Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

AI, the Economy, and Financial Stability — Vice Chair Philip N. Jefferson

Thank you, Director Knotek, for the kind introduction. It is a pleasure to be with you today and to be back in Cleveland and the beautiful Fourth district.1 It is always a pleasure to visit the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland—and all…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, Director Knotek, for the kind introduction. It is a pleasure to be with you today and to be back in Cleveland and the beautiful Fourth district.1 It is always a pleasure to visit the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland—and all the Reserve Banks. The hard work and dedication of Reserve Bank staff, leadership, and directors help ensure the economic well-being of communities across the country, including in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky. One of the many important roles the Reserve Banks have is to be the connection between policymakers and families, workers, and businesses in every corner of the country. That allows us to be well-informed and to make the best decisions for the benefit of all Americans. I thank everyone here at the Cleveland Fed for their service.

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As we are gathered to discuss financial stability in an era of rapid economic and technological transformation, I would like to turn our attention to what many see as a significant catalyst of change: artificial intelligence (AI). Today, I will talk about how I approach thinking about AI. First, I will build on remarks I gave earlier this month and discuss how I see AI affecting the economy through the lens of the dual mandate given to the Federal Reserve by Congress to pursue maximum employment and price stability.2 Next, I will discuss AI in the context of financial stability because a stable and resilient financial system is, of course, critical to achieve that dual mandate. I will do so by highlighting some of the findings in our recently released Financial Stability Report (FSR). And finally, I will discuss how the current period compares with another recent period of notable technological change—the late 1990s. Afterwards, I would be happy to answer your questions.

AI technology has been advancing at an extraordinary pace in recent years.3 Hundreds of millions of people now regularly use AI to write and translate documents, obtain practical guidance on a variety of topics, and search for information.4 A recent report from the St. Louis Fed showed that in August almost 55 percent of working-age adults said they used generative AI for personal or work use, up notably from a year earlier.5 Businesses are increasingly adopting AI, with use cases clearly moving from the experimentation phase to operations. In the financial industry, AI adoption rates are even higher.6 And while it may take some time before we see its full effects, many believe that AI has the potential to generate substantial change across the economy and to be a valuable tool for people all around the world.7

AI and the Dual Mandate I see, as many others do, the promise for AI technology to be transformative, perhaps in ways as dramatic as past technological achievements, such as the printing press, steam engine, and the internet. When I think about the macroeconomic consequences of AI, I consider how it will affect both sides of our dual mandate.

AI can enable a worker to complete in seconds or a few minutes tasks that previously took many minutes, if not hours. Already, it is boosting worker productivity in a wide range of industries and occupations, including customer service, logistics, computer programming, and medical research. Increased productivity leads to economic growth, which may also create new employment opportunities. There is already robust competition among high-tech firms for workers who possess the skills to develop and effectively deploy this technology.

At the same time, many people have legitimate concerns that AI will cause job loss. At least for certain firms and workers in certain occupations, this is likely to be true. Indeed, some large employers have recently indicated they are lowering overall hiring plans in light of advances in AI and other forms of automation.8 Some research has also suggested that AI is having a more detrimental effect on the job prospects of younger, less-experienced workers, including recent graduates, compared with those further along in their careers.9

The net effect on employment is highly uncertain and may show variation across industries and occupations over time. For the overall economy, one way to think about AI-related job losses—at least until it creates new jobs—is that AI can create economic slack. In a world where firms only deployed AI to replace existing workers, even at a lower level of overall employment, the productive capacity of the economy has increased (or stayed the same). Of course, if people get redeployed to more productive tasks, the economy produces more without any additional slack. Whether AI substitutes for labor or complements it is an important question that requires continued study.

On the other side of our dual mandate—price stability—AI could help the economy achieve higher growth through increased productivity while reducing inflationary pressures. Specifically, increased productivity could lower production costs and put downward pressure on prices. Not only could AI allow a specific worker to be more efficient in their day-to-day tasks, but it also has the potential to allow for better thinking around complex problems. More efficient allocation of resources as well as potential improvements in supply chains could reduce associated costs, leading to lower prices for various goods and services. Conversely, AI could put upward pressure on certain price categories as many firms push to scale up the technology. I mentioned the rising wages for certain workers with skills that complement AI. AI technology also requires data centers, which compete with other production processes for land, energy, and other inputs. As with the labor market, the timing and degree of AI's effect on prices are uncertain and should be monitored.

In terms of AI's implications for monetary policy, it is likely still too soon to tell. Policymakers must sort out changes in the economy that are due to cyclical factors from those resulting from structural change, which AI may well represent. Productivity gains from AI may affect the relationship between employment and inflation and, hence, the conduct of monetary policy. Monetary policy decisions, of course, need to be made with a broad view of what is happening in the economy, not just in one sector or technology. There is still much to learn. I counsel exercising humility about the challenges in predicting AI's effects on employment and inflation.

AI and Financial Stability Now, I will turn to discussing AI through the lens of financial stability. But first I would like to step back and briefly offer my overall assessment. The financial system remains sound and resilient, with high levels of risk appetite and leverage at hedge funds balanced by strong household and business balance sheets and high levels of capital in the banking system. Because the continued resilience of the financial system is so important to achieving our dual-mandate goals, policymakers monitor a range of indicators associated with vulnerabilities, as is discussed in our semiannual FSR. The latest version of that report was published a few weeks ago.10

As part of our financial stability monitoring work at the Fed, we routinely survey market contacts regarding potential risks to the U.S. financial system. A finding in the most recent survey is likely of particular interest to a conference exploring financial stability in a time of technological change—30 percent of contacts surveyed cited a turn in the prevailing sentiment toward AI as a salient risk to the U.S. financial system and the global economy. That was up from 9 percent in the spring survey. Participants noted that if such an unwinding were to occur, it could tighten financial conditions and restrain economic activity more broadly. It is not my intention to make a judgement on the likelihood of those, or other scenarios offered in the FSR. Rather, I want to reiterate that I am monitoring the scenarios.

