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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Supervision and Regulation Report — Vice Chairman for Supervision Randal K. Quarles

Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, other members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Federal Reserve's regulation and supervision of the financial system. My testimony today covers two main topics:…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Vice Chairman for Supervision Quarles submitted identical remarks to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, on November 15, 2018.

Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, other members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Federal Reserve's regulation and supervision of the financial system. My testimony today covers two main topics: our efforts to improve regulatory transparency, including the report accompanying my submission to the committee, and our progress in making the post-crisis regulatory framework simpler and more efficient.

The Role of Transparency in Regulation and Supervision I am mindful that this semiannual testimony--like my position as Vice Chairman for Supervision--is grounded in Congress's efforts to strengthen and improve the nation's regulatory framework following the financial crisis. This testimony reflects a critical element of those efforts: the desire, and the need, for greater transparency.

Transparency is part of the foundation of public accountability and a cornerstone of due process. It is also key to a well-functioning regulatory system and an essential aspect of safety and soundness, as well as financial stability. Transparency provides financial firms clarity on the letter and spirit of their obligations; it provides supervisors with the benefit of exposure to a diversity of perspectives; and it provides markets with insight into the condition of regulated firms, fostering market discipline. Transparency increases public confidence in the role of the financial system to support credit, investment, and economic growth.

The Federal Reserve has taken a number of steps since my last testimony to further increase transparency, and to provide more information about our supervisory activities to both regulated institutions and the public.

For example, the Board recently improved its supervisory ratings system for large financial institutions.1 Ratings are an essential vehicle for supervisory feedback--a clear, concise way to convey whether a firm meets expectations, with tangible, predictable consequences for those that fall short. Our ratings system for large institutions had remained unchanged since 2004, even as our supervision of those institutions evolved significantly after the crisis. The new rating system will better align ratings for these firms with the supervisory feedback they receive, and will focus firms on the capital, liquidity, and governance issues most likely to affect safety and soundness.

The banking agencies also recently clarified that supervisory guidance is a tool to enhance the transparency of supervisory expectations, and should never be the basis of an enforcement action.2 Guidance--a valuable tool for examiners to help evaluate firms and explain supervisory findings--should always be based on concerns for safety and soundness or compliance at a particular firm. However, guidance is not legally enforceable, and Federal Reserve examiners will not treat it that way.

Finally, we expect shortly to make final a set of measures to increase visibility into the Board's supervisory stress testing program. The enhanced disclosures will include more granular descriptions of our models; more information about the design of our scenarios; and more detail about the outcomes we project, including a range of loss rates for loans held by firms subject to the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review. The disclosures will provide a more complete picture of the stress testing process, and facilitate thoughtful comments from academics and other members of the public, while mitigating the risk of convergence on a single model. As a result, we believe the disclosures will improve our work, making the tests more reliable, visible, and credible. We will continue our efforts toward greater transparency in stress testing over the next several years, including by disclosing descriptions of additional material models and modeled loss rate disclosures for loan and non-loan portfolios.

Semiannual Review of the Safety and Soundness of the U.S. Banking System The report that accompanies my testimony today is another tool to keep Congress, and the public, informed about our work, the banking system, and the role of both in supporting the broader economy.3 The report focuses on the Federal Reserve's prudential supervisory activities.4 As the report shows, the banking sector remains in strong condition, in line with strong U.S. economic performance, with lending growth, fewer nonperforming loans, and strong overall profitability.

Large institutions are well capitalized and liquid, and their capital planning and liquidity-risk-management processes are improving. Ninety-nine percent of regional and community banks are currently well capitalized, and supervisory recommendations made to smaller firms during the financial crisis have largely been closed. We are, however, very much aware of the dangers of complacency, and our report lists several priority areas of risk we will continue to monitor closely in the coming year, including cyber and information technology risks at supervised firms of all sizes.

