Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

The Economic Outlook and Appropriate Monetary Policy — Governor Adriana D. Kugler

Thank you, Barbara, and thank you for the invitation to speak to you today. It is an honor to join other members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) who have addressed the Economic Club of New York over the years.1

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

THE PRIMARY SOURCE

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, Barbara, and thank you for the invitation to speak to you today. It is an honor to join other members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) who have addressed the Economic Club of New York over the years.1

My subject is the current state of the U.S. economy, the economic outlook, and the implications for monetary policy. The short version is that the labor market appears resilient and stable and economic activity is continuing to grow, although at a more moderate pace than in the second half of last year.

While the labor market is currently at or near the FOMC's goal of maximum employment, there is the prospect that trade and other policy changes could raise the unemployment rate and push employment away from our objective. These policies, especially higher import tariffs, could also raise inflation over the rest of this year. In fact, while progress toward the FOMC's goal of 2 percent inflation has continued, we have seen an escalation in goods inflation and data from surveys, and non-traditional sources point to some inflationary pressures as well.

In addition to increases in U.S. import tariffs and retaliatory increases in the tariffs foreign countries apply to U.S. exports, other policy changes, either proposed or already underway relate to immigration, fiscal policy and regulation. Those policies could affect economic conditions, and since it is the FOMC's job to set monetary policy that is best able to achieve our mandated goals of maximum employment and stable prices, we must consider the effects of these policies. So far, we are beginning to see the impact only of higher tariffs on inflation. Still, thinking about the outlook requires consideration of how the economy could be affected by all these policy changes moving forward.

It remains difficult to judge the current strength of economic activity, based on data through the first four months of 2025, primarily because of the front-loading of imports ahead of the implementation of tariffs. While real gross domestic product (GDP) declined slightly in the first quarter, that was largely because of a surge in imports ahead of anticipated tariff increases, a surge that will likely reverse. Putting aside fluctuations in trade and in inventories and focusing on the April data, personal income and consumption point to a slight moderation in economic activity. While personal disposable income increased at a healthy pace so far this year, consumption grew more slowly in April, which may indicate consumers are becoming more cautious. That said, there is considerable uncertainty about imports in the second quarter and uncertainty about the impact that higher prices will have on spending, so I will be looking for more evidence about economic activity in May ahead of the FOMC's next meeting, June 17 and 18.

One encouraging sign about economic activity is the resilience of the labor market. We will get the May employment report tomorrow, but the data in hand indicate that employment has continued to grow and that labor supply and demand remain in relative balance. In April, employers added 177,000 jobs, slightly higher than the average for the previous six months. The unemployment rate was steady in April at 4.2 percent, in the historically low range of 4 percent to 4.2 percent that it has remained in since May 2024. Data on job openings and quits for April likewise point to a resilient but somewhat looser labor market with a balance of supply and demand. The vacancy rate, a measure of demand for workers, was 4.4 percent, down from a peak of 7.4 percent three years ago and roughly the same level as just before the pandemic.2 The quits rate, an indicator of the confidence workers feel in finding a job, has been in the narrow range of 1.9 to 2.2 percent since December 2023, and just a bit below the average level in 2019.3

Ahead of tomorrow's employment report, other data that we have for May are generally consistent with this picture of the labor market but may suggest some cooling. The average of private-sector forecasters' predictions for total job creation is 130,000.4 Also, while the pace of job layoffs remained at historically low levels through the final week of May, based on the number of new claims for unemployment benefits, other measures suggest modest increases in layoffs. For instance, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifications (WARN notices) of layoffs have ticked up since the beginning of the year, as have the mentions of layoffs in the Fed's Beige Book survey and job cuts data reported by Challenger, Gray and Christmas.

The other side of the FOMC's dual mandate is price stability. Progress in lowering inflation toward the Committee's 2 percent target has slowed some since last summer, even if headline and core inflation have continued to decline. The FOMC's preferred inflation gauge, based on personal consumption expenditures (PCE), grew at a 2.1 percent annual rate in April. While that is quite close to the FOMC's target, it was dragged down by a decline in energy prices. Core inflation—which excludes volatile prices for food and energy and is a good guide to future inflation—came in at 2.5 percent, so I do believe that our monetary policy stance, which I view as modestly restrictive, is currently appropriate to achieve and sustain 2 percent inflation over the longer term.

