Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

The Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy — Governor Lisa D. Cook

Thank you, David. I appreciate the opportunity to speak again at the Brookings Institution.1 It is always an honor for me to return to the place where I held my first job as an aspiring economist. I had the good fortune to be a research…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, David. I appreciate the opportunity to speak again at the Brookings Institution.1 It is always an honor for me to return to the place where I held my first job as an aspiring economist. I had the good fortune to be a research assistant for the eminent economist and public servant, including as Vice Chair of the Fed, Alice Rivlin early in my career. It was a formative, if not transformative, experience for me, and I remain grateful to her and Brookings for it.

Today, I would like to speak to you about how I see the U.S. economic outlook evolving, specifically through the lens of the dual mandate given to the Federal Reserve by Congress to promote maximum employment and price stability. Then, I will discuss how my assessment of the outlook guides my thinking on monetary policy.

I will start by acknowledging that, due to the government shutdown, this is a challenging time to give an economic outlook speech. Federal statistical agencies, including the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, have not produced many of the data I regularly use in assessing the economy, such as monthly employment data from BLS and the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index from BEA. The longer the shutdown lasts, the more data could be disrupted.

Economic Outlook However, we are not flying blind. The staff at the Federal Reserve and I use a wide variety of data from administrative sources and various private-sector providers to continually evaluate the state of the economy in real time. That practice has become essential in recent weeks given the lack of official releases. These data include alternative measures of inflation, labor-market activity, and production and spending, inflation. For example, states continue to report data on unemployment insurance (UI) claims, and online job boards provide data on available positions. Various firms provide pricing data on a variety of products and services, including housing and vehicles, and offer information on credit card spending, the moods of consumers and employers, and manufacturing and service-sector output. In my first speech as a Governor in 2022, I encouraged the use of more high-frequency, real-time data from the private sector, and I think this has borne fruit.2 And, of course, the Reserve Banks in the Fed System are a rich source of statistical and anecdotal data, some of which are documented in the Beige Book report policymakers receive before each Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting.

In addition, I find broad outreach to business leaders, workers, nonprofits, and families around the country essential in understanding the state of the economy. I will rely on this outreach, these alternative data sources, and the latest available federal data when discussing my outlook today.

Inflation First, I will turn to inflation. Based on the available data for September, it is estimated that the PCE price index rose 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in September, significantly above our 2 percent target. Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy categories, was also estimated to be 2.8 percent. Both of these readings are as high or higher than their readings a year before, propped up by an increase in tariff-affected goods prices.

My outreach to business leaders suggests that the pass-through of tariffs to consumer prices is not yet complete. Many firms have adopted a strategy of running down their inventories at lower price levels before raising prices. Others have reported waiting until tariff uncertainty is resolved before passing increases on to consumers. New car models, clothing lines, and other products will be coming onto the market, and that process will continue to provide firms with an opportunity to level set prices. As such, I expect inflation to remain elevated for the next year.

Nonetheless, the effect of tariffs on prices, in theory, should represent a one-time increase. It is encouraging that most long-run inflation expectations, including from the New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations, are low and stable at this juncture. When excluding tariff effects, 12-month core PCE inflation through September appears to be about 1/2 percentage point lower at about 2.3 percent, suggesting that underlying inflation has continued to make progress toward target. My assessment is that inflation is on track to continue on its trend toward our target of 2 percent once the tariff effects are behind us. The big caveat is that tariff effects must prove not to be persistent and that monetary policy remains appropriately focused on achieving that goal.

This is a point worth dwelling on for just a moment. The FOMC's firm commitment to its inflation mandate is imperative to ensure that inflation does remain in check, as I do expect in my baseline forecast. So let me be clear. I am committed to reaching our 2 percent inflation target. Moreover, I will be prepared to act forcefully, if the tariff effects appear to be larger or last longer than expected, or if other evidence emerges that higher levels of inflation are becoming entrenched in expectations.

Labor market I will now turn to the labor market. We have less recent official data on the labor market, but the latest available indicators suggest that the labor market remains solid, though gradually cooling. The unemployment rate edged up over this summer from 4.1 percent in June to 4.3 percent in August, a relatively low reading one would expect to see in a healthy economy. To put 4.3 percent into perspective, the average unemployment rate over the 50-year period preceding the pandemic was 6.2 percent. Since August, more recent labor-market indicators, such as UI claims, job postings, and individuals' assessments of job availability, signal little change to the August reading—at most a small uptick. Taken together, the slightly rising unemployment rate indicates the labor market is softening, but only modestly so.

I would be remiss if I did not mention slowing in payroll gains observed over the summer. In most cases, a sharp slowing in payrolls would suggest increasing slack and would generally be accompanied by an increase in the unemployment rate. However, in this instance, the slowing in payrolls can mostly be explained by a coincident decline in population growth due to immigration policy. Because they are currently driven by fluctuations in population growth, the payroll numbers do not provide a definitive signal about labor-market slack. Therefore, it would be prudent for us to consult the other indicators I already mentioned.

