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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Systemically important financial institutions and the Dodd-Frank Act — Michael S. Gibson, Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation

Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Maloney, and other members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) as it…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Maloney, and other members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) as it relates to the designation, supervision, and regulation of systemically important nonbank financial companies.

Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies and the Problem of "Too Big to Fail" The recent financial crisis showed that some financial companies, including nonbank financial companies not historically subject to consolidated prudential supervision, had grown so large, leveraged, and interconnected that their failure could pose a threat to overall financial stability. The sudden collapses or near-collapses of major financial companies, and in particular major nonbank financial companies, were among the most destabilizing events of the crisis. The crisis also demonstrated weaknesses in the existing framework for supervising, regulating, and otherwise constraining the risks of major financial companies, as well as deficiencies in the government's toolkit for managing their failure.

As a result of the imprudent risk-taking of major financial companies and the perceived severe consequences to the financial system and the economy associated with their disorderly failure, the U.S. government (and many foreign governments) intervened to reduce the impact of, or prevent, the failure of these companies. Before the crisis, market participants had assumed that major financial companies likely would receive government assistance if they became troubled. The actions taken by governments in response to the crisis, although necessary, helped to solidify the market view that such financial firms were too big to fail.

The Dodd-Frank Act addresses key gaps in the framework for supervising and regulating systemically important financial institutions and the market perception that such firms are too big to fail. Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to mitigate the threat to financial stability posed by systemically important nonbank financial companies that were historically outside the existing regulatory framework for bank holding companies. The Dodd-Frank Act takes a multi-pronged approach to do so, including: (i) the establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the Council), which has the authority to designate nonbank financial companies that could pose a threat to financial stability; (ii) a new framework for consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve of nonbank financial companies designated by the Council; and (iii) improved tools for the resolution of failed nonbank financial companies.

I will briefly discuss the Federal Reserve's work to date in each of these key areas.

Designation of Nonbank Financial Companies by the Financial Stability Oversight Council As you know, the Dodd-Frank Act created a council of regulators, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to coordinate efforts to identify and mitigate threats to U.S. financial stability across a range of institutions and markets. Among the Council's most important responsibilities are establishing a framework for designating nonbank financial companies whose failure could pose a threat to financial stability, and applying that framework to designate and reassess individual firms over time. Once designated, these firms would be subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve and would be required to satisfy enhanced prudential standards established by the Federal Reserve under title I of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The Federal Reserve has been working closely with the other member agencies of the Council to put this designation framework in place. On April 3, the Council issued a final rule and interpretive guidance setting forth the criteria and process it will use to designate nonbank financial firms as systemically important. The Council's rule provides detail on the framework that it intends to use to assess a particular firm's potential to threaten U.S. financial stability. The analysis would take into account the firm's size, interconnectedness, provision of critical products or services, leverage, and reliance on short-term funding, as well as its existing regulatory oversight.

The Council's issuance of this rule is an important step forward in ensuring that systemically critical nonbank financial firms will be subject to strong consolidated supervision and regulation. The Council and its member agencies' staffs currently are using these criteria to analyze the potential systemic importance of individual nonbank financial companies in different industries. As the Council gains experience with the designation process, we expect it will make adjustments to its rule and procedures as appropriate.

Regulation and Supervision of Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies Of course, the identification and designation of systemically important nonbank financial companies is only an initial step. Just as important is the establishment of a strong, effective regulatory framework for constraining the systemic risk posed by such firms. In this regard, sections 165 and 166 of the Dodd-Frank Act require the Federal Reserve to establish enhanced prudential standards both for bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more and for nonbank financial companies designated by the Council. These standards include enhanced risk-based capital and leverage requirements, liquidity requirements, single-counterparty credit limits, stress testing, risk-management requirements, an early remediation regime, and resolution-planning requirements. Sections 165 and 166 also require that these prudential standards become more stringent as the systemic footprint of the firm increases.

In December, the Federal Reserve issued a package of proposed rules to implement sections 165 and 166 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Federal Reserve's proposed rules would apply the same set of enhanced prudential standards to covered companies that are bank holding companies and covered companies that are nonbank financial companies designated by the Council. As we made clear in the proposal, however, the Federal Reserve may tailor the application of the enhanced standards to different companies on an individual basis or by category, taking into consideration each company's capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities, size, and any other risk-related factors that the Federal Reserve deems appropriate. Working out the exact details of how enhanced prudential standards will apply to nonbank financial companies will certainly require a thoughtful and iterative analysis of each designated company over time. Once the Council designates one or more nonbank financial companies, the Federal Reserve is committed to thoroughly assessing the business model, capital structure, and risk profile of each designated company and tailoring the application of the enhanced standards to each company on an individual basis or by category, as appropriate. The Federal Reserve will also give careful consideration to the appropriate transition period required for newly designated nonbank financial companies to comply with the enhanced prudential standards and other regulatory requirements.

The comment period for the Federal Reserve's enhanced prudential standards proposal closed on April 30, 2012. Nearly 100 comments letters were received. The Federal Reserve is currently reviewing those comments carefully as we work to develop final rules to implement sections 165 and 166.

Living Wills and Orderly Resolution Ending "too big to fail" also requires that a systemically important financial institution be allowed to fail if it cannot meet its obligations--and to fail without inflicting serious damage on the broader financial system. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to reduce the impact on the system in the event of the failure of a systemically important nonbank financial company through two important new regulatory tools. First, section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires each bank holding company with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more and each nonbank financial company designated by the Council to prepare and provide to the FDIC and the Federal Reserve a resolution plan, or "living will," for its rapid and orderly resolution under the U.S. bankruptcy code. Second, title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides for an orderly resolution process to be administered by the FDIC. Importantly, both of these new tools extend to systemically important nonbank financial companies, in addition to bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more.

Thank you very much for your attention. I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published May 16, 2012.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierApr 16, 2012Publication referenceMay 16, 201230 days laterJun 15, 2012
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.88%Observed 3.83%Observed −5 bps vs. earlier reference3.71%Observed −12 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the TreasuryUnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Feb 16, 2012 – Aug 16, 2012
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around May 16, 2012Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.00%3.75%4.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.87% · Feb 16, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.95% · Feb 23, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.90% · Mar 1, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.88% · Mar 8, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.92% · Mar 15, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 4.08% · Mar 22, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.99% · Mar 29, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.98% · Apr 5, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.88% · Apr 12, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.90% · Apr 19, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.88% · Apr 26, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.84% · May 3, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.83% · May 10, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.79% · May 17, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.78% · May 24, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.75% · May 31, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.67% · Jun 7, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.71% · Jun 14, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Jun 21, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Jun 28, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.62% · Jul 5, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.56% · Jul 12, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.53% · Jul 19, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.49% · Jul 26, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.55% · Aug 2, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.59% · Aug 9, 201230-year fixed mortgage: 3.62% · Aug 16, 2012Feb 16, 2012May 16, 2012Aug 16, 2012
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,403.00/month

3.83% · May 10, 2012

At the later reference$1,382.55/month

3.71% · Jun 14, 2012

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $20.45 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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