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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Community Banking: Looking Toward the Future — Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle W. Bowman

As we wrap up today's conference, I would like to thank all of the moderators and presenters on today's panels. And of course, Secretary Bessent for sharing his perspectives on community banks, and the many community bankers, and state…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

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As we wrap up today's conference, I would like to thank all of the moderators and presenters on today's panels. And of course, Secretary Bessent for sharing his perspectives on community banks, and the many community bankers, and state bank regulators and others who attended today's event in person or virtually. I would also like to recognize our staff whose hard work made today's conference possible.

Community banks drive local and regional economic growth, and they play a central role in the financial health of the customers and communities they serve.1 These banks often pursue unique business models—ones that are not easily replicated by larger banks, including the relationship banking model that is a central tenet of community banking. In today's environment, many community banks are embracing innovation and continuing to evolve to better serve their customers in the current and future financial system. The focus of today's conference has been on community banks, how they continue to innovate, and how they rise to the challenge to support their customers as the financial landscape continues to change.

Legislators and regulators are also rising to the challenge to ensure that the community banking system continues to thrive, through the critical task of ensuring that supervision and regulation are appropriately tailored. Our support for community banks cannot just be lip service; it must translate into specific actions that right-size regulation and apply appropriate supervisory standards, specifically in identifying the appropriate definition of a community bank, in establishing appropriately tailored regulatory thresholds, and in approaching supervision focused on material financial risk.

So, what is a community bank for this purpose? Generally, the regulatory framework uses the blunt tool of fixed asset thresholds. We know that relying solely on fixed asset thresholds is imperfect, at best. They fail to account for economic growth and inflation over time, resulting in firms with stable growth, consistent business models, and no change in risk profile crossing asset thresholds. These firms become subject to increasingly complex and burdensome regulatory requirements and supervisory expectations. This is clearly not the intended or desired outcome, in that crossing these fixed thresholds has the unintended consequence of "pushing down" standards designed for larger and more complex banks to smaller and less complex ones. Compounding this problem is the overlapping and inconsistent thresholds used to define banks of different sizes and engaged in different activities. We should ask whether this additional complexity is necessary or even helpful, and to what extent it impairs economic growth.

A simple fix would be for policymakers to adjust the community bank and other thresholds based on growth—and apply that adjusted threshold consistently—indexed to adjust for future growth. This approach would preserve the policy choice established when the threshold was initially set.

Defining a community bank is an important first step, but it is just that, a first step. The next question is how to appropriately tailor regulations for these and other firms. Over the years, I have supported an approach to regulation grounded in asking some simple—but critical—threshold questions. What problem does each new and existing regulation solve? What are the costs of this approach? And importantly, what alternative approaches are available? When we look back at existing regulations, we can clearly identify areas for improvement. For example, the community bank leverage ratio, or "CBLR," was designed as an optional alternative framework to risk-based capital requirements for community banks. A community bank that opts into the CBLR framework and complies with the established ratio is deemed to comply with risk-based capital requirements.

But if we look back at the history of the CBLR, the agencies approached the task of calibration primarily by evaluating how many banks would be eligible to opt in and calibrating the requirement to maintain the same high level of capital in this population of banks. In my view, this approach failed to achieve the relief Congress intended, and more fundamentally, failed to answer the critical questions we must consider in the rulemaking process.

Let me turn to another area that needs to be addressed, the applications process. This process can also negatively impact community banks. It requires banks to seek approval from the Federal Reserve and other state and federal regulators for regulatory permission to engage in a transaction or activity. But this process can be unpredictable in terms of timing and information necessary to be ripe for consideration and approval. The costs of delay can be significant, damaging the value of the target bank, creating uncertainty for bank employees and customers, and resulting in costly delays for critical systems, integration contracts, and service agreements, potentially damaging the reputation of both firms.

The remedy is simple—regulatory application review should be effective, timely, and efficient. Banks should have a clear understanding of the information they must provide to complete the application well in advance. The standards for approval must be clearly defined and available to the public. And regulators should be prepared to act on a complete application within the statutory time frames. We have an opportunity to take a new approach, and we are doing so. We cannot accept the opacity of the status quo, especially when the "fix" is as simple as clear standards, clear forms, and prompt attention to and action on applications.

