Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

The Case for Cutting Now — Governor Christopher J. Waller

My purpose this evening is to explain why I believe that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) should reduce our policy rate by 25 basis points at our next meeting.1 I used to tell my junior research colleagues that presentations are…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, John, and thank you for the invitation to speak to you today.

My purpose this evening is to explain why I believe that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) should reduce our policy rate by 25 basis points at our next meeting.1 I used to tell my junior research colleagues that presentations are not murder mysteries—just tell the audience up front "who did it" by telling them the main point. So let me follow my own advice and state up front the reasons I believe we should cut the policy rate at our meeting in two weeks.

First, tariffs are one-off increases in the price level and do not cause inflation beyond a temporary surge. Standard central banking practice is to "look through" such price-level effects as long as inflation expectations are anchored, which they are.

Second, a host of data argues that monetary policy should be close to neutral, not restrictive. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth was likely around 1 percent in the first half of this year and is expected to remain soft for the rest of 2025, much lower than the median of FOMC participants' estimates of longer-run GDP growth. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate is 4.1 percent, near the Committee's longer-run estimate, and headline inflation is close to our target at just slightly above 2 percent if we put aside tariff effects that I believe will be temporary. Taken together, the data imply the policy rate should be around neutral, which the median of FOMC participants estimates is 3 percent, and not where we are—1.25 to 1.50 percentage points above 3 percent.

My final reason to favor a cut now is that while the labor market looks fine on the surface, once we account for expected data revisions, private-sector payroll growth is near stall speed, and other data suggest that the downside risks to the labor market have increased. With inflation near target and the upside risks to inflation limited, we should not wait until the labor market deteriorates before we cut the policy rate.

Let me explain my reasoning by starting with my view of economic activity. Given the ups and downs of monthly indicators of GDP this year, we can best get a view of the performance of the economy by combining the first- and second-quarter numbers. With the data in hand, estimates suggest that real GDP increased at an annual rate of about 1 percent in the first half of this year, compared with 2.8 percent in the second half of 2024. That comparison is important not only for the extent of the slowdown, which is considerable, but also because it is well below most estimates of the potential growth rate of the economy. Based on forward-looking indicators, I don't expect a rebound in the second half—in fact, most forecasts suggest that real GDP growth will remain around 1 percent at an annual rate. While the recent tax bill has a significant number of elements that will spur economic growth in the future, not much of those effects will show up this year.

The slowdown in GDP is evident in consumer spending, which constitutes about two-thirds of economic activity. After hovering near 3 percent last year, real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) growth is estimated to have stepped down to 1 percent in the first half of this year. This morning the Commerce Department announced June retail sales. The data are consistent with this forecast, as the increase is on the heels of a couple of soft monthly readings. As we move forward this year, consumer spending is expected to continue to grow at a similar pace, tempered by the expected slowing in growth of real disposable income because of the temporary effects of tariff increases. I will say more about tariffs when I discuss inflation, but in assessing the near-term momentum of the economy, tariffs could well be a factor.

Turning to the "soft" data, this picture of declining momentum is consistent with what I am hearing from my business contacts and other sources. The Fed's July 16th Beige Book reported mixed evidence on economic activity across Federal Reserve Districts, with 5 reporting slight or modest gains and the remaining 7 having flat or declining activity.2 This mixed news is also found in surveys of purchasing managers where there is a continuing contraction in manufacturing and a slight expansion in nonmanufacturing activity. Given that firms outside manufacturing represent the large majority of businesses, this implies a modest expansion in activity.

Now let's talk about the labor market. The headline numbers from the June jobs report looked reassuring—the unemployment rate stands at 4.1 percent, within the range it has been for the past year, and payroll gains were reported as 147,000, essentially the same as in May. But looking a little deeper, I see reasons to be concerned. Half of the payroll gain came from state and local government, a sector of employment that is notoriously difficult to seasonally adjust this time of year. In contrast, private payroll employment grew just 74,000, a much smaller gain than in the previous two months, and that is consistent with other surveys you might have read about that found a drop in private-sector employment.3 I focus on private-sector employment not only because it is the lion's share of employment, but also because it is a better guide to the cyclical movement in employment than counting public and private sector together. As I used to tell my students, the Federal Reserve's job should be to maximize private-sector employment, not government employment.

And there is another reason to cite the slowdown in private-sector hiring. A pattern in data revisions in recent years tells us that the private payroll data are being overestimated and will be revised down significantly when the benchmark revision occurs in early 2026. Accounting for the anticipated revision to the level of employment in March 2025 and extrapolating forward, private-sector employment gains last month were much closer to zero.4 This is why I say private-sector payroll gains are near stall speed and flashing red.

