Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Do Non-inflationary Economic Expansions Promote Shared Prosperity? Evidence from the U.S. Labor Market — Vice Chair Philip N. Jefferson

Thank you, Professor O'Connell, for that kind introduction and for the opportunity to talk to this group.1 I am delighted to be back at Swarthmore College. This special community brings back fond memories of fantastic students, great…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

THE PRIMARY SOURCE

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, Professor O'Connell, for that kind introduction and for the opportunity to talk to this group.1 I am delighted to be back at Swarthmore College. This special community brings back fond memories of fantastic students, great colleagues, and pedagogical excellence.

Slide 1

Yesterday, I discussed my outlook for the current U.S. economy. I highlighted how the economy is growing and appears to be roughly in balance, with low unemployment and declining inflation. Today, I will review some of the historical evidence pertaining to periods when the Federal Reserve has achieved both components of its dual mandate, maximum employment and stable prices, on a sustained basis—that is, periods of long non-inflationary economic expansions. My title question is whether economic evidence indicates that such expansions also result in greater shared prosperity.

My focus will be on the labor market. A reason for this focus is that for many individuals, their employment attachment is a key determinant of their household's overall well-being. My approach will be to compare the current labor market with the labor market at the end of 2019—that is, at the end of the most recent long, non-inflationary expansion. Such a comparison provides a lens through which to view the prospects for broadly shared prosperity fostered by the current U.S. labor market.

The remainder of my talk is organized as follows. First, I describe the labor market at the end of 2019. After that, I discuss the state of the labor market in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Then, I describe the current labor market situation. Next, I discuss possible reasons why strong labor markets facilitate broad-based prosperity. Before concluding, I consider whether the benefits of long expansions are persistent.

The Labor Market on the Eve of the COVID-19 Pandemic Let's begin the exploration of my title question with a careful look at the situation during the historically strong labor market on the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis, the U.S. economy expanded for 128 consecutive months, making it the longest economic expansion in U.S. history. During this period, as shown in figure 1, the aggregate unemployment rate fell steadily from a peak of 10 percent in October 2009 to 3.5 percent in September 2019, the lowest recorded in nearly 50 years. Job opportunities were plentiful in this strong labor market, with the ratio of vacancies to job seekers hovering around 1.2 throughout 2019, implying that businesses were seeking to fill more open positions than there were workers actively searching for employment. Moreover, while some long economic expansions have led to an unwelcome rise in prices, inflation remained low and stable. Indeed, the Federal Reserve was grappling with inflation somewhat below, rather than above, its longer-run 2 percent target.

In addition, and perhaps related to the length of the expansion, the pre-pandemic labor market was remarkable in terms of the broad-based gains seen across demographic groups, which contributed to a historic narrowing of employment disparities. For instance, as shown in figure 2, the unemployment rate among African Americans, the solid red line, has usually been about twice as high as that for white individuals, the solid blue line, and is more sensitive to the state of the business cycle. The unemployment rate among Hispanics, the dotted green line, falls between these two groups. In late 2019, however, both African American and Hispanic unemployment rates had fallen to the lowest levels on record up to that point, significantly narrowing the persistent unemployment gaps between these groups. Before this, the greatest improvement in the unemployment rate among African Americans was at the end of the 1991–2001 economic expansion, which itself was the second longest expansion in U.S. history. But in 2019, the unemployment rate for African Americans was about 2 percentage points lower than it was in early 2001.

The influence of the long expansion on employment gaps also was evident for other groups of workers. Like minorities, individuals with less education, and especially those who have not completed high school, also experience higher cyclical volatility in their employment.2 In 2019, as shown in figure 3, the unemployment rate gaps between workers with less than a high school education, the solid red line, and those who have attained at least a bachelor's degree, the solid purple line, also were near multidecade lows. Further, the strong labor market created new opportunities for teens and younger workers, groups whose employment prospects, and even long-term career trajectories, are especially sensitive to the cyclical state of the economy.3

Beyond narrowing gaps between workers actively searching for a job, the strong pre-pandemic labor market also helped draw many new participants into the labor force. Among prime-age workers, those aged 25 to 54, the labor force participation rate began rising again around 2015, as shown in figure 4, reversing a declining trend. This was true among both men, the solid black line, whose participation had been steadily declining since the 1950s, and women, the dashed red line, whose participation had previously peaked in early 2000. Labor force participation among women was rising especially briskly in the months just before the pandemic, essentially reversing its entire decline over the previous 20 years. While this partially reflects broader demographic trends such as increasing educational attainment, participation was rising for both women with and without a college degree after 2015, suggesting that the strong labor market played a part in this reversal.

