Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

The Case for Continuing Rate Cuts — Governor Christopher J. Waller

Thank you to the Society for the honor of addressing your annual meeting.1 In doing a little research on the SPE's history, I noted that one goal cited by the business economists who founded this group was creating a forum to discuss…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you to the Society for the honor of addressing your annual meeting.1 In doing a little research on the SPE's history, I noted that one goal cited by the business economists who founded this group was creating a forum to discuss the divergence between real-world challenges and economic theory. That task is pressing when business profits, losses, and the jobs of employees are on the line, and the stakes are also high for economic policymakers, who face those very challenges today.

Economies are confoundingly difficult to understand because, in a sense, they are the largest and most complex things ever created by humans. Economists try to make sense of this complicated world and explain in logical and clear terms how to understand it. We develop rigorous theories that yield testable hypotheses, and we test those hypotheses to see if they are supported or rejected by the data. Being both an economist and economic policymaker, my objective today is to follow in that tradition and use economic theory and various types of data to describe my outlook for the U.S. economy and my views on the appropriate course of monetary policy. It may seem odd to come all the way to London to speak about the U.S. economy, but I hope it will be of interest—and I did warn the organizers about what I would talk about. Monetary policymakers like to use forward guidance to avoid surprises.

Formulating my outlook has been complicated recently by the 43-day government shutdown, including the agencies that produce key economic data. As I will argue, I believe the challenge presented by this missing data has been overstated in many quarters. Policymakers and forecasters are not "flying blind" or "in a fog." While it is always nice to have more data, as economists, we are skilled at using whatever available data there is to formulate forecasts. Despite the government shutdown, we have a wealth of private and some public-sector data that provide an imperfect but perfectly actionable picture of the U.S. economy.

So, what is that data telling us? First, that the labor market is still weak and near stall speed. Second, that inflation through September continued to show relatively small effects from tariffs and support the hypothesis that tariffs are having a one-off effect raising price levels in the U.S. and are not a persistent source of inflation. Accounting for estimated tariff effects, underlying inflation is relatively close to the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) 2 percent target. Third, despite realized inflation running close to 3 percent and above target for five years, medium- and longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. And, lastly, even excluding the temporary effects of the shutdown, growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) has likely slowed in the second half of 2025 from its fast pace in the second quarter.

This reading of the data leads me, at this moment, to support a cut in the FOMC's policy rate at our next meeting on December 9 and 10 as a matter of risk management. As I will discuss in more detail, risk management, in fact, provides some practical guidance in dealing with two questions that seem to have flummoxed some people: Is the job-creation slowdown in the U.S. this year mostly supply or demand related, and how should monetary policy respond?

Before I delve into the outlook, I'd like to say a bit more about data availability. The official sources delayed by the U.S. government shutdown are important but by no means the only source of information for Fed policymakers about the economy. At any time, my colleagues and I rely on a range of data to form our views on economic conditions and the outlook. That can be "hard" data, such as official government statistics, or "soft" data, gleaned from surveys or conversations with a variety of people. Often, different sources of data are consistent with each other, but at critical times they can conflict. When that happens, it takes our skills as economists to reconcile this conflict.

Let me cite two examples of my own experience to illustrate this point. First, back in 2022, the Fed was combating rampant inflation, and this required large and rapid increases in our policy rate. Standard Phillips curve models predicted that this would cause a sharp slowdown in economic growth and high unemployment. However, I had more trust in the Beveridge curve, which relates the unemployment rate to the job vacancy rate, as my guide to thinking about how the labor market would respond to these large rate hikes. I argued that we were on the steep part of the Beveridge curve, which meant that we could tighten policy and that the brunt of the effect would be borne by a decline in job vacancies, and crucially, not by the higher unemployment many predicted. A critical assumption I made was that a spike in layoffs would not occur. This assumption was controversial, since previous hard data showed that this was not the typical outcome. But all of my business contacts at that time were telling me about their struggles to find and keep workers since the COVID-19 pandemic and that they had no intention of letting workers go if aggregate demand eased. This "soft" data helped convince me that my view of the labor market was correct, and subsequent "hard" data confirmed my theoretical prediction.

The second example of reconciling conflicting data is from this past summer. From late spring through June, the soft data, including anecdotes from business contacts, suggested the labor market was in a "no hire, no fire" equilibrium. Firms repeatedly said they were holding off on hiring for a variety of reasons. Yet the hard data at that time indicated a robust job market, with job creation rising from a monthly average of 110,000 in the first quarter to 150,000 in the second quarter. It was clear to me that, once again, something wasn't quite right with the labor market despite the official data. After the June FOMC meeting, I said that the labor market was more fragile than the hard data indicated and that the Committee needed to cut the policy rate to head off substantial weakening in the labor market.2 This was clearly an out-of-consensus view that raised more than a few eyebrows. But when the July jobs report was released on August 1, the second-quarter jobs numbers were revised down dramatically—from an average of 150,000 per month to 64,000 a month, which vindicated my view. So, once again, the soft data gave a better signal of the state of the labor market than the hard data.