It is important to recognize that there appear to be worsening outcomes for vulnerable and low-to-middle-income (LMI) households. In the labor market, youth and Black unemployment rates, both of which tend to be more cyclical than total unemployment, have steadily risen since this spring through the latest readings in August. The deteriorating labor market experienced by these two vulnerable groups mirrors other emerging strains in some households' financial health and balance sheets. Among LMI households, we have observed large increases in delinquencies, especially last year, and there is some evidence that their spending has stagnated, in particular compared to the robust spending growth of their higher-income counterparts. This is sometimes called a "two-speed" economy, when the well-off are doing well, while LMI and vulnerable households are not.

Monetary policy works by affecting conditions for the entire economy and is not well suited to produce specific outcomes for specific groups of people. Ultimately, I believe delivering on our dual-mandate goals will produce the best outcomes for all Americans. Nonetheless, it is important for policymakers to monitor the two-speed economy. Understanding the challenges faced by so many Americans underscores the reasons why we need to get monetary policy right. Vulnerable and LMI households are the ones who will be the first and most hurt, if the labor market were to suddenly deteriorate or if inflation were to remain too high.

Economic activity To turn to economic activity, recent readings are consistent with solid overall growth. Output has been supported by household consumption that has held up better than expected earlier this year. Yet, what has been more striking is the strength of business investment. Business investment has been driven by investment in high-tech equipment and software, seemingly mostly related to AI. As I have mentioned in previous speeches, that suggests to me there is a reason to be sanguine about future productivity growth.3 I see AI as a general-purpose technology, on par with the steam engine and the personal computer, that has the potential to transform the economy and boost productivity. I expect this sector to continue to provide support to output growth over the next few years, at least.

In the very near term, I see the federal government shutdown as weighing on activity this quarter. Furloughing federal workers and forgoing government purchases of goods and services, including those provided by contractors, directly lowers output in the public sector. And spillover effects to the private sector are worth considering. Potential delays in government payments, permits, inspections, insurance provision and other functions could slow certain spending and investment activities, and some small business contractors with very little cushion may never be paid and may ultimately close their businesses. I see both sets of effects as being largely temporary. It is anticipated that they would unwind in the following quarter after the shutdown ends.

In summary, after a temporary slowdown due to the government shutdown, I expect the economy to grow moderately over the medium term, supported by an AI productivity boom. I see the labor market as still solid, but I am highly attentive to downside risks. I see inflation as remaining somewhat elevated due to tariff effects and subject to upside risks.

Monetary Policy Having articulated my outlook, I will turn to my current view of monetary policy. At the FOMC meeting last week, I supported the Committee's decision to lower the target range for the fed funds rate by a quarter-point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent. I viewed that decision as appropriate, because I believe that the downside risks to employment are greater than the upside risks to inflation. I view the latest reduction in the fed funds rate as another gradual step toward normalization. I see the current policy rate as remaining modestly restrictive, which is appropriate given that inflation remains somewhat above our 2 percent target.

At last week's meeting, I also supported the decision to conclude the reduction of the aggregate securities holdings on the balance sheet on December 1. The long-stated plan had been to stop balance sheet runoff when reserves were somewhat above the level the Committee deemed consistent with ample reserve conditions. In the several weeks ahead of our latest meeting, signs, such as an increase in repo rates relative to administered rates, did emerge suggesting this standard had been reached. These developments were anticipated as the size of the balance sheet declined and supported the decision to cease runoff.

Looking ahead, policy is not on a predetermined path. We are at a moment when risks to both sides of the dual mandate are elevated. Keeping rates too high increases the likelihood that the labor market will deteriorate sharply. Lowering rates too much would increase the likelihood that inflation expectations will become unanchored. As always, I determine my monetary policy stance each meeting based on the incoming data from a wide variety of sources, the evolution of my outlook, and the balance of risks. Every meeting, including December's, is a live meeting.

Thank you again for the opportunity to return to Brookings. I look forward to our conversation.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Nov 3, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierOct 4, 2025Publication referenceNov 3, 202530 days laterDec 3, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.34%Observed 6.17%Observed −17 bps vs. earlier reference6.23%Observed +6 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.13%Observed 4.13%Observed Unchanged vs. earlier reference4.06%Observed −7 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Aug 3, 2025 – Feb 3, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Nov 3, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Aug 7, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 14, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 21, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.56% · Aug 28, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Sep 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Sep 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Sep 25, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.34% · Oct 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Oct 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Oct 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.17% · Oct 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Nov 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.24% · Nov 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Nov 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Jan 22, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.10% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Aug 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Aug 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Sep 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Sep 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Sep 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Sep 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Sep 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Sep 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Sep 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Sep 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Sep 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Sep 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Oct 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Oct 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 15, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 20, 202510-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 21, 202510-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 27, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Nov 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Nov 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 202610-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jan 20, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 21, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 22, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 23, 202610-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jan 26, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 27, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 28, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 29, 202610-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jan 30, 202610-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.28% · Feb 3, 2026Aug 3, 2025Nov 3, 2025Feb 3, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,831.57/month

6.17% · Oct 30, 2025

At the later reference$1,843.25/month

6.23% · Nov 26, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $11.68 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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