress testing and resolution planning were also designed to require banks to assess liquidity positions, in preparation for monetizing assets under stressed conditions. In theory, these requirements should work together to mitigate the risk of a bank failure resulting from a lack of liquidity to meet its ongoing payment obligations and foreseeable cash outflows.

Fifteen years post-GFC, we need to know whether these tools deliver the promised resilience or whether we have created a framework that looks impressive on paper but fails to capture the vulnerabilities that emerge in times of stress. It is time to move beyond asking whether banks are compliant and ask whether compliance actually translates into resilience.2

Today I will review the current liquidity framework, then turn to the considerations relevant to reform—and the principles that should guide our work. I will conclude with brief discussion of the discount window and broader implications for the Fed's balance sheet. Without question, these are challenging issues, but if we're committed to building a more resilient banking system, we need to identify what is working and what could be improved in our current approach.

The Current Liquidity Framework The prudential liquidity framework relies on three main components: 1) the LCR and NSFR set quantitative standards for liquid assets and stable funding; 2) internal liquidity stress testing (ILST) requires banks to assess liquidity needs under adverse scenarios; and 3) resolution planning governs how firms manage liquidity in distress or failure. These tools, developed largely in response to the 2008 financial crisis, were designed to work together to ensure that banks could withstand both sudden withdrawals and prolonged market disruptions.

The LCR is designed to promote short-term liquidity resilience by requiring banks to hold high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) to meet presumed net cash outflows over a 30-day time horizon.3 These assets, subject to regulatory haircuts, are readily convertible into cash enabling banks to meet short-term liquidity needs without emergency borrowing.

The framework does not consider how banks actually perform during stress. Banks have strong incentives to convert less liquid assets, like loans, into cash to meet withdrawal and repayment demands. They routinely pledge collateral to secure liquidity through Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances. Yet, the LCR does not provide credit for this collateral for a number of reasons, including uncertainty around availability and valuation.

The Federal Reserve's discount window similarly allows banks to pledge illiquid assets for cash during market disruptions, accepting an even broader range of collateral than the FHLBs. However, whether the discount window is effective as a reliable liquidity backstop requires careful examination.

In practice, the liquidity framework creates two problems. During normal times, banks over-allocate to HQLAs because they must demonstrate that liquidity needs can be met with their own balance sheet resources. At the same time, traditional Federal Reserve sources of liquidity—like daylight overdrafts, the discount window, and standing repo facilities—are stigmatized. This reduces a bank's capacity to lend and support its communities.

During stress, the framework becomes pro-cyclical. Banks that maintain HQLAs at or above 100 percent of presumed outflows are often reluctant to use them out of concern they will fall below the minimum LCR. The LCR effectively becomes an isolated, unusable buffer. This reluctance exacerbates stress, forcing banks to convert less liquid assets into cash to meet obligations.

Liquidity Regulation Considerations Liquidity requirements create incentives that affect bank behavior. In practice, the regulatory requirements understate the amount of liquid assets that banks are effectively required to maintain on an ongoing basis and limit optionality in stress conditions. In the aggregate, the liquidity framework produces strong incentives for banks to engage in "liquidity hoarding," where they maintain liquid assets well in excess of what may be necessary or prudent for ongoing business operations and possible stressed outflows over a 30-day window. Maintaining liquidity resources in excessive amounts may impose unnecessary costs on the banking system and the broader U.S. economy.

As we consider changes, we must carefully consider the consequences—both intended and unintended.

Role of the Federal Reserve and the Impact on the Balance Sheet The Federal Reserve plays a vital role in banking system liquidity. Since 2003, our discount window has operated through two facilities, primary credit for strong banks and secondary credit with more stringent terms.

As we have seen, banks avoid the discount window, even in times of stress, because of the stigma that disclosure and higher borrowing costs present. Weekly aggregate disclosure makes borrowing potentially detectable by markets. Above-market interest rates make borrowing costly, even for testing. Markets interpret any usage as a sign of fragility. These factors combine to discourage banks from using the facility precisely when they may need it most.

The Federal Reserve's discount window is a critical but underutilized tool, one that requires fundamental reform to fulfill its intended purpose. It should function as a liquidity backstop with consistent rules, processes, and procedures. Currently, each of the 12 Reserve Banks has their own rules and processes and an independent ability to make lending decisions—decisions that may vary across Reserve Banks for similarly situated borrowers and similar collateral. This fragmentation creates uncertainty for borrowers, but it can also serve to exacerbate fragilities in the banking system.

After years of recognized flaws, we have yet to address these known weaknesses. The consequences are clear. Banks create additional buffers by hoarding high-quality liquid assets rather than lending. This liquidity hoarding reduces credit availability to the economy. In addition, by increasing the demand for reserves, it also requires the Fed to maintain a larger balance sheet to meet that demand.

Some see tension between monetary policy implementation tools and regulatory objectives. In my mind, these goals should be compatible if we are modernizing the discount window to serve as an effective liquidity backstop, instead of a theoretical option.

Closing Thoughts I hope today's discussion provides an opportunity to explore these issues. Hal, I appreciate your invitation to begin a transparent and public discussion on this topic. I look forward to better understanding the considerations that could lead us to alternative approaches.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Mar 3, 2026.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierFeb 1, 2026Publication referenceMar 3, 202630 days laterApr 2, 2026
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.10%Observed 5.98%Observed −12 bps vs. earlier reference6.46%Observed +48 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.26%Observed 4.06%Observed −20 bps vs. earlier reference4.31%Observed +25 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Dec 3, 2025 – Jun 3, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Mar 3, 2026Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Jan 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.10% · Jan 29, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Feb 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Feb 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.01% · Feb 19, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 5.98% · Feb 26, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.00% · Mar 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Mar 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Mar 19, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.38% · Mar 26, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.46% · Apr 2, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.37% · Apr 9, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Apr 16, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Apr 23, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Apr 30, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.37% · May 7, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.36% · May 14, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.51% · May 21, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.53% · May 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jan 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jan 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Feb 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Feb 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.16% · Feb 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Feb 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.03% · Feb 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.02% · Feb 26, 202610-year Treasury: 3.97% · Feb 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Mar 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.06% · Mar 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Mar 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.13% · Mar 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Mar 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.12% · Mar 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Mar 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Mar 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.23% · Mar 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.20% · Mar 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Mar 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · Mar 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Mar 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · Mar 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Mar 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.42% · Mar 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.44% · Mar 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Mar 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Mar 31, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Apr 1, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Apr 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Apr 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.32% · Apr 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Apr 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Apr 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.36% · Apr 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.42% · Apr 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · May 1, 202610-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.36% · May 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.41% · May 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.38% · May 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.42% · May 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.46% · May 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.46% · May 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.47% · May 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.59% · May 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.61% · May 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.67% · May 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.57% · May 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.57% · May 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.56% · May 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.50% · May 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.48% · May 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jun 1, 202610-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.49% · Jun 3, 2026Dec 3, 2025Mar 3, 2026Jun 3, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury126 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,794.80/month

5.98% · Feb 26, 2026

At the later reference$1,888.32/month

6.46% · Apr 2, 2026

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $93.52 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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