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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Remarks at the Hoover Institution — Vice Chair for Supervision Randal K. Quarles

I want to thank John Taylor and the Hoover Institution for inviting me to speak today. I will start with some brief remarks about the current economic situation and monetary policy and then turn to the actions that the Federal Reserve…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

I want to thank John Taylor and the Hoover Institution for inviting me to speak today. I will start with some brief remarks about the current economic situation and monetary policy and then turn to the actions that the Federal Reserve has taken this year to help ensure that the banking system remains a source of strength during the recovery from the COVID event, the term I use for the complex set of responses in both the private and public sectors to the outbreak of COVID-19. I will close with some thoughts on nonbank financial institutions and international coordination.

Although the COVID event put the U.S. economy in a deep hole, the recovery since the economy began reopening in May has been stronger than almost any forecaster predicted back in the spring. Spurred in part by record fiscal stimulus, both business and household spending appear to have bounced back significantly through the third quarter, and we have regained about half of the jobs lost in March and April.

I attribute a good portion of that strength to the inherent dynamism and flexibility of the American economy. Although the COVID event continues to stress businesses, many businesses adjusted their operations to remain open, and applications for new businesses surged over the summer. Meanwhile, better treatments and more-targeted containment measures focused on protecting the most vulnerable have resulted in falling rates of hospitalization and mortality. Therefore, I am optimistic that the recovery from the COVID event will continue to be robust.

Of course, while we're doing better than expected, we still have a ways to go. The labor market remains deeply depressed, and employment is far short of the Federal Reserve's maximum employment goal. We are also keenly aware that the harm from higher unemployment has fallen even more than usual on those low-income households least able to bear it. Some businesses, particularly those in high-contact and personal-service industries, largely have been left out of the recovery. Inflation is well below our 2 percent longer-run goal, and some measures of inflation expectations have ticked down.

Therefore, at the September Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, I voted in favor of the new and clearer forward guidance for monetary policy because it will provide additional support for the recovery.1 Indeed, interest-rate and credit-sensitive sectors—business spending, home sales, auto sales, and other "big-ticket" items—have helped fuel that recovery. This spending was supported by our timely and forceful moves to cut the federal funds rate to its effective lower bound, restore market functioning, and provide emergency support to households and businesses through 13(3) emergency lending facilities.

Which leads me to the banking industry. For monetary policy to fully support Main Street, we need a well-capitalized, stable banking system that is lending to creditworthy households and businesses. Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Federal Reserve has focused on building the resiliency of banks so that they would be a source of strength during the next downturn. Thus far, that plan has borne a great deal of fruit.

As the crisis intensified in early March, banks stepped into the breach and met the massive demands for cash from businesses that drew on their preexisting credit lines. Banks also funded the bulk of the more than $500 billion in Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. According to our weekly bank credit data, commercial and industrial loans increased $715 billion between the week of February 26th and their peak on May 13th.2 For millions of struggling households, banks have agreed to forbear interest and principal payments on their loans. In addition, through September, banks absorbed more than $1.2 trillion of central bank reserves and received about $2.5 trillion of core deposits from investors who sought the safe haven of the U.S. dollar and insured bank accounts.

As supervisors, we recognized that these actions strained the balance-sheet capacity of banks and so have taken a number of steps to allow them to continue to support their customers during this unprecedented time. A number of those steps—such as encouraging banks to work with their customers until the emergency subsides—are consistent with what we do whenever there is a natural disaster that disrupts normal commerce. But the COVID event has affected the entire country at the same time, requiring a broad set of extraordinary actions. For instance, we have temporarily exempted reserves and Treasury securities from the Supplementary Leverage Ratio so that banks do not become constrained by growing Treasury issuance and central bank reserves and can support businesses and households.3 More broadly, we have reintroduced and added numerous funding facilities through our 13(3) authority to support the continued flow of credit in the economy.4

Throughout all this, U.S. banks have remained financially healthy. Second-quarter data showed that most banks were profitable, aggregate capital ratios increased, and banks continued to maintain ample levels of liquidity. In addition, banks added substantially to their loan loss reserves over the first half of 2020, providing additional resilience. This week, some of the largest institutions have begun to report that their profitability held up again in the third quarter, partly because their robust provisions for loan losses earlier this year limited the need for additional provisions this quarter.

