Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Opening Remarks — Chair Jerome H. Powell

Good morning. I am pleased to welcome everyone here today. Thomas Laubach's research and support of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) helped us better understand monetary policy, and it is fitting that this work will continue…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

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Good morning. I am pleased to welcome everyone here today. Thomas Laubach's research and support of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) helped us better understand monetary policy, and it is fitting that this work will continue today in his name. Thank you to the authors of the papers, to the discussants, and to our panel participants. Thank you also to Trevor and his team for organizing this conference; a lot of work went into bringing us together.

As in our last review, the 2025 review consists of three key elements: this conference, Fed Listens events at Reserve Banks around the country, and policymaker discussions and deliberations, supported by staff analysis, at a series of FOMC meetings. In the current review we will reconsider aspects of our strategic framework in light of the experience of the last five years. We will also consider possible enhancements to the Committee's policy communication tools, regarding forecasts, uncertainty, and risks.

Title slide

The Consensus Statement In 2012, the FOMC first codified our monetary policy framework in a document entitled the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which we refer to as the consensus statement.1 The language in the opening paragraph, which has never changed, articulates our commitment to fulfilling our congressional mandate and to explaining clearly what we are doing and why (figure 1).2 That clarity reduces uncertainty, improves the effectiveness of our policy, and enhances transparency and accountability.

As Chair, Ben Bernanke led the Committee through the creation of that initial consensus statement, adopting a 2 percent inflation target, and outlining our approach to achieving our congressionally assigned dual mandate. The framework laid out in that document broadly aligned with best practices for a flexible inflation-targeting central bank.

The structure of the economy evolves over time, and monetary policymakers' strategies, tools, and communications need to evolve with it. The challenges presented by the Great Depression differ from those of the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation, which in turn differ from the ones we face today.3 A framework should be robust to a broad range of conditions, but also needs to be updated periodically as the economy and our understanding of it evolve.

2019–20 Review From 2012 to 2018, the FOMC voted at each January meeting to reaffirm the consensus statement, in most years without substantive changes.4 In 2019, we changed that practice, conducting our first-ever public review, and said that we would repeat such reviews at roughly five-year intervals. There is nothing magic about a five-year pace. We believe that frequency is appropriate to reassess structural features of the economy and to engage with the public, practitioners, and academics on the performance of our framework. Several of our global peers have adopted similar approaches to their framework reviews.

At the time of the last review, we had been living for about a decade in a new normal characterized by proximity to the effective lower bound, with low interest rates, low growth, low inflation, and a very flat Phillips curve. If I could capture that era with one statistic, it would be that the policy rate had been stuck at the lower bound for seven long years following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in late 2008 (figure 2). After liftoff in December 2015, we were able to raise the policy rate only very gradually over a period of three years to a peak of just 2.4 percent. Seven months later, we began reducing it, leaving the rate at 1.6 percent in late 2019, where it would be when the pandemic arrived a few months later. Policy rates in other major advanced economies were even lower, in many cases below zero, and in all such economies, inflation regularly ran below its target.

The sense at that time was that when the economy next experienced even a mild downturn, we would be right back at the lower bound, probably for another extended period. The post–financial crisis decade had demonstrated the pain that could bring. Inflation would likely decline in a weak economy, raising real interest rates as nominal rates are pinned at zero. Higher real rates would further weigh on job growth and reinforce the downward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations.

Reflecting these concerns, we adopted a policy to make up for persistent shortfalls from the inflation target, an approach that was common in the extensive literature on the risks associated with the lower bound.5 Given the downside risks to employment and inflation from proximity to the lower bound and the need to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at 2 percent, we said that following periods in which inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, we would likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.

We also concluded that policy decisions would be informed by assessments of "shortfalls" rather than "deviations" from maximum employment. The change to shortfalls was not a commitment to permanently forswear preemption or to ignore labor market tightness.6 Rather, it signaled that apparent labor market tightness would not, in isolation, be enough to trigger a policy response, unless the Committee believed that, if left unchecked, it would lead to unwelcome inflationary pressure.

This change reflected our experience with long expansions that featured historically low unemployment amid low and stable inflation, suggesting that a policy approach that carefully probed for the maximum level of employment could bring about the benefits of a strong labor market without risking price stability. In the years just prior to the pandemic, for example, unemployment was at multidecade lows while inflation ran below 2 percent. By December 2019, estimates of the longer-run unemployment rate had fallen sharply (figure 3).7 The use of "shortfalls" acknowledged that a combination of low inflation and low unemployment does not necessarily pose an adverse tradeoff for monetary policy.

The economic conditions that brought us close to the lower bound and drove the changes in our consensus statement were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that were likely to persist for an extended period—at least until our next five-year review.8 And that might well have been the case had the pandemic not intervened.

The idea of an intentional, moderate overshoot proved irrelevant to our policy discussions and has remained so through today. There was nothing intentional or moderate about the inflation that arrived a few months after we announced our changes to the consensus statement. I acknowledged as much publicly in 2021.9 We fell back on the rest of the framework, which called for traditional inflation targeting.

Through the end of 2021, FOMC participants continued to forecast that inflation was likely to subside fairly quickly in 2022, with only a moderate increase in our policy rate. That projection was consistent with other central banks with different frameworks and the vast majority of forecasters (figure 4).10 When the evidence showed otherwise, we hiked 525 basis points over a period of 16 months. The most recent data suggest that 12-month PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation was 2.2 percent in April, far below its 7.2 percent peak in 2022.11 In a welcome and historically unusual result, this disinflation has come without the sharp increase in unemployment that has often accompanied a campaign of rate hikes to reduce inflation.