Turning now from employment and participation to earnings, nominal wages were growing solidly before the pandemic. As with gains in employment, the strong labor market was especially beneficial for some groups. Most noticeably, as shown in figure 5, wage growth for the bottom quartile of earners, the solid red line, started to pick up about five years into the expansion, in late 2014, and by 2019 was significantly stronger than for workers in higher earnings quartiles, the solid purple line.4 These differences in wage growth are important, as they imply convergence in levels and, therefore, declining wage inequality as the bottom of the distribution catches up to higher earners. Similarly, wages were growing faster for non-white workers relative to white workers in 2019, though differences by educational attainment were less pronounced at the time.

Looking back now, the U.S. economy in 2019 was in a good place. The labor market was tight but not overheating, bringing widespread gains to workers. Further, had it not been for the sudden and dramatic interruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, this strong labor market was expected to persist. In December 2019, the median Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participant expected the aggregate unemployment rate to remain below 4 percent through the end of 2022 while inflation was expected to move back up to the Committee's 2 percent objective.5 Had this long, non-inflationary expansion continued as the Committee forecast, gaps in employment and earnings across groups may have continued to narrow as well.

The Labor Market Following the COVID-19 Pandemic The expansion, however, was cut short by the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, the unemployment rate, as shown in figure 6, briefly surged to 14.8 percent, its highest rate since the Great Depression while the share of Americans seeking jobs (not shown) plummeted. Moreover, those same groups that had benefited from the strong pre-pandemic labor market—African American and Hispanic workers, women, and individuals without a college degree—generally fared worse at the onset of the pandemic. Although some of these groups typically experience greater losses in economic downturns, factors unique to the pandemic, including greater exposure to the industries most affected by lockdowns, also contributed to disparities in job losses. For instance, unlike a typical recession, the pandemic disproportionately affected service industries, which employ a larger share of women than industries like construction and manufacturing, which are generally more cyclically sensitive.

Just as the pandemic itself led to unprecedented losses in the labor market, the subsequent recovery was unprecedented in many ways. As the health risk abated and the economy reopened, labor demand surged as businesses attempted to re-hire workers, but many workers remained on the sidelines. By late 2021, the labor force participation rate was still well below its pre-pandemic level. Vacancies rose to record levels, while, at the same time, quits, as shown in figure 7, surged as workers sought out new job opportunities, leading some to refer to the post-pandemic recovery as the "Great Resignation." Consequently, as shown in figure 8, the gap between available jobs, the solid black line, and available workers, the dashed red line, which had been just over 1 million positions in late 2019, widened to over 6 million, the equivalent of two job openings for every unemployed worker. This was an exceptionally tight labor market, far exceeding any in recent history, including the labor market before the pandemic.

The strong post-pandemic aggregate economy reversed the disparities between groups that initially widened in 2020. The aggregate unemployment rate fell to 3.4 percent in April 2023, its lowest since 1969. That same month, the unemployment rate for African Americans fell to 4.8 percent, the lowest level on record and 1/2 percentage point below the previous record set in 2019, as shown in figure 9 by the red solid line, which is the difference between the unemployment rate for African Americans and its own average in the year 2019.

Although labor force participation was initially slower to recover, the labor force participation rate among prime-age women climbed to its highest level ever in 2023, well above even pre-pandemic levels, as shown in figure 10 by the red dashed line, which is the difference between the labor force participation rate for women and its own average in the year 2019.

The tight labor market also led to a surge in nominal wage growth, especially for workers lower in the earnings distribution. In fact, as shown in figure 11, wage growth for low-wage workers, the solid red line, was strong enough, with a peak wage growth close to 7.5 percent in 2022, to drive a meaningful compression in the aggregate wage distribution (not shown). Economic research suggests that the pandemic recovery reversed around one-third of the increase in the aggregate ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile wage inequality since the 1980s.6 These gains at the bottom of the income distribution also were reflected in the experience of different demographic groups, as shown in figure 12, with stronger wage growth for nonwhite workers, the dashed red line, relative to white workers, the solid black line, and, unlike even the pre-pandemic expansion, for workers with a high school education or less relative to those with a bachelor's degree or more.

