Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Economic Outlook — Governor Lisa D. Cook

Thank you, Adam, and thank you to the Peterson Institute for inviting me to speak today. This is my first speech as a Fed Governor, and I am delighted to deliver it here, joining friends and colleagues from across my career, from…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

THE PRIMARY SOURCE

Read the communication

Original source →

Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you, Adam, and thank you to the Peterson Institute for inviting me to speak today. This is my first speech as a Fed Governor, and I am delighted to deliver it here, joining friends and colleagues from across my career, from academia to policymaking.1

I would like to start with a discussion of the U.S. economy, including the implications of international developments, and then talk about my approach as a policymaker and how I view the current stance of monetary policy.

The Labor Market I will begin with the labor market, which is very strong. Employment rebounded much more swiftly post-pandemic than it did during previous recoveries and has continued to grow at a rapid pace of about 440,000 jobs a month so far this year. The unemployment rate, at 3.7 percent, remains very low. Other indicators also point to labor market strength: Despite a large drop in the number of job openings in August, which may suggest that labor demand is moderating, there is still an unusually high 1.7 job openings per unemployed job seeker. Meanwhile, layoffs are near historical lows, and the quits rate is well above pre-pandemic levels even as it has moderated somewhat, indicating that workers still feel confident they can find another job.

On the supply side, labor force participation has recovered more slowly than expected and has largely moved sideways this year even after a welcome rise to 62.4 percent in August. Early retirements prompted by the pandemic have not yet reversed. Some of these are likely due to fear of exposure to COVID-19. And COVID continues to weigh on a full recovery in labor supply in other ways as well, as people with long-haul cases and caring responsibilities stay home and others lose hours to short-term illness. If the health impact of COVID-19 continues to diminish, I am optimistic that more workers will reenter the labor force, but there is a risk that labor supply remains below its pre-pandemic trend.

Inflation On the price stability side of the Fed's mandate, inflation remains stubbornly and unacceptably high, and data over the past few months show that inflationary pressures remain broad based. My focus, therefore, is on bringing inflation back down to our 2 percent target. I am heartened to see measures of medium- to long-term inflation expectations falling in the surveys from the New York Fed and the University of Michigan. Although those declines may partly reflect falling gasoline prices, they provide some evidence that inflation expectations are well anchored.

The data on actual inflation, however, have showed a slower decline than I had anticipated, and I am seeking to better understand the reasons. I am focused on the lag between signs of easing price pressures and actual inflation coming down from its very high levels.

Much of the surge in inflation over the past year was rooted in the incomplete recovery of aggregate supply from pandemic-related shutdowns. Global supply chain disruptions had especially wide-reaching effects. This year, Russia's invasion of Ukraine sparked a surge in energy prices and affected global food markets both directly, by reducing shipments of commodities such as grain, and indirectly, by, for example, curtailing fertilizer production.

In recent months, some of the upward pressure from those forces has begun to wane. Supply bottlenecks appear to be easing, and global oil and commodity prices have declined. This largely reflects worsening global growth prospects, notably in Europe, which is suffering from the reduced flow of Russian natural gas, and in China, with its zero-COVID policy and property-sector difficulties.

U.S. gasoline prices have fallen more than $1 per gallon since June, reflecting the fall in oil prices and refinery margins and helping to slow the monthly increases in headline consumer prices. However, core prices—those excluding food and energy—have continued to rise rapidly. In particular, inflation in core goods prices has been surprisingly strong, in part because the elevated demand for goods we saw during the height of the pandemic has taken longer to abate than previously anticipated.

Still, there are reasons to expect core goods inflation to slow in coming months. Wholesale used vehicle prices have declined considerably, but there is some uncertainty about how long it will take for that decline to show up in consumer prices. Similarly, new car prices should moderate over time as production of new vehicles continues to ramp up. Overall, a broad range of goods have seen declines in supplier delivery times and freight prices. And core import prices have fallen in each of the past four months, driven by lower commodity prices and an appreciating dollar.

