Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy Implementation — Vice Chair Philip N. Jefferson

Thank you, President Hasner, for the kind introduction. It is an honor to speak at Florida Atlantic University, and I am glad to have the chance to talk with those here from the American Institute for Economic Research and the Shadow…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

THE PRIMARY SOURCE

Read the communication

Original source →

Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, President Hasner, for the kind introduction. It is an honor to speak at Florida Atlantic University, and I am glad to have the chance to talk with those here from the American Institute for Economic Research and the Shadow Open Market Committee.

slide 1

I especially appreciate the opportunity to discuss my economic outlook at the start of the new year. It is a task made considerably easier with the gradual return of federal government data, which was disrupted by last year's lapse in funding. The lack of data reinforced two long-held beliefs for me. One, how grateful I am for the dedicated service of the statistical agencies to keep policymakers, businesses, and the public informed about the state of the economy. And, two, how important it is to have access to an array of data beyond what those agencies provide. That includes data produced by the Federal Reserve System, state governments, and a wide variety of private-sector sources. All of those data sources inform my view of the economy and help me make monetary policy decisions.

Today, I will start by sharing my outlook for the economy at the start of 2026. Next, I will discuss the implications of that outlook for the path of monetary policy. And, finally, I will discuss some recent developments in monetary policy implementation, which I know is of interest to many of you in this room. As a reminder, these views are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues.

Economic Outlook I am starting 2026 with a cautiously optimistic point of view. Conditions in the labor market appear to be stabilizing, and I see the economy as well positioned to continue to grow while inflation returns to a pathway toward our 2 percent objective. The most recent data indicate that economic activity has remained strong. In the third quarter of 2025, gross domestic product rose at an annual rate of 4.3 percent. As you can see in figure 1, that was a sharp acceleration from the first half of last year, mostly reflecting strong consumer spending and an upward swing in net exports, which can be volatile. Business investment grew at a solid rate in the third quarter, while residential investment continued to be soft. Fourth-quarter growth is likely to be restrained due to the effects of the government shutdown. Still, excluding those effects, I see the economy expanding at a solid pace of about 2 percent in the near term.

Looking at the labor market, job growth moderated last year, and the unemployment rate edged higher. In November and December, employers added about 50,000 jobs to payrolls each month, as you can see in figure 2. This came after payrolls declined in October, largely due to an unusually large number of separations from the federal government. However, even setting aside October, the broader trend last year showed slower job creation than in 2024. At least part of the slowdown in the job market reflects a decline in the growth of the labor force due to lower immigration and labor force participation. However, labor demand has softened as well. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate, shown in figure 3, ended the year at 4.4 percent, up modestly from 4.1 percent at the end of the previous year.

That said, the labor market is not deteriorating rapidly, as layoffs remain low; however, hiring remains low as well. Figure 4 shows that there were 0.9 available jobs in November for every unemployed American seeking work. While that level is normally consistent with a solid labor market, the ratio is considerably lower than a few years ago, when labor market conditions were much tighter early in the pandemic recovery. In this less dynamic and somewhat softer labor market, the downside risks to employment appear to have risen. My baseline, however, is for the unemployment rate to hold steady throughout this year.

Considering the other part of our dual mandate, inflation remains somewhat elevated from our 2 percent goal. As you know, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) targets the rate of increase in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index; however, due to the government shutdown, the most recent available PCE price data are for September 2025. For this reason, I find it informative to review consumer price index (CPI) data to get a timelier sense of the direction of inflation, even if it does not directly translate to our inflation target. Over the longer term, both CPI and PCE measures tell a similar story. Data released earlier this week showed that the CPI rose 2.7 percent over the 12 months ending in December, the same rate as November. Core CPI, which excludes food and energy prices, rose 2.6 percent, also matching November's reading. You can see in figure 5 that both headline and core measures of inflation have eased significantly from their highs in mid-2022. However, that progress slowed over the past year or so, and inflation remains at a level that is above readings consistent with our inflation target.

Looking at the subcomponents of core CPI, shown in figure 6, we can see why there has been a slowdown in the pace of disinflation. Over the past year, we have seen further notable declines in services inflation—rent of shelter as well as other non-energy services—but these have been offset by an increase in core goods price inflation. Looking at the three buckets separately, shelter inflation, shown by the black dot-dashed line, has continued to decline, and core services inflation excluding shelter, the red dashed line, has also been on a downward trend, albeit on a somewhat bumpier path. Those readings are consistent with overall inflation moving back toward our target. What is inconsistent with a return to 2 percent inflation is the rise in core good prices. Following very high readings during the pandemic, goods inflation fell sharply, reaching its pre-pandemic range in 2023, and fluctuated roughly in that range until 2025. Last year, core goods price inflation picked up markedly, to 1.4 percent over the 12 months ending in December 2025, at least in part reflecting increased tariffs filtering through to certain goods prices.

