Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Interlinking Fast Payment Systems — Governor Christopher J. Waller

Thank you to the conference organizers for the opportunity to speak this year at the Global Fintech Fest—a place where there is so much payments innovation.1 The technology-driven payments revolution in India has been enabled by a…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you to the conference organizers for the opportunity to speak this year at the Global Fintech Fest—a place where there is so much payments innovation.1 The technology-driven payments revolution in India has been enabled by a public-private partnership to build the "technology stack" of digital platforms that has broadened financial inclusion and done so at low costs.2 Building on the foundation established by the public sector, innovators in the private sector seized the opportunity to enhance payments through the introduction of new capabilities that alleviate frictions while remaining within regulatory guardrails. In today's remarks, I am going to touch on how interplay between the public and private sectors may be the key to advancing cross-border payments.

Now that fast payment systems have been established around much of the globe—in over 70 countries and climbing—attention is turning to how these newer systems could potentially enhance global payments. Specifically, interlinking fast payment systems has been identified as a possible means to deliver enhanced cross-border payments for consumers and businesses. Interlinking arrangements would allow banks in different countries who are users of domestic fast payment systems to send payments to each other through technical connections between their respective domestic systems. As you all know, interlinking is one of the areas outlined in the G20 roadmap for further exploration as part of a holistic effort to enhance cross-border payments. The overarching G20 goal is to mitigate challenges with cross-border payments in a coordinated way at a global level, with input from key stakeholders including the private sector.

The G20 roadmap addresses a new topic that payments industry stakeholders have been circling around for years—more cost-effective and timely cross-border payments for consumers and businesses. This policy goal has been advanced by the Federal Reserve over time in various payment system improvement initiatives, dating back to the late 1990s when the Federal Reserve began adapting the automated clearinghouse (ACH) service to support international payments, and more recently in 2015 when we collaborated with industry to improve the payment system.3 Today's consumers and businesses can generally send a payment anywhere in the world, but they all seem to want faster and cheaper global payments, just like we always want faster flights and cheaper airfares. However, I am not entirely convinced that interlinking arrangements will necessarily deliver on those goals. Let me explain with some context.

Faster and cheaper cross-border payments Not all frictions that slow payments down are bad. Certain frictions are purposely built into the global payment system for compliance and risk-management reasons. Slowing down the speed at which payments are cleared and settled helps banks prevent money laundering and counter the financing of terrorism, detect fraud, and recover fraudulent or misdirected cross-border payments. Granted, the practice today of sending payments through an often complex chain of correspondent banks contributes to slower payments that could benefit from efficiency enhancements. However, there is no silver bullet that increases speed and efficiency without tradeoffs. Unless new solutions are found, interlinking fast payment systems might increase the risk-management burden for banks that participate in them. That is, legal, compliance, and operational considerations are critical to the discussion of the promise and challenges of interlinking. Governance, oversight, and settlement arrangements also need to be thought through, along with considerations for data privacy.

In addition, can we assume that all parties to a cross-border transaction want faster payments? The fundamental friction in any transaction is that the seller of an object—a can of soup, an hour of labor, or a good manufactured for export—wants to receive their money as fast as possible. However, the buyer of the object, or the buyer's intermediary, typically has an incentive to wait as long as they can to pay for something they have purchased. Under this logic, senders need to be properly incentivized to speed up cross-border payments. The one exception may be person-to-person remittances, where workers from other countries want to send money home, and recipients want access, as fast as possible. But remittances are only a small percentage of the value of cross-border payments, so we'd need to weigh the benefits against the costs of a potential public-sector intervention to shift incentives. So, I am still left with the larger question of whether we should be incentivizing faster cross-border payments.

Suppose we do want to incentivize senders by lowering costs of faster payments—whose responsibility is it to do that? Should it be left to private-sector competition to drive down costs as is typically the case with other products? Or is there something unique about payments that requires central banks or payment system operators to step in to interlink their networks with the goal of bringing costs down? We have already seen examples of the private sector leveraging technology to innovate in the market for cross-border instant payments, both at the wholesale and retail level. For example, we have seen a real-time payment system built for wholesale clients that allows clearing and settlement between global clients in seconds, with necessary compliance performed upfront in less than 24 hours. Another example is the SWIFT Global Payments Innovation, which offers improved speed and transparency for the business customers of participating banks, and, by their account, has been adopted by 150 banks globally. In mentioning these examples, I am not intending to endorse certain private-sector services. Rather, these newer services are illustrative of how market forces and competition can meet consumer and business demands for more efficient cross-border payments.

In the United States we have experience with offering low-cost international ACH payments. We provided direct ACH linkages from the United States to Europe and Canada, but after more than 20 years, the banks were not using it, and we stopped the service. It is possible that a fast payment interlinking arrangement adopted by Federal Reserve would be more effective for our bank customers than the former ACH service, but we would proceed cautiously to carefully consider the costs and benefits. Economic viability needs to be a cornerstone for any action we may take. We need to ask ourselves whether banks would find a central bank interlinking service more effective than their existing arrangements for cross-border payments, and if they would actually use it.

