Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

The Global Fight Against Inflation — Governor Adriana D. Kugler

Thank you, Isabel, and thank you for the opportunity to speak here at the ECB today.1 I am particularly pleased to be part of this year's conference because the theme you have chosen has, for some time now, also been a theme of my…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, Isabel, and thank you for the opportunity to speak here at the ECB today.1 I am particularly pleased to be part of this year's conference because the theme you have chosen has, for some time now, also been a theme of my career as an academic and public servant. Every day, of course, central bankers must bridge science and practice, drawing on the insights that research provides, specifically, because the economy and the world are continuously subject to new circumstances. We must do so, and put those insights into practice, because everyone in the United States, and in Europe, and around the world, depends on a healthy and growing economy, and depends on policymakers making the right decisions to help keep it that way.

But well before I came to the Federal Reserve, I was also bridging science and practice. First, as a labor economist, when, for example, I was exploring how employment, productivity, and earnings are influenced not only by educational attainment and experience, but also by policies. Later, as chief economist at the Department of Labor, I brought science to bear in carrying out its mission of supporting workers. As the U.S. representative at the World Bank, economic science was likewise crucial in deciding how to best direct the institution's resources to where they were needed the most. In each of these roles, I have learned a bit more about the need to balance rigorous scientific understanding of the problems that people face with the real-world experiences of those people, which sometimes do not fit so neatly into an economic theorem or principle.

Most recently, my colleagues and I on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have been focused on the very practical task of reducing inflation while keeping employment at its maximum level. To understand the recent experience of high inflation in the United States, it is helpful to consider how inflation behaved around the world after the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the remainder of my remarks, I will discuss the global dimensions of the recent bout of high inflation in different economies, both comparing similarities and contrasting differences, with a special emphasis on the factors that enabled the United States to achieve disinflation while having stronger economic activity relative to its peers. I will then conclude with some comments on the U.S. economic outlook and the implications for monetary policy.

Starting with the similarities in our inflationary experiences, in early 2020, a worldwide pandemic disrupted the global economy and ultimately caused a surge of inflation around the world. Global goods production was hobbled, transportation and other aspects of supply chains became entangled, and there were significant labor shortages, all combining to cause a severe imbalance between supply and demand in much of the world. Sharp increases in commodity prices were exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The result was a global escalation of inflation. As you can see by the black line on slide 2, a measure of world headline inflation in 26 economies accounting for 60 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) rose to a degree that had not been experienced since the early 1980s.

This worldwide increase of inflation was synchronized and widespread across advanced and emerging economies. To measure the synchronization and breadth of this inflationary period, Federal Reserve Board researchers have employed a dynamic factor model to estimate a common component of inflation across these 26 economies.2 As you can see by the blue line on slide 2, the estimated global component accounts for a large share of the variation of headline inflation among these economies after inflation began rising sharply in 2021. This evidence is consistent with the familiar story of widespread lockdowns, shutdowns of manufacturing plants in different parts of the world, disrupted logistic networks, increases in shipping costs, and longer delivery times. In the recovery, we also saw globally higher demand for commodities, intermediate inputs, and final goods and services, with demand exceeding a still-constrained supply.

Indeed, one important contributor to the recent co-movement in inflation across the world has been food and energy prices. As you know, most of the time variations in inflation are heavily influenced by food and energy prices, which tend to be more volatile than the prices for other goods and services. Because many food and energy commodities are traded internationally, retail prices paid by consumers also tend to have some degree of global synchronization. Thus, as you would expect, the black line in the left chart on slide 3 shows that food and energy inflation faced by consumers around the world—here called noncore inflation—rose substantially in the recent inflationary episode. Moreover, world noncore inflation is largely accounted for by its global component in yellow, thus also showing a high degree of global synchronization.

Another thing we can say about the recent worldwide escalation of inflation is how widely diffused it was across different price categories. Core inflation excludes food and energy prices, and it includes many categories more exposed to domestic conditions such as housing and medical services. Yet, as shown by the black and red lines in the right chart on slide 3, the recent rise in core inflation showed a high degree of global synchronization, with the global component accounting for a large share of the post-pandemic inflation. Looking back in history, this is the first time since the 1970s that we saw a rise in core inflation so widespread across such a large number of countries. Moreover, underlying this rise in core inflation in the United States and other advanced economies, research carried out by Federal Reserve Board economists shows that there was a widespread rise in prices across the whole range of categories within the core basket.3

