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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Regulatory Dominance of the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet — Governor Stephen I. Miran

The Federal Reserve is actively revising its banking regulations, a project that I strongly support. For many years, financial regulation mostly moved in one direction, increasingly restricting the banking sector. Because the…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.1

The Federal Reserve is actively revising its banking regulations, a project that I strongly support. For many years, financial regulation mostly moved in one direction, increasingly restricting the banking sector. Because the interactions of regulation with financial markets, the economy, and monetary policy implementation are too often unappreciated, this led to adverse consequences and lots of head scratching as to their causes. In some respects, regulations enacted to shore up financial stability have constrained the Fed's control over some elements of monetary policy transmission and the size of the balance sheet. Regulatory dominance of the balance sheet must be considered and accounted for to ensure the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), through its statutory mandate, has autonomy over conducting monetary policy.

My goal in today's remarks is to share the core principles that will help guide my decision making in this area, including how regulation affects the Fed's balance sheet as well as current efforts to reform bank leverage requirements. While discussions about bank reserve balances and interest paid on reserves, the composition of the balance sheet, and Treasury market intermediation are flourishing, I believe that many of these conversations are downstream of the bank regulatory framework. Once we properly tailor the regulatory environment, we can then address questions that are more pertinent to monetary policy implementation.

Before delving into specifics, let me describe five guiding principles. First, I believe that policymakers should always consider the potential costs and benefits of any regulation that crosses their desks. Far too often, adverse spillovers are recognized only after the fact, and the answer to a poorly functioning regulation is the Band-Aid approach of layering on another regulation. Banking regulation typically involves tradeoffs between ensuring smooth market functioning and credit availability during typical conditions and limiting the frequency or magnitude of stressful episodes.

Mapping how second-order impacts are expected to flow through the financial system and economy can help shape regulatory frameworks that are sensible and durable. For instance, the costs and benefits of a regulation on a community bank are rarely comparable to those of the same regulation on a systemically important bank, but heavily impact the credit available to Main Street businesses where local knowledge is critical. Our regulatory framework should take that into account and allow community banks to remain the engines of their local economies, and I would support proposals to grant additional relief aimed at community banks.

A second principle is that policymakers should resist the urge to overreact in the wake of crisis. Broadly speaking, I believe regulators went too far after the 2008 financial crisis, creating many rules that raised the cost of credit and limited its availability without reducing risk in a compensatory fashion. The signs of this overreach are clear: Many traditional banking activities have migrated away from the regulated banking sector partly because burdensome rules have made provision of these services too costly or otherwise difficult for banks to provide. While I have no bias against nonbank financial companies, credit allocation should be driven by market forces, not regulatory arbitrage.

Third, the Federal Reserve should aim for the smallest footprint it can manage. This means limiting distortions to the provision of credit in the economy—for instance, through large-scale asset purchases. It also means sticking to our clear statutory mandate and not coloring outside the lines, and we have recently taken steps in these directions. For example, the FOMC recently announced that maturing agency mortgage-backed securities will be replaced with Treasury bills in the Fed's portfolio, and the Board voted to rescind the Fed's climate guidance. Maintaining a focus on our congressional mandates is essential to ensuring the Fed remains a credible independent organization. There is more work to be done in reorienting the Fed's activities to properly heed our narrow statutory mandate.

Fourth, transparency has many benefits. Banks are one of the most heavily regulated sectors in the economy, and regulators owe the public an accounting for our actions. Transparency is also pragmatic, because it means that banks will understand what we expect of them. Without transparency, effective congressional oversight is impossible. For this reason, I was pleased to vote in favor of the Board's recent issuance of its stress testing framework for public comment.

Last is a principle that I try to consider in most of my work, which is to keep an open mind. Good new ideas can come from any direction; the regulatory process guarantees that the public can provide input, but regulators listen to different degrees. I will be listening.

