Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Sovereign Markets, Global Factors — Vice Chair Richard H. Clarida

Good morning, and thank you, Raphael. I am delighted to participate in the 25th Financial Markets Conference, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, which this year focuses on the role of central banks in fostering a…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Good morning, and thank you, Raphael. I am delighted to participate in the 25th Financial Markets Conference, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, which this year focuses on the role of central banks in fostering a resilient economy and financial system.1

Central banks can indeed make important contributions to the resilience of the economy and the financial system. In the case of the Federal Reserve, our responsibilities include ensuring that banks are well supervised and regulated, working with other government agencies through the Financial Stability Oversight Council to promote financial stability, and, of course, conducting a U.S. monetary policy that aims to achieve our dual-mandate goals of maximum employment and price stability. As the title of my talk suggests, my remarks today will focus on the importance of some specific global financial linkages that are relevant to the execution and communication of U.S. monetary policy aimed at achieving our domestic mandates.

Signs of financial globalization are abundant and evident across markets for many asset classes. But why and in what possible ways is financial globalization relevant for national monetary policies charged with achieving domestic mandates? A comprehensive and complete answer to this fundamental question is, of course, beyond the scope of a single speech, and so in my remarks today, I will focus specifically on two ways in which the integration and globalization of sovereign bond markets is relevant to the execution and communication of national monetary policies.

Central banks rightly pay a lot of attention to domestic sovereign bond yields "across the curve" for at least two reasons. First, yield curves for nominal and inflation-indexed bonds provide useful—if also noisy—information about the expected future path of the policy rate, inflation, the business cycle, and the term premium required to hold sovereign bonds. Second, yields on long-maturity bonds represent, generally, a key channel in the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy and, specifically, are a fundamental building block markets use to discount cash flows relevant for valuing financial assets. To anticipate my bottom line, the message of this speech is that global integration of sovereign bond markets has important implications not only for how central banks extract relevant signals from observed yields on bonds issued by the domestic sovereign, but also for how central banks calibrate the transmission of policy and policy guidance to the real economy via the yields on long-maturity bonds that are relevant for saving, investment, and asset valuation.

Sovereign Yields Embed Global Factors There is a rich academic and practitioner literature devoted to modeling and interpreting fluctuations in domestic sovereign yield curves. A fundamental empirical regularity that motivates much of this research is that, across time and geography, yields along any given sovereign curve tend to rise and fall—and steepen and flatten—together over time. This empirical regularity led Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) to hypothesize and demonstrate that in the market for U.S. Treasury securities, a very small number of common factors—two or, at most, three—are able to account not only for most of the time-series variation, but also for the cross-sectional dispersion in yields across the entire Treasury curve. Moreover, the two most empirically important factors extracted statistically from the Treasury yield curve have intuitive geometric interpretations as "level" and "slope." The "level" factor has approximately an equal effect on yields across the maturity spectrum—thus, changes in the level factor are often referred to as "parallel shifts" in the yield curve—and accounts for most of the variance in yields across the full range of maturities. The "slope" factor has an effect that is increasing (monotonically) in maturity—thus, changes in the slope factor are often referred to as "steepening" or "flattening" pivots in the yield curve.

The original Litterman and Scheinkman factor model, with its geometric interpretation of level and slope factors, has held up remarkably well over the ensuing three decades and has been replicated for sovereign yield curves across scores of countries around the world, revealing similar regularities. Indeed, many, if not most, major central banks—and certainly their central bank watchers—estimate yield curve models and extract the factors that are reflected in their domestic sovereign yield curves. So, for example, for the three major economies included in figure 1, one can easily extract—using the methodology developed in Diebold and Li (2006)—on a country-by-country basis, U.S., U.K., and German level factors as well as U.S., U.K., and German slope factors. As is clear from figure 1, level and slope factors extracted from these individual sovereign yield curves are highly correlated across these major sovereign bond markets.

