Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Modernizing the Regulatory and Supervisory Landscape — Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle W. Bowman

Good morning. It is good to be here with you this morning for the Community Banking Research Conference.1 Today I will discuss the work we have under way to modernize the bank regulatory and supervision framework. These frameworks are…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

THE PRIMARY SOURCE

Read the communication

Original source →

Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Good morning. It is good to be here with you this morning for the Community Banking Research Conference.1 Today I will discuss the work we have under way to modernize the bank regulatory and supervision framework. These frameworks are the foundation for the long-term stability and success of the banking system, and for community banks around the country.

Targeted Reforms to Support Community Banks At this conference two years ago, I described actionable approaches to support and enhance the role of community banks in the U.S. financial system.2 Since that time, we have made progress in a number of areas. At the Federal Reserve, we have refocused supervision with our Statement of Supervisory Operating Principles. These principles focus supervision on risks that could lead to a material deterioration in a firm's financial condition. We are also improving our coordination with federal and state banking agency counterparts. Together with the OCC and FDIC, we updated the community bank leverage ratio—a material simplification of the capital framework for community banks—to the statutory level of 8 percent. We demonstrated our support for community bank innovation by eliminating the Novel Activities Supervision Program, which had operated as a barrier to innovation.

We are continuing our initiative to update and index outdated asset thresholds, including the thresholds defining the scope of community banks for supervisory purposes, and making supervisory ratings (like the "M" rating in "CAMELS") more reflective of financial condition and financial risk. In issuing regulations or guidance that applies to community banks, we include tools, additional guidance, and compliance guides to clarify new expectations, like the recent compliance guide for third-party risk-management guidelines.

More work remains.

First, mergers and acquisitions. The Federal Reserve's competitive analysis in bank mergers has a disproportionate effect on rural banks in small and underserved markets. This analysis systematically understates the competition banks in these markets face—downplaying or ignoring credit unions, nonbank lenders, farm credit institutions, and branchless banks that compete in local markets across the country. This analysis is antiquated and harmful to community banks that may face greater difficulties in merging, even when doing so may actually create a stronger and more competitive banking environment.

Second, de novo formation. In June, the FFIEC issued a statement reaffirming its support for de novo bank formation. While this was an important show of broad-based support for de novos, federal and state banking agencies can and should do more to promote new bank formation—including clarifying approval standards (like capital requirements), adhering to specific and reasonable processing timelines, and issuing conditional approvals where appropriate.

Third, rationalizing and streamlining the call report. The FFIEC issued a request for information on call report streamlining in December 2025, seeking public comment about excessive burden on banks that file the call report and requesting stakeholders to identify options for streamlining.

I also highlighted the necessity of community banking and state bank commission experience for those involved in regulatory and supervisory oversight processes. Understanding the business of banking and how supervision and regulation hinder or support this business is fundamental to a safe and sound banking system. Since becoming the Vice Chair for Supervision, I have served as the Board's FFIEC member, and as its chairman. During this time, we have made progress on long-standing issues within the FFIEC's purview, including updating the CAMELS rating system, which I will discuss more in a moment.

Bank regulators rely on an effective and proportionate approach to bank regulation and supervision, based on size, complexity, business model, and risk profile. This includes updating asset-based thresholds to reflect changes over time and indexing them to economic growth to help ensure that they remain appropriately calibrated in the future.

Asset Thresholds and Regulatory Tailoring Bank regulation and supervision must be appropriately tailored, calibrated, and updated over time. Asset thresholds that are established in regulation (like low, fixed-dollar thresholds that limit a bank's lending to directors and officers) or static standards are used to create different tiers of institutions for regulatory and supervisory purposes (like the definition of a community bank being generally set at $10 billion in assets) become irrational over time.

These thresholds matter. They limit a bank's activities and impact the proportionality of supervisory oversight. Every standard reflects a policy decision at a particular point in time, but over time, without adjustment, policy judgment is replaced by a miscalibration.

The Board has taken steps to address these issues. In July, we proposed revisions to Regulation O, which governs the extension of credit by banks to bank "insiders," including bank executives, board members, and major shareholders.3 Regulation O has not been comprehensively updated since 1979. While the original transaction limits may have been appropriate at that time, these limits create a significant administrative burden on community banks and go beyond what is appropriate or necessary for safety and soundness.