Connecting these principles to the work I am doing as a Governor: After two and a half years of shrinking our balance sheet, the FOMC has decided to end those reductions beginning December 1, as the Committee gauged reserve balances to be somewhat around or above ample.

But what determines whether reserves are ample or not? Before the Global Financial Crisis, reserve levels were much lower, or scarce. Even some months ago, reserves were higher, or abundant. Empirically, we can use movements in money markets to assess when conditions are shifting from one regime to another; but, to me, this ignores first principles. Liquidity requirements force banks to hold high-quality liquid assets, including reserves. Meanwhile, capital requirements, such as the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) and global systemically important bank surcharge, impose costs to hold those assets. When these banks, many of which are primary dealers of U.S. Treasury securities, attempt to get that new government debt from auctions to investors, they navigate a regulatory patchwork of contradictory incentives.

Supervisory policy can also boost demand for reserves. In a 2022 podcast, former Fed Vice Chairman for Supervision Randy Quarles describes how supervisory preferences for reserves over other types of liquid assets, as well as fear of heightened scrutiny or supervisory action, can raise demand for bank reserves above and beyond what's required.2

For all the talk about fiscal dominance of monetary policy, the reality is that the size of the balance sheet is a result of regulatory dominance. Regulations boost demand for reserves, which in turn requires us to end runoff or purchase securities for reserve management purposes. These actions may affect financial conditions and create cross currents with monetary policy goals. The Fed no longer targets monetary aggregates like reserve levels, but that doesn't mean we should not think about them.

A consequence of the Fed's large balance sheet is significant payments of interest to the banking sector. Now, this is little different for banks' income than if they held Treasurys directly, as would occur in a scarce-reserves regime. In fact, an upward-sloping yield curve would suggest banks would earn more from holding Treasurys rather than reserves.

Regardless, the optics differ. Large interest on reserve balances (IORB) outlays may appear like the Fed is unfairly subsidizing the banking system with billions of dollars, even if that's not the case. These perceptions can affect the Fed's credibility and thus its effectiveness. Several times now, the Senate has debated whether the Fed ought to be stripped of its statutory authority to pay IORB despite its necessity as a tool for managing the federal funds rate.

It has become apparent to me that trying to settle the ongoing debates on how monetary policy is best implemented before settling the regulatory framework is putting the cart before the horse. Due to regulatory dominance, regulations will determine the right size of the balance sheet and the role for IORB.

As I noted, I remain open to new ideas, including on the Fed's balance sheet. For example, the Fed pays interest to banks, but not on the Treasury General Account (TGA). Should the Fed also pay interest, or similar compensation, to Treasury?3 In one sense, it's a wash on the consolidated government balance sheet; reducing the Fed's net profits also reduces remittances to Treasury. But with a deferred asset position that occasionally reflects losses on the SOMA portfolio, paying interest on TGA could smooth remittances over time, reducing the volatility of fiscal borrowing.

Additionally, rather than keep our liabilities to Treasury as zero-yielding deposits directly, would it make more sense for the Fed to hold short-term assets such as Treasury bills or repos against the TGA? Currently, days when new Treasury securities settle often result in sharp and temporary declines in reserve supply. But the Fed could sterilize these settlements by flexibly adjusting its balance sheet through open market operations. Versions of this idea have been proposed by Bill Nelson and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen.4 I think we should consider all avenues for improving market functioning, particularly when volatility arises from regular and foreseeable government debt settlement dates.

Moving to leverage ratios, I see the benefit of the proposal the Board issued before I arrived because the leverage ratio should not be the binding constraint on banks in the ordinary course of managing their balance sheets, incentivizing higher-risk behavior for no good reason. However, I also believe that penalizing holdings of Treasurys and reserves through leverage ratios is at odds with requiring banks to hold those instruments as high-quality liquid assets to cover potential outflows.

In addition, dealer intermediation of the Treasury market can suffer if banks are forced to hold substantial capital just to support their Treasury and repo trading books, which often are low-return, low-risk, high-volume activities. This otherwise esoteric issue can have meaningful consequences for Treasury market functioning and monetary policy implementation.

