Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Supervision and Regulation — Vice Chair for Supervision Randal K. Quarles

Chairwoman Waters, Ranking Member McHenry, members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. Last May, my colleagues and I came before you—in a virtual format for the first time—discussing our actions to maintain…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Vice Chair for Supervision Quarles submitted identical remarks to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate on May 25, 2021.

Chairwoman Waters, Ranking Member McHenry, members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. Last May, my colleagues and I came before you—in a virtual format for the first time—discussing our actions to maintain a strong banking sector as a source of support for consumers, households, and businesses. I'd like to thank the Committee for its flexibility and its commitment to ongoing, open dialogue, especially in the course of such a challenging year.

My remarks one year ago came after the onset of sudden and pervasive financial stress.1 Early turmoil in overseas financial markets quickly crossed borders and, within days, had reached almost every asset class and corner of the financial system. From the beginning, the causes of this strain were clear, rooted in the policy measures taken to address the outbreak of COVID-19. But at that time, the full implications of the COVID event remained unclear, and the costs would continue to mount.

The American economy and banking sector then remained at the edge of the storm, with one wave of stress behind us and others yet to come. Today, the storm waters are receding. The economy is beginning a strong recovery, which owes much to an extraordinary, coordinated, and sustained campaign of support, by both Congress and the Federal Reserve, that helped clear a path to the other side of the COVID event.

As the Federal Reserve's recent reports detail, banking organizations have remained an important source of strength in this recovery.2 Entering the COVID event, the banking system was fortified by over 10 years of work to improve safety and soundness, from both regulators and the banks themselves. Higher levels of capital and liquidity, better risk management, and more robust systems let them absorb an unprecedented shock—while providing refuge from market instability, delivering essential public aid, and working constructively to support borrowers and communities.3 In short, the full set of post-2008 reforms—as refined and recalibrated by the work of the last four years—ensured that this time would truly be different than the last. Today, the U.S. banking system is actually more liquid and better capitalized than it was a year ago, with over $100 billion in additional loan loss reserves, leaving it well-positioned to weather future shocks.

While a strong recovery is underway, it is not yet complete.4 Some households and businesses are still vulnerable, even as we enter this last stretch of the return to normal. Our role, as policymakers, is to support the financial system and the economy through the end of this transition back to normal operations. Our challenge, however, is to do so as circumstances change and the nation's need for that support evolves.5

Most immediately, we have worked to align our emergency actions with other relief efforts, as the economic situation improves. Last spring, the Federal Reserve adopted a set of extraordinary and mostly temporary measures to ease the strain in financial markets and ensure banks could support communities and meet customer needs.6 In the last six months, we have maintained or extended some of those measures, where appropriate, to preserve household assistance and promote continued access to credit.7

We also began the transition back to our normal activities, our normal supervisory posture, and our normal rulebook. We closed 12 of our 13 emergency lending facilities; let temporary changes to our leverage rules expire as planned; and announced plans to transition large banks back to our regular capital regulation program, calibrating dividend and share repurchase restrictions to the results of the upcoming supervisory stress tests.8

These are important near-term steps, and they are part of any responsible transition out of our emergency posture. However, our role and our responsibility extend much further than merely returning to normal. We also have an obligation to look closely at the last year, to understand how the financial system came to experience such severe stress, and to identify and act on any lessons we find. The COVID event was a unique shock, but it was also the first real-world test of the regulatory and supervisory regime established after the 2008 financial crisis. As such, it gives us a chance to examine that regime's strengths and shortcomings, and to position it well for future challenges.

Any list of lessons must begin with the strong performance of supervisory stress testing.9 The stress-testing program not only prepared banks for a period of prolonged hardship; it also clarified their health and resilience as the COVID event progressed. This role was a return to the original purpose of stress testing and a confirmation of its earliest use during the 2008 financial crisis. It also, however, affirmed the ways that stress testing has evolved in recent years, into a more flexible, more transparent anchor for the Federal Reserve's broader capital program.

For example, while it was prudent—given that this was the first real-world test of the post-2008 system—for us to impose temporary capital distribution restrictions beyond those that form part of that system, we now know that our framework works. We can have particular confidence in the framework when it is supplemented and informed by a real-time stress testing regime. In the future, having learned the lessons of this test, we will be able to rely on the automatic restrictions of our carefully developed framework when the stress test tells us the system will be resilient, rather than impose ad hoc and roughly improvised limitations.

Other areas, however, are ripe for closer examination, both domestically and internationally. These include the strains in short-term funding markets, and the second destabilizing run on prime money market mutual funds in roughly a decade, which required significant public intervention to address.10 Despite some efforts after the 2008 crisis to enhance the resiliency of these investment vehicles, the basic model of a seemingly stable-value fund, backed by assets the value and liquidity of which varies, remained vulnerable. Work is ongoing both domestically and at the Financial Stability Board on how to better address these vulnerabilities.

