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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Supervision and Regulation — Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S. Barr

Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Waters, and other members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Overall, the U.S. banking system remains strong and resilient, and depositors should be confident that all…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Vice Chair for Supervision Barr submitted identical remarks to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, on May 18, 2023.

Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Waters, and other members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Overall, the U.S. banking system remains strong and resilient, and depositors should be confident that all deposits in our banking system are safe. At the same time, recent stress in the banking system shows the need for us to be vigilant as we assess and respond to risks.

My review of Silicon Valley Bank's (SVB) failure demonstrates that there are weaknesses in regulation and supervision that must be addressed, and I am committed to doing so.1 I am also committed to maintaining the strength and diversity of the banking system so that it can continue to provide financial services and access to credit for households and businesses. As we consider adjustments to our rules and supervisory practices, I am sensitive to how changes may affect banks in the current economic environment.

Accompanying my testimony today is the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation Report. I am also submitting my report that examines the factors that led to the failure of SVB, including the role of the Federal Reserve. My testimony will offer an overview of banking conditions, the findings of the review, and opportunities for strengthening the Federal Reserve's regulatory and supervisory framework.

Banking Conditions Let me begin with conditions in the banking system. Overall, banks have strong capital and liquidity, enabling them to lend and provide financial services to households and businesses.

At the same time, recent stress in the banking system shows the need for us to be vigilant as we assess and respond to risks. The recent failures of three large U.S. banks have also demonstrated the risks of concentrated funding sources and poor management of interest rate risks. As interest rates have risen, fair values of investment securities have declined significantly. Deposit costs have also increased from low levels, and firms are turning to wholesale borrowings to address emerging funding needs. Delinquency rates for some loan segments have started to increase from the low levels seen over the past several years. Banks have increased provisions for credit losses in anticipation of asset quality deterioration. Accordingly, supervisors are redoubling their efforts to assess banks' preparedness for emerging credit, liquidity, and interest rate risks.

SVB Review Let me turn to the SVB review. Immediately following SVB's failure, I led a review of the Federal Reserve's supervision and regulation of the bank. Staff who were not involved in the supervision of SVB conducted the review. The resulting report takes an unflinching look at the conditions that led to the bank's failure, including the role of Federal Reserve supervision and regulation. There are four key takeaways from the report.

First, SVB's board of directors and management failed to manage the bank's risks. The bank tripled in size between 2019 and 2021—expanding from $71 billion to $211 billion—as the rise in tech and venture capital activity led to growth in uninsured deposits, which the bank then invested largely in held-to-maturity securities. As the bank grew, its board and management failed to effectively oversee the risks inherent in the bank's concentrated business model and high level of reliance on uninsured deposits. The bank repeatedly failed its own liquidity tests, and SVB responded, in part, by changing the assumptions that determined its liquidity needs. The bank also mismanaged its interest-rate risk. Its senior leadership focused on short-term profits, removed interest-rate hedges that would have helped to protect the bank in a rising rate environment, and ignored multiple breaches of long-term interest-rate-risk limits.

The second key takeaway is that Federal Reserve supervisors did not fully appreciate the extent of the vulnerabilities as SVB grew in size and complexity. This meant that SVB remained well-rated through the summer of 2022, even as significant risk to the bank's safety and soundness were growing.

The third key takeaway is that when supervisors did identify vulnerabilities, they did not take sufficient steps to ensure that the bank fixed those problems quickly enough. When SVB became subject to heightened supervision in the large and foreign banking organization, or LFBO, portfolio in 2021, it was clear to supervisors that there were serious problems at the bank. However, Federal Reserve regulations provided SVB with a long runway to meet higher standards, and the bank entered the LFBO portfolio with a default view as satisfactory, which led examiners to wait to accumulate evidence to impose a lower rating. Yet supervisors found many serious problems: when the bank failed, it had 31 unaddressed safety and soundness supervisory findings—triple the number of peer banks. Overall, the supervisory approach at SVB was too focused on the continued accumulation of supporting evidence in an environment for supervision that emphasized consensus.

