Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Path Ahead for Productivity — Governor Lisa D. Cook

Thank you, President Bostic. Let me start by saying my thoughts are with all the people of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and the other communities who have felt the force of Helene's impact. I am saddened…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, President Bostic. Let me start by saying my thoughts are with all the people of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and the other communities who have felt the force of Helene's impact. I am saddened by the tragic loss of life and widespread disruption in these regions served by the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and Richmond. As Chair Powell said yesterday, we at the Fed are encouraging banks to work with customers in affected areas and we are working to support the Reserve Banks to ensure there are ample cash supplies, which can be especially important during times of power outages.

I am always happy to be in Atlanta, in Georgia, and at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. I grew up in Georgia, and I am a proud graduate of Spelman College. Atlanta is an appropriate place to speak about today's topic, artificial intelligence (AI), as it is in the midst of large corporations and startups developing uses for AI and near so many impressive schools, including Georgia Tech, a top AI research university and where I took courses to prepare for a Ph.D. in economics. Our tech entrepreneurship and AI roundtable with Chair Powell, held at Spelman last year, is a testament to Atlanta being such a locus of activity.

Today, I will speak to you about AI, big data, and the path ahead for productivity.1 My comments today will build upon what I offered a year ago at the NBER AI meeting in Toronto, when I emphasized the importance of business decision-making in our progress along that path.2 Technology alone will not determine the outcome.

Futurists have dreamed of an autonomous, thinking machine throughout the modern era. Benjamin Franklin once lost a game of chess to such a machine, the "Mechanical Turk"; of course, there was a human chess master hidden inside. Nowadays, chess engines that beat the top players can run on your phone.

So, what exactly makes these machines merit the label of "artificial intelligence"? Information systems with AI exploit complex patterns recognized in vast unstructured data sets to mimic human creativity, problem solving, and critical thinking. Some forms of AI—prediction of customer tastes with machine learning, for example—are already employed in the business sector. Others are still emerging, especially generative AI—programs that create new text and images in response to prompts. Applications in software creation, customer service, and marketing are already with us. But the full scope of generative AI's application will be revealed slowly as firms experiment and innovate.

This subject bears careful research and understanding in my role as a monetary policymaker. The Federal Reserve's dual mandate is to promote maximum employment and stable prices. As I discussed in a recent speech at the Ohio State University, the spread of AI and other technologies could have an effect on both.3

Artificial Intelligence Adoption on the Rise Let me say from the outset that there is tremendous uncertainty about AI's implications. We still do not know what the magnitude or intensity of these effects will be, which workers and firms will be most affected, how big the increase in productivity might be, or even the period over which these effects will be realized.

While much is still to be learned, I see growing evidence that AI is poised to have a substantial effect on U.S. and global labor markets. As firms deploy these technologies and workers discover ways to make use of them, such developments can create the conditions for greater productivity and thus higher wage growth consistent with stable prices. And adjustments in the labor market that follow as the economy adapts to technical change can affect maximum employment.

My view is that AI, and generative AI in particular, is likely to become a general-purpose technology—one that spreads throughout the economy, sparks downstream innovation, and continues to improve over time. Since my speech last year, further evidence in favor of a cautiously optimistic view has accumulated. The list of tasks for which AI performance is at least equivalent to that of a skilled human continues to grow. Remarkably, one AI model reached silver-medal performance at the International Mathematical Olympiad this year.4 Survey results from the Census Bureau show that AI adoption has risen, with AI in regular use across many sectors of the economy, but is still used in only a small share of firms.5 Other surveys find wider adoption. For example, a study from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis found generative AI is being adopted at a faster rate than the internet and personal computers were at a comparable point after those technologies were widely introduced.6 In a sign that the prospect of more widespread use of AI is on the horizon, U.S. data center construction spending and semiconductor imports have soared in the past two years.

Examining Productivity Since the high-tech boom ended in the early 2000s, smoothing through recession-driven swings, growth in output per hour worked has been relatively modest, roughly 1.5 percent per year, on average, though it has picked up some over the past two years. In fact, the latest estimate for productivity would not have looked out of place in the high-tech boom: it grew 2.7 percent over the year ending in the second quarter. The emergence of generative AI has raised hopes for a technology-fueled revival of strong growth in labor productivity, which could support rising real earnings for workers and purchasing power for households. Like many of the most significant innovations of the past few centuries—such as the steam engine, electricity, computers, and the internet—AI has the potential to affect labor productivity in a wide swath of economic activities across many industries and occupations.

Although I share the view that AI could lift productivity out of this period of low growth, it bears emphasis that recent productivity gains have been modest despite rather impressive changes in information technology. For example, we live much of our lives on our smartphones, devices that almost no one used 20 years ago. Moreover, the generative AI models that have captured our attention since 2022 were preceded by other forms of AI that have already been integrated into e-commerce and other business operations. In other words, the modest productivity growth seen of late already incorporates gains from some types of AI. Whether generative AI delivers a similar, incremental contribution to productivity growth or something larger remains to be seen.

