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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

The Adaptability of Stress Testing — Vice Chair for Supervision Randal K. Quarles

Thank you for the opportunity to again address this group, which has played such an important role encouraging diversity, and a diversity of perspectives, in housing and finance. I gave my first speech to Women in Housing and Finance…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you for the opportunity to again address this group, which has played such an important role encouraging diversity, and a diversity of perspectives, in housing and finance. I gave my first speech to Women in Housing and Finance almost 30 years ago. You've been kind enough to invite me back in each of my tours of duty in public service since then, and throughout that time you have been an exemplar of the adage that diversity is the art of thinking independently together.

Today, I'd like to talk to you about how banking regulation and supervision is adjusting to the unprecedented economic challenges posed by the coronavirus outbreak and especially the containment measures taken in response, which together we call the "COVID event." In particular, I will discuss how the COVID event is affecting a cornerstone of the Federal Reserve's oversight of large banks—our periodic stress tests, which verify that banks are prepared to deal with severe economic and financial conditions. Although our stress tests were not designed to test specifically against the effects of the COVID event on the economy and on our banks, they were designed to be flexible. I will describe modifications we've made to the stress test process this year, including expansions in stress testing appropriate to the unique circumstances we face, and preview our approach to the results the Fed will release next week.

Let me start with some more general background on stress tests, among other steps the Federal Reserve Board has taken since the 2007-2009 financial crisis to strengthen the financial system and increase its resiliency. Since the financial crisis, we have mandated a substantial increase in the quantity and quality of capital in the banking system, including specially targeted higher capital requirements for the largest banks critical to overall financial stability. Capital provides a cushion to ensure that banks are prepared to face financial stress and other unexpected circumstances. Our requirements include capital buffers that are designed to be drawn down in periods of stress, in addition to minimum capital requirements. We have also established periodic stress tests to examine how banks would respond to hypothetical adverse financial and economic conditions.

The Fed took these steps so that, during a crisis, banks would be in a position of strength and would not be forced to curtail lending to preserve capital, which would only worsen the crisis. In early March, in a move unrelated to the COVID event, the Board simplified its capital rules by finalizing a stress capital buffer requirement. This new framework uses our stress tests to set capital requirements for large banks and has the same goal as the previous framework: using forward-looking analysis to help ensure that banks have sufficient capital to survive a severe recession while still being able to lend to households and businesses.1

This year, as every year, the stress test began in February with the publication of a hypothetical scenario. This scenario, however, predated the serious economic effects of the COVID event, which began in March. This timing presented challenges and demanded changes to our usual process, and we responded with an approach that required more extensive analysis than normal. We simply would not have been doing our jobs if we had just run the test using a scenario framed before the economy began to deteriorate in March.

One reason for changing course hearkens back to the first stress test in 2009, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, or SCAP. Like this year's test, SCAP was conducted in the midst of a crisis. One goal was to provide information, transparency and market discipline. But another goal was to restore and maintain public confidence in the financial system. In that sense, ever since then stress testing has acted to stabilize and strengthen the financial system, and it is this ongoing benefit that would be put at risk if we failed to alter our approach to make it relevant to the unique circumstances we face.

While the first test likewise was conducted during a crisis, the current situation is unlike what we have faced in subsequent stress tests. In normal circumstances, we can take our time to carefully examine data and make a deliberate judgement about the capital planning of banks. This time, we have had to act much more quickly to be timely and relevant. That necessarily means a different approach.

We didn't have the time or the comprehensive data to run a complete and updated COVID event stress test. Normally, we publish our scenarios, which serve as the hypothetical basis for the test, two months before the start of the process, and we take two months to run the test. We use data that banks submit around six weeks after the end of each quarter, so the test we run beginning in April normally uses data submitted in February and March reflecting bank balance sheets as of December. We also normally ask banks to complete their own stress tests using our scenarios before we begin our stress test.

Another consideration was preserving the forward-looking benefits of stress tests. As we weighed how to proceed on this year's stress testing process, it was clear that the starting point was a lot less important than the considerable uncertainty we continue to face about the course of the COVID event and thus the path of the recovery.

For that reason, we decided to stick with the February 2020 severely adverse scenario as the starting point for a different approach. We are calling this forward-looking approach a sensitivity analysis, and now I'll try to explain how that differs from a focus on just one severely adverse scenario.

