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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Lessons from the failure of Lehman Brothers — Chairman Ben S. Bernanke

Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and other members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the failure of Lehman Brothers and the lessons of that failure. In these opening remarks I will address several key…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and other members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the failure of Lehman Brothers and the lessons of that failure. In these opening remarks I will address several key issues relating to that episode.

The Federal Reserve was not Lehman's supervisor. Lehman was exempt from supervision by the Federal Reserve because the company did not own a commercial bank and because it was allowed by federal law to own a federally insured savings association without becoming subject to Federal Reserve supervision. The core subsidiaries of Lehman were securities broker-dealers under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which also supervised the Lehman parent company under the SEC's Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) program. Importantly, the CSE program was voluntary, established by the SEC in agreement with the supervised firms, without the benefits of statutory authorization.

Although the Federal Reserve had no supervisory responsibilities or authorities with respect to Lehman, it began monitoring the financial condition of Lehman and the other primary dealers during the period of financial stress that led to the sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase.1 In March 2008, responding to the escalating pressures on primary dealers, the Federal Reserve used its statutory emergency lending powers to establish the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Term Securities Lending Facility as sources of backstop liquidity for those firms. To monitor the ability of borrowing firms to repay, the Federal Reserve, in its role as creditor, required all participants in these programs, including Lehman, to provide financial information about their companies on an ongoing basis. Two Federal Reserve employees were placed onsite at Lehman to monitor the firm's liquidity position and its financial condition generally. Beyond gathering information, however, these employees had no authority to regulate Lehman's disclosures, capital, risk management, or other business activities.

During this period, Federal Reserve employees were in regular contact with their counterparts at the SEC, and in July 2008, then-Chairman Cox and I negotiated an agreement that formalized procedures for information-sharing between our two agencies. Cooperation between the Federal Reserve and the SEC was generally quite good, especially considering the stress and turmoil of the period. In particular, the Federal Reserve, with the SEC's participation, developed and conducted several stress tests of the liquidity position of Lehman and the other major primary dealers during the spring and summer of 2008. The results of these stress tests were presented jointly by the Federal Reserve and the SEC to the managements of Lehman and the other firms. Lehman's results showed significant deficiencies in available liquidity, which the management was strongly urged to correct.

The Federal Reserve was not aware that Lehman was using so-called Repo 105 transactions to manage its balance sheet. Indeed, according to the bankruptcy examiner, Lehman staff did not report these transactions even to the company's board. However, knowledge of Lehman's accounting for these transactions would not have materially altered the Federal Reserve's view of the condition of the firm; the information we obtained suggested that the capital and liquidity of the firm were seriously deficient, a view that we conveyed to the company and that I believe was shared by the SEC and the Treasury Department.

Lehman did succeed at raising about $6 billion in capital in June 2008, took steps to improve its liquidity position in July, and was attempting to raise additional capital in the weeks leading up to its failure. However, its efforts proved inadequate. During August and early September 2008, increasingly panicky conditions in markets put Lehman and other financial firms under severe pressure. In an attempt to devise a private-sector solution for Lehman's plight, the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and SEC brought together leaders of the major financial firms in a series of meetings at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the weekend of September 13-15. Despite the best efforts of all involved, a solution could not be crafted, nor could an acquisition by another company be arranged. With no other option available, Lehman declared bankruptcy.

The Federal Reserve fully understood that the failure of Lehman would shake the financial system and the economy. However, the only tool available to the Federal Reserve to address the situation was its ability to provide short-term liquidity against adequate collateral; and, as I noted, Lehman already had access to our emergency credit facilities. It was clear, though, that Lehman needed both substantial capital and an open-ended guarantee of its obligations to open for business on Monday, September 15. At that time, neither the Federal Reserve nor any other agency had the authority to provide capital or an unsecured guarantee, and thus no means of preventing Lehman's failure existed.

The Lehman failure provides at least two important lessons. First, we must eliminate the gaps in our financial regulatory framework that allow large, complex, interconnected firms like Lehman to operate without robust consolidated supervision. In September 2008, no government agency had sufficient authority to compel Lehman to operate in a safe and sound manner and in a way that did not pose dangers to the broader financial system. Second, to avoid having to choose in the future between bailing out a failing, systemically critical firm or allowing its disorderly bankruptcy, we need a new resolution regime, analogous to that already established for failing banks. Such a regime would both protect our economy and improve market discipline by ensuring that the failing firm's shareholders and creditors take losses and its management is replaced.

Thank you. I would be glad to respond to your questions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Apr 20, 2010.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierMar 21, 2010Publication referenceApr 20, 201030 days laterMay 20, 2010
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®4.96%Observed 5.07%Observed +11 bps vs. earlier reference4.84%Observed −23 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the TreasuryUnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jan 20, 2010 – Jul 20, 2010
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Apr 20, 2010Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.4.50%5.00%5.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 4.99% · Jan 21, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.98% · Jan 28, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 5.01% · Feb 4, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.97% · Feb 11, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.93% · Feb 18, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 5.05% · Feb 25, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.97% · Mar 4, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.95% · Mar 11, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.96% · Mar 18, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.99% · Mar 25, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 5.08% · Apr 1, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 5.21% · Apr 8, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 5.07% · Apr 15, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 5.07% · Apr 22, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 5.06% · Apr 29, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 5.00% · May 6, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.93% · May 13, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.84% · May 20, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.78% · May 27, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.79% · Jun 3, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.72% · Jun 10, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.75% · Jun 17, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.69% · Jun 24, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.58% · Jul 1, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.57% · Jul 8, 201030-year fixed mortgage: 4.57% · Jul 15, 2010Jan 20, 2010Apr 20, 2010Jul 20, 2010
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,623.32/month

5.07% · Apr 15, 2010

At the later reference$1,581.26/month

4.84% · May 20, 2010

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $42.07 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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