Unlike the noninflationary pre-pandemic expansion, however, these nominal wage gains coincided with rising prices, reducing many workers' actual purchasing power. Real wage growth deflated by the personal consumption expenditures price index, which adjusts for the effect of inflation on workers' purchasing power, was negative for many workers in 2022, despite strong aggregate employment growth. Further, the costs of inflation also vary across groups, and there is evidence that rising prices may hurt lower-income populations more.7 This underscores the connection between the two components of the Federal Reserve's dual mandate to promote both maximum employment and stable prices, since the benefits of strong labor markets are eroded when accompanied by an unwelcome rise in inflation.

The Current Labor Market Situation Let me turn now to the labor market situation more recently. As the economy has recovered from the pandemic, the labor market has come into better balance. By mid-2024, the gap between available jobs and available workers—I'll show that figure again here—had essentially returned to where it was in 2019, reflecting both a decline in vacancies and improvements in labor supply. Various indicators pointed to a labor market that was still tight, but no longer overheating.

Currently, the labor market remains solid, on balance, and inflation continues a bumpy descent toward the FOMC's 2 percent objective. Layoff activity and initial claims for unemployment insurance, shown in figure 13, remain low by historical standards even as job openings have moved down to more normal levels. The unemployment rate appears to have leveled off close to what the median FOMC participant currently sees as its long-run sustainable level of 4.2 percent.8 While employment gaps between certain demographic groups have widened a touch since 2022, they remain historically narrow. Further, a welcome development as inflation has moderated is that real wage growth has picked up even as nominal wage growth has slowed. Though wages are now growing similarly across demographic groups, the narrowing of the wage gap across demographic groups realized in 2021 and 2022 persists.

How Do Strong Labor Markets Facilitate Broad-Based Prosperity? Looking back at long, noninflationary episodes like the pre-pandemic expansion raises the question of why strong labor markets have been especially beneficial for certain demographic groups. Although the literature has not reached a definite conclusion to this question, researchers have pointed to several economic mechanisms that may help explain these patterns.

In 1973, the economist Arthur Okun argued that "high-pressure" labor markets—such as those in 2019 and during the pandemic recovery—allowed workers to move up the job ladder, creating new opportunities for individuals on the margins of the labor market.9,10 Further, he argued that when job openings are difficult to fill, employers relax hiring standards, creating new opportunities for individuals who otherwise might struggle to find employment. Consistent with this argument, economic research shows that as the labor market strengthened from 2010 to 2014, employers reduced education and experience requirements in online job postings.11 Economic research also highlights the role of more productive job-worker matches as tight labor markets facilitate a re-allocation of labor to better and more productive jobs.12 On the participation side, the labor force participation rate tends to respond to business cycles with a significantly longer lag than the unemployment rate, for instance, due to the stickiness of decisions related to caregiving or educational responsibilities. This suggests that long expansions are especially important for drawing non-participants back into the labor market.13

Of course, each business cycle is different, making it difficult to draw general conclusions from past episodes. The pandemic recovery, for example, led to a rise in retirements, far more than what would have been expected given population aging.14 On the downside, this contributed to the significant shortage of workers as the economy was reopening. On the upside, it may have created more opportunities for younger workers to move up the job ladder than is typical during a normal expansion, making Okun's argument especially relevant. The COVID-19 pandemic also was a remarkable reallocation shock, and elevated quits and job switching may have improved the quality of matches between businesses and workers more than usual, potentially contributing to strong productivity growth and wage gains.

Perhaps paradoxically, excessively tight labor markets may not be beneficial to lower-wage workers in the long run. Some economists argue that hiring difficulties may lead firms to adopt technologies that substitute, rather than complement, workers, ultimately reducing labor demand.15 Similarly, an overheating labor market may lead some workers to prioritize short-term gains over longer-term career stability. Empirical evidence, for example, suggests that during economic expansions some young people choose to take an unstable job that is likely to disappear in the next recession, rather than invest in training opportunities.16

Are the Benefits of Long Expansions Lasting? Another key question for policymakers is whether the benefits of long expansions can be sustained, given that the same groups who benefit disproportionately from strong labor markets also fare worse in recessions. Again, the literature, while not conclusive, offers some reasons for cautious optimism. There is some empirical evidence that suggests that the benefits of tight labor markets are somewhat persistent, at least for African Americans and women.17 The fact that labor market disparities that worsened during the pandemic returned to their pre-pandemic levels so quickly following the pandemic may be another reason to be hopeful.

