Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Bank Regulation in 2025 and Beyond — Governor Michelle W. Bowman

Governor Bowman presented identical remarks at the 2025 Wisconsin Bankers Association Bank Executives Conference, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on February 7, 2025, and at the 2025 Iowa Bankers Association Bank Management and Policy Conference,…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

THE PRIMARY SOURCE

Read the communication

Original source →

Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Governor Bowman presented identical remarks at the 2025 Wisconsin Bankers Association Bank Executives Conference, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on February 7, 2025, and at the 2025 Iowa Bankers Association Bank Management and Policy Conference, Des Moines, Iowa (virtual), on February 11, 2025.

Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today.1 It is a pleasure to be with you. I always enjoy the opportunity to meet bankers from across the country to learn about the issues that are important to you. Recently, I have observed a shift in tone when I talk to bankers about the bank regulatory environment. Bankers are cautiously optimistic that we will see meaningful reform that right-sizes regulation and supervisory approach, reforms that—if executed appropriately—should help the banking system promote economic growth in a safe and sound manner. Today, I will share my views on a number of issues related to banking regulation and supervision, including the importance of tailoring, having a problem-focused approach to bank regulation and supervision, and the imperative of innovation in the banking system.

One of the unique characteristics of the U.S. banking system is the broad scope of institutions it includes and the wide range of customers and communities it serves. Given this wide variety of institutions, regulators must strive to foster a financial system that enables each and every bank, no matter its size, to thrive, supporting a vibrant economy and financial system. We must also be sensitive to emerging issues and trends that require attention, whether that be unintended consequences from capital requirements, the incentives created by our approach to regulatory applications, and to ensure legal compliance.

Tailoring The approach to regulation and supervision should promote a healthy and vibrant banking system. One key element of a regulatory approach that does so, and one that I often highlight, is the use of "tailoring" in the regulatory framework. For those familiar with my philosophy on bank regulation and supervision, my interest and focus on tailoring will come as no surprise.2 In its most basic form, it is difficult to disagree with the virtue of regulatory and supervisory tailoring—calibrating the requirements and expectations imposed on a firm based on its size, business model, risk profile, and complexity—as a reasonable, appropriate, and responsible approach for bank regulation and supervision. In fact, tailoring is embedded in the statutory fabric of the Federal Reserve's bank regulatory responsibilities.3

The bank regulatory framework inherently includes significant costs—both the cost of operating the banking agencies and the cost to the banking industry of complying with regulations, the examination process, and supplying information to regulators both through formal information collections and through one-off requests. In the aggregate, these costs can ultimately affect the price and availability of credit, geographic access to banking services, and the broader economy. The cost of this framework—both to regulators and to the industry—reflects layers of policy decisions over many years. But this framework could be more effective in balancing the mandate to promote safety and soundness with the need to have a banking system that promotes economic growth.

Let's consider costs. As regulatory and supervisory demands grow, there is often parallel growth in the staff and budgets of the banking agencies. We should not only be cognizant of these costs, but we should act in a way that requires efficiency while ensuring safety and soundness. Some degree of elasticity in regulator capacity is necessary to respond to evolving economic and banking conditions, as well as emerging risks, but there must be reasonable constraints on banking agency growth. Expansion of the regulatory framework is not a cost-free endeavor. These costs are shouldered by taxpayers, banks, and, ultimately, bank customers.

The bank regulatory framework has great potential to provide significant benefits, including supporting an innovative banking system that enhances trust and confidence in our institutions and promotes safety and soundness. When we consider the benefits and the costs, we can institute greater efficiencies in both banking regulation and in the banking industry itself. The framework is complex, and the various elements of this framework are intended to work in a complementary way. As banks evolve—by growing larger or by engaging in new activities—tailoring can help us to quickly recalibrate requirements in light of the new risks posed by the firm.

But the regulatory framework, especially how supervisors prioritize its application to the banking industry, can pose a serious threat to a bank's viability. For example, imposing the same regulatory requirements on banks with assets of $2 billion to $2 trillion under the new rules implementing the Community Reinvestment Act demonstrated a missed opportunity to promote greater effectiveness and efficiency.4 I question the wisdom of applying the same evaluation standards to banks within such a broad range.

