Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Opening Remarks for the “AI and Productivity across the Economy” Panel — Governor Lisa D. Cook

Good morning. Thank you to the National Association for Business Economics for inviting me to speak with you today, and thank you to Jared for serving as our moderator.1 I am honored to share the stage with my former colleague Michael…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Good morning. Thank you to the National Association for Business Economics for inviting me to speak with you today, and thank you to Jared for serving as our moderator.1 I am honored to share the stage with my former colleague Michael and my former student and research assistant Ging Cee, and I look forward to our discussion.

In economics, artificial intelligence (AI) and productivity are among my favorite areas of inquiry. In the two decades before I became a Federal Reserve governor, I studied and contributed research to the economics of innovation and used machine learning in my research. In my current role, I have continued to pursue this line of inquiry and have frequently spoken about the advances in AI, the implications of that progress for the economy, and the Fed's dual-mandate goals of maximum employment and price stability.2 Today, I appreciate the opportunity to briefly update you on my thinking. While I am appropriately cautious, in the long run, I am optimistic about AI's ability to contribute to new products and processes—innovation—that will make our lives better.

People are using AI in varied and interesting ways, including writing romance novels more quickly, dreaming up new recipes, and even deciding marital disputes.3 I am thrilled to see firms experimenting with AI in novel, creative ways, which I look forward to learning about from my fellow panelists. At the Federal Reserve, we hold ourselves to the highest standard of safety and exercise caution. Simultaneously, like many organizations, the Fed sees value in using AI to summarize research and other documents, generate code, and plan travel, among other uses.4 As you might imagine, there is an extensive research effort to examine AI and its effects on the economy at the Board and throughout the Federal Reserve System.5

AI can boost productivity growth by speeding up idea creation—a key element in Paul Romer's endogenous growth theory—through its ability to process and combine knowledge rapidly.6 By making powerful analytical tools available to everyone, not just experts, AI democratizes innovation: it allows more people to become inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs, creating a cycle of self-generating ideas where ideas generate more ideas. This democratization supports Romer's concept that ideas can be shared repeatedly without being "used up," potentially transforming innovation by allowing more people to contribute to economic growth. Undoubtedly, AI will usher in new tasks and occupations, many of which are impossible for us to conceive of today. That is not surprising, considering that 60 percent of today's occupations did not exist in 1940.7 Airplane designer, computer application engineer, and cybersecurity analyst have become Census-recognized occupations since World War II.

AI has tremendous promise. Nonetheless, I view its general adoption with caution. AI's emergence is poised to be the latest example of the creative destruction economist Joseph Schumpeter described almost a century ago. We appear to be approaching the most significant reorganization of work in generations. This transition could create new opportunities, but it could also come with some costs. In a recent speech, I discussed the possibility that job displacement may precede job creation such that the unemployment rate may rise and participation in the labor force may decline as the economy transitions.8 This outcome could cause hardship for many workers and their families.

Evidence that the transition has commenced has emerged, even if it is too soon to see the effects in the aggregate. Demand for labor in certain occupations has declined—most notably for coders, a field where AI has made significant strides. Similarly, the unemployment rate for recent college grads has increased over the last few years at a time when some employers are deploying AI for what had been tasks previously performed by entry-level workers. Nevertheless, the overall unemployment rate is still at a low 4.3 percent, and recent measures of layoffs remain subdued. Therefore, we do not yet know the exact evolution of this labor-market transition nor its intensity.

To be sure, the AI transition I am contemplating could have profound implications for monetary policy. It is too early to observe the exact contours, but I am carefully studying several aspects of this transition. Allow me to briefly raise two issues for consideration.

First, if AI continues to raise productivity, economic growth could remain strong, even as churn in the labor market leads to an increase in unemployment. In a productivity boom such as this, a rise in unemployment may not indicate increased slack. As such, our normal demand-side monetary policy may not be able to ameliorate an AI-caused unemployment spell without also increasing inflationary pressure. This means that monetary policymakers would face tradeoffs between unemployment and inflation. While there is a role for monetary policy, education, workforce, and other policy that is nonmonetary may be better suited to address these challenges in a more targeted way.

Second, I am thinking about how AI might affect the neutral rate of interest in the short run and over time. To recall, the neutral rate is a long-run concept that articulates the equilibrium level of interest rates that is noninflationary and consistent with maximum employment. The AI investment context compels us to understand what is happening in the short run. In anticipation of future productivity gains, we already see soaring AI-related business investment in data centers and chips, despite interest rates broadly being elevated relative to levels over the past 20 years. With investment contributing to strong aggregate demand, it is possible that the current neutral rate is higher than before the pandemic. This could reverse when the AI productivity gains are more fully realized or if the labor market transition leads to a rise in income inequality, such that well-off consumers receive a larger share of income, which could lower the neutral rate, all else equal.

AI is poised to profoundly change the economy and our lives—I believe ultimately for the better. I briefly discussed how AI could affect the labor market and the neutral rate of interest, but there are many other factors to examine. And it is too early to observe the exact contours of any changes. I will conclude by reminding those of you in this room that you will play a crucial role in helping employers—and policymakers—understand these rapidly changing dynamics in real time through your careful observations and thoughtful analysis. Thank you for your work. I look forward to the conversation.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Feb 24, 2026.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJan 25, 2026Publication referenceFeb 24, 202630 days laterMar 26, 2026
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.09%Observed 6.01%Observed −8 bps vs. earlier reference6.38%Observed +37 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.24%Observed 4.04%Observed −20 bps vs. earlier reference4.42%Observed +38 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Nov 24, 2025 – May 24, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Feb 24, 2026Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Jan 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.10% · Jan 29, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Feb 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Feb 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.01% · Feb 19, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 5.98% · Feb 26, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.00% · Mar 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Mar 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Mar 19, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.38% · Mar 26, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.46% · Apr 2, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.37% · Apr 9, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Apr 16, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Apr 23, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Apr 30, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.37% · May 7, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.36% · May 14, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.51% · May 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jan 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jan 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Feb 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Feb 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.16% · Feb 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Feb 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.03% · Feb 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.02% · Feb 26, 202610-year Treasury: 3.97% · Feb 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Mar 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.06% · Mar 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Mar 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.13% · Mar 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Mar 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.12% · Mar 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Mar 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Mar 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.23% · Mar 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.20% · Mar 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Mar 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · Mar 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Mar 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · Mar 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Mar 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.42% · Mar 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.44% · Mar 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Mar 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Mar 31, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Apr 1, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Apr 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Apr 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.32% · Apr 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Apr 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Apr 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.36% · Apr 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.42% · Apr 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · May 1, 202610-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.36% · May 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.41% · May 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.38% · May 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.42% · May 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.46% · May 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.46% · May 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.47% · May 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.59% · May 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.61% · May 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.67% · May 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.57% · May 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.57% · May 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.56% · May 22, 2026Nov 24, 2025Feb 24, 2026May 24, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,800.58/month

6.01% · Feb 19, 2026

At the later reference$1,872.59/month

6.38% · Mar 26, 2026

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $72.01 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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