Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Regulations, the Supply Side, and Monetary Policy — Governor Stephen I. Miran

Thank you, Madame Ambassador, for the introduction and thank you also to the Delphi Economic Forum for the opportunity to speak today. My topic is the implications of deregulation for monetary policy, an appropriate one for this…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, Madame Ambassador, for the introduction and thank you also to the Delphi Economic Forum for the opportunity to speak today. My topic is the implications of deregulation for monetary policy, an appropriate one for this setting.1 Greece's recovery from the crisis that began in 2009 was only possible after the Greek people implemented substantial and painful reforms, including alleviating suffocating over-regulation in many sectors. In addition to the other reforms embraced by Greece, deregulation freed businesses to compete domestically and internationally, and promoted individuals' access to the economy. The range of reforms has included liberalizing product and service markets, easing licensing and administrative burdens, opening previously restricted professions, and increasing labor market flexibility. The government liberalized electricity and gas utilities; privatized airports, ports, and utilities; and reformed bankruptcy procedures and other business laws.

While it is challenging to quantify how these deregulatory actions have affected the economy, there is little doubt that these reforms have supported a remarkable return to economic growth and higher living standards. Macroeconomic stability has returned to Greece. Unemployment has fallen to its lowest level since the Global Financial Crisis, and investment and exports have rebounded. Product and labor market reforms helped restore competitiveness, reduce unit labor costs, and encourage firm entry. By easing the ability of supply to respond to prices, these reforms have improved the transmission of monetary policy. While monetary policy is set by the ECB, its transmission varies in part with how national governments manage their economies. Long-term Greek borrowing rates narrowed their spread to Germany's, below 1 percent, compared with 6 percent a decade ago. Greece has a come a long way, impressing the whole world with its recovery.

Regulation and the Economy's Supply Side For all the conversation around Mario Draghi's report,2 Greece shows that well-targeted deregulatory reforms can help lay the foundation for more sustained and robust economic growth by expanding the productive capacity of the economy, known as the supply side. Such sustainable increases in actual and potential growth have different implications for monetary policy than purely cyclical growth spurts, which boost growth in the near term without raising economic potential. These jolts can create substantial inflation, undermining growth in the medium term by forcing central banks to raise interest rates, and also in the long term by causing a misallocation of resources.

Recent experiences have reinforced the need for central bankers to fully consider the broad range of nonmonetary factors that could affect the appropriate stance of monetary policy. One such factor that is especially important at this juncture is the regulatory burden borne by businesses and individuals, which has begun to recede in the past year.3 I believe that the sweeping deregulation underway in the United States will significantly boost competition, productivity, and potential growth, allowing faster economic growth without putting upward pressure on inflation. This would support continued easing of restrictive monetary policy, but ignoring these effects would result in monetary policy that is needlessly contractionary.

One challenge for central bankers in fully incorporating deregulation into their economic outlooks is that it is difficult to measure in aggregate. Economists are inclined to study things when there are quantitative data to illuminate their work—a version of the famous "lamppost problem" of only looking where the lamppost shines. This may have contributed to a tendency to give short shrift to regulation in judging the economic outlook. Quantitatively measuring regulations is more difficult than taxes, subsidies, or interest rates. Regulations that businesses face can vary enormously based on the sector, size, and sometimes even the age of a company. Some regulations ban activities altogether. Some regulations impose fixed or variable costs for complying. Some regulations affect consumption decisions and some affect production. Regulations can vary enormously across jurisdictions and sometimes within jurisdictions. Additionally, enforcement determines how binding regulations are in practice, and enforcement can be even harder to measure than the effects of regulations themselves.

These measurement challenges are evident in the abundance of economic studies on specific regulations but the much smaller volume of work that tries to comprehensively measure the aggregate effects of the accumulation of regulations on the macroeconomy.4 From the perspective of an individual firm, it may be easy to adjust behavior in response to one regulation, known as a "margin of adjustment," but compounding regulations can constrain the ability to shift costs by hitting multiple margins of adjustment.5 One pebble doesn't stop a stream, water can flow around it; but enough pebbles will.

A common approach to quantifying the effects of regulations is to count the number of pages of new regulations, though this does not account for varying economic significance across pages. Another approach is to count the number of work hours required to comply, as reported under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). However, there is wide variation in how different regulatory agencies produce these costs estimates, even sometimes variation within agencies, and more importantly, the counting of work hours related to the PRA does not capture the full opportunity cost of the regulations—that is, how that lost hour of work could have been used more productively—or the firms and industries that don't exist because of the regulation.6 If a firm needs to hire a person to comply with some new regulation and can't hire a sales associate who could generate new business or can't engage in a productive activity at all, then the foregone opportunity can be significantly larger than the wage for compliance hours.7