Academics and policymakers have debated about the possible reasons explaining the recent co-movement of inflation around the world. The COVID-19 pandemic was a global phenomenon and had effects on supply and demand that were similar in many countries. On the supply side, businesses closed, affecting goods production and the provision of services. There were labor shortages due to illness, social distancing, early retirements, and declines in immigration, with all of these factors making it harder to produce goods and services.4 Production disruptions and labor shortages propagated around the world due to long and intricate supply chains forged over several decades of growing globalization in trade. The imbalance between supply and demand widened as consumers switched their spending from services to goods, straining transportation capacity that further disrupted supply chains.5 This re-allocation of demand from services to goods also strained the ability of firms to produce, as they struggled to find qualified workers due to the needed re-allocation of workers across sectors.6 This demand was also likely fueled by the fiscal response to COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021. All of these factors drove up costs, and there were others. Russia's war on Ukraine intensified the increases in energy and food commodity prices during the recovery from the pandemic. And the interaction of these different forces also likely played a role.7 For example, as Asia increased production to meet higher demand for goods in the U.S., this may have driven up wages and other input costs in Asia, increasing demand for imports from other places and, in turn, raising costs there, and so on. My assessment is that both supply and demand contributed to the recent global inflationary episode, including in the United States, with international trade of goods, including commodities, and services playing an important role in disseminating these forces around the world.

One salient aspect of past inflationary episodes is the observation that core inflation typically falls more slowly than it increases. As we can see by the red lines on slide 4, world core inflation rose more quickly than it decreased in the three most recent episodes of significant inflation and disinflation—from a trough in 1972 to a new trough in 1978; from 1978 to a trough in 1986; and then the recent episode, from the end of 2020 through the first quarter of 2024. In these episodes, the escalation of four-quarter core inflation increased by an average of 7/10 percentage point per quarter to its peak, while it decreased by an average of only 3/10 percentage point per quarter to the trough.8

Still, it is important that central bankers not only compare similarities across economies in the recent inflation fight, but also contrast the differences. Notably, another important feature of the last three inflation and disinflation periods is that though the share of core inflation explained by the common component increases when inflation rises, this share decreases when inflation falls, as can be seen by the black shaded areas of the three panels on slide 4. This suggests that while the reasons underlying the co-movement of inflation across the world—such as global supply disruptions and commodity price shocks—may have been important when prices were increasing, they have been less important when prices have decreased. This evidence indicates that factors that vary from economy to economy become more relevant in the disinflationary period.

Economic researchers have raised several possible explanations for the different inflation trajectories experienced by different economies during this post-pandemic period. For example, some point to differences in the magnitudes of the demand and supply imbalances driven by the shutdown and reopening of each economy, with this imbalance possibly playing a larger role on inflation in the euro area relative to the United States.9 While noting that differences in the size of fiscal stimulus in different countries were likely important, the targeting of that stimulus also differed, in some cases with a greater emphasis on addressing supply disruptions.10 Global factors also affect various economies differently, with studies showing that the exposures to fluctuations in commodity prices are an important issue.11 For instance, Europe was heavily affected by natural gas shortages related to Russia's war on Ukraine, while gas supplies in the United States were more plentiful during this period. Also, supply chains were untangled at different speeds in different parts of the world, with, for instance, low water levels in the Panama Canal and attacks in the Red Sea by Houthi rebels affecting different shipping routes differently around the world. And, last but not least, differences in labor market tightness very likely played a role, with evidence pointing to its importance in the United States in driving up nominal wage growth, a factor that likely helped keep employment and economic activity at healthy levels.12

Researchers at the Board of Governors also find that differences in the pace of disinflation across countries have been largely driven by different trajectories of services price inflation.13 As shown on slide 5, they find that the dispersion of inflation across countries peaked in 2023 and has been declining since then for headline and core goods, but not so much for core services inflation, with housing developments helping to account for the differences in services inflation. Other cross-country research suggests that wage developments help explain services inflation dynamics.14 Indeed, services inflation from both the United States and the euro area have been elevated. Still, while U.S. housing services inflation has been running higher than the wage-driven nonhousing component, the reverse is true in the euro area.

While the cross-country differences during the recent bout of high inflation have emerged more prominently during the disinflationary period, economic growth has been very heterogenous since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Generally speaking, the U.S. has experienced a significantly stronger recovery than other advanced economies. As we can see in the left panel on slide 6, real GDP has grown substantially more in the United States since 2021. This is also the case with respect to the larger components of GDP, such as consumption and investment, shown in the right two panels.

