Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Monetary Policy in the Time of COVID — Chair Jerome H. Powell

Seventeen months have passed since the U.S. economy faced the full force of the COVID-19 pandemic. This shock led to an immediate and unprecedented decline as large parts of the economy were shuttered to contain the spread of the disease.

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

THE PRIMARY SOURCE

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Seventeen months have passed since the U.S. economy faced the full force of the COVID-19 pandemic. This shock led to an immediate and unprecedented decline as large parts of the economy were shuttered to contain the spread of the disease.

The path of recovery has been a difficult one, and a good place to begin is by thanking those on the front line fighting the pandemic: the essential workers who kept the economy going, those who have cared for others in need, and those in medical research, business, and government, who came together to discover, produce, and widely distribute effective vaccines in record time. We should also keep in our thoughts those who have lost their lives from COVID, as well as their loved ones.

Strong policy support has fueled a vigorous but uneven recovery—one that is, in many respects, historically anomalous. In a reversal of typical patterns in a downturn, aggregate personal income rose rather than fell, and households massively shifted their spending from services to manufactured goods. Booming demand for goods and the strength and speed of the reopening have led to shortages and bottlenecks, leaving the COVID-constrained supply side unable to keep up. The result has been elevated inflation in durable goods—a sector that has experienced an annual inflation rate well below zero over the past quarter century.1 Labor market conditions are improving but turbulent, and the pandemic continues to threaten not only health and life, but also economic activity. Many other advanced economies are experiencing similarly unusual conditions.

In my comments today, I will focus on the Fed's efforts to promote our maximum employment and price stability goals amid this upheaval, and suggest how lessons from history and a careful focus on incoming data and the evolving risks offer useful guidance for today's unique monetary policy challenges.

The Recession and Recovery So Far The pandemic recession—the briefest yet deepest on record—displaced roughly 30 million workers in the space of two months.2 The decline in output in the second quarter of 2020 was twice the full decline during the Great Recession of 2007–09.3 But the pace of the recovery has exceeded expectations, with output surpassing its previous peak after only four quarters, less than half the time required following the Great Recession. As is typically the case, the recovery in employment has lagged that in output; nonetheless, employment gains have also come faster than expected.4

The economic downturn has not fallen equally on all Americans, and those least able to shoulder the burden have been hardest hit. In particular, despite progress, joblessness continues to fall disproportionately on lower-wage workers in the service sector and on African Americans and Hispanics.

The unevenness of the recovery can further be seen through the lens of the sectoral shift of spending into goods—particularly durable goods such as appliances, furniture, and cars—and away from services, particularly in-person services in areas such as travel and leisure (figure 1). As the pandemic struck, restaurant meals fell 45 percent, air travel 95 percent, and dentist visits 65 percent. Even today, with overall gross domestic product and consumption spending more than fully recovered, services spending remains about 7 percent below trend. Total employment is now 6 million below its February 2020 level, and 5 million of that shortfall is in the still-depressed service sector. In contrast, spending on durable goods has boomed since the start of the recovery and is now running about 20 percent above the pre-pandemic level. With demand outstripping pandemic-afflicted supply, rising durables prices are a principal factor lifting inflation well above our 2 percent objective.

Given the ongoing upheaval in the economy, some strains and surprises are inevitable. The job of monetary policy is to promote maximum employment and price stability as the economy works through this challenging period. I will turn now to a discussion of progress toward those goals.

The Path Ahead: Maximum Employment The outlook for the labor market has brightened considerably in recent months. After faltering last winter, job gains have risen steadily over the course of this year and now average 832,000 over the past three months, of which almost 800,000 have been in services (figure 2). The pace of total hiring is faster than at any time in the recorded data before the pandemic. The levels of job openings and quits are at record highs, and employers report that they cannot fill jobs fast enough to meet returning demand.

These favorable conditions for job seekers should help the economy cover the considerable remaining ground to reach maximum employment. The unemployment rate has declined to 5.4 percent, a post-pandemic low, but is still much too high, and the reported rate understates the amount of labor market slack.5 Long-term unemployment remains elevated, and the recovery in labor force participation has lagged well behind the rest of the labor market, as it has in past recoveries.