Going forward, we will want to be sure that banks remain a source of strength and support for the economy. Even with the economic recovery being stronger and faster than expected, there are certainly reasons to be vigilant. Interest rates are likely to remain very low for quite some time, putting downward pressure on banks' net interest margins and their profitability more generally. The high level of corporate debt and elevated valuations in commercial real estate going into this crisis, combined with prolonged uncertainties and changes in the way we shop and work, could lead to higher-than-expected losses on loans to some of these businesses. Consumer lending and residential mortgages seem to be holding up well so far, which may reflect the relatively high quality of household credit going into the COVID event. However, the performance of these loans also needs to be watched closely in light of the forbearance policymakers have encouraged and the possibility of a reduction in fiscal support for households.

For the past decade, robust stress testing has been at the core of our strategy for ensuring that our largest banks have sufficient capital to meet the credit needs of their customers while weathering an extreme downturn. In making decisions about our stress tests this year, I have been guided by three principles: First, we want to make sure that our supervisory and regulatory actions do not exacerbate the fallout from what was the most extreme deterioration in economic conditions on record. Second, we want to jealously guard the credibility of our stress tests, which restored confidence in banks during the GFC and have helped maintain that confidence since. Third, we want to establish the precedent that our response to a crisis would remain as deliberate, data driven, and bank specific as could be done prudently.

Therefore, once it was apparent that our initial stress test scenarios for 2020—which were released before the pandemic—had been overtaken by events, we conducted a suite of additional analyses to assess the sensitivity of this year's results.5 This comprehensive analysis included consideration of banks' vulnerabilities under three additional downside scenarios that were very severe even given how gloomy the picture looked this spring. The staff also incorporated a number of conservative assumptions about the balance sheet changes that we saw at the end of the first quarter.

This analysis found that the banking system would experience substantial losses under those highly adverse conditions but remain well capitalized in the aggregate. However, individual bank outcomes across the three scenarios varied significantly. The variation in those outcomes highlighted the considerable uncertainty in the economic outlook at the time and how that would translate to banking conditions in coming quarters.

Accordingly, we required banks to resubmit their capital plans and took several actions to preserve capital in the interim. For the third quarter, the Board required large banks to suspend all stock repurchases, capped their dividends, and placed a second limit based on individual banks earnings. The limitation of share repurchases, which accounted for 70 percent of all capital distributions at large banks in recent years, by itself led to a meaningful preservation of capital among large banks. The dividend restrictions guarded against capital depletion in the event that some banks experienced unexpectedly large losses, while still allowing firms that could support them to pay out dividends. Late last month, the Board extended the distribution limitations onto the fourth quarter amid the continued uncertainty. The Federal Reserve is currently conducting another round of stress tests, using two new severe downside scenarios published last month, and will release bank-specific results from both scenarios before the end of the year.6

Taken together, these actions will preserve capital in the system during this highly uncertain time. As I noted, I also hope that the process we followed to arrive at these decisions will affirm that our actions, even in a crisis, will be dictated by the most comprehensive analysis we can do in a timely manner and will be as tailored to individual institutions' condition as is feasible given the circumstances.

While banks so far have been resilient to the shock from the COVID event, the same cannot be said for important parts of the system of nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI). Starting in March, Federal Reserve facilities were needed to contain pressures in some prime money market funds, as well as, to a lesser extent, in certain long-term mutual funds that invest in corporate debt. Other types of NBFI also struggled during that period, including nonbank mortgage servicers and real estate investment trusts, the latter of which received support from the Board's decision to, for the first time, purchase agency commercial mortgage–backed securities.7

The vulnerabilities of NBFI are also at the top of the mind of international regulators. The Financial Stability Board's (FSB) annual report on NBFI indicates that the NBFI sector is now almost 50 percent of total financial intermediation, and many NBFIs rely on the banking system for credit and backstop liquidity.8 Thus, late last year, I formed a high-level steering group of central bankers, market regulators, and international organizations to oversee the FSB work on nonbank finance and to help coordinate work across the range of global standard setting bodies that oversee the financial sector. The group is currently completing a holistic review of the COVID event to better understand the role that vulnerabilities stemming from the NBFI sector played in those events. In the wake of the COVID event, we have made good progress in arriving at a shared diagnosis of the market turmoil that happened during the onset of the event in March.

Our discussions have surfaced a number of issues associated with particular types of market participants and mechanisms that may have caused liquidity imbalances and propagated stress. They include: vulnerabilities in money market funds (as I discussed earlier); dealers' capacity and willingness to intermediate; market structure in the core government bond markets and, potentially, the role of leveraged investors; and fragilities in US dollar cross-border funding.