Sticking with core inflation, to help me judge ongoing progress toward price stability, I like to look at the 12-month change in each of the three main categories of core inflation: housing services, services excluding housing, and goods. The PCE price index for housing services has declined markedly in the past year, from 5.7 percent in April 2024 to 4.2 percent in April this year, but it is still considerably above the level that persisted before the pandemic. Meanwhile, the PCE price index for core services excluding housing, which makes up more than half of core PCE inflation, has declined from 3.6 percent in April last year to 3 percent in April 2025, still somewhat above the level that prevailed before the pandemic. And the third category is core goods inflation, which rose at a 0.2 percent annual rate in the 12 months through April, compared with April 2024 when it had actually fallen 0.5 percent over the previous 12 months. In recent decades, core goods prices have typically fallen over time, helping to keep a lid on overall inflation, so this is a meaningful reversal of the disinflationary process. To sum up, while core services inflation has fallen, it is still running above the rate before the pandemic, and the progress on core goods inflation has reversed. I have been paying attention to this reversal for some time and how this could be exacerbated by the announced and implemented tariffs.

Research published recently by Federal Reserve Board staff calculates the pass-through of tariffs enacted before April 2 to individual product categories tracked in personal consumption expenditures.5 Using PCE data from February through April, the authors estimate that the 20 percentage point increase in tariffs on Chinese imports earlier in the year raised overall core PCE prices by two tenths of 1 percent. Since tariffs on China are currently higher than 20 percent, and tariffs have increased for other countries, these results tell me, first, that the pass-through of tariffs into prices is relatively quick, and, second, should elevated tariffs persist, even just in the short run, larger effects may be coming soon. The import surge I mentioned earlier, ahead of sharp tariff increases, has delayed the price effects associated with those tariffs, and the reversal in that surge that I expect in the next few months will likely signal larger price increases.

An important feature of most of the data I have mentioned so far is that it is released with significant lags. For example, the initial estimate of GDP is released about 30 days after the end of the quarter, and two later revisions mean that we may not get a clear idea of how output increased until nearly three months afterward. Monthly data on job openings are typically released with a one-month delay. The reasons for these lags are well known. For instance, statistical agencies can only survey households and businesses every so often, and it takes time to compile and publish high-quality statistics. Still, if policymakers solely rely on these traditional data to forecast what the economy will do in the future, they end up focusing on the past, which is a little like driving down the road by looking in a rearview mirror.

As I mentioned in my speech last year to the National Association for Business Economics, there has been an explosion of nontraditional or soft data produced by the private sector, giving us an opportunity to measure economic developments with greater timeliness (sometimes even in real time), at a higher frequency, and with more granularity.6 These data are released closer to the time of collection, such as several surveys from the Federal Reserve Banks. Given today's fast-changing and uncertain environment, soft and non-traditional data becomes all the more important.

That said, nontraditional data often face their own challenges, including issues with representativeness, the lack of methodological consistency, and a short time-series history. And, to be clear, while some non-traditional data are indeed "soft data" in that they capture sentiment or expectations, other data in this category are decidedly "hard," since they are based on actual decisions and actions by businesses and households. In evaluating both traditional and nontraditional data on the economy, I face a tradeoff between timeliness and precision, but both sources are essential for me in formulating an outlook.

So, in the context of hard data that has lately been providing a less-than-clear view of the economy, what are the nontraditional data telling me about meeting the FOMC's two economic objectives? On the price-stability side, survey data from businesses suggest that price increases are coming. These surveys report diffusion indexes, which are calculated as the percentage of total respondents reporting increases in prices minus the percentage reporting declines. Surveys for May point to indexes for inputs and selling prices being elevated relative to the beginning of the year, probably reflecting effects from higher tariffs. Manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM), as well as several surveys from the Federal Reserve Banks report increases in material prices and prices charged to customers, with many respondents volunteering that this is related to tariff increases.

I believe expectations of future inflation are an important determinant of current inflation, and data for May continue to point to increases in measures of near-term inflation expectations. An average of private-sector economists published by the Survey of Professional Forecasters finds that expectations for core PCE inflation over the next year moved up from 2.4 percent in April to 2.9 percent in May. Among data on inflation expectations, the most dramatic increases have been seen in the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. While I take seriously the concern that recent methodological changes in the survey may have made this measure less reliable, this survey is a longstanding and important barometer of consumer sentiment, and I still monitor the signals it is giving us closely. According to the Michigan survey, consumers expect inflation in the next year to average 6.6 percent and over the next 5 to 10 years to average 4.2 percent. Tariffs continued to be an important issue in the Michigan survey, with nearly three-quarters of consumers mentioning them, up from almost 60 percent in April. Firms have also raised their inflation expectations, with a survey by the Cleveland Fed reporting an increase in one-year-ahead expectations from 3.2 percent in the first quarter to 3.9 percent in the second.

However, I still see stability in most measures of longer-run inflation expectations. Notably, expectations among professional forecasters for inflation 6 to 10 years ahead decreased from 2.1 percent in April to 2 percent in May. That provides me some comfort, as it points to confidence from the public in the Fed to bring inflation to our goal of 2 percent over the medium term.