Improvements in Regulatory Efficiency Improving regulatory efficiency is another core element of our current regulatory efforts. Tailoring regulation and supervision to risk has been a programmatic goal of Federal Reserve policy for more than two decades. The motivations are clear: supervisory resources are not limitless, and supervision is not costless, either to the public or to supervised institutions. Activities and firms that pose the greatest risk should receive the most scrutiny, and where the risk is lower, the regulatory burden should be lower as well.

This principle guided Congress and the federal banking agencies in designing the post-crisis regulatory framework, which imposed greater restrictions on larger, more systemically important firms and less intrusive requirements on smaller ones. It has also guided our implementation of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA, or the Act).5 On this front, we have made substantial progress:

The Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) have also continued the work to significantly reduce the reporting burden on community banking organizations, altering reporting frequencies, items, and thresholds, while preserving the data necessary for effective oversight.9 The agencies recently issued a proposal to reduce further reporting requirements for small depository institutions in the first and third quarters of the year. Under the proposal, around 37 percent of data items would not be required in those quarters.

Our most significant step to implement the Act came two weeks ago, when the Board issued two proposals to better align prudential standards with the risk profile of regulated institutions.10 These proposals implement changes that Congress enacted this spring in the EGRRCPA. One of the proposals addresses the Board's enhanced prudential standards for large banking firms, and the other is an interagency proposal amending the regulatory capital and liquidity regulations that apply to large banking organizations. Both proposals separate large banking firms into four categories, using size as a relevant but not sufficient factor for increased regulatory requirements. Among the other factors that will now enter into this assessment are nonbank assets, short-term wholesale funding, and off-balance-sheet exposure. The changes would significantly reduce regulatory compliance requirements for firms in the lowest risk category, including most institutions with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets. Firms with $250 billion or more in assets, or firms with assets between $100 billion and $250 billion that meet a risk threshold, will face reduced liquidity requirements. The proposals would largely maintain existing requirements for the largest and most complex firms.

These new categories represent a step forward in regulatory efficiency. They draw on our experience administering enhanced prudential requirements and other post-crisis measures. They recognize that other indicators of risk beyond size are appropriate to consider when determining if more stringent standards should apply to certain firms. They move toward a more risk-sensitive, nuanced framework, where riskier activities and a larger systemic footprint correspond to higher supervisory and regulatory requirements.

Apart from the requirements of the Act, we also recently proposed a new approach to calculating credit risk, known as the standardized approach to counterparty credit risk, or SA-CCR. The new approach would better account for the risks associated with derivatives exposures, including market practices that reduce risk, such as netting and initial margin.11 We issued a proposal simplifying and tailoring requirements under the Volcker rule, to ensure that the most stringent requirements apply to the firms with the most trading activity, and that compliance is as simple and objective as possible. We also issued a rule limiting the exposure of large firms to a single counterparty, addressing a key source of contagion during the financial crisis. We have received thoughtful input from the public that will help inform our implementation of all of these measures.

Finally, we have continued to engage with supervisors and central banks overseas. The ultimate goal of having an efficient and transparent regulatory system is to help the American economy--to enable banking organizations to offer safe, stable financial services to households and businesses around the country. But American businesses compete in a global marketplace, and as the financial crisis showed, when regulatory standards fall in other countries, Americans can pay the price. Engaging overseas, through forums like the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, helps level the playing field--and it helps ensure that all countries, not just the United States, do their part to maintain and protect the global economy.

Our work to improve regulatory efficiency is not done, and we expect to make additional progress in the months ahead on a number of issues. In particular, we are working with our counterparts at the OCC and FDIC on a community bank leverage ratio proposal. We expect that this proposal would meaningfully reduce the compliance burden for community banking organizations, while preserving overall levels of capital at small banks and our ability to take prompt action when problems arise.

I look forward to continuing our efforts to make our regulatory framework simpler, more transparent, and more efficient--and I look forward to participating in the committee's oversight of those efforts. As Chairman Powell said at his swearing-in: "As a public institution, we must be transparent about our actions so that the public, through its elected representatives, can hold us accountable."12 We will continue to do so to the best of our ability.