Economic theory suggests at least two reasons why the factors embedded in sovereign yield curves may be correlated across countries. First, this correlation will be present if the underlying macro fundamentals—for example, productivity growth, saving–investment imbalances, and longer-term inflation expectations—that drive the factors are correlated across countries.2 Second, as is emphasized in Clarida (2019c) and Obstfeld (2020), this correlation will also be present if countries are tightly financially integrated even if fundamentals themselves are independent across countries.3

Interpreting the Global Level Factor From any set of level and slope factors extracted across a collection of sovereign yield curves, one can in turn extract a global level factor and a global slope factor that account for the correlation among the country-specific level and slope factors.4 As can be seen in figure 1, the global level factor (the blue line) accounts for most of the evident downward trend and much of the variation relative to that trend in the estimated U.S., U.K., and German level factors. But what is this global level factor? Plausibly, the global level factor embedded in these three sovereign yield curves reflects the contribution of possibly several global macro fundamental drivers—including global productivity growth, the balance between global saving and investment, and longer-term inflation expectations—and likely also other "market" or "technical" factors specific to the trading of these sovereigns in the global bond market.

As can be seen in figure 2, however, most of the trend and variation in the global level factor about this trend can be accounted for by the evolution of estimates of the neutral real interest rates in these countries.5 Figure 2 plots the global level factor against a simple average of the Holston, Laubach, and Williams (2017, henceforth HLW) time-series estimates of $$r\ast\ $$—the neutral real interest rate consistent with trend growth and stable inflation—for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Now, while it is certainly intuitive that an $$r\ast\ $$ index for these countries would be correlated with the global level factor extracted from their yield curves, the degree to which this simple index can account for the trend and variation in the global level factor around this trend is striking. And because central banks, including the Federal Reserve, typically channel Milton Friedman (1968) and believe that the evolution of $$r\ast\ $$ primarily reflects nonmonetary factors that are beyond the central bank's control, an "$$r\ast\ $$ theory" of the level factor—if true—has important implications for how central banks extract signal from noise from sovereign yield curves as well as for how they calibrate the stance of monetary policy consistent with a credible inflation target. Under this interpretation, and as was anticipated years ago by Greenspan (2005), Bernanke (2005), Clarida (2005), and others, credible inflation-targeting central banks operating in an integrated global capital market—at least when they are operating away from their effective lower bound (ELB)—are primarily in the yield curve "slope" business, but much less so in the yield curve "level" business.6

Figure 3 shows the relationship between the yield on a 10-year Treasury note and an estimate of the neutral nominal U.S. policy rate, which I set equal to the HLW estimate of $$r\ast\ $$ for the United States plus a 2 percent inflation objective, a proxy for the neutral nominal interest rate when longer-term inflation expectations are anchored at the 2 percent target. As is evident from the figure and as can be verified econometrically, there has been since at least the 1990s a stable, mean-reverting dynamic relationship between the benchmark nominal Treasury yield and a neutral nominal interest rate proxy derived from the HLW time-series estimates for $$r\ast\ $$ in the United States.

Interpreting the Slope Factor I would now like to illustrate what I mean when I say that the slope of the yield curve is an important channel through which monetary policy is transmitted. Figure 4 plots the Diebold-Li (DL) slope factor for the United States—which is included in figure 1—against the spread between the HLW estimate of the U.S. neutral nominal policy rate and the actual federal funds rate (hereafter the "policy rate spread"). As is evident from figure 4, most of the variation in the DL slope factor for the Treasury yield curve can be accounted for by changes in the U.S. policy rate spread.7 A simple regression over the 1999:Q1 to 2019:Q4 sample of the slope factor on the policy rate spread shown in figure 4 yields an R2 of 0.84 with a coefficient on the policy rate spread of 1.23. In other words, over the past 20 years, more than three-fourths of the variance of the Treasury slope factor can be accounted for by the policy rate spread, which is obviously something the Federal Reserve can control when it sets the federal funds rate. The remaining variance of the benchmark Treasury slope factor is, by construction, accounted for by factors that are uncorrelated with the U.S. policy rate spread. A similar empirical relationship between the policy rate spread and the slope factor embedded in gilt and bund yield curves is also evident in the data, although there is some evidence in these markets of a structural break in these relationships between the slope factor and the policy rate spread sometime after the Global Financial Crisis.8 In the interest of time, I shall not put forward a theory of what accounts for the residual variance of yield curve slope factors after accounting for the policy rate spread itself, but obvious candidates (certainly at the ELB) would include forward guidance about the path of the future policy rate as well as actual and prospective large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs.