There has been some progress in measuring regulation through advances in natural language processing and artificial intelligence, and I expect more of this to come. For instance, Patrick McLaughlin's QuantGov project at Stanford University's Hoover Institution uses computational tools to move beyond regulation page counts toward counting restrictions and obligations imposed by the text and quantifying regulations by industry.8 In other work, Joseph Kalmenovitz uses machine learning methods to count and separate regulations that are relevant for a firm's core businesses from those that are not relevant.9 These measures show a substantial drop in the number of rules in 2025.10

Among other deregulatory efforts is the current U.S. Administration's "one-in-ten-out policy" revoking 10 old regulations for every new one adopted.11 Based on the pace of the Administration's deregulatory efforts in the first part of 2025, I estimate that 30 percent of the regulatory restrictions in the Code of Federal Regulations will be eliminated by 2030, though this may prove an underestimate.12

Regulations can have far larger consequences for the supply side than, for example, taxes, because they can amount to outright prohibitions and thus function as infinite taxes. Quantity controls are usually far more damaging than those that directly affect prices.13 Consider agglomeration, when a group of firms in the same general industry benefit from proximity, such as R&D labs and production plants, or clients and customers. An auto parts producer benefits from being close to an automaker.

Environmental or other restrictions that restrict co-location can affect the entire economy's supply side by preventing the agglomeration necessary for an industry to be profitable. Take one piece of an industrial ecosystem away because of a regulation and the rest become harder to sustain. Supply chain ecosystems exist—or don't—because of regulations determining what activity can take place and where. I think it is hard to argue that, say, the excess burden of going from a 30 percent to a 33 percent marginal tax rate has the same effect as a regulation preventing an entire industry from existing domestically. Regulations, particularly those that affect physical production, can force the economy from high-productivity sectors to low-productivity sectors by encouraging capital-intensive production to move to less regulated places, such as China.

Research on the effects of regulation on the supply side of the economy has developed along two major lines of inquiry. The first studies regulation's effect on total factor productivity (TFP) and growth by making production more expensive.14 If regulations make, say, electricity or manufactured goods more expensive to produce, they lower TFP.15 Regulations can also distort investment decisions across sectors or impede innovation, leading to an economy-wide misallocation of resources with commensurate effects on aggregate productivity levels.16

An alternative way of modeling regulation is via its effects on free entry and markups. Regulatory costs that appear marginal from an industry perspective often originate as fixed costs from a firm perspective. An existing homebuilder building one more house may be marginal, but for a new entrant to build it, they would have to invest in vast compliance infrastructure. In many jurisdictions, they'd have to learn how to measure carbon emissions, decipher labor regulations, pass various inspections at different stages, and pay other fixed costs. The barriers to building a house have become so burdensome that many builders exit entire markets, leaving numerous large metro areas without desperately needed supply. As such, regulations often serve as barriers to entry, with all the attendant consequences: reduced competition, artificially high returns to scale, higher markups, reduced innovation, and reduced productivity growth. Let's call these "markup regulations."17

There is abundant evidence both within and across countries that increased regulation causes reduced firm entry, decreased competition, and lower investment, all consistent with elevated fixed costs.18 Decreased firm entry, competition, and innovation lead to a malaise familiar to many: Formerly dynamic industries calcify, flagship businesses choose to move elsewhere or shutter completely, and communities feel cheated out of their way of life.

Implications for Monetary Policy Now let me discuss the implications of regulation and deregulation for monetary policy. Most theory and research suggest that increasing the regulatory burden reduces productivity and thus puts upward pressure on prices. This is intuitive: Regulations impede production, and deregulation removes those impediments. More production means lower prices, and vice versa. But gauging the magnitudes of these effects is more difficult.

Work by Dustin Chambers, Courtney A. Collins, and Alan Krause found that a 1 percent increase in U.S. federal regulations in a particular industry is associated with a roughly 10 basis point increase in consumer prices in that industry, and that is only in the near term.19 Longer-term effects and effects from more substantial changes in regulations are, in my view, likely to be substantially larger, since firm entry and the effects of increased competition develop over time. Supply chain ecosystems can take years to rise or fall. I'd also expect cross-industry spillovers to boost aggregate effects above this level. But even these modest within-industry, short-term effects would be substantial in the context of the potential 30 percent decline in the regulatory code that I projected earlier. This implies a cumulative drag of roughly 3 percent on the consumer price level through 2030, a little over half a percent per year.20

What happens in the short term depends on various factors—the types of regulations involved, the way these regulations affect firms and households, and the manner of enforcement. On balance, I believe the substantial deregulation that has occurred in 2025 will continue over at least the next three years and be a large positive shock to productivity that will put downward pressure on prices. On net, this supports a more accommodative stance of monetary policy.

