Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Cutting Rates in the Face of Conflicting Data — Governor Christopher J. Waller

Since the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) last meeting on September 16 and 17, economic data have tended to support my view of a labor market that is softening and inflation—absent temporary tariff effects—that is running fairly…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, Tom, and thank you to the Council on Foreign Relations for the opportunity to speak to you today.1

Since the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) last meeting on September 16 and 17, economic data have tended to support my view of a labor market that is softening and inflation—absent temporary tariff effects—that is running fairly close to the FOMC's 2 percent target. Based on what I know today, I support continued easing of monetary policy from its current setting, which I judge is moderately restricting aggregate demand and economic activity. But I also see a conflict right now between data showing solid growth in economic activity and data showing a softening labor market.2 So, something's gotta give—either economic growth softens to match a soft labor market, or the labor market rebounds to match stronger economic growth. Since we don't know which way the data will break on this conflict, we need to move with care when adjusting the policy rate to ensure we don't make a mistake that will be costly to correct. I believe that how that process plays out in the coming months will have a significant impact on the path of monetary policy.

Resolving this conflict has been complicated by the government shutdown, which has delayed important economic data that policymakers and the public rely on to judge economic conditions. Although private-sector data alternatives are available and a helpful complement to official statistics, they are less informative when they stand alone. The delay in the September employment report in particular makes it harder to know whether the labor market is continuing to soften or is stabilizing. The shutdown also delayed today's retail sales report for September, which would help show if household spending is continuing to support solid growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) or if there are signs of slower spending that forecasters have been expecting for some time. Yesterday's and today's releases on consumer and producer prices were also delayed, data that is important in judging the impact of higher import tariffs and progress toward the FOMC's price-stability goal. The Administration has recalled some Labor Department employees to complete and release the consumer price inflation report on October 24—in time to inform the FOMC's policy decision five days later.

To deal with this lack of public data, I spend a lot of my time talking to business contacts, whose views help me form my outlook for the economy. So far that input tends to support—rather than resolve—the contrast we have seen between strong economic activity and a softening labor market. Employers indicate to me that there was some further softening of the labor market last month, while retailers report continued solid spending, with a bit of caution from lower-income households.

In the balance of these remarks, I will examine other information we have on economic activity, inflation, and the labor market, and what this implies for monetary policy. While I feel confident, based on what I know today, that monetary policy should take another step toward a more neutral setting at the FOMC's next meeting, the path of appropriate policy beyond that point will be influenced by how the conflict between data on economic activity and the labor market is resolved and the expected path of inflation.

While there are times when the data are consistent and paint a clear picture, the economy is vast and complex, and it is quite often the case that some of the data we look at will point in a different direction from other data and make that picture of the economy fuzzy. Almost every month, I need to use some judgment in sifting signal from noise in the economic data—it is just part of the job of economic forecasting and policymaking. Less often, but often enough, the conflicts in the data are consequential for the outlook. For example, recall that in the first half of 2022, the data were creating a puzzle: GDP was contracting while the economy created 2.7 million jobs.3 These conflicting data on the performance of the economy complicated the decision on how to set the policy rate. We are facing a similar problem today.

I have been referring to the surprisingly strong data on economic activity, so let's start there. After real GDP expanded 2.8 percent last year, it slowed in the first half of this year. GDP—after smoothing through the modest contraction in the first quarter and robust growth of 3.8 percent in the second quarter—grew around 1.6 percent in the first half. This pattern of GDP growth is partially a result of consumption growth that showed a similar pattern. Slower growth in spending and GDP made sense based on the restrictive setting of monetary policy, but it was stronger than many expected with the imposition of sizable tariffs. And after not observing the effects of tariffs on household spending in the first half of the year, many thought it would show up in the third quarter. Yet, the data we have for the third quarter indicate that growth has accelerated. Looking across all the available data, the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model is projecting another quarter of GDP growth close to 4 percent, while the Blue Chip consensus of private-sector forecasts has a prediction of 2.5 percent. Even if the published estimate is closer to 2.5 percent, that is still not consistent with a labor market that has barely created any jobs since May.

One sign that GDP may be expanding closer to the lower end of these estimates is that business conditions seemed a bit softer in September, based on surveys of purchasing managers. The manufacturing sector continued to contract slightly—as it has since March. Purchasing managers for the large majority of businesses that are outside manufacturing reported a slowdown from August to a level that is at the breakeven point between expansion and contraction.