While some upside risks remain, moving forward I expect to see inflation return to a sustainable path back to our 2 percent target. It is a reasonable base case that the effects of tariffs on inflation will not be long-lasting—effectively, a one-time shift in the price level. My view that inflation will resume a path toward our goal is consistent with near-term measures of inflation expectations declining from their peaks last year, as reflected in both market- and survey-based measures. And most measures of longer-term expectations remain consistent with our 2 percent inflation goal.

Monetary Policy Although I am cautiously optimistic about the path ahead, as a monetary policymaker, I do confront a challenging situation. With the downside risks to employment having risen last year, I viewed the balance of risks as having shifted. As a result, I supported the FOMC's decisions to reduce the policy interest rate last year. I viewed that as the right step to balance the upside risk of persistent above-target inflation and the downside risk of a deteriorating labor market. This policy stance puts the economy in a good position moving forward.

As shown in figure 7, since the middle of 2024, the Committee has reduced the policy rate by 1.75 percentage points. In my view, those moves have brought the federal funds rate into a range consistent with the neutral rate — a rate that neither stimulates nor restricts economic activity. I look forward to our upcoming policy meeting, which will be held in less than two weeks. While I do not want to prejudge the decision that will take place there, in my view, the current policy stance leaves us well positioned to determine the extent and timing of additional adjustments to our policy rate based on the incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks.

Monetary Policy Implementation Now, let me turn to monetary policy implementation. I'll begin with a bit of history to provide a backdrop for recent developments.

In January 2019, following many years of successful implementation along with extensive deliberations, the FOMC formally adopted its ample-reserves implementation framework.1 Some key advantages of this framework include successful control of the policy rate in a variety of conditions and effective transmission to other money market rates and broader financial conditions. The FOMC defined this framework as one where "control over the level of the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates is exercised primarily through the setting of the Federal Reserve's administered rates, and in which active management of the supply of reserves is not required."2 Therefore, the supply of reserves needs to be sufficiently large to meet the demand for reserves on most days.

Against this backdrop, I'll now discuss recent developments in monetary policy implementation. As of December 2025, the FOMC concluded the process of reducing the size of the Fed's balance sheet that began in mid-2022 by halting the reduction of the Fed's asset holdings. During this process, we successfully reduced our securities holdings by about $2.2 trillion. This asset runoff affected not only our assets, but also our liabilities such as the reserves in the banking system and the level of overnight reverse repurchase agreement (repo) operation balances.

At the beginning of balance sheet runoff in 2022, reserves were at an abundant level of around $3.5 trillion. As the balance sheet shrank over the next few years, the federal funds rate remained about 7 basis points below the interest on reserve balances (IORB) rate for most of this period. The decline in the level of reserves from an abundant level toward an ample level exerted upward pressure on money market rates in recent months. As the level of reserves declined, repo rates started to increase and became more volatile. We began to see intensified rate pressures, especially on tax payment days and Treasury securities settlement days, when large flows into the Treasury General Account (TGA), another liability of the Fed, led to corresponding declines in the amount of reserves in the banking system. The federal funds rate started to move up steadily in its target range, and it now stands at 1 basis point below the IORB rate. These and other indicators of tightening money market conditions were what we expected to see as reserves declined toward the range of ample reserves.

It is important to note that while ending the asset runoff slows down the decline in reserves, it does not completely halt this process. Even when the Fed's assets remain constant, trend growth in non-reserve liabilities, particularly currency in circulation, will continue to absorb reserves over time. There is also significant cyclical variation in the supply of reserve balances, reflecting seasonal changes in the TGA and other factors. Furthermore, the demand for reserves is not static but rather dynamic, influenced by various factors including economic growth and changes in the financial system. Consequently, to maintain an ample reserves level—a key operational objective of our current monetary policy implementation framework—the FOMC must expand its balance sheet commensurately with the public's demand for its liabilities. This necessitates a nuanced and forward-looking approach to balance sheet management that considers both cyclical and structural factors affecting the demand for and supply of reserves.