This is only one month of data, I realize, and one possible factor in the slowdown in private-sector hiring could be a deceleration in net immigration this year, although it will take time to get a clear picture of how immigration is affecting employment. But other data support the idea of a slowdown in hiring. There are widespread media reports of the difficulty new college graduates are encountering in finding jobs, and, in fact, the unemployment rate for new grads is at a 10-year high, far above the level before the pandemic.5

Looking across the soft and hard data, I get a picture of a labor market on the edge. The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey reports continued low rates of firing but also low rates of hiring. I suspect this is a hangover of a labor market that was very tight after the pandemic, leaving employers resistant to let go of qualified workers for fear of renewed labor shortages. That said, purchasing managers report caution and even some pauses on hiring. The June 4th Beige Book reported declining labor demand in every single Federal Reserve District, and the July 16th Beige Book emphasized that labor demand continued to be less than labor supply in many industries. With hiring already low, at a certain point, declining demand would overcome any instinct to hold on to workers, and if that attitude does shift, it implies that a larger and more sudden reduction in payrolls and an increase in the unemployment rate are a risk.

To sum up here, I see the hard and soft data on economic activity and the labor market as consistent: The economy is still growing, but its momentum has slowed significantly, and the risks to the FOMC's employment mandate have increased.

Let's turn to the inflation data. In the past two days, we received June consumer and producer price data that give us a good idea of the inflation rate based on PCE, the FOMC's benchmark for monetary policy. After several months of readings that moved the 12-month inflation rate closer to the FOMC's target, the consumer price index and the producer price index suggest that total PCE inflation moved up to around 2.5 percent in June, and core inflation likewise rose to roughly 2.7 percent. I believe these data reflect some modest effect from tariff increases, which began in February, and I believe there are further tariff-induced increases to inflation to come later this year, with the asterisk that there remains a lot of uncertainty about how trade agreements or escalations in trade conflicts may affect that outcome.

To understand how tariffs are affecting prices, I have been following not only the Bureau of Labor Statistics monthly data, but also studies of high frequency price data. For example, some researchers this year are tracking the short-run price impact of tariffs on goods prices in real time by examining product-level price data from online stores of large U.S. retailers.6 Using data through mid-July, they find that, on net, imported goods prices have increased modestly while domestic goods prices are little changed. Looking across country of origin, Chinese goods imports have seen the most persistent and steady price increases. That said, to date, the data point to very small goods price increases relative to the size of the tariff rates.

This finding is consistent with my view that a large share of tariff increases won't be passed through to consumers. My presumption has been that consumers will have to pay about one-third of the price increases from higher tariffs, with the remainder split between foreign suppliers and U.S. importers. So if there is a permanent increase to import tariffs of about 10 percent, I expect this will raise PCE inflation three-tenths of 1 percent this year, and that this increase would fade over the next year or so.7

I can think of a couple of other reasons that may limit the impact on consumers. The first is that the slowing down of the rollout of many tariffs, with multiple postponements for continuing negotiations, may be giving U.S. importers time to substitute finished or intermediate goods to domestic suppliers or foreign sources subject to lower tariffs. A second reason is that, faced with the slowing economy that I have described and the likelihood that tariffs will be weighing on consumer spending, foreign producers and importers may be finding ways to hold the line on prices to maintain their presence on store shelves and hold on to customers. In fact, slowing demand increases competition for all firms, and consumers may benefit. Finally, despite all of the discussion of supply chain disruptions, tariff effects on supply chains are completely different than what happened during the pandemic. In the pandemic, supply chains were actually broken: Many workers were not working, factories were idle, and waves of COVID were hitting at asynchronous times across the globe. In contrast, in the case of the higher tariffs, we know exactly where things are being produced, and nothing is broken—firms are simply arguing about prices and who will eat the tariffs. Once that gets resolved, goods will flow naturally across the globe but potentially using different routes.

It is possible, of course, that tariffs may have a larger effect on inflation than I expect, but that won't affect my view of the implications for monetary policy. As I have said many times, tariff increases are a one-time boost to prices that do not sustainably increase inflation. In the absence of an unanchoring of inflation expectations and an acceleration of wage growth, which we have not seen, tariffs won't and can't permanently increase the inflation rate. What does this mean for monetary policy? Research shows that central bankers should—and, in fact, do—look through price-level shocks to avoid needlessly tightening policy in times like these and damaging the economy.8

The key question for monetary policy right now is what we can discern about the underlying rate of inflation—that is, the rate excluding tariffs—based on the fundamentals of the economy. Federal Reserve Board staff has done work to try to estimate tariff effects on PCE prices.9 Using that methodology, if I subtract estimated tariff effects from the reported inflation data, I find the inflation numbers for the past few months would have been quite close to our 2 percent goal. You're not going to hear "mission accomplished" from me, but what this tells me is that underlying inflation has been lower than what is reported and close to our objective.