Now let me turn to the outlook, and I will start with U.S. economic activity. In my last speech, I discussed an apparent conflict between some forecasts of GDP growth in the second half of 2025 and the story that the labor market is weakening.3 In the absence of more official data but with additional private-sector forecasts and surveys, it now appears to me that economic activity is not accelerating and, therefore, is tracking more closely with the weak labor market data than appeared to be the case when I spoke on October 16. For example, private-sector forecasts, as seen by the median of respondents to the Blue Chip survey, are pointing to real GDP growth for the second half of this year that will be close to the modest first-half pace and a significant slowing from the pace of last year.

Of course, one factor lowering economic growth in the fourth quarter is the shutdown, which lasted longer than many expected. I continue to assume that any loss in real GDP growth in the fourth quarter will boost growth by roughly the same amount early next year. But besides that one-off boost from the shutdown, a possible warning about future economic activity is coming from a survey of consumer sentiment conducted by the University of Michigan. While over the decades this survey has not been closely correlated with near-term spending, large and persistent drops in consumer sentiment have occurred heading into recessions. In the United States, personal consumption expenditures are about 70 percent of GDP, so a slowdown in spending has dramatic implications for GDP growth. The Michigan survey is down significantly since July and fell unexpectedly sharply in October to near its record low reading. The dour view expressed by consumers, which may have been affected by the shutdown, lines up with what I am hearing from U.S. businesses, which report slackening demand from middle- and lower-income consumers.

One interesting detail from that survey is that deteriorating consumer sentiment was widespread among different demographic groups, with the exception of those who own stocks. While the booming stock market is supporting spending by a narrow band of well-off consumers, it does not reflect financial conditions for most Americans, and that is a vulnerability for the economy. The rise in the stock market is substantially driven by artificial intelligence (AI)–related businesses that only account for a small share of employment.4 Even while AI's share of stock market growth and corporate profits grew significantly from 2021 through 2024, employment in AI-related firms held steady at less than 3 percent of nonfarm employment. While I believe AI will create jobs in the medium term, the AI boom on Wall Street isn't doing so yet.

A factor that I believe will weigh on spending in the coming months is that most households are facing strains in purchasing large assets, such as housing and autos, in part because of the expense. While home price increases have slowed recently and even declined in some parts of the country, prices rose significantly in the past few years. That is especially true for lower-value homes, which is making it harder for first-time buyers.

Although mortgage rates have declined a bit this year, they are still above 6 percent and much higher than the average for the decade or so before rates began rising in 2022. Housing affordability is near a record low. Since 2020, the income needed to afford a median priced home has risen by 50 percent, while median income through 2024 was up about 26 percent.5 And while the growth of mortgage debt has slowed, that in part reflects how high mortgage rates are weighing on demand for mortgages.

Turning to auto loan growth, it has been relatively weak this year, likely reflecting a combination of weak demand from households and pressures in car affordability. To a greater extent than housing, the cost of purchasing an auto mostly reflects the price, but interest rates play a factor in the monthly payment. Auto loan rates continue to be elevated relative to their average in the years before the pandemic. For example, in 2019, the average five-year loan carried a 5.3 percent interest rate, whereas the average is now 7.6 percent.6 Reflecting the combination of higher auto prices and interest rate expenses, the weeks of median income needed to purchase an average new vehicle remains elevated, rising from 32.8 weeks in November 2019 to 37.4 weeks in September this year.7

To sum up, I consider the costs of housing and autos to be an ongoing challenge for consumers, especially lower- and middle-income consumers. This is likely weighing on spending growth and would become a more acute problem if the labor market continues to weaken.

Now let me turn to inflation, which, even with the delay in price data is the more straightforward side of the FOMC's dual mandate to discuss. Twelve-month consumer price index inflation through September was 3 percent, and estimates are that inflation based on personal consumption expenditures—the FOMC's targeted measure—was about 2.8 percent. Tariff effects have been smaller than many forecasters expected and the fraction borne by consumers will only modestly boost inflation—an effect that has been quite gradual so far because of the slow drawdown of inventories that was built up in anticipation of tariffs.

Despite inflation that has been above target for five years, inflation expectations are well anchored in the medium and longer run. To me, this shows that financial markets understand that they need to look through one-time price-level shocks and that they have confidence the FOMC will achieve its 2 percent target in the medium term. With the evidence of slower economic growth and the prospect of only modest wage increases from the weak labor market, I don't see any factors that would cause an acceleration of inflation.

Let me now focus on the side of the FOMC's economic mandate that has more of my attention—maximum employment. In the absence of federal data on the labor market, states have continued to report on initial and continuing unemployment insurance claims and private-sector sources have continued to publish their data as well. While there are methodological differences in these private data—some of it that is less than comprehensive and some that does not meet the strictest statistical standards—the private data do contain useful information.