Finally, the fourth key takeaway is that the Federal Reserve Board's tailoring approach in response to the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act and a shift in the stance of supervisory policy impeded effective supervision by reducing standards, increasing complexity, and promoting a less assertive supervisory approach. Absent these changes, SVB would have been subject to supervision within the LFBO portfolio and subject to heightened standards beginning in 2019—throughout the bank's period of rapid growth. While higher supervisory and regulatory requirements may not have prevented SVB's failure, they would have meant that the bank had stronger risk management and more financial resources to weather the stress.

The four key takeaways show failures by SVB's board and senior management and failures by the Federal Reserve. It is crucial that we address those failures. Next, I will outline how we can strengthen both our supervision and regulation based on what we have learned and based on the Federal Reserve's existing authorities. I highlight a few examples below.

Lessons Learned from SVB's Failure To start, SVB's failure confirms the importance of strong levels of bank capital. While the proximate cause of SVB's failure was a liquidity run, the underlying issue was concern about its solvency—the bank's ability to absorb the losses on its securities and repay its depositors and other creditors. We should be humble about our ability—and that of bank managers—to predict how losses might be incurred, how future financial stress might unfold, and what the effect of financial stress might be on the financial system and our broader economy. Stronger capital will guard against the risks that we may not fully appreciate today and reduce the costs of bank failures.

A second key lesson is that SVB's distress proved to have broader consequences for the banking system, even though SVB was not extremely large, highly connected to other financial counterparties, or involved in critical financial services. We need to reconsider the requirements that apply to banks based on size and risk.

With respect to capital, we need to evaluate whether our capital requirements appropriately measure the ability of banks to absorb losses. Had SVB been required to reflect declines in the face value of available-for-sale securities in its capital, it may have held more capital to cover these losses. Any rule changes such as these that we might propose would not be effective for several years because of the standard notice and comment rulemaking process and would be accompanied by an appropriate phase-in.

We also should evaluate how we supervise and regulate a bank's management of interest-rate risk. While interest-rate risk is a core risk of banking that is not new to banks or supervisors, SVB did not appropriately manage its interest-rate risk, and supervisors did not force the bank to fix these issues quickly enough.

In addition, we should evaluate how we supervise and regulate liquidity risk, starting with the risks of uninsured deposits. For instance, liquidity requirements and models used by both banks and supervisors should better capture the liquidity risk of a firm's uninsured deposit base. We should also consider applying standardized liquidity requirements to a broader set of banks. Any adjustments to our rules would, of course, go through normal notice and comment rulemaking and have appropriate transition periods.

In addition, our oversight of incentive compensation for bank managers should also be improved. SVB's senior management responded to the poor incentives approved by its board of directors; they were not compensated to manage the bank's risk, and they did not do so effectively.

Speed, Force, and Agility of Supervision I also plan to improve the speed, force, and agility of supervision. Supervisors did not fully appreciate the extent of the vulnerabilities as SVB grew in size and complexity, and when supervisors did identify vulnerabilities, they did not take sufficient steps to ensure that SVB fixed those problems quickly enough.

Supervision should intensify at the right pace as a bank grows in size or complexity. Within our supervisory structure, there should be more continuity between the portfolios for banks of different sizes and risk so that a bank is ready to comply with heightened regulatory and supervisory standards more quickly. We also need to be especially attentive to the particular risks that banks with rapid growth, concentrated business models, or other special factors might pose regardless of asset size.

Once identified, issues should be addressed more quickly, both by the bank and by supervisors. Today, for example, the Federal Reserve generally does not require additional capital or liquidity beyond regulatory requirements for a bank with inadequate capital planning, liquidity risk management, or governance and controls. I believe that needs to change in appropriate cases. Higher capital or liquidity requirements can serve as an important safeguard until risk controls improve, and they can focus management's attention on the most critical issues.

Moreover, we need to ensure we have a culture that empowers supervisors to act in the face of uncertainty. Supervisors should be encouraged to evaluate risks with rigor and consider a range of potential shocks and vulnerabilities so that they think through the implications of tail events with severe consequences.