Besides tariffs, I don't expect an undesirable, sustained increase in inflation from other forces. Among the reasons for this are that the rate of growth in labor compensation is down considerably in the past year or two, and, with the softening labor market, I do not expect workers will be able to get large wage increases going forward. Combining this with solid rates of productivity growth implies inflation should continue around 2 percent.

Two more points support my inflation outlook, and I will only summarize them here since I discussed them at length in my June outlook speech.10 The first addresses the question of whether I could be making the same kind of mistake my FOMC colleagues and I made in 2021 and 2022 in expecting inflation increases to be only transitory when they turned out to be persistent. But unlike then, there is no pandemic disrupting labor, goods, and services supply around the world, and economic growth is now slow and slowing, rather than expanding rapidly. These differences bring me to the second point, which is that unlike in 2021 and 2022, when expectations of future inflation rose, today the measures of expectations I watch remain firmly anchored.11

To sum up, tariffs have boosted, and will continue to boost, inflation a bit above the FOMC's 2 percent objective this year, but policy should look through tariff effects and focus on underlying inflation, which seems to be close to the FOMC's 2 percent goal, and I do not see any concern for forces driving it persistently higher.

As I hope will be evident by now, the evidence of a slowing economy, and all the factors I have cited weighing on economic activity, mean that the risks to the FOMC's employment mandate are greater, and sufficient to warrant an adjustment in the stance of monetary policy. Based on June's Summary of Economic Projections, the current target range for the federal funds rate of 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent is 125 to 150 basis points above the participants' median estimates of the longer-run federal funds rate of 3 percent. While I sometimes hear the view that policy is only modestly restrictive, this is not my definition of "modestly."

In fact, the distance that must be traveled to reach a neutral policy setting weighs heavily on my judgment that the time has come to resume moving in that direction. In June, a majority of FOMC participants believed it would be appropriate to reduce our policy rate at least two times in 2025, and there are four meetings left. I also believe—and I hope the case I have made is convincing—that the risks to the economy are weighted toward cutting sooner rather than later. If the slowing of economic and employment growth were to accelerate and warrant moving toward a more neutral setting more quickly, then waiting until September or even later in the year would risk us falling behind the curve of appropriate policy. However, if we cut our target range in July and subsequent employment and inflation data point toward fewer cuts, we would have the option of holding policy steady for one or more meetings.

For this reason, I believe it makes sense to cut the FOMC's policy rate by 25 basis points two weeks from now. And looking to later this year, if, as I expect, underlying inflation remains in check—with headline inflation data reporting modest, temporary increases from tariffs that are not unanchoring inflation expectations—and the economy continues to grow slowly, I would support further 25 basis point cuts to move monetary policy toward neutral.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jul 17, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJun 17, 2025Publication referenceJul 17, 202530 days laterAug 16, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.84%Observed 6.75%Observed −9 bps vs. earlier reference6.58%Observed −17 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.39%Observed 4.47%Observed +8 bps vs. earlier reference4.33%Observed −14 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Apr 17, 2025 – Oct 17, 2025
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jul 17, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.25%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.83% · Apr 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Apr 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · May 1, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · May 8, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · May 15, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.86% · May 22, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.89% · May 29, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Jun 5, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.84% · Jun 12, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Jun 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.77% · Jun 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Jul 3, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 10, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.75% · Jul 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.74% · Jul 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Aug 7, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 14, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 21, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.56% · Aug 28, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Sep 4, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 11, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.26% · Sep 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Sep 25, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.34% · Oct 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.30% · Oct 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Apr 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Apr 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Apr 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Apr 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Apr 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · May 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · May 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.36% · May 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · May 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · May 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · May 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · May 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.49% · May 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.53% · May 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · May 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.48% · May 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.58% · May 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.54% · May 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.51% · May 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · May 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · May 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · Jun 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jun 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.51% · Jun 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.49% · Jun 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jun 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Jun 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.36% · Jun 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Jun 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.39% · Jun 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jun 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jun 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jun 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jun 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Jun 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jun 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Jun 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jun 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jul 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jul 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Jul 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.50% · Jul 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jul 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jul 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.44% · Jul 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Jul 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · Jul 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Aug 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Aug 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Sep 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Sep 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Sep 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.08% · Sep 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Sep 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Sep 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.04% · Sep 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Sep 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.11% · Sep 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Sep 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Sep 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Sep 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Sep 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Sep 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Sep 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.12% · Oct 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.18% · Oct 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.13% · Oct 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.05% · Oct 15, 202510-year Treasury: 3.99% · Oct 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 2025Apr 17, 2025Jul 17, 2025Oct 17, 2025
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury126 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,945.79/month

6.75% · Jul 17, 2025

At the later reference$1,912.02/month

6.58% · Aug 14, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $33.78 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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