Areas for further examination also include Treasury markets, where last year's selling pressures overwhelmed dealers' willingness or ability to intermediate, and which continue to be a focus for the Board, the Department of the Treasury, and other regulators.11 Among other measures, we are reviewing the design and calibration of the supplementary leverage ratio, which was originally gauged for a financial system with far lower levels of cash reserves and a much smaller Treasury market.12

Finally, these areas for further review include a rapidly changing set of customer practices; changing patterns in the use of financial services, by consumers and businesses; and a changing relationship between banks and their nonbank partners. These trends predate the COVID event, but the past year accelerated them dramatically, with important implications for financial stability, safety and soundness, consumer protection, and underserved communities' access to safe and fair financial services. The Federal Reserve is working to understand and address this changing landscape in a number of ways—from the use of artificial intelligence, to the evolving need for operational resiliency, to the growing risk of disruptive shocks from cybersecurity failures.13

We are not alone in our work to understand these post-COVID-event lessons. We have valuable and willing partners in our fellow regulators, in other agencies across government, and in our colleagues abroad. We continue to participate actively in relevant work at the Financial Stability Board and other international forums, since financial risks do not respect the jurisdictional lines between agencies or countries. And we are committed to keeping Congress closely and actively informed of our efforts, mindful of the effect these trends may have on our core mandate.

This work is critical, but only in service of a more fundamental goal: a safe, transparent, and efficient approach to supervision and regulation, which ensures the financial system is strong and stable enough to withstand even historic shocks.14 Those values are of perennial importance, and they continue to be the bedrock of the Federal Reserve's work.15 They also animate two of our highest priorities for this year: to finalize the post-crisis Basel III reforms and to complete the long-overdue transition away from LIBOR. On the former, we remain committed to implementing Basel III for our internationally active banking organizations in a full, timely, and consistent manner, with a rulemaking proposal for public comment later this year. For LIBOR, by contrast, the time for comment, speculation, and delay has long since passed. Continued use of LIBOR in new contracts after 2021 would create safety and soundness risks, and we will examine bank practices accordingly.16

The COVID event is not behind us, and the vulnerabilities it exposed are not gone. As we continue to recover, the "vast influence of accident" can only grow, with consequences that can disproportionately fall on the most vulnerable.17 However, we can do more than just wait and hope that the path out of the COVID event is smooth. We can work to ensure the financial system is resilient enough to support consumers, households, and businesses, and we can recommit ourselves to supporting the economy through the completion of the recovery. The work we undertake to learn the lessons of the past year is a critical step in upholding that commitment.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published May 19, 2021.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierApr 19, 2021Publication referenceMay 19, 202130 days laterJun 18, 2021
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.04%Observed 2.94%Observed −10 bps vs. earlier reference2.93%Observed −1 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.61%Observed 1.68%Observed +7 bps vs. earlier reference1.45%Observed −23 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Feb 19, 2021 – Aug 19, 2021
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around May 19, 2021Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.1.00%2.25%3.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 2.97% · Feb 25, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.02% · Mar 4, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.05% · Mar 11, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.09% · Mar 18, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.17% · Mar 25, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.18% · Apr 1, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.13% · Apr 8, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.04% · Apr 15, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.97% · Apr 22, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.98% · Apr 29, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.96% · May 6, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.94% · May 13, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.00% · May 20, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.95% · May 27, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.99% · Jun 3, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.96% · Jun 10, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.93% · Jun 17, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.02% · Jun 24, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.98% · Jul 1, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.90% · Jul 8, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.88% · Jul 15, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.78% · Jul 22, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.80% · Jul 29, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.77% · Aug 5, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.87% · Aug 12, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.86% · Aug 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.34% · Feb 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Feb 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Feb 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.38% · Feb 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Feb 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.44% · Feb 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Mar 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.42% · Mar 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.47% · Mar 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Mar 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Mar 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Mar 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.55% · Mar 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.53% · Mar 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Mar 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Mar 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Mar 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Mar 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Mar 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.71% · Mar 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.74% · Mar 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.69% · Mar 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Mar 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Mar 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Mar 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.67% · Mar 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.73% · Mar 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.73% · Mar 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.74% · Mar 31, 202110-year Treasury: 1.69% · Apr 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.72% · Apr 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.73% · Apr 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.67% · Apr 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.68% · Apr 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Apr 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.67% · Apr 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.69% · Apr 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Apr 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Apr 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Apr 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Apr 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · Apr 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Apr 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Apr 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Apr 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Apr 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Apr 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Apr 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Apr 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.65% · Apr 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.65% · Apr 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · May 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · May 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · May 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.60% · May 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · May 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.69% · May 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.66% · May 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · May 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · May 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.68% · May 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · May 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · May 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · May 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · May 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · May 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Jun 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Jun 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Jun 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.53% · Jun 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.47% · Jun 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jun 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jun 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.52% · Jun 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Jun 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Jun 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Jul 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.44% · Jul 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Jul 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.38% · Jul 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.42% · Jul 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Jul 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Jul 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Jul 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.23% · Jul 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.27% · Jul 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Jul 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.25% · Jul 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Jul 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.28% · Jul 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.24% · Jul 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.20% · Aug 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Aug 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Aug 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.23% · Aug 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Aug 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Aug 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.36% · Aug 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.35% · Aug 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.36% · Aug 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Aug 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Aug 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Aug 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.27% · Aug 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.24% · Aug 19, 2021Feb 19, 2021May 19, 2021Aug 19, 2021
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury128 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,255.12/month

2.94% · May 13, 2021

At the later reference$1,253.51/month

2.93% · Jun 17, 2021

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $1.61 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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