Likewise, supervisory guidance can provide fertile ground to differentiate supervisory expectations under a more tailored approach. While supervisory guidance is not binding on banks as a legal matter, it can signal how regulators think about particular risks and activities, and often drives community banks to reallocate resources in a way that may not be necessary or appropriate. The Fed's guidance on third-party risk management is an example of this. Originally, this guidance was published in a way that applied to all banks, including community banks. Yet it was acknowledged even at the time of publication that it had known shortcomings, particularly in terms of its administration and lack of clarity for community banks.5

Tailoring is important for all banks, but it is particularly important for community banks. There are real costs not only to banks, but to communities, when the framework is insufficiently tailored, as community banks faced with excessive regulatory burdens may be forced to raise prices or seek to merge or be acquired. These banks often reach unbanked or underbanked corners of the U.S. economy, not only in terms of the customers they serve but also in terms of their geographic footprint. We are all familiar with banking deserts and the challenges many legitimate and law-abiding businesses and consumers have in accessing basic banking services and credit. It is difficult to imagine that a system with far fewer banks would as effectively serve U.S. banking and credit needs and sufficiently support economic growth.

It is imperative that we keep the benefits of tailoring in focus as the bank regulatory framework evolves. A tailored regulatory and supervisory approach can help inform our policies on a wide range of industry issues that are likely to emerge in the coming years.

Problem-Based Solutions One of the most difficult challenges on the regulatory front is prioritization, both for banks managing their businesses and for regulators deciding how to fulfill their responsibilities. At a basic level, the role of regulators is dictated by statute. Congress granted the Federal Reserve and other banking agencies broad statutory powers but has constrained how those powers may be directed through the use of statutory mandates, including to promote a safe and sound banking system, and broader U.S. financial stability. In the execution of these responsibilities, the Federal Reserve must also balance the need to act in a way that enables the banking system to serve the U.S. economy and promote economic growth. While these objectives are not incompatible, they do require us to consider tradeoffs when establishing policy.

How can regulators best meet these responsibilities? As many of you may already know, I strongly believe in a pragmatic approach to policymaking.6 This requires us to identify the problem we are trying to solve, determine whether we are the appropriate regulator to address the problem based on our statutory mandates and authorities, and explore options for addressing the identified issue.

This approach of pragmatic problem-solving also applies to supervision, where process improvements could improve functioning. The Federal Reserve exercises its supervisory responsibilities by supervisory portfolio, with each portfolio relying on a combination of Board and Reserve Bank staff.7 It is important that responsibility for supervisory decisions be paired with accountability for such decisions, which can be complicated depending on the different roles played by Board and Reserve Bank staffs, and as institutions change supervisory portfolios. The misalignment of responsibility and accountability detracts from effective supervision.

Our supervisory program should require strong examiner training, rely on examiner expertise in the conduct of examinations, and work in partnership with state bank supervisors. Doing so will allow us to leverage the practical experience and judgment of examination staff—characteristics that are necessary for effective supervision—while preserving the role of the Board to delegate and provide Reserve Bank oversight. Examinations cannot be just a box-checking exercise. We must rely on well-trained and experienced examiners empowered to exercise independent judgment and ask questions, which leads to stronger and more effective supervision.

As we look at the banking system, including the regulatory framework, we must focus on those issues that are most important to advancing statutory priorities. There is always the risk of misidentification and mis-prioritization, and that we fail to take appropriately robust action on key issues or focus on issues that are less material to a bank's safety and soundness. Our goal should be to develop a better filter to promote appropriate and effective prioritization.

Treasury market functioning Where regulation may create or exacerbate financial stability risks, we need to take a close look at whether those risks are justified by the safety and soundness benefits of the regulation. The erosion of liquidity in U.S. Treasury markets provides a good example of unintended consequences and the need to evaluate tradeoffs in regulation. This issue is a byproduct of several important dynamics: (1) the role of large banks in the intermediation of U.S. Treasury markets, (2) the growth of "safe" assets in the banking system, and (3) the increase in leverage-based capital requirements becoming the binding capital constraint on some large banks. While regulators may not have tools to address all of these dynamics, clearly the adverse impact of leverage-based capital requirements falls within the banking regulators' scope of responsibility.