Recent developments and the data I have been monitoring have led me to consider at least three channels through which tariffs could have a persistent influence on inflation. First, as I have mentioned in some previous speeches, while it is true that short-run inflation expectations are influenced by short-term economic shocks, I value them because they often represent the horizon of decisionmaking for businesses and consumers.7 The increase in short-run inflation expectations that I previously mentioned may give businesses more leeway to raise prices, thus increasing the persistence of inflation. A second channel for tariffs influencing inflation could be opportunistic pricing by firms, if they take advantage to increase prices of items not directly affected by tariffs. This, along with tariffs on intermediate goods, could generate second-round effects on inflation. And a third channel is that lower productivity may lead to upward pressure on prices. As firms adjust to the higher input costs and lower demand, they may cut back on capital investment and shift to a less-efficient combination of inputs. While, so far, I have only seen anecdotal evidence for the opportunistic pricing among these three channels, I am closely monitoring any signs of increased persistence on inflation.

Nontraditional data indicators of real activity suggest that the economy might be starting to slow. Measures of household sentiment about economic conditions remain downbeat, such as those from the University of Michigan or the Conference Board. As for businesses, manufacturing surveys, such as the ISM, report a slowing in new orders. Additionally, the May Beige Book reports that economic activity has declined slightly relative to April. On the services side, representing the majority of businesses, the ISM PMI has trended down in the past few months and reached a level in May consistent with stagnation. Focusing on the ISM services new order component, it declined significantly in May to one of its lowest levels in recent years.

In summary, the nontraditional data on economic activity are consistent with my overall assessment that we might be seeing some moderation in the growth of economic activity but not yet a significant slowdown. As policies on fiscal matters and immigration take shape, I find it important to also account for their implications for the U.S. economic outlook. On the fiscal side, the omnibus bill passed by the House would add stimulus to the economy.8 On the immigration side, we have seen inflows substantially down since last year, which decreases the labor supply and could add meaningful upward pressure to inflation by the end of the year in sectors reliant on immigrant labor such as agriculture, construction, food processing, and leisure and hospitality. That said, I have not yet seen much of an imprint on wages from these developments.

Let me conclude with the implications of all this for monetary policy. As inflation has declined over the past two years, due in part to tighter monetary policy, the U.S. economy has remained resilient, with stable labor markets and employment near its maximum sustainable level. Disinflation has slowed, and we are already seeing the effects of higher tariffs, which I expect will continue to raise inflation over 2025. I see greater upside risks to inflation at this juncture and potential downside risks to employment and output growth down the road, and this leads me to continue to support maintaining the FOMC's policy rate at its current setting if upside risks to inflation remain. I view our current stance of monetary policy as well-positioned for any changes in the macroeconomic environment.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today, and I look forward to what I expect will be interesting questions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jun 5, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierMay 6, 2025Publication referenceJun 5, 202530 days laterJul 5, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.76%Observed 6.85%Observed +9 bps vs. earlier reference6.67%Observed −18 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.30%Observed 4.40%Observed +10 bps vs. earlier reference4.35%Observed −5 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Mar 5, 2025 – Sep 5, 2025
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jun 5, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.4.00%5.50%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Mar 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Mar 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 27, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.64% · Apr 3, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.62% · Apr 10, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.83% · Apr 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Apr 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · May 1, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · May 8, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · May 15, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.86% · May 22, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.89% · May 29, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Jun 5, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.84% · Jun 12, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Jun 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.77% · Jun 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Jul 3, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 10, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.75% · Jul 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.74% · Jul 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Aug 7, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 14, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 21, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.56% · Aug 28, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.50% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Mar 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Mar 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Mar 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Mar 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Mar 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Mar 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Mar 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Mar 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Mar 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Mar 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Apr 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Apr 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Apr 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Apr 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.48% · Apr 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Apr 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Apr 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Apr 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Apr 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Apr 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Apr 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · May 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · May 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.36% · May 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · May 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · May 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · May 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · May 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.49% · May 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.53% · May 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · May 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.48% · May 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.58% · May 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.54% · May 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.51% · May 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · May 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · May 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · Jun 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jun 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.51% · Jun 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.49% · Jun 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jun 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Jun 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.36% · Jun 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Jun 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.39% · Jun 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jun 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jun 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jun 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jun 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Jun 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jun 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Jun 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jun 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jul 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jul 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Jul 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.50% · Jul 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jul 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jul 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.44% · Jul 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Jul 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · Jul 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Aug 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Aug 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Aug 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Aug 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Sep 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Sep 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Sep 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.10% · Sep 5, 2025Mar 5, 2025Jun 5, 2025Sep 5, 2025
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury128 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,965.78/month

6.85% · Jun 5, 2025

At the later reference$1,929.87/month

6.67% · Jul 3, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $35.91 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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