One area where we have improved transparency relates to mutual bank capital, which I have spoken about a number of times. Yesterday, the Board issued a series of frequently asked questions and two templates for mutual banks to use as they consider engaging in raising capital. These provide options for mutual banks to issue capital instruments that could qualify as tier 1 common equity or as additional tier 1 equity. These approaches are just a start—we are open to further refinement and improvement once mutuals have an opportunity to review and work to implement this new approach.

I will conclude with a discussion about how we ensure that the supervisory process is appropriate for community banks. Regulators are once again working to incorporate "tailoring" to more effectively allocate supervisory and bank staffing resources. This allows the calibration of supervisory activities that are appropriate to a bank's size, risk, complexity, and business model. This approach is not new, but it has simply been ignored in recent years. Regulators have significant leeway in designing supervisory approaches, which may include issuing guidance that is technically non-binding but often plays a role similar to a regulatory requirement.

How do we address this problem?

First, through greater transparency. Supervisory practices often escape public and internal scrutiny. They are developed with little public input, and they are not subject to public notice and comment requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act. Supervisory practices are not scrutinized after an exam because of the activity's designation as "confidential supervisory information" (CSI). "CSI" includes a broad array of bank and supervisory materials and actions taken in an exam context. The Fed continues to revise and redirect our supervisory practices, including the shift in focus toward material financial risk. These efforts would be most effective if accompanied by revisions to the definition and scope of CSI, which would promote greater public transparency and accountability.

Second, calibration of supervisory standards. Supervisory findings inform bank ratings, which can have follow-on effects like limiting options for mergers and acquisitions activity; raising the cost of liquidity; or diverting resources away from other, more important bank management priorities. We need to ensure that supervisory practices are appropriately calibrated so that a bank's supervisory ratings reflect its financial condition and material financial risks.

Closing Thoughts Before we close out today's conference, I would like to again thank all of our attendees, both those here with us and those online. We appreciate the continued support for community banks across the United States. I would especially like to thank the community bankers who work tirelessly to support their customers, businesses, and local economies. Thank you for joining us today.

In my role as the Vice Chair for Supervision, my responsibilities extend across banks of all sizes, from the largest GSIB to a single-branch community bank operating in an underserved rural market. The Fed's regulatory and supervisory approaches to this wide range of firms must be tailored to address the unique characteristics of each type and size of institution. A one-size-fits-all approach that pushes down requirements from the larger banks to the smallest ones results in overregulation and excessive supervision that is not appropriate for the size, risk, complexity, and business model of community banks. Today, we have the opportunity to right-size the frameworks for each size of institution, and I look forward to working together with my colleagues at the FDIC and OCC to accomplish this goal, through sensible reforms and more appropriate supervisory approaches.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 9, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 9, 2025Publication referenceOct 9, 202530 days laterNov 8, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.50%Observed 6.30%Observed −20 bps vs. earlier reference6.22%Observed −8 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.08%Observed 4.14%Observed +6 bps vs. earlier reference4.11%Observed −3 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 9, 2025 – Jan 9, 2026
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 9, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 10, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.75% · Jul 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.74% · Jul 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Aug 7, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 14, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 21, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.56% · Aug 28, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Sep 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Sep 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Sep 25, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.34% · Oct 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Oct 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Oct 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.17% · Oct 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Nov 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.24% · Nov 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Nov 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.23% · Nov 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.19% · Dec 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.22% · Dec 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.21% · Dec 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.18% · Dec 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.15% · Dec 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.16% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.50% · Jul 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jul 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jul 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.44% · Jul 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Jul 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · Jul 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Aug 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Aug 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Sep 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Sep 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Sep 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Sep 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Sep 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Sep 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Sep 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Sep 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Sep 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Sep 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Oct 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Oct 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 15, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 20, 202510-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 21, 202510-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 27, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Oct 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Nov 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Nov 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Nov 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Nov 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Nov 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Nov 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.00% · Nov 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Nov 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.09% · Dec 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Dec 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Dec 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Dec 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Dec 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Dec 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Dec 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Dec 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 2, 202610-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jan 5, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 6, 202610-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jan 7, 202610-year Treasury: 4.19% · Jan 8, 202610-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jan 9, 2026Jul 9, 2025Oct 9, 2025Jan 9, 2026
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury127 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,856.92/month

6.30% · Oct 9, 2025

At the later reference$1,841.30/month

6.22% · Nov 6, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $15.62 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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