According to the Labor Department, we know that job creation in the U.S. stalled from May through August, and with expected revisions that have been previewed and will become official next year, it is likely that employment actually fell over that period. A private-sector measure of job creation that has continued since August, produced by the payroll services firm ADP, mirrored the drop in official data from May through August, reporting a monthly average of 27,000 jobs created over that period, compared to the 143,000 a month that ADP counted for the six months up to May. While the ADP data are quite volatile and have some other shortcomings that make them less reliable than government statistics, I do think these data are telling us something. And in September and October, ADP reported that businesses created a net total of only 6,500 jobs a month. And the latest weekly data are even weaker.

Slowing labor demand is also being echoed in surveys of employers and workers. There has been a steady decline this year in the Conference Board index of job availability reported by employers. Fewer small businesses are saying it is hard to fill jobs according to the National Federation of Independent Business. Meanwhile, job postings by Indeed continued to drift lower in October. A new survey of large employers found that these companies are predicting that 2026 will be the worst job market for new college graduates since the pandemic year of 2021, when the unemployment rate was around 6 percent at graduation time.8

One series of government labor market data that we do have, continuing state-level claims for unemployment benefits, have risen, on net, in recent weeks and are running above levels in 2023 and 2024, although they are still fairly low by historical standards. This increase reflects the fact that it is taking unemployed individuals longer to find jobs than in the recent past. This is consistent with the well-known news lately about large corporate layoffs. Such announcements are anecdotes and may not be fully reflected, at least yet, in initial unemployment claims. But the numbers are eyepopping. The staffing firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas reported announcements of 153,000 job cuts in September and around 1 million so far in 2025, which is up 65 percent from 2024. By all accounts, many businesses may be cutting jobs, or allowing levels to fall by attrition, in connection with actual or anticipated productivity gains from AI.

As you may know, there is a vigorous debate in the U.S. about whether the low job-creation numbers are the result of declining labor supply or declining labor demand. Simply looking at job-creation numbers isn't sufficient to answer the question—one must look at other data that correspond to these changes.

To help sort things out, let's think about a standard supply and demand diagram. Consider a situation where there is a decline in labor supply that is greater than a decline in labor demand. This would shift the supply curve inward more than the demand curve. The result would be a reduction in employment, which is what we have seen. But it would also lead to upward pressure on wages due to labor shortages. We should also see an increase in job vacancies and a higher quits rate as workers chase higher-paying jobs. Furthermore, workers should be reporting that job availability is increasing, and firms should be saying that it's becoming more difficult to hire workers. Now consider the opposite situation: a contraction in labor demand that is greater than the decline in labor supply. Again, this would lead to a reduction in employment. But it would also correspond to downward pressure on wages from an excess supply of labor as well as declines in vacancies and quit rates; workers would be reporting that job availability is falling, and firms would be saying that hiring is getting easier.

So, which of these two situations are the data telling me we are in? It is clear to me that the data are saying that there has been a greater reduction in demand than supply. I'm not seeing or hearing stories of an acceleration in wage growth, an increase in job openings, or a rise in the quits rate. The overwhelming share of the data I have cited so far supports the weaker demand story. There is definitely a reduction in supply, but, to me, that is masking the extent of the reduction in demand that I am concerned about. When outcomes are uncertain, policymakers must manage the risks, and the evidence is pointing toward a greater risk that low job creation is predominantly demand driven. This has implications for monetary policy.

So let's talk about the implications of this hard and soft data. With underlying inflation close to the FOMC's target and evidence of a weak labor market, I support cutting the Committee's policy rate by another 25 basis points at our December meeting. For reasons I have explained, I am not worried about inflation accelerating or inflation expectations rising significantly. My focus is on the labor market, and after months of weakening, it is unlikely that the September jobs report later this week or any other data in the next few weeks would change my view that another cut is in order. I worry that restrictive monetary policy is weighing on the economy, especially about how it is affecting lower-and middle-income consumers. A December cut will provide additional insurance against an acceleration in the weakening of the labor market and move policy toward a more neutral setting.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Nov 17, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierOct 18, 2025Publication referenceNov 17, 202530 days laterDec 17, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.27%Observed 6.24%Observed −3 bps vs. earlier reference6.22%Observed −2 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.02%Observed 4.13%Observed +11 bps vs. earlier reference4.16%Observed +3 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Aug 17, 2025 – Feb 17, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Nov 17, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 21, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.56% · Aug 28, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Sep 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Sep 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Sep 25, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.34% · Oct 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Oct 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Oct 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.17% · Oct 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Nov 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.24% · Nov 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Nov 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Jan 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.10% · Jan 29, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.11% · Feb 5, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Feb 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Aug 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Aug 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Sep 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Sep 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Sep 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Sep 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Sep 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Sep 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Sep 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Sep 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Sep 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Sep 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Oct 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Oct 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 15, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 20, 202510-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 21, 202510-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 27, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Nov 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Nov 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jan 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jan 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Feb 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.21% · Feb 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Feb 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.16% · Feb 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Feb 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.09% · Feb 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.04% · Feb 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.05% · Feb 17, 2026Aug 17, 2025Nov 17, 2025Feb 17, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury124 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,845.20/month

6.24% · Nov 13, 2025

At the later reference$1,841.30/month

6.22% · Dec 11, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $3.90 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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