In explaining why the U.S. has managed to bring down inflation and experience strong economic activity, I believe that the combination of restrictive monetary policy together with convex supply curves can help explain these developments.15 In addition, there are three supply-related factors that have also made significant contributions to the combination of rapid disinflation together with continued and resilient growth.

First, there are important factors that have affected total factor productivity differently across countries. For instance, the U.S. has seen greater business dynamism, as reflected in a higher rate of new business formation, shown in the left panel on slide 7. This is important because while most new firms fail, a small share of those that survive grow rapidly and make significant contributions to aggregate productivity.16 Moreover, the pandemic-era business creation surge has been particularly strong in high-tech sectors, such as computer systems design as well as research and development services.17 In fact, we have also seen greater growth in total factor productivity in the U.S. relative to other advanced economies, as shown in the right figure on slide 7. In addition, while the artificial intelligence (AI) technology is still in its nascency, U.S. businesses across different sectors of the economy are investing in and adopting AI. According to the Business Trends and Outlook Survey of the Census, more than 20 percent of companies in 15 sectors have adopted AI.18 It may be too early to tell, but additional productivity gains may be coming from tasks that are enhanced by AI through process improvements.19

Second, we have seen a stronger rate of labor productivity growth in the United States as shown in the left panel on slide 8.20 The economic policy response to the pandemic in the U.S. was robust, but it was different from the response in many other advanced economies. In other economies, the emphasis was on maintaining employment, and specifically keeping workers employed in their existing firms when the pandemic arrived. This was the case, for example, in the euro area, and the middle panel indeed shows that the unemployment rate peaked several times higher in the United States. This approach minimized euro-area job losses, but it may have limited the flow of workers to more-productive sectors of the economy, which is supported by Federal Reserve Board research showing substantially more sectoral re-allocation of workers in the United States compared to the euro area, as seen in the right figure on slide 8.21

Third, the U.S. labor supply has grown in the post-pandemic period. The labor force participation rate increased solidly, especially from the beginning of 2021 through the middle of 2023, and the U.S. population increased strongly because of high levels of immigration. While recent immigration flows into some European countries have been comparable in proportion to those into the U.S., as seen in the left figure on slide 9, new immigrants may have contributed relatively more to U.S. growth because they often integrate more quickly into the labor force, as seen in the right figure.22

Finally, and turning our focus to monetary policy, this stronger economic performance, with falling inflation, has allowed the FOMC to be patient about the timing in reducing our policy rate. This performance gave us time to strongly focus on the inflation side of our mandate. And this, together with the bump in inflation early this year, helps explain why we began to ease monetary policy to less-restrictive levels only after other central banks of advanced economies had done so. But now, the combination of significant ongoing progress in reducing inflation and a cooling in the labor market means that the time has come to begin easing monetary policy, and I strongly supported the decision by the FOMC in our September meeting to cut the federal funds rate by 50 basis points.

Looking ahead, while I believe the focus should remain on continuing to bring inflation to 2 percent, I support shifting attention to the maximum-employment side of the FOMC's dual mandate as well. The labor market remains resilient, but I support a balanced approach to the FOMC's dual mandate so we can continue making progress on inflation while avoiding an undesirable slowdown in employment growth and economic expansion. If progress on inflation continues as I expect, I will support additional cuts in the federal funds rate to move toward a more neutral policy stance over time.

Still, my approach to any policy decision will continue to be data dependent and to rely on multiple and diverse sources of data to form my view of how the economy is evolving. For instance, I am closely monitoring the economic effects from Hurricane Helene and from geopolitical events in the Middle East, since these could affect the U.S. economic outlook. If downside risks to employment escalate, it may be appropriate to move policy more quickly to a neutral stance. Alternatively, if incoming data do not provide confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent, it may be appropriate to slow normalization in the policy rate.

As I have described, the escalation of inflation unleashed by the pandemic was global in scope, and the fight to reduce inflation has also been global. Each of our economies faces its own unique mixture of challenges, but by comparing our similarities and contrasting our differences, I believe we can learn from each other's experiences.