Something that will affect the growth rate of GDP in the fourth quarter is the federal government shutdown. If it is resolved in the next couple of weeks without major changes in government staffing or funding, the shutdown will lower GDP growth several tenths of a percentage point in the fourth quarter and raise it the same amount in the first quarter of next year. But if the shutdown lasts considerably longer and does result in permanent staffing and spending cuts, then the drag in the fourth quarter could be larger and the bounceback smaller.

Let me now turn to inflation. Twelve-month personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation rose in August to 2.7 percent, and core PCE inflation was up 2.9 percent—both above the FOMC's 2 percent target. Compared with an earlier era, when inflation ran close to 2 percent—from 2002 through 2007—core goods inflation is now running a half a percentage point higher, and research by Federal Reserve Board staff and others indicates that most of this is due to the effects of tariffs. Though a partial pass-through of tariffs will permanently raise the price level, tariffs will only temporarily affect the rate of inflation. The FOMC does not target the price level, but it does target 2 percent inflation over the longer run. Since I expect tariff effects on inflation to fade in the coming months, what matters for monetary policy is the rate of inflation outside of tariffs, and estimates by Federal Reserve staff indicate that this underlying rate of inflation is running fairly close to our target.4 With market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations apparently well anchored and a soft labor market keeping down wage demands, I judge that inflation is on a path to a sustained level of 2 percent and should not itself be a barrier to moving monetary policy toward a more neutral setting.

Given this benign view of inflation, I believe the ultimate disposition of the labor market will be the more salient factor affecting monetary policy. As I said, the broad message of all the labor market data is one of weakening in demand, relative to supply, even with substantially lower net immigration and a decline in labor force participation this year. Monthly job creation went from an average of 111,000 in the first quarter to 55,000 in the second, and the latest official report for August was 22,000. The numbers are nearly the same for the private sector, which I consider a better guide to the overall labor market. Furthermore, based on an estimate of the benchmark revision to the level of employment in March 2025 and extrapolating forward for the rest of this year, when the revisions are released next year it is likely that payroll employment has actually fallen, on net, since May. If the economy is growing as healthily as spending and GDP data indicate, I would expect that employment would recover in the coming months to a positive but not high level, reflecting the reduced labor supply that I just mentioned. However, if spending and GDP growth slow, and better reflect an economy that doesn't seem to be creating jobs, then the labor market may continue to soften.

With the absence of the September employment report, we must rely on other data for a sense of what happened last month. Alternative labor market data for September present a mixed picture of how things are evolving. Private-sector employment tracked by the payroll services firm ADP points to continued slowing in job creation. ADP estimates that private employment fell 32,000 in September after falling 3,000 in August. The company said that "job creation continued to lose momentum across most sectors."5 Data on job postings on the online job search firm Indeed also point to a continued gradual reduction in employment but don't signal of a significant downturn in hiring.

Indeed's openings data are useful in the absence of the September jobs report because, over time, they line up closely with another report for September that may be delayed: the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The JOLTS data, available through August, have been echoing what I have been hearing consistently from my business contacts, which is that firms are holding on to workers but are not backfilling positions or planning to expand hiring. Total separations are quite low by historical standards, and both layoffs and the number of people voluntarily quitting their jobs are low. At the same time, the hiring rate has continued to fall and, outside of the pandemic recession, is at its lowest level since 2012.

This situation may appear fairly stable, but I find this "no hire, no fire" stance by employers a bit ominous. It is possible that many employers who found it hard to find qualified workers during the pandemic are especially reluctant to let them go, even in the face of considerable uncertainty about demand and staffing levels in the future. But when workers do leave, they are not being replaced. Businesses have reported that hiring and expansion are "on pause," but some of my business contacts say that they can't wait forever and will soon have to decide whether more or fewer employees are needed. Both business and consumer surveys conducted by the New York Fed signal an upturn in expectations about future levels of unemployment.6

Looking further ahead, I can see two possible paths for the labor market.

On the one hand, we could see a stabilization of the labor market—in essence, it could move toward the story that consumption and GDP seem to be telling. Despite more than three years of restrictive monetary policy, spending has proved very resilient. Most forecasts called for a significant step-down in the pace of PCE growth this year, but that sizable slowdown hasn't happened. One factor that may help explain this is that the savings rate has been revised notably upward, resulting in higher disposable personal income and more support for spending. It is possible that resilient spending will help convince businesses to maintain staffing and even expand in the coming months, bringing about a recovery in job creation. Another possibility is that r*—the interest rate below which monetary policy stimulates demand—is higher than most forecasters believe. If this were true, then the current setting of monetary policy may not be holding back demand and economic activity very much, which would have implications for how quickly the FOMC should lower the policy rate.