We are looking at the role that each of these factors may have played, but we are not yet prepared to say "J'accuse" to any one of them. This is because our work has also reinforced the point that one needs to examine the system as a whole and take into account the various linkages within nonbank financial intermediation and between nonbanks and banks.

We will provide to the G20 Summit next month our holistic review of the turmoil and a concrete set of proposals for follow-up work on NBFI. This will provide a basis for a work plan for 2021, focused on better understanding this critical sector, vulnerabilities related to it, and how we might take a more macroprudential approach to supervising and regulating at least some parts of this sector.

Thanks again to the Hoover Institution for having me, and I look forward to the discussion that follows.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 14, 2020.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 14, 2020Publication referenceOct 14, 202030 days laterNov 13, 2020
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®2.86%Observed 2.87%Observed +1 bps vs. earlier reference2.84%Observed −3 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury0.68%Observed 0.73%Observed +5 bps vs. earlier reference0.89%Observed +16 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 14, 2020 – Jan 14, 2021
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 14, 2020Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.0.50%2.00%3.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 2.98% · Jul 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.01% · Jul 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.99% · Jul 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.88% · Aug 6, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.96% · Aug 13, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.99% · Aug 20, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.91% · Aug 27, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.93% · Sep 3, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.86% · Sep 10, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.87% · Sep 17, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.90% · Sep 24, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.88% · Oct 1, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.87% · Oct 8, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.81% · Oct 15, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.80% · Oct 22, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.81% · Oct 29, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.78% · Nov 5, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.84% · Nov 12, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.72% · Nov 19, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.72% · Nov 25, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.71% · Dec 3, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.71% · Dec 10, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.67% · Dec 17, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.66% · Dec 24, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.67% · Dec 31, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.65% · Jan 7, 202130-year fixed mortgage: 2.79% · Jan 14, 202110-year Treasury: 0.63% · Jul 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Jul 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Jul 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Jul 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Jul 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.61% · Jul 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.60% · Jul 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.59% · Jul 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.59% · Jul 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Jul 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.59% · Jul 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.58% · Jul 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.55% · Jul 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.55% · Jul 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.56% · Aug 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.52% · Aug 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.55% · Aug 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.55% · Aug 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.57% · Aug 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.59% · Aug 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Aug 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Aug 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Aug 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Aug 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Aug 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Aug 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Aug 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Aug 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Aug 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Aug 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Aug 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Aug 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Aug 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Aug 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Aug 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · Sep 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Sep 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Sep 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Sep 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Sep 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Sep 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Sep 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Sep 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Sep 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Sep 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · Sep 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Sep 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · Sep 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Sep 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Oct 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Oct 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.78% · Oct 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Oct 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.81% · Oct 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.78% · Oct 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.79% · Oct 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Oct 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · Oct 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Oct 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Oct 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.78% · Oct 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.81% · Oct 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.83% · Oct 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.87% · Oct 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.85% · Oct 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.81% · Oct 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.79% · Oct 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.79% · Oct 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.85% · Oct 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Oct 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.87% · Nov 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.90% · Nov 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.78% · Nov 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.79% · Nov 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.83% · Nov 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.96% · Nov 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.98% · Nov 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Nov 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.89% · Nov 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.91% · Nov 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.87% · Nov 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Nov 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.86% · Nov 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.83% · Nov 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.86% · Nov 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Nov 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Nov 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.84% · Nov 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.84% · Nov 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Dec 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.95% · Dec 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Dec 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.97% · Dec 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.94% · Dec 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Dec 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.95% · Dec 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Dec 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.90% · Dec 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.90% · Dec 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Dec 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Dec 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.94% · Dec 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.95% · Dec 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.95% · Dec 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.93% · Dec 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.96% · Dec 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.94% · Dec 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.94% · Dec 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.94% · Dec 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.93% · Dec 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.93% · Dec 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.93% · Jan 4, 202110-year Treasury: 0.96% · Jan 5, 202110-year Treasury: 1.04% · Jan 6, 202110-year Treasury: 1.08% · Jan 7, 202110-year Treasury: 1.13% · Jan 8, 202110-year Treasury: 1.15% · Jan 11, 202110-year Treasury: 1.15% · Jan 12, 202110-year Treasury: 1.10% · Jan 13, 202110-year Treasury: 1.15% · Jan 14, 2021Jul 14, 2020Oct 14, 2020Jan 14, 2021
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury127 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,243.88/month

2.87% · Oct 8, 2020

At the later reference$1,239.07/month

2.84% · Nov 12, 2020

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $4.80 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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