The Board's regulations include other thresholds that are similarly outdated. Later this year, the Board will consider updates to fixed-dollar asset thresholds in the Board's regulations to account for inflation and economic growth. The proposal will increase static thresholds, with a mechanism to update them every five years. This will preserve the policy intent at the time the threshold was implemented. This regulatory housekeeping should not require comprehensively and routinely revisiting our regulations to update thresholds so that they remain appropriate for future economic conditions, so we have included mechanisms that will allow this adjustment on a regular cadence.

Later this year, the Board will consider broader structural reforms to bank portfolios defined by asset size and updates to the large bank tailoring framework. For the past 15 years, a community bank has been defined as a bank with assets of less than $10 billion.4 Fixed asset thresholds can push a smaller noncomplex bank into a higher supervisory tier with standards designed for more complex institutions and stronger supervisory scrutiny—like those based on the risk of their activities. This approach is not appropriate for firms with straightforward business models that should be subject to the risk tier appropriate for their risk profile. Both directions of change could be appropriate if based on an assessment of a bank's activities and risk profile. By expanding the range of institutions treated as community banks that operate using a traditional community bank business model and relationship banking and appropriately modifying the supervisory expectations and regulatory requirements for these firms, we will preserve safety and soundness while effectively applying appropriately tailored and risk-calibrated supervision and regulation.

Congress has given the federal banking agencies discretion to modify thresholds and to tailor requirements for institutions based on size and complexity. Our work will ensure that our requirements remain appropriate for this purpose.

Refocusing Supervision on the Risk of Material Financial Harm Effective bank supervision requires an approach that prioritizes risk that can result in material financial harm. One year ago, the Federal Reserve implemented a risk-based supervisory program with the introduction of our Statement of Supervisory Operating Principles (SSOP). These principles outline our enhanced approach to supervision describing what supervisors do and how they do it for both examiners and for the broader public.5

Publishing the SSOP enabled us to begin the process to shift our culture to encourage and direct our supervisors to return our focus to the fundamental purpose of supervision. This emphasizes our mandate to preserve safety and soundness in the banking system and support U.S. financial stability. In recent years, our examinations had drifted to focus on process over substance, prioritizing checklists of requirements instead of applying judgment and expertise to evaluate safety and soundness. The SSOP begins by reiterating the core purpose of supervision—which is to identify material vulnerabilities as early as possible and take prompt, decisive, and proportionate action to encourage or require firms to mitigate them. It then clarifies expectations for examiners to use reasoned judgment and escalate matters of concern, including where additional tools may be needed to identify or address risks.6

The SSOP marks a turning point that memorializes the beginning of our work to address the long-standing issues in our supervisory culture. Of course, we know that the SSOP is an initial step. It must be followed up with clear expectations and actions. Therefore, we have followed that formal document with targeted examiner trainings, outreach, and necessary structural reforms to ensure these messages have permeated throughout the entire supervisory system and enhance how we conduct supervision.

The Federal Reserve's supervisory approach should not be a mystery. Supervisory expectations should be transparent, clear, and consistent. A bank should not learn about and then be held accountable for changed expectations during an examination. In recent months, we published a number of LISCC examination manuals and provided targeted guidance to further this goal of transparency. One example is our new third-party risk-management guidance, which includes a guide that is tailored to community banks. These banks face unique challenges in managing third-party relationships, particularly where there is a mismatch in negotiating power between banks and service providers. These should clarify supervisory expectations and encourage effective third-party relationship due diligence and ongoing compliance.

While these examples demonstrate the commitment to updating and modernizing the bank regulatory and supervisory framework, there is much more to be addressed. Together, through the FFIEC, the agencies and states are working to finalize revisions to the CAMELS rating system.7 The CAMELS proposal revises the bank ratings framework to focus on material financial risks and provides clarity to each component and the weight of each element that comprises the components and leads to a composite rating. Importantly, the proposal also provides transparency and clarity to the assignment of a Management rating. The "M" rating will no longer singularly drive a composite rating.

Our revised supervisory approach adopts humility and openness, acknowledging that some elements should be periodically updated and refined over time to reflect changing economic conditions, evolving banking and financial system risks and practices, and the broader economy.