Although supply constraints in goods appear to be easing, we cannot assume that improvement will be steady. Globally, at least one potential snag is the possible reduction in Russian oil supply later this year when European sanctions come into full force. As we saw with drought in Europe and China and the floods in Pakistan, extreme weather conditions may also disrupt global supplies of food and other commodities. Domestically, the recent threat of a rail strike, though averted, highlights the existence of latent risks that could result in further negative supply shocks.

Consumer prices continue to rise rapidly over a broad range of services as demand for services recovers. Continued strong wage increases will likely put further upward pressure on service price inflation. Housing services inflation will likely boost overall inflation well into next year. Although rent increases on new leases are starting to slow, that moderation also is likely to have a substantial and uncertain lag before it appears in PCE (personal consumption expenditures) and CPI (consumer price index) measures of inflation.

The widespread nature of the inflation pressures suggests that the overall economy is very tight, with constrained supply continuing to fall short of demand. The Fed cannot act directly on supply, but it can moderate demand by tightening monetary policy. The rate hikes so far this year, coupled with expectations of further hikes and ongoing balance sheet runoff, have led to a sharp tightening of U.S. financial conditions. This has helped soften interest-sensitive components of private demand, including business investment and—most notably—housing. Indications of cooling in the housing market include declines in single-family starts and permits, existing home sales, and homebuyer and homebuilder sentiment.

While there is heterogeneity across countries, high inflation is a global phenomenon. And financial conditions also have tightened abroad, as foreign central banks have raised policy rates. Some observers have raised concerns that central banks around the world, which are tightening policy to contain domestic inflation, may not be accounting for the cross-border spillovers of their policies. My role is to focus on the Fed's dual mandate to promote maximum employment and stable prices for the American people, which is a domestic mandate. My colleagues and I on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), however, are very attuned to foreign developments, including monetary policy abroad, and their effect on domestic conditions through trade and financial market channels. Sharp slowdowns in foreign economies, along with dollar appreciation, are reducing demand for U.S. exports, and financial market spillovers between the United States and abroad are a two-way street. As with almost everything else in these times, there is substantial uncertainty about the size of these spillovers.

These international dimensions are among those that I consider in my risk-management approach, which I will describe in a moment. I will also address how data drive my understanding of the inflation dynamics I have outlined.

My Approach to Policymaking The role of policymaker robs economists of one of the profession's great joys, which is to simply ruminate or expound on the vagaries of economics. In my new role, I must make judgments on the economy, weighing new information against existing theories, and translate those judgments into appropriate policy action.

To a large extent, my own research and experiences shape my views on policy. My research on economic growth has given me an appreciation for the dual mandate and the importance of economic and financial stability for fostering innovation and growth. My experience working at the Council of Economic Advisers during the eurozone crisis and with emerging economies—particularly Russia and some African economies—has taught me how difficult it can be to forecast in highly uncertain environments. I also saw firsthand that it is often a mistake to rely on standard models for nonstandard situations.

Paying close attention to the data is key, which, of course, includes readings on inflation and the labor market. But we must be humble about our ability to draw firm conclusions and prepare for inevitable surprises. We also need to consider timely high-frequency data that more quickly capture evolving economic developments than do traditional data sources. Examples include wholesale used car prices, rental rates on new leases, and survey responses on supplier delivery times or prices paid. There is also nontraditional, real-time information, such as Google mobility data and Open Table data on dining reservations, which were useful in estimating economic activity during various waves of the pandemic.

In considering whether standard models remain appropriate, one focus for me is the well-known long and variable lag between monetary policy actions and their effect on the real economy and on inflation. Less of a lag may exist now between rate hikes and the tightening of financial conditions, which occurs as markets anticipate future rate hikes. Residential investment also responds quickly to changes in monetary policy, while consumer spending is slower to react. Lags between monetary policy and inflation are even more unclear. Expectations of future monetary policy can have quite rapid effects on commodity and other import prices, but monetary transmission through economic slack appears to affect inflation more slowly.