With the level of bank reserves judged to have declined to an ample level, the FOMC initiated reserve management purchases in December 2025. This was the crucial next step in balance sheet management to maintain ample reserves and ensure effective interest rate control, as consistent with the plan we adopted in May 2022.3

It is important to note that reserve management purchases are not quantitative easing (QE). Each process has a distinct purpose, with different goals and economic implications. QE represents a monetary policy tool deployed when the federal funds rate is constrained by the effective lower bound. The primary objective of QE is to provide economic stimulus by exerting downward pressure on long-term interest rates. This has been achieved typically through large-scale purchases of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities. These purchases are intended to influence the yield curve and broader financial conditions by removing duration risk held by the public for a given setting of short-term interest rate policy.

In contrast, reserve management purchases involve the acquisition of Treasury bills and other short-term Treasury securities in a manner that further normalizes the average maturity of the Federal Reserve's asset holdings. They help implement the short-term interest rate policy decided on by the Committee but do not alter broader financial conditions. These routine purchases are conducted to maintain ample reserves and ensure effective control over short-term interest rates. The pace and size of these purchases are calibrated to meet demand for reserve balances and to adjust reserve supply as other items on the liabilities side of our balance sheet grow over time. These purchases do not have any implications for the stance of monetary policy.

As detailed in the statement released by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the conclusion of our December 2025 FOMC meeting, reserve management purchases will be front-loaded for the first few months to alleviate potential near-term pressures in money markets.4 Thereafter, we expect the pace of reserve management purchases to decline, though the actual size will depend on seasonal fluctuations in non-reserve liabilities and market conditions. In the end, the size of our balance sheet will be determined by the public's demand for our liabilities in our ample-reserves regime.

Before concluding, let me also emphasize that in our ample-reserves regime, standing repo operations are a critical tool that helps provide a ceiling on money market rates. By doing so, these operations ensure that the federal funds rate remains within its target range, even on days of elevated pressures in money markets. Consistent with this view, the FOMC eliminated the aggregate limit on standing repo operations in December 2025.5 These operations are intended to support monetary policy implementation and smooth market functioning, and they should be used by our counterparties when deemed economically sensible. This is indeed what we saw over the 2025 year-end period. There was notable upward pressure on repo rates amid substantial net Treasury settlements, as widely expected. Usage increased at the Fed's standing repo operations on year-end as market repo rates increased substantially. Despite the elevated levels of repo rates, trading conditions remained orderly in money markets. I am pleased to see increased usage of our standing repo operations when it becomes economically sensible to do so.

Conclusion To conclude, I will reiterate that I am cautiously optimistic about the path of the economy while acknowledging that we face risks to both sides of our dual mandate. Consequently, I will continue to watch incoming data carefully so that we can set policy to achieve our mandated goals: maximum employment and stable prices. A critical aspect of achieving these goals is ensuring that the Fed can efficiently and smoothly implement monetary policy decisions. We have taken the necessary steps to ensure that capability and will continue to do so.

Once again, it has been an honor to be here. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you, and I look forward to our discussion.

slide 11

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jan 16, 2026.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierDec 17, 2025Publication referenceJan 16, 202630 days laterFeb 15, 2026
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.22%Observed 6.06%Observed −16 bps vs. earlier reference6.09%Observed +3 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.16%Observed 4.24%Observed +8 bps vs. earlier reference4.04%Observed −20 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Oct 16, 2025 – Apr 16, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jan 16, 2026Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.00%6.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Oct 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.17% · Oct 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Nov 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.24% · Nov 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Nov 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Jan 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.10% · Jan 29, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Feb 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Feb 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.01% · Feb 19, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 5.98% · Feb 26, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.00% · Mar 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Mar 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Mar 19, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.38% · Mar 26, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.46% · Apr 2, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.37% · Apr 9, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Apr 16, 202610-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 20, 202510-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 21, 202510-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 27, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Nov 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Nov 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jan 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jan 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Feb 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Feb 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.16% · Feb 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Feb 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.03% · Feb 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.02% · Feb 26, 202610-year Treasury: 3.97% · Feb 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Mar 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.06% · Mar 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Mar 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.13% · Mar 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Mar 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.12% · Mar 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Mar 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Mar 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.23% · Mar 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.20% · Mar 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Mar 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · Mar 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Mar 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · Mar 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Mar 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.42% · Mar 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.44% · Mar 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Mar 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Mar 31, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Apr 1, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Apr 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Apr 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.32% · Apr 16, 2026Oct 16, 2025Jan 16, 2026Apr 16, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,810.24/month

6.06% · Jan 15, 2026

At the later reference$1,816.05/month

6.09% · Feb 12, 2026

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $5.81 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

Evaluate a rate lock around your closing date →See current advertised mortgage options →