Issues with Treasury market functioning have been known for quite some time. We have seen a persistent trend of low liquidity in U.S. Treasury markets for several years, which has been noted in the Board's semiannual Financial Stability Report.8 Low liquidity can create more volatility in prices, exacerbate the effects of market shocks, and can threaten market functioning. Treasury market functioning and liquidity will likely be affected by the Securities and Exchange Commission's central clearing requirement for U.S. Treasuries, which may improve market functioning. In addition, the Federal Reserve's Standing Repo Facility may also help to promote smooth functioning in the Treasury market. But there is uncertainty regarding how the volume of Treasury securities issued and outstanding, and changes to the Fed's balance sheet over time, may affect this.

We have seen Treasury markets experience stress events as recently as the September 2019 repo market stress, and the so-called "dash for cash" in March of 2020. Both of these events raised concerns about the resiliency of U.S. Treasury markets. Therefore, we should continue to actively monitor indicators of market function, particularly whether Treasury market functioning improves over time, thereby enabling it to withstand future shocks.

The banking regulators are uniquely positioned to not only analyze but also remediate components of the bank regulatory framework that may exacerbate Treasury market illiquidity. Large bank-affiliated primary dealers play an important role in the intermediation of U.S. Treasury markets. These dealers are not immune or insulated from the effect of banking regulation. While many factors can affect market liquidity, including interest rate volatility and Treasury market saturation, we must consider whether some of the pressure is a byproduct of bank regulation.

The Federal Reserve has previously intervened to address market stress and support Treasury market functioning, for example, by temporarily excluding Fed reserves and Treasuries from the denominator of the supplemental leverage ratio (SLR).9 Treasury markets play a critical role in the U.S. and global financial systems, and we should take action to address the unintended consequences of bank regulation, while ensuring the framework continues to promote safety, soundness, and financial stability.10

Leverage ratios do not differentiate between the risk of certain asset classes or exposures, and therefore appropriately operate as a backstop to risk-based capital requirements. However, in periods of banks' balance sheet expansion—as during COVID-19 when we saw significant deposit inflows—leverage ratios can become the binding constraint on banks and their affiliates, increasing the amount of required capital based on increased balance sheet size regardless of risk. When constrained in this way, bank-affiliated primary dealers may pull back on market intermediation activities.

Where we can take proactive regulatory measures to ensure that primary dealers have adequate balance sheet capacity to intermediate Treasury markets, we should do so. This could include amending the leverage ratio and G-SIB surcharge regulations for the largest U.S. banks. Adopting regulatory changes to mitigate these concerns may not be sufficient to ensure market liquidity, but it would be an important step toward building resiliency in advance of future stress events. In my view, it would be better to fix the roof now, while the sun is shining, by addressing over-calibrated leverage ratio requirements, and considering the unintended consequences of any future capital reforms.

Stress testing I will now turn to another area that the Board has already identified as a priority for review—stress testing. Stress testing can be an important supervisory tool, but its implementation, outcomes and process have raised significant questions and concerns about whether it is useful in identifying systemic weaknesses. In its current structure, it is an opaque test hidden from public scrutiny that is used to establish variable binding capital requirements on large banks. Our review should consider whether it is transparent and fair, and whether there are technical improvements that could enhance the reliability and credibility of the test and its results.11

In its current form, stress testing is likely deficient on each of these fronts. Transparency promotes fairness, as regulated entities and the public can better understand why and how our actions further our goals. When we identify areas that suffer from a lack of transparency, we should act promptly to address those concerns. On December 23 of last year, the Fed announced that it would soon seek public comment on "significant changes" to the stress testing process designed to improve transparency of the tests and reduce volatility of the resulting stress capital buffers that apply to large financial institutions.12 Given my longstanding support for revisiting the stress testing framework to promote transparency and reduce volatility, I am pleased with this development.13

Fraud Finally, I would like to address the problem of fraud, particularly check fraud, which has grown in frequency and impact over the past several years. Fraud continues to harm banks, damaging the perceived safety of the banking system, and importantly hurting consumers who are the victims of fraudulent activity. Sometimes fraudsters target vulnerable populations, like the elderly, who are particularly susceptible to certain forms of fraud.