I believe that uncertain times require a risk-management approach to policy-setting—looking not just at the expected outcomes, but also considering the most salient risks in setting the policy stance. In the current situation, with risks to inflation forecasts skewed to the upside, I believe policy judgments must be based on whether and when we see inflation actually falling in the data, rather than just in forecasts. Although most forecasts see considerable progress on inflation in coming years, it is important to consider whether inflation dynamics may have changed in a persistent way, making our forecasts even more uncertain.

My Perspective on Monetary Policy How do these experiences and the principles of data dependence and risk management influence my views on current monetary policy?

In 2019, well before joining the Board, I took part in the Federal Reserve's Fed Listens event in Chicago. A key takeaway from Fed Listens was the value of a sustained strong labor market that brings people off the sidelines—those who have been on the margins but who have skills that can be developed and the desire to be part of the workforce, if given a chance. Just two weeks ago, we held another Fed Listens event to hear how businesses, families, and communities are adapting to changes in the post-pandemic economy. Notably, we heard about the burden that lower- and middle-income families are feeling from high inflation. These events highlighted for me the importance of achieving both our employment and price-stability mandates.

In our current economy, with a very strong labor market and inflation far above our goal, I believe a risk-management approach requires a strong focus on taming inflation. Inflation poses both a near- and long-term threat. Aside from the immediate effect of higher prices on households and businesses, the longer it persists and the more people come to expect it, the greater the risks of elevated inflation becoming entrenched. I think it is critical that we prevent an inflationary psychology from taking hold. This is not simply an abstract concept, but a risk I take seriously based on personal experience. My time doing dissertation research in Russia in the mid-1990s taught me just how disruptive and painful an extremely high-inflation environment can be.

Reports over the past few months have shown high inflation to be stubbornly persistent, while the labor market has remained strong. Being data dependent, I have revised up my assessment of the persistence of high inflation. And given my risk-management approach, with upside risks to inflation being the most salient, I fully supported the step-up in the front-loading of policy over the past three FOMC meetings.

Front-loading has several positive features. It puts monetary restraint into place more quickly to reduce demand while supply is constrained. It may also act to rein in inflation expectations and, as a result, to influence wage- and price-setting behavior. This preemptive approach is appropriate. Although lowering inflation will bring some pain, a failure to restore price stability would make it much harder and much more painful to restore it in the future.

When I first joined the FOMC, our policy rate was still below 1 percent. In the three meetings since, we have moved expeditiously by raising rates 75 basis points at every meeting. As we move forward in these uncertain times, policy should remain focused on restoring price stability, which will also set the foundation for a sustainably strong labor market. With inflation running well above our 2 percent longer-run goal, restoring price stability likely will require ongoing rate hikes and then keeping policy restrictive for some time until we are confident that inflation is firmly on the path toward our 2 percent goal.

At some point, as we continue to tighten monetary policy, it will become appropriate to slow the pace of increases while we assess the effects of our cumulative tightening on the economy and inflation. In any case, the path of policy should depend on how quickly we make progress toward our inflation goal.

In sum, inflation is too high, it must come down, and we will keep at it until the job is done.