Some observers have asked about comparisons with the late 1990s, which was another period when promising new technological advances were closely tied to strong stock market performance.11 They have asked, are we experiencing "dot-com boom 2.0?" So, in the rest of my talk, I will address this question. I will argue that there are important differences between the recent period and the stock market experience during the dot-com boom of the late 1990s. Of course, much has changed over the past quarter-century, so history can only be a useful reference and not a predictor of future outcomes.

How Current Conditions Compare with the Dot-Com Era I see clear differences across the two periods. Before I discuss three notable differences, let me first refresh our memory and mention a dimension along which the dot-com era and the AI era are similar—the particularly rapid stock price appreciation of firms that encapsulate the promise of transformational technologies.12 Indeed, the stock prices of dot-com firms increased more than 200 percent during their boom between 1996 and 1999, a little faster than the increase we have seen so far in the stock prices of AI-related firms since 2022.13

A closer inspection of the firms driving the stock price increases, however, reveals the first critical difference in the stock market dynamics across the two periods. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, many, albeit not all, dot-com firms typically had little to no realized earnings and only speculative revenue prospects even as they obtained external funding and were listed on public exchanges with relative ease amid pronounced investor enthusiasm. In contrast, the firms most closely identified with AI technologies in today's market generally have well-established and growing earnings streams.

The second difference is that because of their solid earnings base, the price-to-earnings ratios of AI-related firms have thus far remained well below the peak ratios of dot-com firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s. During the dot-com episode, investors were apparently far more willing to bet on the promise of the internet, with dot-com stocks commanding far larger premiums than AI stocks do today.

The third difference is that the proliferation of dot-com firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s suggests a less discriminating enthusiasm than what we are observing in today's market. At the peak in the late 1990s, more than 1,000 firms were publicly listed as dot-com companies, with many having minimal revenue and highly speculative business models. Indeed, researchers have shown that the mere addition of "dot-com" to a company name was sufficient to boost the stock price of the firm.14 By contrast, in the current environment, by one measure about 50 publicly traded firms are considered to be AI-focused enterprises, in the sense that they are expected to derive revenue from other firms using AI technologies, as opposed to the broad-based speculation that we saw in the late 1990s. 15 However, it is important to acknowledge that the rapid growth of private capital markets—which are not publicly traded—in recent years may obscure the extent of investor enthusiasm for financing AI firms, as a growing number of private firms reportedly now identify as AI-focused or AI-native enterprises.

Finally, with respect to financial leverage, both dot-com previously and AI firms recently exhibited limited reliance on debt financing for the most part. This more limited use of leverage may reduce the extent to which a shift in sentiment toward AI could transmit to the broader economy through credit markets. That said, recent market reports suggest that AI firms may be increasing their use of debt, from both public and private credit markets, to fund substantial investments in computing infrastructure and talent acquisition. Just a few weeks ago, large volumes of corporate bonds were issued to support AI infrastructure buildout by key players in the industry. Some analysts estimate that future investments in AI infrastructure will require a lot more debt.16 If that turns out to be the case, leverage in the AI sector could increase—and so could the losses if sentiment toward AI shifts. I will watch this developing trend closely.

In sum, looking at these dimensions, as of now, the differences between the current market and the dot-com era make it less likely that we are witnessing a replay of the late 1990s. Most notably, in contrast with the dot-com era, the current AI-related stock market activity appears more concentrated among established firms with actual earnings. Additionally, these developments are occurring against the backdrop of a financial system that is sound and resilient.

Conclusion To conclude, it is important to acknowledge that assessing the implications of rapidly developing technology for financial stability is subject to a great deal of uncertainty. The ultimate implications of AI for both the macroeconomy and financial stability may take a long time to crystallize. Technology, the financial system, and the broader economy are always evolving. The potential transition to our new world could be bumpy, and it is too early to tell what trajectory will ultimately play out. Our research is continually enriched by the insights provided by market participants in regular outreach, keeping us abreast of the latest developments in AI and their economic implications, and by an ever-expanding analytical toolkit, including AI. Ensuring that the AI revolution unfolds within the context of a stable financial system is not just desirable—it is also imperative for achieving our dual-mandate objectives of maximum employment and price stability.

Thank you.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Nov 21, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierOct 22, 2025Publication referenceNov 21, 202530 days laterDec 21, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.27%Observed 6.26%Observed −1 bps vs. earlier reference6.21%Observed −5 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury3.97%Observed 4.06%Observed +9 bps vs. earlier reference4.16%Observed +10 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Aug 21, 2025 – Feb 21, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Nov 21, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 21, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.56% · Aug 28, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Sep 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Sep 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Sep 25, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.34% · Oct 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Oct 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Oct 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.17% · Oct 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Nov 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.24% · Nov 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Nov 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Jan 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.10% · Jan 29, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Feb 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Feb 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.01% · Feb 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Sep 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Sep 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Sep 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Sep 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Sep 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Sep 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Sep 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Sep 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Sep 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Sep 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Oct 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Oct 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 15, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 20, 202510-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 21, 202510-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 27, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Nov 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Nov 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jan 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jan 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Feb 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Feb 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.16% · Feb 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Feb 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 20, 2026Aug 21, 2025Nov 21, 2025Feb 21, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury124 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,849.10/month

6.26% · Nov 20, 2025

At the later reference$1,839.35/month

6.21% · Dec 18, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $9.75 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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