As I have noted in the past, efforts by regulators have been frustratingly slow to advance, and seem to have done little to address the underlying root causes of this increase in fraud. Why has this important issue failed to garner greater attention from all of the appropriate regulatory and law enforcement bodies? Different governmental agencies may share an important role in addressing this problem, but the need for a joint and coordinated solution does not excuse collective inaction.

Fraud is perhaps the most consistent issue raised when I speak with bankers. Often the concerns note frustrations with the tools available to fight fraud and frictions dealing with counterparties in investigating and addressing fraud. The costs of prevention, detection, and remediation can also be substantial, but so can the costs of navigating these issues dealing with affected bank customers. We are overdue for more assertive action to protect bank customers and the financial system.

The Innovation Imperative Innovation has always been a priority for banks of all sizes and business models. Banks in the U.S. have a long history of developing and implementing new technologies, and innovation has the potential to make the banking and payment systems faster and more efficient, to bring new products and services to customers, and even to enhance safety and soundness.

Regulators must be open to innovation in the banking system. Our goal should be to build and support a clear and sensible regulatory framework that anticipates ongoing and evolving innovation—one that allows the private sector to innovate while also maintaining appropriate safeguards. We must promote innovation through transparency and open communication, including demonstrating a willingness to engage during the development process. Financial institutions should know what activities are permitted, and the supervisory and regulatory expectations that will accompany their activities. By providing clarity and consistency, we can encourage long-term business investment, while also continuing to support today's products and services. A clear regulatory framework would also empower supervisors to focus on safety and soundness, ensuring a safe and efficient banking and payment system.

Absent clearer rules of the road, we run the risk of reducing the availability of banking services. Bank regulatory policy should address the needs of the unbanked and expand the availability of banking services. It should not be used to limit or exclude access to banking services for legitimate customers and businesses in a way that is meant to further unrelated policy goals, sometimes referred to as "de-banking" or bank "de-risking." Credit decisions should not be dictated by banking regulations or supervisory messages. Ultimately, bankers are and should be responsible for their own credit allocation decisions.

Regulators must change approaches that have resulted in credit allocation decisions, research how banks are making decisions related to which customers they serve, and promote an environment that allows legitimate bank customers to obtain banking services.

New technologies and services often require novel regulatory and supervisory approaches, and we recognize that past approaches will likely not be effective. Often regulators take a "more is better" approach to regulation and guidance. Over the past several years, the banking industry has faced an onslaught of proposed and final regulations and guidance, materials that require a significant time commitment to review, to comment on, and to implement. Many times, these require changes to policies and procedures or risk-management practices.

Fundamentally though, this "more is better" approach fails to address the core criticisms, including both an overall lack of transparency, and the perception (and perhaps reality?) that regulators have been overly hostile to innovation, including banks' involvement in any capacity with digital assets, the use of artificial intelligence, and the availability of new technologies and providers to access the payment system.

As a banker, state bank commissioner, and as a Board member, I have made the case for a more open-minded approach to innovation, including by co-hosting an informational event for bankers together with three other bank commissioners on distributed ledger technology and banking innovation just prior to joining the Board.14 We must prioritize understanding the risks and benefits of new technologies before developing a supervisory posture, especially when applying rules and using the "soft" power of supervision to discourage its use. Instead, we must create a supervisory and regulatory environment that facilitates reasonable and supportive approaches. The natural posture of a regulator may be to emphasize safety and soundness above all other objectives, but doing so will ultimately stifle innovation and threaten the long-term health and utility of the banking system.