With vaccinations rising, schools reopening, and enhanced unemployment benefits ending, some factors that may be holding back job seekers are likely fading.6 While the Delta variant presents a near-term risk, the prospects are good for continued progress toward maximum employment.

The Path Ahead: Inflation The rapid reopening of the economy has brought a sharp run-up in inflation. Over the 12 months through July, measures of headline and core personal consumption expenditures inflation have run at 4.2 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively—well above our 2 percent longer-run objective.7 Businesses and consumers widely report upward pressure on prices and wages. Inflation at these levels is, of course, a cause for concern. But that concern is tempered by a number of factors that suggest that these elevated readings are likely to prove temporary. This assessment is a critical and ongoing one, and we are carefully monitoring incoming data.

The dynamics of inflation are complex, and we assess the inflation outlook from a number of different perspectives, as I will now discuss.

1. The absence so far of broad-based inflation pressures The spike in inflation is so far largely the product of a relatively narrow group of goods and services that have been directly affected by the pandemic and the reopening of the economy. Durable goods alone contributed about 1 percentage point to the latest 12‑month measures of headline and core inflation. Energy prices, which rebounded with the strong recovery, added another 0.8 percentage point to headline inflation, and from long experience we expect the inflation effects of these increases to be transitory. In addition, some prices—for example, for hotel rooms and airplane tickets—declined sharply during the recession and have now moved back up close to pre-pandemic levels. The 12-month window we use in computing inflation now captures the rebound in prices but not the initial decline, temporarily elevating reported inflation. These effects, which are adding a few tenths to measured inflation, should wash out over time.

We consult a range of measures meant to capture whether price increases for particular items are spilling over into broad-based inflation. These include trimmed mean measures and measures excluding durables and computed from just before the pandemic. These measures generally show inflation at or close to our 2 percent longer-run objective (figure 3). We would be concerned at signs that inflationary pressures were spreading more broadly through the economy.

2. Moderating inflation in higher-inflation items We are also directly monitoring the prices of particular goods and services most affected by the pandemic and the reopening, and are beginning to see a moderation in some cases as shortages ease. Used car prices, for example, appear to have stabilized; indeed, some price indicators are beginning to fall. If that continues, as many analysts predict, then used car prices will soon be pulling measured inflation down, as they did for much of the past decade.8

This same dynamic of upward inflation pressure dissipating and, in some cases, reversing seems likely to play out in durables more generally. Over the 25 years preceding the pandemic, durables prices actually declined, with inflation averaging negative 1.9 percent per year (figure 5).9 As supply problems have begun to resolve, inflation in durable goods other than autos has now slowed and may be starting to fall. It seems unlikely that durables inflation will continue to contribute importantly over time to overall inflation. We will be looking for evidence that supports or undercuts that expectation.

3. Wages We also assess whether wage increases are consistent with 2 percent inflation over time. Wage increases are essential to support a rising standard of living and are generally, of course, a welcome development. But if wage increases were to move materially and persistently above the levels of productivity gains and inflation, businesses would likely pass those increases on to customers, a process that could become the sort of "wage–price spiral" seen at times in the past.10 Today we see little evidence of wage increases that might threaten excessive inflation (figure 6). Broad-based measures of wages that adjust for compositional changes in the labor force, such as the employment cost index and the Atlanta Wage Growth Tracker, show wages moving up at a pace that appears consistent with our longer-term inflation objective. We will continue to monitor this carefully.

4. Longer-term inflation expectations Policymakers and analysts generally believe that, as long as longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored, policy can and should look through temporary swings in inflation. Our monetary policy framework emphasizes that anchoring longer-term expectations at 2 percent is important for both maximum employment and price stability.

We carefully monitor a wide range of indicators of longer-term inflation expectations. These measures today are at levels broadly consistent with our 2 percent objective (figure 4). Because measures of inflation expectations are individually noisy, we also focus on common patterns across the measures. One approach to summarizing these patterns is the Board staff's index of common inflation expectations (CIE), which combines information from a broad range of survey and market-based measures.11 This index captures a general move down in expectations starting around 2014, a time when inflation was running persistently below 2 percent. More recently, the index shows a welcome reversal of that decline and is now at levels more consistent with our 2 percent objective.