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Nov 14, 2018.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierOct 15, 2018Publication referenceNov 14, 201830 days laterDec 14, 2018
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®4.90%Observed 4.94%Observed +4 bps vs. earlier reference4.63%Observed −31 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury3.16%Observed 3.12%Observed −4 bps vs. earlier reference2.89%Observed −23 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Aug 14, 2018 – Feb 14, 2019
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Nov 14, 2018Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.2.50%3.75%5.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 4.53% · Aug 16, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.51% · Aug 23, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.52% · Aug 30, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.54% · Sep 6, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.60% · Sep 13, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.65% · Sep 20, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.72% · Sep 27, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.71% · Oct 4, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.90% · Oct 11, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.85% · Oct 18, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.86% · Oct 25, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.83% · Nov 1, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.94% · Nov 8, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.94% · Nov 15, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.81% · Nov 21, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.81% · Nov 29, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.75% · Dec 6, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.63% · Dec 13, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.62% · Dec 20, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.55% · Dec 27, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.51% · Jan 3, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 4.45% · Jan 10, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 4.45% · Jan 17, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 4.45% · Jan 24, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 4.46% · Jan 31, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 4.41% · Feb 7, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 4.37% · Feb 14, 201910-year Treasury: 2.89% · Aug 14, 201810-year Treasury: 2.86% · Aug 15, 201810-year Treasury: 2.87% · Aug 16, 201810-year Treasury: 2.87% · Aug 17, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 20, 201810-year Treasury: 2.85% · Aug 21, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 22, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 23, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 24, 201810-year Treasury: 2.85% · Aug 27, 201810-year Treasury: 2.88% · Aug 28, 201810-year Treasury: 2.89% · Aug 29, 201810-year Treasury: 2.86% · Aug 30, 201810-year Treasury: 2.86% · Aug 31, 201810-year Treasury: 2.90% · Sep 4, 201810-year Treasury: 2.90% · Sep 5, 201810-year Treasury: 2.88% · Sep 6, 201810-year Treasury: 2.94% · Sep 7, 201810-year Treasury: 2.94% · Sep 10, 201810-year Treasury: 2.98% · Sep 11, 201810-year Treasury: 2.97% · Sep 12, 201810-year Treasury: 2.97% · Sep 13, 201810-year Treasury: 2.99% · Sep 14, 201810-year Treasury: 2.99% · Sep 17, 201810-year Treasury: 3.05% · Sep 18, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Sep 19, 201810-year Treasury: 3.07% · Sep 20, 201810-year Treasury: 3.07% · Sep 21, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Sep 24, 201810-year Treasury: 3.10% · Sep 25, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Sep 26, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Sep 27, 201810-year Treasury: 3.05% · Sep 28, 201810-year Treasury: 3.09% · Oct 1, 201810-year Treasury: 