Identifying Causation from Bond Yield Correlations It is a truism that "correlation is not causation," and this is especially the case when trying to interpret contemporaneous correlation among asset prices generally and among bond yields in particular. Having identified one possible, parsimonious set of economic fundamentals that can help account for yield curve fluctuations in three major sovereign markets, I will now review what the empirical evidence has to say about the direction of causality reflected in observed correlations among sovereign yields.9 I will explore two possibilities. The first possibility is that, in reality, there are no latent "global" factors whatsoever, but rather there are just U.S. factors that exogenously fluctuate and cause the global correlations in bond yields we observe in the data. There is a vast literature (Claessens, Stracca, and Warnock, 2016, provide an overview) that documents the existence of spillovers from U.S. monetary policy, especially to emerging market (EM) financial conditions, although the recent paper by Hoek, Kamin, and Yoldas (2020) suggests that the degree of those spillovers depends importantly on the source of the shock that triggers changes in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy. In particular, as summarized in figure 5.1, they identified FOMC actions associated with "growth news" as those that were immediately followed by changes in the 10-year Treasury yield and the S&P 500 index in the same direction, whereas actions associated with "monetary news" elicited changes in yields and equity prices in opposite directions. Their key finding, illustrated in figure 5.2, was that FOMC policy rate surprises attributed to stronger U.S. growth generally have only moderate spillovers to EM financial conditions, whereas FOMC policy rate surprises attributed to U.S. inflationary pressures trigger more substantial spillovers to EM financial conditions. Regardless of the type of FOMC policy action, Hoek, Kamin, and Yoldas (2020) also found compelling evidence that the size of the spillover effects from the United States depends importantly on the degree of macroeconomic vulnerability of each emerging market economy (EME), with more vulnerable EMEs experiencing larger spillovers.

While I certainly believe that both fundamental and financial shocks originating in the United States propagate throughout the global financial system and likely account for a significant share of the asset price correlations across global markets that we observe in the data, the evidence—and introspection—suggests to me that causality can and often does run both ways.10 Anecdotally, it is not difficult to recall events—plausibly exogenous to the United States—that have triggered spillovers from foreign sovereign markets to the U.S. Treasury market. A prominent example would be the surprise Brexit vote of June 23, 2016. As the news of the Brexit vote filtered through global markets that day, sovereign yields plunged in both Germany and the United States. Indeed, as is shown in figure 6, on that day, the 10-year Treasury yield fell almost 20 basis points, the single largest one-day decline in the eight years—and over 2,000 trading days—between January 2012 and March 2020.11

The evidence that two-way causality is reflected in sovereign bond yield correlations is not limited to one-off geopolitical events such as Brexit. For instance, Curcuru, De Pooter, and Eckerd (2018) examined 12 years of monetary policy announcements by the FOMC and the European Central Bank (ECB)—a combined total of 266 monetary policy communications—focusing on how sovereign yields in one jurisdiction responded to monetary policy announcements made in the other. Their main findings are summarized in the two panels in figure 7. The left panel presents some of the evidence of the well-known, statistically significant spillovers from FOMC policy announcements to euro-area bond markets. But, as is shown in the right panel, the authors found that the spillover effect from ECB policy announcements to U.S. yields is roughly as large as that from the FOMC announcements to bund yields.12

In another influential study using a very different identification methodology, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon (2011) estimated significant and approximately equal spillovers from U.S. bond market shocks to EU bond markets, and from EU bond market shocks to the U.S. Treasury market.13 They attributed their findings to significant incipient and anticipated portfolio allocation flows across the two jurisdictions that respond elastically to expected rate-of-return differentials.14