Conclusion I want to reiterate that the banking system remains strong and resilient. Recent events demonstrate that we—as regulators—must do better. We need to ensure that we have strong supervision and regulation to make the financial system safer and fairer, in support of an economy that serves the needs of households and businesses.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published May 16, 2023.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierApr 16, 2023Publication referenceMay 16, 202330 days laterJun 15, 2023
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.27%Observed 6.35%Observed +8 bps vs. earlier reference6.69%Observed +34 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury3.52%Observed 3.54%Observed +2 bps vs. earlier reference3.72%Observed +18 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Feb 16, 2023 – Aug 16, 2023
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around May 16, 2023Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.00%5.00%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.32% · Feb 16, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Feb 23, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 2, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.73% · Mar 9, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.60% · Mar 16, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.42% · Mar 23, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.32% · Mar 30, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.28% · Apr 6, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Apr 13, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.39% · Apr 20, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.43% · Apr 27, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.39% · May 4, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · May 11, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.39% · May 18, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.57% · May 25, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.79% · Jun 1, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.71% · Jun 8, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.69% · Jun 15, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Jun 22, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.71% · Jun 29, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Jul 6, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.96% · Jul 13, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Jul 20, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Jul 27, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.90% · Aug 3, 202330-year fixed mortgage: 6.96% · Aug 10, 202310-year Treasury: 3.86% · Feb 16, 202310-year Treasury: 3.82% · Feb 17, 202310-year Treasury: 3.95% · Feb 21, 202310-year Treasury: 3.93% · Feb 22, 202310-year Treasury: 3.88% · Feb 23, 202310-year Treasury: 3.95% · Feb 24, 202310-year Treasury: 3.92% · Feb 27, 202310-year Treasury: 3.92% · Feb 28, 202310-year Treasury: 4.01% · Mar 1, 202310-year Treasury: 4.08% · Mar 2, 202310-year Treasury: 3.97% · Mar 3, 202310-year Treasury: 3.98% · Mar 6, 202310-year Treasury: 3.97% · Mar 7, 202310-year Treasury: 3.98% · Mar 8, 202310-year Treasury: 3.93% · Mar 9, 202310-year Treasury: 3.70% · Mar 10, 202310-year Treasury: 3.55% · Mar 13, 202310-year Treasury: 3.64% · Mar 14, 202310-year Treasury: 3.51% · Mar 15, 202310-year Treasury: 3.56% · Mar 16, 202310-year Treasury: 3.39% · Mar 17, 202310-year Treasury: 3.47% · Mar 20, 202310-year Treasury: 3.59% · Mar 21, 202310-year Treasury: 3.48% · Mar 22, 202310-year Treasury: 3.38% · Mar 23, 202310-year Treasury: 3.38% · Mar 24, 202310-year Treasury: 3.53% · Mar 27, 202310-year Treasury: 3.55% · Mar 28, 202310-year Treasury: 3.57% · Mar 29, 202310-year Treasury: 3.55% · Mar 30, 202310-year Treasury: 3.48% · Mar 31, 202310-year Treasury: 3.43% · Apr 3, 202310-year Treasury: 3.35% · Apr 4, 202310-year Treasury: 