Thank you.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 6, 2022.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 6, 2022Publication referenceOct 6, 202230 days laterNov 5, 2022
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®5.66%Observed 6.66%Observed +100 bps vs. earlier reference6.95%Observed +29 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury3.33%Observed 3.83%Observed +50 bps vs. earlier reference4.17%Observed +34 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 6, 2022 – Jan 6, 2023
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 6, 2022Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.2.50%5.00%7.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 5.30% · Jul 7, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 5.51% · Jul 14, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 5.54% · Jul 21, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 5.30% · Jul 28, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 4.99% · Aug 4, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 5.22% · Aug 11, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 5.13% · Aug 18, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 5.55% · Aug 25, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 5.66% · Sep 1, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 5.89% · Sep 8, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.02% · Sep 15, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.29% · Sep 22, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.70% · Sep 29, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.66% · Oct 6, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.92% · Oct 13, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.94% · Oct 20, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 7.08% · Oct 27, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.95% · Nov 3, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 7.08% · Nov 10, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.61% · Nov 17, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.58% · Nov 23, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.49% · Dec 1, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.33% · Dec 8, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.31% · Dec 15, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.27% · Dec 22, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.42% · Dec 29, 202230-year fixed mortgage: 6.48% · Jan 5, 202310-year Treasury: 2.93% · Jul 6, 202210-year Treasury: 3.01% · Jul 7, 202210-year Treasury: 3.09% · Jul 8, 202210-year Treasury: 2.99% · Jul 11, 202210-year Treasury: 2.96% · Jul 12, 202210-year Treasury: 2.91% · Jul 13, 202210-year Treasury: 2.96% · Jul 14, 202210-year Treasury: 2.93% · Jul 15, 202210-year Treasury: 2.96% · Jul 18, 202210-year Treasury: 3.01% · Jul 19, 202210-year Treasury: 3.04% · Jul 20, 202210-year Treasury: 2.91% · Jul 21, 202210-year Treasury: 2.77% · Jul 22, 202210-year Treasury: 2.81% · Jul 25, 202210-year Treasury: 2.81% · Jul 26, 202210-year Treasury: 2.78% · Jul 27, 202210-year Treasury: 2.68% · Jul 28, 202210-year Treasury: 2.67% · Jul 29, 202210-year Treasury: 2.60% · Aug 1, 202210-year Treasury: 2.75% · Aug 2, 202210-year Treasury: 2.73% · Aug 3, 202210-year Treasury: 2.68% · Aug 4, 202210-year Treasury: 2.83% · Aug 5, 202210-year Treasury: 2.77% · Aug 8, 202210-year Treasury: 2.80% · Aug 9, 202210-year Treasury: 2.78% · Aug 10, 202210-year Treasury: 2.87% · Aug 11, 202210-year Treasury: 2.84% · Aug 12, 202210-year Treasury: 2.79% · Aug 15, 202210-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 16, 202210-year Treasury: 2.89% · Aug 17, 202210-year Treasury: 2.88% · Aug 18, 202210-year Treasury: 2.98% · Aug 19, 202210-year Treasury: 3.03% · Aug 22, 202210-year Treasury: 3.05% · Aug 23, 202210-year Treasury: 3.11% · Aug 24, 202210-year Treasury: 3.03% · Aug 25, 202210-year Treasury: 