Conclusion Let me conclude by offering an answer to my title question. The weight of the historical evidence I discussed today suggests that broadly shared economic prosperity is more likely when the economy grows over time with low unemployment and stable prices. While the early part of the current expansion was inflationary, the intent of monetary policy actions over the past few years has been to return us to a prolonged period where prices are stable and the labor market remains solid. The historical experience of the U.S. labor market suggests that long, noninflationary expansions are associated with narrower gaps in employment and earnings, with minority groups and less-educated workers benefiting disproportionately from sustained periods of strong economic growth. Such benefits can help make up for the disproportionate losses experienced by the same groups during economic downturns and, in some cases, may even lead to lasting gains.

Finally, let me return to where I started, the Federal Reserve's dual mandate: maximum employment and stable prices. The historical evidence that I have reviewed tonight suggests that shared prosperity is a byproduct of sustained accomplishment of our mission.

Thank you.

Slide 18

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Feb 5, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJan 6, 2025Publication referenceFeb 5, 202530 days laterMar 7, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.91%Observed 6.95%Observed +4 bps vs. earlier reference6.63%Observed −32 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.62%Observed 4.43%Observed −19 bps vs. earlier reference4.32%Observed −11 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Nov 5, 2024 – May 5, 2025
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Feb 5, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.4.00%5.75%7.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.79% · Nov 7, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Nov 14, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.84% · Nov 21, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Nov 27, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.69% · Dec 5, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.60% · Dec 12, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Dec 19, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Dec 26, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.91% · Jan 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.93% · Jan 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 7.04% · Jan 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.96% · Jan 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.95% · Jan 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.89% · Feb 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.87% · Feb 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Feb 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · Feb 27, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Mar 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Mar 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 27, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.64% · Apr 3, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.62% · Apr 10, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.83% · Apr 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Apr 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · May 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Nov 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Nov 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.44% · Nov 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 14, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Nov 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.27% · Nov 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Nov 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.18% · Nov 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 2, 202410-year Treasury: 4.23% · Dec 3, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Dec 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.22% · Dec 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Dec 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.32% · Dec 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.40% · Dec 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Dec 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.40% · Dec 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.50% · Dec 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.57% · Dec 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.52% · Dec 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.59% · Dec 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.59% · Dec 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.58% · Dec 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.62% · Dec 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.55% · Dec 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.58% · Dec 31, 202410-year Treasury: 4.57% · Jan 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.60% · Jan 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.62% · Jan 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.67% · Jan 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.67% · Jan 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.68% · Jan 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.77% · Jan 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.79% · Jan 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.78% · Jan 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.66% · Jan 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.61% · Jan 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.61% · Jan 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.57% · Jan 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.60% · Jan 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.65% · Jan 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.63% · Jan 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.53% · Jan 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.55% · Jan 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.55% · Jan 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.52% · Jan 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.58% · Jan 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.54% · Feb 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.52% · Feb 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Feb 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.45% · Feb 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.49% · Feb 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.51% · Feb 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.54% · Feb 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.62% · Feb 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.52% · Feb 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Feb 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.55% · Feb 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.53% · Feb 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.50% · Feb 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Feb 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Feb 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Feb 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Feb 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Feb 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Mar 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Mar 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Mar 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Mar 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Mar 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Mar 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Mar 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Mar 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Mar 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Mar 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Mar 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Mar 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Apr 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Apr 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Apr 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Apr 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.48% · Apr 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Apr 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Apr 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Apr 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Apr 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Apr 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Apr 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · May 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · May 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.36% · May 5, 2025Nov 5, 2024Feb 5, 2025May 5, 2025
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury123 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,985.84/month

6.95% · Jan 30, 2025

At the later reference$1,921.92/month

6.63% · Mar 6, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $63.92 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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