The degree to which AI leads to productivity improvement bears careful watching, because, if it does meaningfully lift productivity, it could help constrain unit labor costs and inflation in the long run. And, of course, measuring productivity in real time is challenging. Famously, Chairman Alan Greenspan spied productivity gains from information technology in the 1990s long before they appeared in the data.

The challenge for macroeconomic forecasters is that productivity does not follow immediately from invention and innovation. The translation of technology into productivity depends on the choices made by firms, workers, and policymakers. Time-consuming work at the adopting firm is often needed to tailor the technology to its specific needs.7 For example, a case study by researchers at Harvard Business School revealed that when GitHub built Copilot, a code-completion tool, on top of generative AI technology adopted from OpenAI, it went through a process of experimentation, false starts, management challenges, and substantial expense.8

Moreover, while productivity growth follows from translation of clever new ideas into concrete business practices, this full effect is realized only when capital and labor are reallocated to the firms that are most adept at doing so. This "business dynamism" contribution to productivity dwindled in the years before the pandemic.9 The recent surge in new business creation provides some hope that dynamism may be rebounding.

Variation between Firms The push to use AI algorithms to make more decisions will entail some degree of adjustment at AI-using firms to the jobs of their employees, as well. Understandably, the prospect of those adjustments has many knowledge workers concerned about job security.10 Importantly, when one considers the wide array of tasks involved in performing most jobs—some of the ones we take for granted are quite difficult to automate—it becomes harder to imagine entire positions becoming redundant.11 For example, an advertising firm might allow AI to produce suggested copy and images reflecting the identity of a client, but only after providing the AI system with notes based on meetings, observation, and experience. And the proposed advertisement could be further reviewed and revised, presented to the client, and evaluated for success by human beings.

This makes it likely that the bundle of tasks involved in many jobs will change, as will the share of the worker's time spent on each task. AI may field routine customer service requests and leave unusual or especially important requests to human representatives. Indeed, work by Erik Brynjolfsson, Danielle Li, and Lindsey Raymond shows that AI may accelerate the acquisition of skills for new workers by offering suggested responses based on the history of previous interactions on a given subject.12 This adjustment process entails both modifying the mix of tasks handled by retained workers and hiring new talent from outside the firm. A recent survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that very few AI-adopting firms had laid off workers as part of that process in the previous six months, and many firms have plans to retrain their workers to use AI.13

Adapting an incumbent business to fully exploit AI can be a daunting task: the business may need to substantially reorganize its operations to reap the full benefit of AI.14 Given access to information from throughout the firm, AI may offer insights into business process efficiency, but the data landscape may be Balkanized, with differing standards and restrictive permissions. Reports are that one prominent technology firm addressed this problem by requiring that employees provide widespread access to all data sets within the company and service interfaces to make the access seamless.15 Not all firms will find it feasible or desirable to take such sweeping measures.

New entrants may have an advantage in this landscape in that they have fewer entrenched practices. In a development that one may speculate is connected to AI, Ryan Decker and John Haltiwanger found that a large share of the surge in new business entry seen in the past three years has been in high tech industries.16 Importantly, even in this moment of abundant startups, we may be missing the potential contributions of some groups. In my own work before joining the Federal Reserve Board, I found that investors underrate the prospects of Black-founded, or simply outsider-founded, startups in early funding stages.17 Addressing better assessment in the early stages of invention and innovation could broaden the range of new entrants and the ideas they contribute.

Nonetheless, incumbent firms may be better positioned to fund the gargantuan sums required to train AI models. Leading-edge models, adaptable for a wide range of tasks, cost tens of millions of dollars to train.18 Big data processing techniques—distributed computing, scalability, in-memory processing—play an important role in that training, which uses terabytes of unstructured data.

And those firms have the accumulated data from their business operations with which to train AI. Some observers have noted that the finite supply of high-quality data is beginning to constrain model improvement.19 Apparently, central bankers are not the only ones always looking for "more good data"! Future gains are expected to be driven by the adaptation of AI to specific contexts using proprietary data available only within the confines of individual firms.

Conclusion In closing, looking ahead, I anticipate an acceleration in productivity grounded in the impressive advances in AI, but substantial uncertainty attends that forecast. Such uncertainty arises from the nature of invention, innovation, diffusion, and adaptation of new technologies, as well as from policy decisions that will govern this process. Fostering the global innovation ecosystem remains desirable through research and development, advanced education, worker training and retraining, and legal protections for intellectual property. Moreover, a consensus needs to be forged on the benefits and costs of regulation of the use of AI in the areas of privacy, compensation for training data, perpetuation and amplification of bias, and fraud. Additionally, the ultimate outcomes could benefit from broader inclusion across demographic groups in the startup and research communities and attention to the potential effects on competition of the advantages of incumbent firms.