As I have argued, I think the primary effects of deregulation are on the supply side of the economy and have the effect of increasing potential output more than they increase actual output. For example, if the number of goods I can produce is effectively limited by regulation, and that cap is removed, this means I can produce more. If demand increases and production is limited by regulation or some other factor, then prices increase. If demand rises and these shackles have been removed, then output grows and pressure on prices is much smaller.

While I think of regulation as primarily a supply-side factor, it can also affect demand. For instance, the news of planned deregulatory action can stimulate investment now for future production, increasing aggregate demand and prices in the short run, before prices adjust to the lower level that would prevail over the longer run. However, I see little reason to expect the short-run effect on demand will exceed potential. In my earlier speech, I assumed that deregulation immediately increases actual output half as much as potential output, and then the two converge over a few years. While some approaches assume TFP shocks increase actual and potential output by the same amount, work by Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Mauricio Ulate shows that a structural approach to modeling the supply-side results in potential output overshooting actual output in response to a TFP shock. 21

Of course, this matters because the output gap is a primary input into calculating the appropriate setting for monetary policy. If actual output falls below potential output, there is slack in the economy that could be accommodated by looser monetary policy. If deregulation boosts potential output above actual, the correct response is to cut rates. At the same time, by increasing the marginal product of capital, deregulation may raise the so-called neutral rate of interest at which monetary policy is neither accommodative nor restrictive. I addressed this in my first speech as a member of the Federal Reserve Board.22

Turning to markups, the second channel for the effects of regulation on the supply side, models indicate that if monetary policy ignores the deflationary effects of deregulation, then we risk causing an unnecessary contraction in the economy. That is the implication of an important 2014 paper by Gauti Eggertsson, Andrea Ferrero, and Andrea Raffo, which models deregulation as a reduction in markups—increased competition—in a standard New Keynesian model.23 They find that the appropriate response of monetary policy is to reduce interest rates in response to this type of deregulation shock and offset its consequent deflation. If for some reason monetary policy fails to do so, then deflation and economic contraction needlessly result. This model implies that, if the Federal Reserve fails to reduce policy rates in response to deregulation, there will be adverse consequences. Greece's experience testifies to this. Had the ECB not implemented exceptionally loose monetary policy and effectively accommodated Greece's structural reforms, the outcome could have been quite different.

I believe that central bankers should be paying close attention to the effects of regulation on productivity, output, and prices. In recent quarters, policy has been tighter than it should have been to reflect significant deregulation lifting potential growth and reducing inflation. Going forward, I expect that the ambitious deregulation underway in the United States will boost growth without boosting inflation and be one factor supporting a further easing of monetary policy. In this regard, Greece and the ECB have lit the path. I have raised this point with my Federal Open Market Committee colleagues and expect to continue to do so in our deliberations.

21. See Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Mauricio Ulate (2018), "The Cyclical Sensitivity in Estimates of Potential Output," (PDF) Brookings Paper on Econonomic Activity, Fall, pp. 343–441. Coibion et al. show that in a Blanchard-Quah (BQ) approach to estimating potential output, TFP shocks increase potential output much more rapidly than actual output (figure 12). The BQ approach relies on the uncontroversial theoretical assumption that supply-side shocks affecting potential output are those which have permanent effects on the level of output while demand shocks are restricted to having no permanent effects. It provides a more structural economic grounding for estimating potential output than various filter-based approaches.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jan 14, 2026.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierDec 15, 2025Publication referenceJan 14, 202630 days laterFeb 13, 2026
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.22%Observed 6.16%Observed −6 bps vs. earlier reference6.09%Observed −7 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.18%Observed 4.15%Observed −3 bps vs. earlier reference4.04%Observed −11 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Oct 14, 2025 – Apr 14, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jan 14, 2026Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.00%6.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Oct 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.17% · Oct 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Nov 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.24% · Nov 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Nov 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Jan 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.10% · Jan 29, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Feb 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Feb 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.01% · Feb 19, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 5.98% · Feb 26, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.00% · Mar 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Mar 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Mar 19, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.38% · Mar 26, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.46% · Apr 2, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.37% · Apr 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 15, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 20, 202510-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 21, 202510-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 27, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Nov 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Nov 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jan 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jan 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Feb 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Feb 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.16% · Feb 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Feb 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.03% · Feb 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.02% · Feb 26, 202610-year Treasury: 3.97% · Feb 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Mar 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.06% · Mar 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Mar 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.13% · Mar 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Mar 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.12% · Mar 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Mar 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Mar 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.23% · Mar 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.20% · Mar 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Mar 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · Mar 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Mar 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.39% · Mar 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Mar 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.42% · Mar 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.44% · Mar 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Mar 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Mar 31, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Apr 1, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Apr 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.31% · Apr 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Apr 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 14, 2026Oct 14, 2025Jan 14, 2026Apr 14, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,829.63/month

6.16% · Jan 8, 2026

At the later reference$1,816.05/month

6.09% · Feb 12, 2026

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $13.58 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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