Practical aspects of interlinking fast payment systems We know from basic economic theory that payment systems are similar to other networks in that greater participation is necessary for the network to grow and increase value to its users. This is true on a global scale, too, which in practical terms means that valuable global interlinked networks would have to be founded on underlying domestic networks with a breadth of senders and receivers. Domestic networks need to be developed first. If this condition is not in place, interlinked networks could end up being a road to nowhere.

Building out domestic networks has been done in different ways. In some countries the central bank has authority to mandate participation, notably in Brazil with the successful Pix system. In other countries, notably India, united efforts by the government, central bank, and private sector established the digital public infrastructure that enabled broad adoption.

In the United States, it's a different story, and the payments landscape is unique. With over 9,000 depository institutions and different authorities than other countries, the Federal Reserve determined that it needed to build a fast payment system accessible to all depository institutions to achieve our policy goals. At the time of our decision, there was only one private-sector instant payment system in the market, built by the largest banks. Based on our experience, we did not believe that this system would ultimately reach all depository institutions, nor would other private-sector systems emerge to compete with it and extend the scope of that service. Yet we knew from industry engagement that smaller banks across the country wanted a broadly accessible fast payment system, so we stepped in to address the clear coordination problem. This action is very much consistent with the Federal Reserve's role in the U.S. payment system historically.

We have seen widespread adoption of the FedNow Service in just a little over a year since implementation, with close to 1,000 depository institutions on the network including many of the largest banks that will drive origination volume. Yet we are still at the beginning of a multiyear journey of establishing a ubiquitous network covering the majority of institutions in our country. Variation around the world in domestic fast payment network adoption means that the value of globally interlinked systems is not yet clear.

From a technical perspective, the promise of interlinking, which is essentially interoperability between or among domestic fast payment systems, is that fast payment networks can just "connect"' with each other and move payments globally. It sounds simple. In practice, however, achieving interoperability is not simple. Technology is probably the easiest part. The legal, compliance, settlement, and governance challenges I mentioned earlier are more substantial. In addition, even when technological connections are in place, payments may not actually be instant as they traverse across systems because of domestic variations in ISO 20022 implementation, which is the global standard used by most fast payment systems. To send an ISO message seamlessly from one country to another across a technical link, operators need to coordinate and align on common practices.

We should consider that new multilateral arrangements for interlinking could potentially address some of the challenges that I have outlined. Today, certain countries have established bilateral links between domestic fast payment systems primarily to support remittance payments. These arrangements demonstrate that linkages are technically possible and that legal and compliance issues can be addressed. Yet each link is unique and requires resource-intensive negotiation and alignment between parties. Establishing bilateral links across the globe simply will not scale. We know this to be true from our own bilateral ACH linkages, where each arrangement required bespoke agreements with correspondent banks and service providers. Multilateral arrangements might bring some efficiencies, yet they are no small undertaking.

Conclusion To sum up, overall, I do see the value of a coordination role for the public sector to improve cross-border payments, an effort in which the Federal Reserve has been and will continue to be heavily engaged. We will continue our engagement with international fora to improve the speed and efficiency of cross-border payments and to investigate the issues critical to interlinking payment systems. Our chief focus in the near-to mid-term, however, is continuing to build the FedNow network domestically and increasing participation in the service. We are also improving existing cross-border rails by considering expanded operating hours on our large-value, real-time gross settlement system, the Fedwire Funds Service, and by adopting ISO 20022, a globally accepted messaging standard. Looking out over the longer term, we will continue to conduct research and experimentation on emerging technologies to better understand the role these innovations could play in the payments landscape of the future. I expect the technical capabilities, legal infrastructure, and use cases for faster cross-border payments will evolve, and I look forward to following the private-sector innovation that will emerge from stakeholders represented at this event.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Aug 28, 2024.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJul 29, 2024Publication referenceAug 28, 202430 days laterSep 27, 2024
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®6.78%Observed 6.46%Observed −32 bps vs. earlier reference6.08%Observed −38 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury4.17%Observed 3.84%Observed −33 bps vs. earlier reference3.75%Observed −9 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