Removing these securities from the leverage ratio, as was suggested as an alternative in the proposed rule, would help insulate the Treasury market from stressful episodes when liquidity is in short supply. Due to heightened uncertainty accompanying extreme volatility, policymakers tend to "overdo it" when overreacting to dysfunction. Instead of being forced to react to Treasury market dysfunction after it has occurred, I think excluding those assets now is a small price to pay to deter that potential dysfunction.

Preventing Treasury market dysfunction in the first place may be the best way to limit the Fed's footprint. Moreover, providing this relief ex post instead of ex ante may lead to the unfortunate perception that the Federal Reserve is bailing out specific entities for poor investment decisions.

While I have noted my openness to new ideas, this one is not novel. The banking regulators excluded Treasurys and reserves from the leverage ratio denominator in response to the increase in bank deposits during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The only observable downside from that intervention came from the transition back to including them in the denominator. Banks then shunned deposits to avoid pushing against their leverage ratios, helping lead to a flood of cash into money market funds and the exorbitant rise in usage of the overnight reverse repo facility, in turn limiting the extent to which quantitative tightening drained reserves for several years. Bank and depositor behavior were unnecessarily distorted: As interest rates rose in 2022 and 2023, some banks had to reverse course and compete for deposits, whipsawing banking behavior that should otherwise be relatively stable. There are already certain instruments that are excluded from some leverage ratio denominators, like custody bank reserves supporting operational deposits, and there is no evidence this is disruptive.

In any case, this is an exciting time to be a bank regulator, which is not something I imagined to be possible before arriving here. And we are still very much in the early innings of change. As I said before, the right level of bank reserves in the system is ultimately a function of that regulatory environment. As we right-size the regulations, my hope is that it will allow us to further reduce the size of the balance sheet, relaxing the grip of regulatory dominance. Given emergent funding market signals, I supported ending the runoff of the Fed's balance sheet immediately at the FOMC's October meeting rather than waiting until December 1, though the difference between October 29 and December 1 is not enormous.

Indeed, as we make more progress peeling back regulations, I expect the optimal level of reserves may drop below where it is now, at least relative to GDP or the size of the banking system. It is possible that in the future, it will be appropriate to resume shrinking the balance sheet; stopping runoff today does not necessarily mean stopping it forever. That would also enable us to reduce our interest payments on reserves. If we go far enough with removing regulations, we may be able to limit perceptions that the Fed is picking winners and losers through regulations, asset purchases, and credit allocation decisions. But before further reductions in the balance sheet, we first have to get the regulations right and ensure that bank balance sheets are flexible enough for an environment with a smaller Federal Reserve footprint.

Thank you.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Nov 19, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierOct 20, 2025Publication referenceNov 19, 202530 days laterDec 19, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.27%Observed 6.24%Observed −3 bps vs. earlier reference6.21%Observed −3 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.00%Observed 4.13%Observed +13 bps vs. earlier reference4.16%Observed +3 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Aug 19, 2025 – Feb 19, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Nov 19, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 21, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.56% · Aug 28, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Sep 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Sep 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Sep 25, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.34% · Oct 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Oct 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Oct 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.17% · Oct 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Nov 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.24% · Nov 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Nov 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Jan 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.10% · Jan 29, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Feb 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Feb 12, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.01% · Feb 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Aug 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Sep 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Sep 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Sep 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Sep 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Sep 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Sep 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Sep 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Sep 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Sep 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Sep 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Oct 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Oct 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 15, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 20, 202510-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 21, 202510-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 27, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Nov 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Nov 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jan 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jan 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Feb 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Feb 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.16% · Feb 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Feb 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.08% · Feb 19, 2026Aug 19, 2025Nov 19, 2025Feb 19, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,845.20/month

6.24% · Nov 13, 2025

At the later reference$1,839.35/month

6.21% · Dec 18, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $5.85 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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