In short, AI will be translated into productivity improvements with "long and variable lags," as we monetary policymakers like to say. The changes we see in the macroeconomy—aggregate output, employment, and income—are the collective effect of millions of firms, households, and government policymakers thinking through what AI means for them. You might say that, like the Mechanical Turk, ultimately the human inside the machine is still in charge.

My hope is that rising productivity gains will serve as a counterweight to inflation going forward. We will monitor these developments closely.

Thank you for having me here today. I look forward to your questions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 1, 2024.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 1, 2024Publication referenceOct 1, 202430 days laterOct 31, 2024
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.35%Observed 6.08%Observed −27 bps vs. earlier reference6.72%Observed +64 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury3.91%Observed 3.74%Observed −17 bps vs. earlier reference4.28%Observed +54 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 1, 2024 – Jan 1, 2025
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 1, 2024Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.95% · Jul 3, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.89% · Jul 11, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.77% · Jul 18, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Jul 25, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.73% · Aug 1, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.47% · Aug 8, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.49% · Aug 15, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.46% · Aug 22, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Aug 29, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 5, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.20% · Sep 12, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Sep 19, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.08% · Sep 26, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.12% · Oct 3, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.32% · Oct 10, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.44% · Oct 17, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.54% · Oct 24, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Oct 31, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.79% · Nov 7, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Nov 14, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.84% · Nov 21, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Nov 27, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.69% · Dec 5, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.60% · Dec 12, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Dec 19, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Dec 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.48% · Jul 1, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 2, 202410-year Treasury: 4.36% · Jul 3, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jul 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jul 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.23% · Jul 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jul 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.16% · Jul 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jul 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jul 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jul 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.27% · Jul 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jul 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jul 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Jul 31, 202410-year Treasury: 3.99% · Aug 1, 202410-year Treasury: 3.80% · Aug 2, 202410-year Treasury: 3.78% · Aug 5, 202410-year Treasury: 3.90% · Aug 6, 202410-year Treasury: 3.96% · Aug 7, 202410-year Treasury: 3.99% · Aug 8, 202410-year Treasury: 3.94% · Aug 9, 202410-year Treasury: 3.90% · Aug 12, 202410-year Treasury: 3.85% · Aug 13, 202410-year Treasury: 3.83% · Aug 14, 202410-year Treasury: 3.92% · Aug 15, 202410-year Treasury: 3.89% · Aug 16, 202410-year Treasury: 3.86% · Aug 19, 202410-year Treasury: 3.82% · Aug 20, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Aug 21, 202410-year Treasury: 3.86% · Aug 22, 202410-year Treasury: 3.81% · Aug 23, 202410-year Treasury: 3.82% · Aug 26, 202410-year Treasury: 3.83% · Aug 27, 202410-year Treasury: 3.84% · Aug 28, 202410-year Treasury: 3.87% · Aug 29, 202410-year Treasury: 3.91% · Aug 30, 202410-year Treasury: 3.84% · Sep 3, 202410-year Treasury: 3.77% · Sep 4, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 5, 202410-year Treasury: 3.72% · Sep 6, 202410-year Treasury: 3.70% · Sep 9, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 10, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 11, 202410-year Treasury: 3.68% · Sep 12, 202410-year Treasury: 3.66% · Sep 13, 202410-year Treasury: 3.63% · Sep 16, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 17, 202410-year Treasury: 3.70% · Sep 18, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 19, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 20, 202410-year Treasury: 3.75% · Sep 23, 202410-year Treasury: 3.74% · Sep 24, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Sep 25, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Sep 26, 202410-year Treasury: 3.75% · Sep 27, 202410-year Treasury: 3.81% · Sep 30, 202410-year Treasury: 3.74% · Oct 1, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Oct 2, 202410-year Treasury: 3.85% · Oct 3, 202410-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.04% · Oct 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.06% · Oct 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Oct 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Oct 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Oct 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Oct 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.24% · Oct 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.21% · Oct 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Oct 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 28, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.29% · Oct 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 31, 202410-year Treasury: 4.37% · Nov 1, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Nov 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Nov 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Nov 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.44% · Nov 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 14, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Nov 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.27% · Nov 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Nov 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.18% · Nov 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 2, 202410-year Treasury: 4.23% · Dec 3, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Dec 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.22% · Dec 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Dec 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.32% · Dec 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.40% · Dec 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Dec 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.40% · Dec 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.50% · Dec 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.57% · Dec 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.52% · Dec 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.59% · Dec 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.59% · Dec 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.58% · Dec 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.62% · Dec 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.55% · Dec 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.58% · Dec 31, 2024Jul 1, 2024Oct 1, 2024Jan 1, 2025
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury126 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,814.11/month

6.08% · Sep 26, 2024

At the later reference$1,939.82/month

6.72% · Oct 31, 2024

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $125.70 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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