The economic environment has changed significantly since 2020, and our review will reflect our assessment of those changes. Longer-term interest rates are a good deal higher now, driven largely by real rates given the stability of longer-term inflation expectations. Many estimates of the longer-run level of the policy rate have risen, including those in the Summary of Economic Projections (figure 5).12

Higher real rates may also reflect the possibility that inflation could be more volatile going forward than in the inter-crisis period of the 2010s. We may be entering a period of more frequent, and potentially more persistent, supply shocks—a difficult challenge for the economy and for central banks.13

While our policy rate is currently well above the lower bound, in recent decades we have cut the rate by about 500 basis points when the economy is in recession.14 Although getting stuck at the lower bound is no longer the base case, it is only prudent that the framework continue to address that risk.

While the framework must evolve, some elements of it are timeless. Policymakers emerged from the Great Inflation with a clear understanding that it was essential to anchor inflation expectations at an appropriately low level. During the Great Moderation, well-anchored inflation expectations allowed us to provide policy support to employment without risking destabilizing inflation.15 Since the Great Inflation, the U.S. economy has had three of its four longest expansions on record.16 Anchored expectations played a key role in facilitating these expansions. More recently, without that anchor, it would not have been possible to achieve a roughly 5 percentage point disinflation without a spike in unemployment.

Keeping longer-run inflation expectations anchored was a driving force behind establishing the 2 percent target in the 2012 framework. Maintaining that anchor was a major consideration behind the changes in 2020. Anchored expectations are critical to everything we do, and we remain fully committed to the 2 percent target today.

2025 Review In the current review, the Committee is engaged in discussions about what we have learned from the experience of the past five years. We plan to complete consideration of specific changes to the consensus statement in coming months. We are paying particular attention to the 2020 changes as we consider discrete but important updates reflecting what we have learned about the economy, and the way those changes were interpreted by the public. In our discussions so far, participants have indicated that they thought it would be appropriate to reconsider the language around shortfalls. And at our meeting last week, we had a similar take on average inflation targeting. We will ensure that our new consensus statement is robust to a wide range of economic environments and developments.

In addition to revising the consensus statement, we will also consider potential enhancements to our formal policy communications, particularly regarding the role of forecasts and uncertainty. As we have been reviewing assessments of the 2020 framework and of policy decisions in recent years, a common observation is the need for clear communications as complex events unfold. While academics and market participants generally have viewed the FOMC's communications as effective, there is always room for improvement.17 Indeed, clear communication is an issue even in relatively placid times. A critical question is how to foster a broader understanding of the uncertainty that the economy generally faces. In periods with larger, more frequent, or more disparate shocks, effective communication requires that we convey the uncertainty that surrounds our understanding of the economy and the outlook. We will examine ways to improve along that dimension as we move forward.

Let me end by saying thank you again for being here. We have been looking forward to the conversations that will occur over the next two days. These discussions will help broaden and deepen our thinking about these issues, and they are critical to the success of these reviews.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published May 15, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierApr 15, 2025Publication referenceMay 15, 202530 days laterJun 14, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.62%Observed 6.81%Observed +19 bps vs. earlier reference6.84%Observed +3 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.35%Observed 4.45%Observed +10 bps vs. earlier reference4.41%Observed −4 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Feb 15, 2025 – Aug 15, 2025
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around May 15, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.4.00%5.50%7.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Feb 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · Feb 27, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Mar 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Mar 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 27, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.64% · Apr 3, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.62% · Apr 10, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.83% · Apr 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Apr 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · May 1, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · May 8, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · May 15, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.86% · May 22, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.89% · May 29, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Jun 5, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.84% · Jun 12, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Jun 18, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.77% · Jun 26, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Jul 3, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 10, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.75% · Jul 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.74% · Jul 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Jul 31, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Aug 7, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Aug 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.55% · Feb 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.53% · Feb 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.50% · Feb 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Feb 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Feb 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Feb 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Feb 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Feb 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Mar 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Mar 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Mar 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Mar 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Mar 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Mar 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Mar 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Mar 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Mar 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Mar 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Mar 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Mar 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Apr 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Apr 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Apr 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Apr 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.48% · Apr 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Apr 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Apr 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Apr 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Apr 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Apr 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Apr 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · May 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · May 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.36% · May 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · May 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · May 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · May 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · May 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.49% · May 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.53% · May 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.45% · May 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · May 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.48% · May 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.58% · May 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.54% · May 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.51% · May 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · May 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · May 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · May 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · Jun 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jun 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.51% · Jun 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.49% · Jun 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jun 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Jun 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.36% · Jun 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Jun 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jun 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.39% · Jun 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jun 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jun 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jun 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jun 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Jun 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jun 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Jun 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jun 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jul 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jul 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Jul 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.50% · Jul 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.46% · Jul 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jul 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.44% · Jul 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Jul 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Jul 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Jul 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Jul 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Jul 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.37% · Jul 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Aug 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Aug 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Aug 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Aug 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Aug 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · Aug 15, 2025Feb 15, 2025May 15, 2025Aug 15, 2025
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,957.77/month

6.81% · May 15, 2025

At the later reference$1,963.78/month

6.84% · Jun 12, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $6.00 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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