3.04% · Aug 26, 202210-year Treasury: 3.12% · Aug 29, 202210-year Treasury: 3.11% · Aug 30, 202210-year Treasury: 3.15% · Aug 31, 202210-year Treasury: 3.26% · Sep 1, 202210-year Treasury: 3.20% · Sep 2, 202210-year Treasury: 3.33% · Sep 6, 202210-year Treasury: 3.27% · Sep 7, 202210-year Treasury: 3.29% · Sep 8, 202210-year Treasury: 3.33% · Sep 9, 202210-year Treasury: 3.37% · Sep 12, 202210-year Treasury: 3.42% · Sep 13, 202210-year Treasury: 3.41% · Sep 14, 202210-year Treasury: 3.45% · Sep 15, 202210-year Treasury: 3.45% · Sep 16, 202210-year Treasury: 3.49% · Sep 19, 202210-year Treasury: 3.57% · Sep 20, 202210-year Treasury: 3.51% · Sep 21, 202210-year Treasury: 3.70% · Sep 22, 202210-year Treasury: 3.69% · Sep 23, 202210-year Treasury: 3.88% · Sep 26, 202210-year Treasury: 3.97% · Sep 27, 202210-year Treasury: 3.72% · Sep 28, 202210-year Treasury: 3.76% · Sep 29, 202210-year Treasury: 3.83% · Sep 30, 202210-year Treasury: 3.67% · Oct 3, 202210-year Treasury: 3.62% · Oct 4, 202210-year Treasury: 3.76% · Oct 5, 202210-year Treasury: 3.83% · Oct 6, 202210-year Treasury: 3.89% · Oct 7, 202210-year Treasury: 3.93% · Oct 11, 202210-year Treasury: 3.91% · Oct 12, 202210-year Treasury: 3.97% · Oct 13, 202210-year Treasury: 4.00% · Oct 14, 202210-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 17, 202210-year Treasury: 4.01% · Oct 18, 202210-year Treasury: 4.14% · Oct 19, 202210-year Treasury: 4.24% · Oct 20, 202210-year Treasury: 4.21% · Oct 21, 202210-year Treasury: 4.25% · Oct 24, 202210-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 25, 202210-year Treasury: 4.04% · Oct 26, 202210-year Treasury: 3.96% · Oct 27, 202210-year Treasury: 4.02% · Oct 28, 202210-year Treasury: 4.10% · Oct 31, 202210-year Treasury: 4.07% · Nov 1, 202210-year Treasury: 4.10% · Nov 2, 202210-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 3, 202210-year Treasury: 4.17% · Nov 4, 202210-year Treasury: 4.22% · Nov 7, 202210-year Treasury: 4.14% · Nov 8, 202210-year Treasury: 4.12% · Nov 9, 202210-year Treasury: 3.82% · Nov 10, 202210-year Treasury: 3.88% · Nov 14, 202210-year Treasury: 3.80% · Nov 15, 202210-year Treasury: 3.67% · Nov 16, 202210-year Treasury: 3.77% · Nov 17, 202210-year Treasury: 3.82% · Nov 18, 202210-year Treasury: 3.83% · Nov 21, 202210-year Treasury: 3.76% · Nov 22, 202210-year Treasury: 3.71% · Nov 23, 202210-year Treasury: 3.68% · Nov 25, 202210-year Treasury: 3.69% · Nov 28, 202210-year Treasury: 3.75% · Nov 29, 202210-year Treasury: 3.68% · Nov 30, 202210-year Treasury: 3.53% · Dec 1, 202210-year Treasury: 3.51% · Dec 2, 202210-year Treasury: 3.60% · Dec 5, 202210-year Treasury: 3.51% · Dec 6, 202210-year Treasury: 3.42% · Dec 7, 202210-year Treasury: 3.48% · Dec 8, 202210-year Treasury: 3.57% · Dec 9, 202210-year Treasury: 3.61% · Dec 12, 202210-year Treasury: 3.51% · Dec 13, 202210-year Treasury: 3.49% · Dec 14, 202210-year Treasury: 3.44% · Dec 15, 202210-year Treasury: 3.48% · Dec 16, 202210-year Treasury: 3.57% · Dec 19, 202210-year Treasury: 3.69% · Dec 20, 202210-year Treasury: 3.68% · Dec 21, 202210-year Treasury: 3.67% · Dec 22, 202210-year Treasury: 3.75% · Dec 23, 202210-year Treasury: 3.84% · Dec 27, 202210-year Treasury: 3.88% · Dec 28, 202210-year Treasury: 3.83% · Dec 29, 202210-year Treasury: 3.88% · Dec 30, 202210-year Treasury: 3.79% · Jan 3, 202310-year Treasury: 3.69% · Jan 4, 202310-year Treasury: 3.71% · Jan 5, 202310-year Treasury: 3.55% · Jan 6, 2023Jul 6, 2022Oct 6, 2022Jan 6, 2023
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury127 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,927.88/month

6.66% · Oct 6, 2022

At the later reference$1,985.84/month

6.95% · Nov 3, 2022

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $57.96 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

Evaluate a rate lock around your closing date →See current advertised mortgage options →