May 28, 2024 – Nov 28, 2024
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Aug 28, 2024Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%5.50%7.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 7.03% · May 30, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.99% · Jun 6, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.95% · Jun 13, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.87% · Jun 20, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.86% · Jun 27, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.95% · Jul 3, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.89% · Jul 11, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.77% · Jul 18, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Jul 25, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.73% · Aug 1, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.47% · Aug 8, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.49% · Aug 15, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.46% · Aug 22, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Aug 29, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.35% · Sep 5, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.20% · Sep 12, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.09% · Sep 19, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.08% · Sep 26, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.12% · Oct 3, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.32% · Oct 10, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.44% · Oct 17, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.54% · Oct 24, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.72% · Oct 31, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.79% · Nov 7, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.78% · Nov 14, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.84% · Nov 21, 202430-year fixed mortgage: 6.81% · Nov 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.54% · May 28, 202410-year Treasury: 4.61% · May 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.55% · May 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.51% · May 31, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Jun 3, 202410-year Treasury: 4.33% · Jun 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.29% · Jun 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jun 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jun 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.47% · Jun 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Jun 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Jun 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.24% · Jun 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jun 14, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jun 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.22% · Jun 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jun 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jun 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jun 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.23% · Jun 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.32% · Jun 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.29% · Jun 27, 202410-year Treasury: 4.36% · Jun 28, 202410-year Treasury: 4.48% · Jul 1, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Jul 2, 202410-year Treasury: 4.36% · Jul 3, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Jul 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.18% · Jul 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.23% · Jul 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jul 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.16% · Jul 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jul 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Jul 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Jul 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Jul 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.27% · Jul 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Jul 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.17% · Jul 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.15% · Jul 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Jul 31, 202410-year Treasury: 3.99% · Aug 1, 202410-year Treasury: 3.80% · Aug 2, 202410-year Treasury: 3.78% · Aug 5, 202410-year Treasury: 3.90% · Aug 6, 202410-year Treasury: 3.96% · Aug 7, 202410-year Treasury: 3.99% · Aug 8, 202410-year Treasury: 3.94% · Aug 9, 202410-year Treasury: 3.90% · Aug 12, 202410-year Treasury: 3.85% · Aug 13, 202410-year Treasury: 3.83% · Aug 14, 202410-year Treasury: 3.92% · Aug 15, 202410-year Treasury: 3.89% · Aug 16, 202410-year Treasury: 3.86% · Aug 19, 202410-year Treasury: 3.82% · Aug 20, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Aug 21, 202410-year Treasury: 3.86% · Aug 22, 202410-year Treasury: 3.81% · Aug 23, 202410-year Treasury: 3.82% · Aug 26, 202410-year Treasury: 3.83% · Aug 27, 202410-year Treasury: 3.84% · Aug 28, 202410-year Treasury: 3.87% · Aug 29, 202410-year Treasury: 3.91% · Aug 30, 202410-year Treasury: 3.84% · Sep 3, 202410-year Treasury: 3.77% · Sep 4, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 5, 202410-year Treasury: 3.72% · Sep 6, 202410-year Treasury: 3.70% · Sep 9, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 10, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 11, 202410-year Treasury: 3.68% · Sep 12, 202410-year Treasury: 3.66% · Sep 13, 202410-year Treasury: 3.63% · Sep 16, 202410-year Treasury: 3.65% · Sep 17, 202410-year Treasury: 3.70% · Sep 18, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 19, 202410-year Treasury: 3.73% · Sep 20, 202410-year Treasury: 3.75% · Sep 23, 202410-year Treasury: 3.74% · Sep 24, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Sep 25, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Sep 26, 202410-year Treasury: 3.75% · Sep 27, 202410-year Treasury: 3.81% · Sep 30, 202410-year Treasury: 3.74% · Oct 1, 202410-year Treasury: 3.79% · Oct 2, 202410-year Treasury: 3.85% · Oct 3, 202410-year Treasury: 3.98% · Oct 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.04% · Oct 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.06% · Oct 9, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Oct 10, 202410-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 11, 202410-year Treasury: 4.03% · Oct 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 16, 202410-year Treasury: 4.09% · Oct 17, 202410-year Treasury: 4.08% · Oct 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.19% · Oct 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.20% · Oct 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.24% · Oct 23, 202410-year Treasury: 4.21% · Oct 24, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Oct 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 28, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 29, 202410-year Treasury: 4.29% · Oct 30, 202410-year Treasury: 4.28% · Oct 31, 202410-year Treasury: 4.37% · Nov 1, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Nov 4, 202410-year Treasury: 4.26% · Nov 5, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 6, 202410-year Treasury: 4.31% · Nov 7, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 8, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 12, 202410-year Treasury: 4.44% · Nov 13, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 14, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 15, 202410-year Treasury: 4.42% · Nov 18, 202410-year Treasury: 4.39% · Nov 19, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 20, 202410-year Treasury: 4.43% · Nov 21, 202410-year Treasury: 4.41% · Nov 22, 202410-year Treasury: 4.27% · Nov 25, 202410-year Treasury: 4.30% · Nov 26, 202410-year Treasury: 4.25% · Nov 27, 2024May 28, 2024Aug 28, 2024Nov 28, 2024
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury127 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,888.32/month

6.46% · Aug 22, 2024

At the later reference$1,814.11/month

6.08% · Sep 26, 2024

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $74.21 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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