Longer-term inflation expectations have moved much less than actual inflation or near-term expectations, suggesting that households, businesses, and market participants also believe that current high inflation readings are likely to prove transitory and that, in any case, the Fed will keep inflation close to our 2 percent objective over time.12

5. The prevalence of global disinflationary forces over the past quarter century Finally, it is worth noting that, since the 1990s, inflation in many advanced economies has run somewhat below 2 percent even in good times (figure 7). The pattern of low inflation likely reflects sustained disinflationary forces, including technology, globalization and perhaps demographic factors, as well as a stronger and more successful commitment by central banks to maintain price stability.13 In the United States, unemployment ran below 4 percent for about two years before the pandemic, while inflation ran at or below 2 percent. Wages did move up across the income spectrum—a welcome development—but not by enough to lift price inflation consistently to 2 percent. While the underlying global disinflationary factors are likely to evolve over time, there is little reason to think that they have suddenly reversed or abated. It seems more likely that they will continue to weigh on inflation as the pandemic passes into history.14

We will continue to monitor incoming inflation data against each of these assessments.

To sum up, the baseline outlook is for continued progress toward maximum employment, with inflation returning to levels consistent with our goal of inflation averaging 2 percent over time. Let me now turn to how the baseline outlook and the associated risks and uncertainties figure in our monetary policymaking.

Implications for Monetary Policy The period from 1950 through the early 1980s provides two important lessons for managing the risks and uncertainties we face today. The early days of stabilization policy in the 1950s taught monetary policymakers not to attempt to offset what are likely to be temporary fluctuations in inflation.15 Indeed, responding may do more harm than good, particularly in an era where policy rates are much closer to the effective lower bound even in good times. The main influence of monetary policy on inflation can come after a lag of a year or more. If a central bank tightens policy in response to factors that turn out to be temporary, the main policy effects are likely to arrive after the need has passed. The ill-timed policy move unnecessarily slows hiring and other economic activity and pushes inflation lower than desired. Today, with substantial slack remaining in the labor market and the pandemic continuing, such a mistake could be particularly harmful. We know that extended periods of unemployment can mean lasting harm to workers and to the productive capacity of the economy.16

History also teaches, however, that central banks cannot take for granted that inflation due to transitory factors will fade. The 1970s saw two periods in which there were large increases in energy and food prices, raising headline inflation for a time. But when the direct effects on headline inflation eased, core inflation continued to run persistently higher than before. One likely contributing factor was that the public had come to generally expect higher inflation—one reason why we now monitor inflation expectations so carefully.17

Central banks have always faced the problem of distinguishing transitory inflation spikes from more troublesome developments, and it is sometimes difficult to do so with confidence in real time. At such times, there is no substitute for a careful focus on incoming data and evolving risks. If sustained higher inflation were to become a serious concern, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would certainly respond and use our tools to assure that inflation runs at levels that are consistent with our goal.

Incoming data should provide more evidence that some of the supply–demand imbalances are improving, and more evidence of a continued moderation in inflation, particularly in goods and services prices that have been most affected by the pandemic. We also expect to see continued strong job creation. And we will be learning more about the Delta variant's effects. For now, I believe that policy is well positioned; as always, we are prepared to adjust policy as appropriate to achieve our goals.

That brings me to a concluding word on the path ahead for monetary policy. The Committee remains steadfast in our oft-expressed commitment to support the economy for as long as is needed to achieve a full recovery. The changes we made last year to our Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy are well suited to address today's challenges.

We have said that we would continue our asset purchases at the current pace until we see substantial further progress toward our maximum employment and price stability goals, measured since last December, when we first articulated this guidance. My view is that the "substantial further progress" test has been met for inflation. There has also been clear progress toward maximum employment. At the FOMC's recent July meeting, I was of the view, as were most participants, that if the economy evolved broadly as anticipated, it could be appropriate to start reducing the pace of asset purchases this year. The intervening month has brought more progress in the form of a strong employment report for July, but also the further spread of the Delta variant. We will be carefully assessing incoming data and the evolving risks. Even after our asset purchases end, our elevated holdings of longer-term securities will continue to support accommodative financial conditions.