Updating the Structure of the Supervisory Function To effectively implement a robust framework, we must also change our organizational structure and approach, our culture, and work to promote accountability and transparency. These reforms are not easy. We have to address long-standing issues embedded in our institutional culture, long-held assumptions and beliefs, and institutional inertia. But in the context of bank supervision and regulation, we must not be distracted from our core mission of safety and soundness while we achieve these goals.

We have identified a number of structural issues that hinder our ability to optimally perform the supervisory function. Starting with the role of committees in the operation of the supervisory function.

For many years, Federal Reserve system supervision relied on a complex web of committees. These committees were well intentioned and appropriately deliberated issues but over time became a source of delay, created barriers to prompt action, and obfuscated decisionmaking responsibility and accountability.

While committees can be effective in breaking down information silos, delayed action results in fractured and inconsistent communication and supervisory approaches. The Federal Reserve's distributed supervisory system encompasses an extensive geographic area, including unique institutions across the country, with a wide range of bank sizes, business models, activities, and risk profiles. Lessons from our supervisory experiences inform examiner judgment. When a committee shields accountability or discourages examination teams from using informed judgment in a timely manner to defer to an unaccountable committee, safety and soundness can suffer as a result. In practice, these committees became a source for plausible deniability and a disincentive for examiners to take prompt and decisive action to address identified risks.

Improving the use of committees is an important first step, but broader changes are needed.

Last month, the Starling Advisory Group released its preliminary report on the failure of Silicon Valley Bank.8 This independent review marks an important milestone in public accountability and transparency for the supervision of banks. It serves as an opportunity identify and address challenges in the implementation of Federal Reserve supervision responsibilities. While we have already made progress in several areas, we must also modernize our organizational structure so that our supervisory operations are well positioned to assess the current landscape and future of the U.S. economy and financial system. This requires a thorough examination of our systemwide operations, our existing footprint, and a recognition of the importance of our state supervisory structure. After all, our banks are "state member banks," and each state conducts supervision jointly with us and, ultimately, holds the state bank charter.

The independent review highlighted a long-standing structural issue in the supervisory function—a mismatch between authority for decisionmaking and accountability for supervisory decisions. The execution of Federal Reserve supervision is the responsibility of the Vice Chair for Supervision, but it is conducted by the Reserve Banks. As the review noted, for decades that structure has disincentivized a critical link between responsibility and accountability and has been further complicated by a complex web of dozens of committees, resulting in dysfunction when critical decisions are most needed.

Today, we begin to restructure the Federal Reserve's supervision function. Informed by the regional structure implemented by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the Federal Reserve supervisory function will be realigned to implement a culture of accountability and clear decisionmaking authority. This will initially take the shape of a realignment into five regions. Each of these regions will be led by a regional leader accountable for all supervisory activity in region, supported by the existing Reserve Bank footprints but aligned to recognize and reflect state boundaries.

This simplified regional structure will provide a number of benefits.

By following state lines rather than Reserve Bank District boundaries, we can coordinate more effectively and efficiently with our state and federal regulatory partners. The regional structure creates scale in our operations. It simplifies our leadership structure while preserving local supervision by examiners. They will remain in the existing Reserve Bank locations across each region, continuing to oversee the banks they currently supervise. This approach clarifies accountability and decisionmaking and enables a consistent application of supervision. We look forward to realizing the benefits of this structure.

Closing Thoughts In just over a year, we have made meaningful progress. But much lies ahead. As we continue to move forward, it is important to reiterate our commitment to risk-focused regulation and supervision, and a strong foundation of capital and liquidity. Our supervision prioritizes those matters that present or could lead to material financial impairment. These approaches allow us to empower examiner judgement and expertise, leading to more timely and effective supervisory outcomes. Our structure and organization will support our examination workforce by better aligning responsibility and accountability for decisionmaking.