3.05% · Oct 2, 201810-year Treasury: 3.15% · Oct 3, 201810-year Treasury: 3.19% · Oct 4, 201810-year Treasury: 3.23% · Oct 5, 201810-year Treasury: 3.21% · Oct 9, 201810-year Treasury: 3.22% · Oct 10, 201810-year Treasury: 3.14% · Oct 11, 201810-year Treasury: 3.15% · Oct 12, 201810-year Treasury: 3.16% · Oct 15, 201810-year Treasury: 3.16% · Oct 16, 201810-year Treasury: 3.19% · Oct 17, 201810-year Treasury: 3.17% · Oct 18, 201810-year Treasury: 3.20% · Oct 19, 201810-year Treasury: 3.20% · Oct 22, 201810-year Treasury: 3.17% · Oct 23, 201810-year Treasury: 3.10% · Oct 24, 201810-year Treasury: 3.14% · Oct 25, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Oct 26, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Oct 29, 201810-year Treasury: 3.12% · Oct 30, 201810-year Treasury: 3.15% · Oct 31, 201810-year Treasury: 3.14% · Nov 1, 201810-year Treasury: 3.22% · Nov 2, 201810-year Treasury: 3.20% · Nov 5, 201810-year Treasury: 3.22% · Nov 6, 201810-year Treasury: 3.22% · Nov 7, 201810-year Treasury: 3.24% · Nov 8, 201810-year Treasury: 3.19% · Nov 9, 201810-year Treasury: 3.14% · Nov 13, 201810-year Treasury: 3.12% · Nov 14, 201810-year Treasury: 3.11% · Nov 15, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Nov 16, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 19, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 20, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 21, 201810-year Treasury: 3.05% · Nov 23, 201810-year Treasury: 3.07% · Nov 26, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 27, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 28, 201810-year Treasury: 3.03% · Nov 29, 201810-year Treasury: 3.01% · Nov 30, 201810-year Treasury: 2.98% · Dec 3, 201810-year Treasury: 2.91% · Dec 4, 201810-year Treasury: 2.87% · Dec 6, 201810-year Treasury: 2.85% · Dec 7, 201810-year Treasury: 2.85% · Dec 10, 201810-year Treasury: 2.89% · Dec 11, 201810-year Treasury: 2.91% · Dec 12, 201810-year Treasury: 2.91% · Dec 13, 201810-year Treasury: 2.89% · Dec 14, 201810-year Treasury: 2.86% · Dec 17, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Dec 18, 201810-year Treasury: 2.77% · Dec 19, 201810-year Treasury: 2.79% · Dec 20, 201810-year Treasury: 2.79% · Dec 21, 201810-year Treasury: 2.74% · Dec 24, 201810-year Treasury: 2.81% · Dec 26, 201810-year Treasury: 2.77% · Dec 27, 201810-year Treasury: 2.72% · Dec 28, 201810-year Treasury: 2.69% · Dec 31, 201810-year Treasury: 2.66% · Jan 2, 201910-year Treasury: 2.56% · Jan 3, 201910-year Treasury: 2.67% · Jan 4, 201910-year Treasury: 2.70% · Jan 7, 201910-year Treasury: 2.73% · Jan 8, 201910-year Treasury: 2.74% · Jan 9, 201910-year Treasury: 2.74% · Jan 10, 201910-year Treasury: 2.71% · Jan 11, 201910-year Treasury: 2.71% · Jan 14, 201910-year Treasury: 2.72% · Jan 15, 201910-year Treasury: 2.73% · Jan 16, 201910-year Treasury: 2.75% · Jan 17, 201910-year Treasury: 2.79% · Jan 18, 201910-year Treasury: 2.74% · Jan 22, 201910-year Treasury: 2.76% · Jan 23, 201910-year Treasury: 2.72% · Jan 24, 201910-year Treasury: 2.76% · Jan 25, 201910-year Treasury: 2.75% · Jan 28, 201910-year Treasury: 2.72% · Jan 29, 201910-year Treasury: 2.70% · Jan 30, 201910-year Treasury: 2.63% · Jan 31, 201910-year Treasury: 2.70% · Feb 1, 201910-year Treasury: 2.73% · Feb 4, 201910-year Treasury: 2.71% · Feb 5, 201910-year Treasury: 2.70% · Feb 6, 201910-year Treasury: 2.65% · Feb 7, 201910-year Treasury: 2.63% · Feb 8, 201910-year Treasury: 2.65% · Feb 11, 201910-year Treasury: 2.68% · Feb 12, 201910-year Treasury: 2.71% · Feb 13, 201910-year Treasury: 2.66% · Feb 14, 2019Aug 14, 2018Nov 14, 2018Feb 14, 2019
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,599.48/month

4.94% · Nov 8, 2018

At the later reference$1,543.32/month

4.63% · Dec 13, 2018

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $56.17 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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