The timing and pace of the coming reduction in asset purchases will not be intended to carry a direct signal regarding the timing of interest rate liftoff, for which we have articulated a different and substantially more stringent test. We have said that we will continue to hold the target range for the federal funds rate at its current level until the economy reaches conditions consistent with maximum employment, and inflation has reached 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time. We have much ground to cover to reach maximum employment, and time will tell whether we have reached 2 percent inflation on a sustainable basis.

These are challenging times for the public we serve, as the pandemic and its unprecedented toll on health and economic activity linger. But I will end on a positive note. Before the pandemic, we all saw the extraordinary benefits that a strong labor market can deliver to our society. Despite today's challenges, the economy is on a path to just such a labor market, with high levels of employment and participation, broadly shared wage gains, and inflation running close to our price stability goal. Thank you very much.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Aug 27, 2021.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJul 28, 2021Publication referenceAug 27, 202130 days laterSep 26, 2021
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®2.78%Observed 2.87%Observed +9 bps vs. earlier reference2.88%Observed +1 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.26%Observed 1.31%Observed +5 bps vs. earlier reference1.47%Observed +16 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

May 27, 2021 – Nov 27, 2021
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Aug 27, 2021Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.1.00%2.25%3.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 2.95% · May 27, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.99% · Jun 3, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.96% · Jun 10, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.93% · Jun 17, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.02% · Jun 24, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.98% · Jul 1, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.90% · Jul 8, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.88% · Jul 15, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.78% · Jul 22, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.80% · Jul 29, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.77% · Aug 5, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.87% · Aug 12, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.86% · Aug 19, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.87% · Aug 26, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.87% · Sep 2, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.88% · Sep 9, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.86% · Sep 16, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.88% · Sep 23, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.01% · Sep 30, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.99% · Oct 7, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.05% · Oct 14, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.09% · Oct 21, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.14% · Oct 28, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.09% · Nov 4, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.98% · Nov 10, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.10% · Nov 18, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.10% · Nov 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · May 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · May 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Jun 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Jun 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Jun 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.53% · Jun 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.47% · Jun 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jun 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jun 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.52% · Jun 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Jun 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Jun 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Jul 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.44% · Jul 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Jul 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.38% · Jul 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.42% · Jul 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Jul 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Jul 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Jul 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.23% · Jul 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.27% · Jul 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Jul 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.25% · Jul 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Jul 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.28% · Jul 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.24% · Jul 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.20% · Aug 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Aug 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Aug 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.23% · Aug 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Aug 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Aug 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.36% · Aug 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.35% · Aug 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.36% · Aug 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Aug 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Aug 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Aug 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.27% · Aug 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.24% · Aug 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Aug 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.25% · Aug 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Aug 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.35% · Aug 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.34% · Aug 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Aug 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Aug 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Aug 31, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Sep 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Sep 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Sep 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.38% · Sep 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.35% · Sep 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Sep 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.35% · Sep 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Sep 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.28% · Sep 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Sep 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.34% · Sep 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Sep 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Sep 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Sep 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.32% · Sep 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.41% · Sep 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.47% · Sep 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Sep 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Sep 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.55% · Sep 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.52% · Sep 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Oct 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Oct 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Oct 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.53% · Oct 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Oct 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · Oct 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Oct 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Oct 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.52% · Oct 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Oct 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Oct 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.65% · Oct 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.65% · Oct 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.68% · Oct 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.66% · Oct 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Oct 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Oct 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Oct 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Oct 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.55% · Oct 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Nov 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Nov 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.60% · Nov 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.53% · Nov 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Nov 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.51% · Nov 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.46% · Nov 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Nov 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Nov 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Nov 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Nov 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.60% · Nov 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Nov 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Nov 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Nov 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.67% · Nov 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Nov 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Nov 26, 2021May 27, 2021Aug 27, 2021Nov 27, 2021
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury126 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,243.88/month

2.87% · Aug 26, 2021

At the later reference$1,245.48/month

2.88% · Sep 23, 2021

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $1.60 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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