Based on past experience and our standing policies, our February scenario assumed stress in corporate debt and real estate markets, among other details, and an increase in unemployment considerably larger than occurred in the Great Recession. Compared to what we are now experiencing, this scenario was less severe than the unprecedented drop in employment and output in the second quarter of 2020 but more severe than the extent of stress we're seeing in debt markets. It also didn't include the unprecedented extent of fiscal stimulus.

But the larger issue is the unprecedented uncertainty about the course of the COVID event and the economy. The range of plausible forecasts is high and continues to shift. We don't know about the pace of reopening, how consumers will behave, or the prospects for a new round of containment. There's probably never been more uncertainty about the economic outlook. Although our policies on stress testing emphasize the value of not increasing capital requirements under stress and thus exacerbating a downturn, our first priority must be—and is—to understand the implications of quite plausible downside scenarios from our current position for bank capital.

In light of that uncertainty, our sensitivity analysis considers three distinct downside risk paths for the economy:

Let me emphasize that these are not forecasts by the Fed or me, only plausible scenarios that span the range of where many private forecasters think the economy could be headed.

While using the same models as our regular stress tests, our sensitivity analysis is different from our normal use of a severely adverse scenario in several ways. First, there are three possible paths instead of one because we must consider this range of outcomes. While we retained the basic structure of the February 2020 scenario, we swapped out a few key variables such as the unemployment rate, change in economic output, and Treasury bill rates. We also didn't follow our scenario design policy statement in formulating these three alternative paths. We chose rough approximations of economic paths rather than detailed scenarios, which means that the usual set of detailed variable data that we use will not be available. Finally, the analysis is still based on year-end 2019 data but with targeted adjustments to account for the most material changes to banks' balance sheets in the first quarter related to the COVID event, such as sizeable credit-line drawdowns by corporations.

Given the changing economic circumstances and the need to act quickly, we didn't publish these three economic paths in advance and ask banks to model their exposures to them. The targeted adjustments to banks' balance sheets include the substantial growth in corporate loan balances and stress on borrowers in certain industry sectors that are most exposed to a sharp drop in demand.

Although we didn't run our full stress test on these three possible downside risk paths for the economy, and while our adjustments only capture the most material changes in balance sheets since last year, this sensitivity analysis has helped sharpen our understanding of how banks may fare in the wide range of possible outcomes. We think it makes the most sense to share with the public some of what we have learned when we publish the results of our stress testing process on Thursday of next week.

Let me lay out what that announcement will entail. First, as a point of reference, we will disclose stress test results using the February 2020 scenario, run against bank exposures as of December 2019. As in past years, this will include both firm-specific and aggregate results. To be more precise, this portion of our disclosure, based on the results of the February 2020 scenario, will be identical in all material ways to last year's stress test disclosure. This approach provides continuity and comparability with past stress tests. For the sensitivity analysis, we will provide key details about the three downside risk paths for the economy and targeted adjustments. We will also provide results aggregated across banks that will compare how the banking system as a whole would fare under the three distinct views of the future.

Because of the limitations I described in examining the three downside risk paths for the economy, our disclosure of the sensitivity analysis will not provide firm-specific results. This adapted stress test, based on December 2019 exposures, will still give detailed information about the vulnerabilities of firms to the range of stresses that may play out.

As a next step, we plan to move ahead and provide all banks subject to stress testing with a stress capital buffer requirement based on the February 2020 scenario, under our new approach integrating stress testing with capital requirements. Our new framework for establishing capital requirements was calibrated based on the assumption that we would set these requirements using a full stress test based on published scenarios. Indeed, the overall severity of the February scenario and our V-shaped sensitivity analysis are roughly the same. And, as I noted earlier, we kept in mind the principle that if possible we should avoid measures that tighten minimum capital levels during a crisis, to avoid intensifying that crisis. Should our assessment of the COVID event's likely evolution change, of course, we will act expeditiously to resize the buffer or take other appropriate actions.

Let me take a minute to explain how and when we will disclose those stress capital buffer requirements. In prior years, the results from Dodd-Frank Act stress tests and the related Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review were released over a two-week period. But in a change, we will be releasing the results from both exercises at the same time. We are able to do this because the new capital framework uses the results of the stress tests to establish the size of banks' stress capital buffers, which they can draw down in times of stress, and allows the banks to adjust their capital plans after receiving those results.

By giving the firms their effective capital buffer requirement for the coming year and allowing them to adjust their capital plans to that buffer, the change will result in a more thoughtful assessment of risks. Once the banks have determined their final capital plans, the Board will publicly release the final capital requirements for each individual firm later this year, before they take effect in the fourth quarter, as planned.2

In addition, given the special circumstances this year we will use the results of our sensitivity analysis to inform our overall stance on capital distributions and in ongoing bank supervision. The sensitivity analysis will help us judge whether banks would have enough capital if economic and financial conditions were to worsen.