In conclusion, let me thank those of you in this room who contribute to bridging science and practice. For those working on the policy side, thank you for the hard work you do each day to analyze the economic data that allows not only policymakers like me, but also consumers and businesses to gain a better understanding of ongoing developments in the global economy. On the academic side, thank you for your creativity and ingenuity in asking policy-relevant questions and pushing the boundaries of our understanding of an ever-changing economic landscape.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 8, 2024.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 8, 2024Publication referenceOct 8, 202430 days laterNov 7, 2024
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.35%Observed 6.12%Observed −23 bps vs. earlier reference6.79%Observed +67 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury3.72%Observed 4.04%Observed +32 bps vs. earlier reference4.31%Observed +27 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 8, 2024 – Jan 8, 2025
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 8, 2024Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.89% · Jul 11, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.77% · Jul 18, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Jul 25, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.73% · Aug 1, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.47% · Aug 8, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.49% · Aug 15, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.46% · Aug 22, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Aug 29, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 5, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.20% · Sep 12, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Sep 19, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.08% · Sep 26, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.12% · Oct 3, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.32% · Oct 10, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.44% · Oct 17, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.54% · Oct 24, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Oct 31, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.79% · Nov 7, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Nov 14, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.84% · Nov 21, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Nov 27, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.69% · Dec 5, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.60% · Dec 12, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Dec 19, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Dec 26, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.91% · Jan 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jul 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jul 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.23% · Jul 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jul 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.16% · Jul 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jul 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jul 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jul 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.27% · Jul 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jul 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jul 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Jul 31, 202410-year Treasury: 3.99% · Aug 1, 202410-year Treasury: 3.80% · Aug 2, 202410-year Treasury: 3.78% · Aug 5, 202410-year Treasury: 3.90% · Aug 6, 202410-year Treasury: 3.96% · Aug 7, 202410-year Treasury: 3.99% · Aug 8, 202410-year Treasury: 3.94% · Aug 9, 202410-year Treasury: 3.90% · Aug 12, 202410-year Treasury: 3.85% · Aug 13, 202410-year Treasury: 3.83% · Aug 14, 202410-year Treasury: 3.92% · Aug 15, 202410-year Treasury: 3.89% · Aug 16, 202410-year Treasury: 3.86% · Aug 19, 202410-year Treasury: 3.82% · Aug 20, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Aug 21, 202410-year Treasury: 3.86% · Aug 22, 202410-year Treasury: 3.81% · Aug 23, 202410-year Treasury: 3.82% · Aug 26, 202410-year Treasury: 3.83% · Aug 27, 202410-year Treasury: 3.84% · Aug 28, 202410-year Treasury: 3.87% · Aug 29, 202410-year Treasury: 3.91% · Aug 30, 202410-year Treasury: 3.84% · Sep 3, 202410-year Treasury: 3.77% · Sep 4, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 5, 202410-year Treasury: 3.72% · Sep 6, 202410-year Treasury: 3.70% · Sep 9, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 10, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 11, 202410-year Treasury: 3.68% · Sep 12, 202410-year Treasury: 3.66% · Sep 13, 202410-year Treasury: 3.63% · Sep 16, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 17, 202410-year Treasury: 3.70% · Sep 18, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 19, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 20, 202410-year Treasury: 3.75% · Sep 23, 202410-year Treasury: 3.74% · Sep 24, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Sep 25, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Sep 26, 202410-year Treasury: 3.75% · Sep 27, 202410-year Treasury: 3.81% · Sep 30, 202410-year Treasury: 3.74% · Oct 1, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Oct 2, 202410-year Treasury: 3.85% · Oct 3, 202410-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.04% · Oct 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.06% · Oct 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Oct 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Oct 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Oct 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Oct 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.24% · Oct 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.21% · Oct 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Oct 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 28, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.29% · Oct 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 31, 202410-year Treasury: 4.37% · Nov 1, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Nov 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Nov 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Nov 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.44% · Nov 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 14, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Nov 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.27% · Nov 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Nov 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.18% · Nov 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 2, 202410-year Treasury: 4.23% · Dec 3, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Dec 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.22% · Dec 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Dec 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.32% · Dec 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.40% · Dec 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Dec 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.40% · Dec 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.50% · Dec 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.57% · Dec 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.52% · Dec 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.59% · Dec 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.59% · Dec 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.58% · Dec 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.62% · Dec 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.55% · Dec 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.58% · Dec 31, 202410-year Treasury: 4.57% · Jan 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.60% · Jan 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.62% · Jan 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.67% · Jan 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.67% · Jan 8, 2025Jul 8, 2024Oct 8, 2024Jan 8, 2025
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury127 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,821.86/month

6.12% · Oct 3, 2024

At the later reference$1,953.78/month

6.79% · Nov 7, 2024

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $131.92 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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