Closing Thoughts Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. The financial system is constantly evolving, and our regulatory approach must anticipate this evolution. We must return to a regulatory approach that emphasizes appropriate tailoring of regulatory requirements and supervisory expectations and take a pragmatic approach in identifying and remediating the most pressing issues. And we must encourage ongoing innovation in the banking and financial systems.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Feb 5, 2025.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJan 6, 2025Publication referenceFeb 5, 202530 days laterMar 7, 2025
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.91%Observed 6.95%Observed +4 bps vs. earlier reference6.63%Observed −32 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.62%Observed 4.43%Observed −19 bps vs. earlier reference4.32%Observed −11 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Nov 5, 2024 – May 5, 2025
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Feb 5, 2025Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.4.00%5.75%7.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 6.79% · Nov 7, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Nov 14, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.84% · Nov 21, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Nov 27, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.69% · Dec 5, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.60% · Dec 12, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Dec 19, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Dec 26, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.91% · Jan 2, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.93% · Jan 9, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 7.04% · Jan 16, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.96% · Jan 23, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.95% · Jan 30, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.89% · Feb 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.87% · Feb 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.85% · Feb 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · Feb 27, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.63% · Mar 6, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 13, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.67% · Mar 20, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.65% · Mar 27, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.64% · Apr 3, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.62% · Apr 10, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.83% · Apr 17, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Apr 24, 202530-year fixed mortgage: 6.76% · May 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Nov 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Nov 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.44% · Nov 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 14, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Nov 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.27% · Nov 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Nov 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.18% · Nov 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 2, 202410-year Treasury: 4.23% · Dec 3, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Dec 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Dec 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.15% · Dec 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Dec 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.22% · Dec 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Dec 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.32% · Dec 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.40% · Dec 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Dec 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.40% · Dec 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.50% · Dec 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.57% · Dec 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.52% · Dec 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.59% · Dec 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.59% · Dec 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.58% · Dec 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.62% · Dec 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.55% · Dec 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.58% · Dec 31, 202410-year Treasury: 4.57% · Jan 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.60% · Jan 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.62% · Jan 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.67% · Jan 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.67% · Jan 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.68% · Jan 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.77% · Jan 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.79% · Jan 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.78% · Jan 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.66% · Jan 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.61% · Jan 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.61% · Jan 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.57% · Jan 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.60% · Jan 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.65% · Jan 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.63% · Jan 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.53% · Jan 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.55% · Jan 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.55% · Jan 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.52% · Jan 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.58% · Jan 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.54% · Feb 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.52% · Feb 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.43% · Feb 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.45% · Feb 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.49% · Feb 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.51% · Feb 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.54% · Feb 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.62% · Feb 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.52% · Feb 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.47% · Feb 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.55% · Feb 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.53% · Feb 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.50% · Feb 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Feb 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Feb 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.30% · Feb 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Feb 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Feb 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Feb 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.16% · Mar 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Mar 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 5, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Mar 6, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Mar 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.22% · Mar 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.28% · Mar 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Mar 12, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 13, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Mar 18, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 19, 202510-year Treasury: 4.24% · Mar 20, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · Mar 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Mar 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.31% · Mar 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Mar 26, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Mar 27, 202510-year Treasury: 4.27% · Mar 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Mar 31, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.20% · Apr 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.06% · Apr 3, 202510-year Treasury: 4.01% · Apr 4, 202510-year Treasury: 4.15% · Apr 7, 202510-year Treasury: 4.26% · Apr 8, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 9, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 10, 202510-year Treasury: 4.48% · Apr 11, 202510-year Treasury: 4.38% · Apr 14, 202510-year Treasury: 4.35% · Apr 15, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 16, 202510-year Treasury: 4.34% · Apr 17, 202510-year Treasury: 4.42% · Apr 21, 202510-year Treasury: 4.41% · Apr 22, 202510-year Treasury: 4.40% · Apr 23, 202510-year Treasury: 4.32% · Apr 24, 202510-year Treasury: 4.29% · Apr 25, 202510-year Treasury: 4.23% · Apr 28, 202510-year Treasury: 4.19% · Apr 29, 202510-year Treasury: 4.17% · Apr 30, 202510-year Treasury: 4.25% · May 1, 202510-year Treasury: 4.33% · May 2, 202510-year Treasury: 4.36% · May 5, 2025Nov 5, 2024Feb 5, 2025May 5, 2025
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury123 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,985.84/month

6.95% · Jan 30, 2025

At the later reference$1,921.92/month

6.63% · Mar 6, 2025

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $63.92 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

Evaluate a rate lock around your closing date →See current advertised mortgage options →