As I have noted, our largest banks entered the COVID event in a position of strength, with high levels of capital and liquidity, and they have demonstrated that strength in the support they have provided to the economy during a crisis. In addition, I will note that almost all of our large banks have suspended share repurchases for the second quarter. In light of the ongoing economic uncertainty, I consider this move for the second quarter a prudent step as a very substantial capital conservation measure. Before the COVID event over 70 percent of the capital distributions of global systemically important banks, for example, came in form of share repurchases, which ceased in March. The sensitivity analysis will help the Board assess whether additional measures are advisable for certain banks or certain future developments.

Let me conclude by reiterating that stress tests remain a valuable tool, even in this time of extreme uncertainty. Our use of the sensitivity analysis is an acknowledgement that the path ahead is unusually uncertain, but that the work of verifying the resiliency of banks must continue, to aid the recovery by bolstering public confidence in the financial system. The new stress capital buffer framework will likewise aid capital planning and risk management by banks, leaving them better prepared to maintain lending to households and businesses. We will closely monitor the condition of these banks and the broader financial system in the coming months, including through additional COVID-related analysis. We will not hesitate to take additional policy actions should they be warranted under the then-prevailing economic conditions.

Thank you, and I am happy to respond to your questions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jun 19, 2020.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierMay 20, 2020Publication referenceJun 19, 202030 days laterJul 19, 2020
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.28%Observed 3.13%Observed −15 bps vs. earlier reference2.98%Observed −15 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury0.68%Observed 0.70%Observed +2 bps vs. earlier reference0.64%Observed −6 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Mar 19, 2020 – Sep 19, 2020
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jun 19, 2020Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.0.50%2.25%4.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Mar 19, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.50% · Mar 26, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 2, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 9, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.31% · Apr 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.23% · Apr 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.26% · May 7, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.28% · May 14, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.24% · May 21, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.15% · May 28, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.18% · Jun 4, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.21% · Jun 11, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.13% · Jun 18, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.13% · Jun 25, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.07% · Jul 2, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.03% · Jul 9, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.98% · Jul 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.01% · Jul 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.99% · Jul 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.88% · Aug 6, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.96% · Aug 13, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.99% · Aug 20, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.91% · Aug 27, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.93% · Sep 3, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.86% · Sep 10, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 2.87% · Sep 17, 202010-year Treasury: 1.12% · Mar 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Mar 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Mar 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.84% · Mar 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Mar 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.83% · Mar 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Mar 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Mar 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Mar 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Apr 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.75% · Apr 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.77% · Apr 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · Apr 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Apr 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Apr 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.61% · Apr 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Apr 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.58% · Apr 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.61% · Apr 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.60% · Apr 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Apr 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Apr 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · May 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · May 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · May 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · May 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · May 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · May 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · May 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · May 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · May 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · May 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · May 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · May 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · May 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · May 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · May 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · May 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · Jun 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Jun 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.77% · Jun 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.82% · Jun 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.91% · Jun 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Jun 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.84% · Jun 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.75% · Jun 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · Jun 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Jun 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Jun 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.75% · Jun 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Jun 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Jun 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Jun 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Jun 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Jun 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Jun 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Jun 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Jun 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Jun 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · Jun 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Jul 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Jul 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Jul 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Jul 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Jul 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Jul 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Jul 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Jul 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Jul 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Jul 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Jul 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Jul 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Jul 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.61% · Jul 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.60% · Jul 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.59% · Jul 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.59% · Jul 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Jul 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.59% · Jul 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.58% · Jul 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.55% · Jul 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.55% · Jul 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.56% · Aug 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.52% · Aug 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.55% · Aug 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.55% · Aug 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.57% · Aug 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.59% · Aug 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Aug 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Aug 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Aug 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Aug 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Aug 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Aug 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Aug 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Aug 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Aug 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Aug 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Aug 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Aug 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Aug 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Aug 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Aug 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · Sep 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Sep 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Sep 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Sep 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.71% · Sep 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Sep 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · Sep 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Sep 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · Sep 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Sep 18, 2020Mar 19, 2020Jun 19, 2020Sep 19, 2020
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury128 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,285.94/month

3.13% · Jun 18, 2020

At the later reference$1,261.58/month

2.98% · Jul 16, 2020

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $24.36 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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