Those are some reasons why the labor market may strengthen and validate the story being told, based on what we know so far, about economic activity in the third quarter. On the other hand, there are some reasons why the labor market could continue to soften while GDP growth steps down to a more moderate pace. For me, one of them is how dependent consumption is on a relatively small number of higher-income consumers. The highest-earning 10 percent of households are responsible for 22 percent of personal consumption. The top 20 percent of households spend 35 percent of the total. Their share of stock market wealth is even more skewed, and lots of research shows that these consumers are fairly unaffected by higher prices, higher unemployment, or a slower economy. The bottom 60 percent of earners represent 45 percent of consumption and hold only 15 percent of wealth. Their spending decisions are much more likely to be affected by prices, financing conditions, and job availability. I have heard from business contacts that this group has been affected by higher prices this year and is already changing its spending plans to find better value.

That view was echoed in the Federal Reserve's recently released Beige Book, which is a survey of business contacts.7 The consensus view across the country is that while consumer spending inched down in recent weeks, spending by higher-income households on luxury travel and accommodation was strong; lower- and middle-income households continued to seek discounts and promotions in the face of rising prices and elevated economic uncertainty. At what point do higher prices prompt a larger cutback in spending by middle- and lower-income people?

Another reason for a greater weakening of the labor market is that artificial intelligence (AI) may reduce demand for workers. Over the past few months, retailers have told me that they will reduce employment next year because of the efficiency gains from AI. Firms are saying that they can and will replace workers in call centers and IT support with AI robots. This echoes what I read recently about the largest private employer in the United States: Walmart. Walmart says that despite expectations of solid sales growth, it plans to hold net employment steady for the next three years as AI replaces or transforms different roles at the company.

That said, while AI adoption is widespread among large firms, it is not nearly as common among smaller firms, which account for a large share of the U.S. economy, so the impact of AI on labor demand is uncertain. The implication of this for monetary policy is not so clear. Monetary policy addresses cyclical fluctuations in the economy, but if AI constitutes a structural shift in the demand for labor, monetary policy will not be an effective tool. Overall, I see AI as a short-term risk for the labor market, but, in the long run, AI should bring productivity gains that will be welfare improving.8

So where does all this leave monetary policy? Tariffs have modest effects on inflation, but with underlying inflation close to our goal and expectations of future inflation well anchored, I believe we are on track toward the FOMC's 2 percent goal. As a result, my focus is on the labor market, where payroll gains have weakened this year and employment may well be shrinking already. Lower labor supply has surely reduced what would be a good monthly rate of job creation, but I am very skeptical that it could be zero, or a negative number. Based on all of the data we have on the labor market, I believe that the FOMC should reduce the policy rate another 25 basis points at our meeting that concludes October 29. But beyond that point, I will be looking for how the solid GDP data reconcile with the softening labor market.

If GDP growth holds up or accelerates and the labor market accordingly recovers, it might be an indication that policy is less restrictive than I thought and that the pace toward a neutral setting for the policy rate should be slower than I expected at the last FOMC meeting. What I would want to avoid is rekindling inflationary pressure by moving too quickly and squandering the significant progress we have made taming inflation.

On the other hand, if the labor market continues to soften or even weaken and inflation remains in check, then I believe the FOMC should proceed to reduce the policy rate toward a neutral level, which I judge is about 100 to 125 basis points lower than it is today. The labor market has been sending some clear warnings lately, and we should be ready to act if those warnings are validated by what we learn in the coming weeks and months.

Thank you.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 16, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 16, 2025Publication referenceOct 16, 202530 days laterNov 15, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.35%Observed 6.27%Observed −8 bps vs. earlier reference6.24%Observed −3 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.04%Observed 3.99%Observed −5 bps vs. earlier reference4.14%Observed +15 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 16, 2025 – Jan 16, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 16, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.75% · Jul 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.74% · Jul 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Aug 7, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 14, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 21, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.56% · Aug 28, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Sep 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Sep 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Sep 25, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.34% · Oct 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Oct 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Oct 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.17% · Oct 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Nov 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.24% · Nov 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Nov 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202630-year fixed mortgage: 6.06% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jul 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jul 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.44% · Jul 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Jul 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · Jul 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Aug 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Aug 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Sep 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Sep 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Sep 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Sep 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Sep 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Sep 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Sep 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Sep 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Sep 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Sep 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Oct 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Oct 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 15, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 20, 202510-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 21, 202510-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 27, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Nov 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Nov 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 12, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 13, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 14, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 15, 202610-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jan 16, 2026Jul 16, 2025Oct 16, 2025Jan 16, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury127 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,851.06/month

6.27% · Oct 16, 2025

At the later reference$1,845.20/month

6.24% · Nov 13, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $5.85 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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