3.30% · Apr 5, 202310-year Treasury: 3.30% · Apr 6, 202310-year Treasury: 3.39% · Apr 7, 202310-year Treasury: 3.41% · Apr 10, 202310-year Treasury: 3.43% · Apr 11, 202310-year Treasury: 3.41% · Apr 12, 202310-year Treasury: 3.45% · Apr 13, 202310-year Treasury: 3.52% · Apr 14, 202310-year Treasury: 3.60% · Apr 17, 202310-year Treasury: 3.58% · Apr 18, 202310-year Treasury: 3.60% · Apr 19, 202310-year Treasury: 3.54% · Apr 20, 202310-year Treasury: 3.57% · Apr 21, 202310-year Treasury: 3.52% · Apr 24, 202310-year Treasury: 3.40% · Apr 25, 202310-year Treasury: 3.43% · Apr 26, 202310-year Treasury: 3.53% · Apr 27, 202310-year Treasury: 3.44% · Apr 28, 202310-year Treasury: 3.59% · May 1, 202310-year Treasury: 3.44% · May 2, 202310-year Treasury: 3.38% · May 3, 202310-year Treasury: 3.37% · May 4, 202310-year Treasury: 3.44% · May 5, 202310-year Treasury: 3.52% · May 8, 202310-year Treasury: 3.53% · May 9, 202310-year Treasury: 3.43% · May 10, 202310-year Treasury: 3.39% · May 11, 202310-year Treasury: 3.46% · May 12, 202310-year Treasury: 3.50% · May 15, 202310-year Treasury: 3.54% · May 16, 202310-year Treasury: 3.57% · May 17, 202310-year Treasury: 3.65% · May 18, 202310-year Treasury: 3.70% · May 19, 202310-year Treasury: 3.72% · May 22, 202310-year Treasury: 3.70% · May 23, 202310-year Treasury: 3.73% · May 24, 202310-year Treasury: 3.83% · May 25, 202310-year Treasury: 3.80% · May 26, 202310-year Treasury: 3.69% · May 30, 202310-year Treasury: 3.64% · May 31, 202310-year Treasury: 3.61% · Jun 1, 202310-year Treasury: 3.69% · Jun 2, 202310-year Treasury: 3.69% · Jun 5, 202310-year Treasury: 3.70% · Jun 6, 202310-year Treasury: 3.79% · Jun 7, 202310-year Treasury: 3.73% · Jun 8, 202310-year Treasury: 3.75% · Jun 9, 202310-year Treasury: 3.73% · Jun 12, 202310-year Treasury: 3.84% · Jun 13, 202310-year Treasury: 3.83% · Jun 14, 202310-year Treasury: 3.72% · Jun 15, 202310-year Treasury: 3.77% · Jun 16, 202310-year Treasury: 3.74% · Jun 20, 202310-year Treasury: 3.72% · Jun 21, 202310-year Treasury: 3.80% · Jun 22, 202310-year Treasury: 3.74% · Jun 23, 202310-year Treasury: 3.72% · Jun 26, 202310-year Treasury: 3.77% · Jun 27, 202310-year Treasury: 3.71% · Jun 28, 202310-year Treasury: 3.85% · Jun 29, 202310-year Treasury: 3.81% · Jun 30, 202310-year Treasury: 3.86% · Jul 3, 202310-year Treasury: 3.95% · Jul 5, 202310-year Treasury: 4.05% · Jul 6, 202310-year Treasury: 4.06% · Jul 7, 202310-year Treasury: 4.01% · Jul 10, 202310-year Treasury: 3.99% · Jul 11, 202310-year Treasury: 3.86% · Jul 12, 202310-year Treasury: 3.76% · Jul 13, 202310-year Treasury: 3.83% · Jul 14, 202310-year Treasury: 3.81% · Jul 17, 202310-year Treasury: 3.80% · Jul 18, 202310-year Treasury: 3.75% · Jul 19, 202310-year Treasury: 3.85% · Jul 20, 202310-year Treasury: 3.84% · Jul 21, 202310-year Treasury: 3.86% · Jul 24, 202310-year Treasury: 3.91% · Jul 25, 202310-year Treasury: 3.86% · Jul 26, 202310-year Treasury: 4.01% · Jul 27, 202310-year Treasury: 3.96% · Jul 28, 202310-year Treasury: 3.97% · Jul 31, 202310-year Treasury: 4.05% · Aug 1, 202310-year Treasury: 4.08% · Aug 2, 202310-year Treasury: 4.20% · Aug 3, 202310-year Treasury: 4.05% · Aug 4, 202310-year Treasury: 4.09% · Aug 7, 202310-year Treasury: 4.02% · Aug 8, 202310-year Treasury: 4.00% · Aug 9, 202310-year Treasury: 4.09% · Aug 10, 202310-year Treasury: 4.16% · Aug 11, 202310-year Treasury: 4.19% · Aug 14, 202310-year Treasury: 4.21% · Aug 15, 202310-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 16, 2023Feb 16, 2023May 16, 2023Aug 16, 2023
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury126 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,866.71/month

6.35% · May 11, 2023

At the later reference$1,933.84/month

6.69% · Jun 15, 2023

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $67.14 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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