I look forward to hearing your feedback as we implement these approaches, as we continue to enhance the regulatory framework, and as we improve our supervision. Thank you for your work to ensure the future of banking for communities across the United States. It is an honor and a privilege to work with you.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 6, 2026.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 6, 2026Publication referenceOct 6, 202630 days laterNov 5, 2026
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.71%Observed 7.28%Observed +57 bps vs. earlier reference7.18%Observed −10 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.78%Observed 5.27%Observed +49 bps vs. earlier reference4.84%Observed −43 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 6, 2026 – Jan 6, 2027
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 6, 2026Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.4.00%5.75%7.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.49% · Jul 9, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.55% · Jul 16, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Jul 23, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.66% · Jul 30, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.69% · Aug 6, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Aug 13, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Aug 20, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.66% · Aug 27, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.71% · Sep 3, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · Sep 10, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.95% · Sep 17, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 7.03% · Sep 24, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 7.28% · Oct 1, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 7.40% · Oct 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 7.40% · Oct 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 7.32% · Oct 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 7.24% · Oct 29, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 7.18% · Nov 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.48% · Jul 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.55% · Jul 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.56% · Jul 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.54% · Jul 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.56% · Jul 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.62% · Jul 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.58% · Jul 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.55% · Jul 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.57% · Jul 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.55% · Jul 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.60% · Jul 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.63% · Jul 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.67% · Jul 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.71% · Jul 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.69% · Jul 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.65% · Jul 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.61% · Jul 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.67% · Jul 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.68% · Jul 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.75% · Jul 31, 202610-year Treasury: 4.70% · Aug 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.63% · Aug 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.63% · Aug 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.69% · Aug 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.65% · Aug 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.72% · Aug 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.70% · Aug 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.68% · Aug 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.63% · Aug 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.68% · Aug 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.72% · Aug 17, 202610-year Treasury: 4.71% · Aug 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.65% · Aug 19, 202610-year Treasury: 4.69% · Aug 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.74% · Aug 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.70% · Aug 24, 202610-year Treasury: 4.64% · Aug 25, 202610-year Treasury: 4.66% · Aug 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.67% · Aug 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.73% · Aug 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.75% · Aug 31, 202610-year Treasury: 4.79% · Sep 1, 202610-year Treasury: 4.79% · Sep 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.77% · Sep 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.78% · Sep 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.80% · Sep 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.83% · Sep 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.95% · Sep 10, 202610-year Treasury: 4.96% · Sep 11, 202610-year Treasury: 4.97% · Sep 14, 202610-year Treasury: 5.00% · Sep 15, 202610-year Treasury: 5.01% · Sep 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.94% · Sep 17, 202610-year Treasury: 5.01% · Sep 18, 202610-year Treasury: 4.96% · Sep 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.96% · Sep 22, 202610-year Treasury: 5.11% · Sep 23, 202610-year Treasury: 5.18% · Sep 24, 202610-year Treasury: 5.17% · Sep 25, 202610-year Treasury: 5.24% · Sep 28, 202610-year Treasury: 5.26% · Sep 29, 202610-year Treasury: 5.29% · Sep 30, 202610-year Treasury: 5.24% · Oct 1, 202610-year Treasury: 5.28% · Oct 2, 202610-year Treasury: 5.31% · Oct 5, 202610-year Treasury: 5.27% · Oct 6, 202610-year Treasury: 5.28% · Oct 7, 202610-year Treasury: 5.22% · Oct 8, 202610-year Treasury: 5.24% · Oct 9, 202610-year Treasury: 5.21% · Oct 13, 202610-year Treasury: 5.19% · Oct 14, 202610-year Treasury: 5.10% · Oct 15, 202610-year Treasury: 5.09% · Oct 16, 202610-year Treasury: 5.15% · Oct 19, 202610-year Treasury: 5.12% · Oct 20, 202610-year Treasury: 5.13% · Oct 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.96% · Oct 22, 202610-year Treasury: 5.00% · Oct 23, 202610-year Treasury: 5.00% · Oct 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.99% · Oct 27, 202610-year Treasury: 5.05% · Oct 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.98% · Oct 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.94% · Oct 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.91% · Nov 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.95% · Nov 3, 202610-year Treasury: 4.90% · Nov 4, 202610-year Treasury: 4.84% · Nov 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.86% · Nov 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.88% · Nov 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.98% · Nov 10, 2026Jul 6, 2026Oct 6, 2026Jan 6, 2027
30-year fixed mortgage18 observations10-year Treasury90 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The future portion of the window has no observations. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$2,052.64/month

7.28% · Oct 1, 2026

At the later reference$2,032.30/month

7.18% · Nov 5, 2026

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $20.33 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

Evaluate a rate lock around your closing date →See current advertised mortgage options →