Concluding Remarks To sum up, I believe that in extracting signal from noise from the Treasury yield curve, it is essential to incorporate the fact that observed yields in the United States and other major sovereign markets are determined in a global general equilibrium that is reflected, at least in part, in the global level of neutral policy rates and the state of longer-term global inflation expectations.15 Conditional on neutral policy rates and longer-term inflation expectations, the Federal Reserve and other major central banks can be thought of as calibrating and conducting the transmission of policy—be it through rates, forward guidance, or LSAPs—primarily through the slopes of their yield curves and much less so via their levels.16 Thank you very much for your time and attention. I look forward to my conversation with Raphael.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published May 17, 2021.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierApr 17, 2021Publication referenceMay 17, 202130 days laterJun 16, 2021
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.04%Observed 2.94%Observed −10 bps vs. earlier reference2.96%Observed +2 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.59%Observed 1.64%Observed +5 bps vs. earlier reference1.57%Observed −7 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Feb 17, 2021 – Aug 17, 2021
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around May 17, 2021Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.1.00%2.25%3.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 2.81% · Feb 18, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.97% · Feb 25, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.02% · Mar 4, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.05% · Mar 11, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.09% · Mar 18, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.17% · Mar 25, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.18% · Apr 1, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.13% · Apr 8, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.04% · Apr 15, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.97% · Apr 22, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.98% · Apr 29, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.96% · May 6, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.94% · May 13, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.00% · May 20, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.95% · May 27, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.99% · Jun 3, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.96% · Jun 10, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.93% · Jun 17, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 3.02% · Jun 24, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.98% · Jul 1, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.90% · Jul 8, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.88% · Jul 15, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.78% · Jul 22, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.80% · Jul 29, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.77% · Aug 5, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.87% · Aug 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Feb 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Feb 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.34% · Feb 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Feb 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Feb 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.38% · Feb 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Feb 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.44% · Feb 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Mar 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.42% · Mar 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.47% · Mar 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Mar 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Mar 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Mar 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.55% · Mar 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.53% · Mar 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Mar 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Mar 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Mar 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Mar 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Mar 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.71% · Mar 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.74% · Mar 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.69% · Mar 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Mar 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Mar 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Mar 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.67% · Mar 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.73% · Mar 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.73% · Mar 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.74% · Mar 31, 202110-year Treasury: 1.69% · Apr 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.72% · Apr 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.73% · Apr 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.67% · Apr 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.68% · Apr 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Apr 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.67% · Apr 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.69% · Apr 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Apr 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · Apr 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Apr 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Apr 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · Apr 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Apr 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Apr 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Apr 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Apr 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · Apr 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Apr 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Apr 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.65% · Apr 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.65% · Apr 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · May 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · May 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · May 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.60% · May 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · May 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.69% · May 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.66% · May 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · May 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.64% · May 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.68% · May 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · May 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · May 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · May 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · May 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.61% · May 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.58% · May 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.59% · Jun 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.63% · Jun 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.56% · Jun 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.53% · Jun 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.47% · Jun 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jun 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jun 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.52% · Jun 17, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 18, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Jun 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 24, 202110-year Treasury: 1.54% · Jun 25, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.45% · Jun 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.48% · Jul 1, 202110-year Treasury: 1.44% · Jul 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Jul 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.38% · Jul 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.42% · Jul 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 14, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Jul 15, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Jul 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Jul 19, 202110-year Treasury: 1.23% · Jul 20, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 21, 202110-year Treasury: 1.27% · Jul 22, 202110-year Treasury: 1.30% · Jul 23, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Jul 26, 202110-year Treasury: 1.25% · Jul 27, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Jul 28, 202110-year Treasury: 1.28% · Jul 29, 202110-year Treasury: 1.24% · Jul 30, 202110-year Treasury: 1.20% · Aug 2, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Aug 3, 202110-year Treasury: 1.19% · Aug 4, 202110-year Treasury: 1.23% · Aug 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.31% · Aug 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.33% · Aug 9, 202110-year Treasury: 1.36% · Aug 10, 202110-year Treasury: 1.35% · Aug 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.36% · Aug 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.29% · Aug 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Aug 16, 202110-year Treasury: 1.26% · Aug 17, 2021Feb 17, 2021May 17, 2021Aug 17, 2021
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury128 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,255.12/month

2.94% · May 13, 2021

At the later reference$1,258.35/month

2.96% · Jun 10, 2021

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $3.22 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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