Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Financial Markets and Monetary Policy: Is There a Hall of Mirrors Problem? — Vice Chair Richard H. Clarida

Thank you to the conference organizers for inviting me here to discuss what former Chair Bernanke has famously referred to as a "hall of mirrors" problem: a situation in which a central bank's reaction function and financial market…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you to the conference organizers for inviting me here to discuss what former Chair Bernanke has famously referred to as a "hall of mirrors" problem: a situation in which a central bank's reaction function and financial market prices interact in economically suboptimal and potentially destabilizing ways.1 In my remarks today, I will lay out the way I think about the interplay between financial markets and monetary policy, with a focus on how I myself seek to integrate noisy but often correlated signals about the economy that I glean from models, surveys, and financial markets.2

Three Observations I begin with three unobjectionable observations. First, because of Friedman's long and variable lags, monetary policy should be—and, at the Fed, is—forward looking. Policy decisions made today will have no effect on today's inflation or unemployment rates, so good policy needs to assess where the economic fundamentals are going tomorrow to calibrate appropriate policy today. Of course, financial markets are also forward looking. An asset's value today depends upon its expected future cash flows discounted by a rate that reflects the expected path of the policy rate plus an appropriate risk premium. Thus, central banks and financial markets are looking at the same data on macro fundamentals to make inferences about the future path of the economy, and, of course, any decisions on the policy path made by the central bank will influence asset prices through the discount factor. So optimal monetary policy will (almost) always be correlated with asset prices. Correlation is not evidence of causation, and the hall of mirrors problem at its essence is about inferring causation from correlation.

Second, because key variables that are crucial inputs for conducting monetary policy—such as r*, u*, and expected inflation, to name just three—are both unobserved and time varying, responsible monetary policy requires informed views about how these variables evolve over time as well as a humility and an appreciation for the uncertainties surrounding baseline views, however well informed they might be.

Third, when trying to make an inference about unobserved variables like r* or expected inflation, it is generally a good idea to seek data from multiple signals correlated with the variable of interest, so long as the signals themselves are not perfectly correlated with one another. Think of this third unobjectionable observation as a sort of "model averaging" or "triangulation" principle of robust inference in a noisy and complex environment.3

Data Dependence As I have written before, monetary policy needs to be—and, at the Fed, is— "data dependent" in two distinct ways.4 Policy should be data dependent in the sense that incoming data indicate the position of the economy relative to the ultimate objectives of price stability and maximum employment. This information on where the economy is relative to the goals of monetary policy is an important input into standard interest rate feedback rules, such as those introduced by John Taylor in 1993 and ones that continue today to inform monetary policy decisions at the Fed and at other central banks.5

Monetary policy, however, also needs to be data dependent in the second sense—that incoming data contain signals—that can enable the central bank to update its estimates of r* and u* in order to obtain its best estimate of the destination to which the economy is heading. As I mentioned a moment ago, a challenge for policymakers is that key variables that are essential inputs to monetary policy—such as u*, r*, and expected inflation—cannot be observed directly and must be inferred from observed data. And as is indicated in the Summary of Economic Projections, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants have, over the past seven years, repeatedly revised down their estimates of both u* and r* as unemployment fell and as real interest rates remained well below previous estimates of neutral without the rise in inflation those earlier estimates would have predicted. I would argue that these revisions to u* and r* indicate that the FOMC has been data dependent in this second sense and that these updated assessments of u* and r* have had an important influence on the path for the policy rate actually implemented in recent years. Indeed, had the Fed not been data dependent in this second sense and remained closed to the possibility that the economy had changed and historical estimates of r* and u* needed to be revised, that stubbornness would have represented a material policy mistake.

In addition to u* and r*, an important input into any monetary policy assessment is the state of inflation expectations. One of the robust messages from the DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) literature on optimal monetary policy is that, away from the effective lower bound, optimal monetary policy will not eliminate all inflation volatility—there are always shocks—but will, under rational expectations (RE), deliver average, and under RE, expected, inflation equal to the target. Since the late 1990s, inflation expectations appear to have been stable and well anchored in the neighborhood of our 2 percent goal. However, like r* and u*, inflation expectations are not directly observable and so must be inferred from data. But which data?

Financial Data and Monetary Policy Let me now discuss in more detail how I use a form of model averaging to combine financial market data with data from surveys and econometric models to inform my thinking about the evolution of two key inputs to monetary policy: r* and long-run expected inflation. To be sure, financial market signals are noisy, and day-to-day movements in asset prices are unlikely to tell us much about the cyclical or structural position of the economy, let alone r* and expected inflation. However, persistent shifts in financial market conditions can be informative. Signals derived from financial market data, when combined with signals revealed from surveys of households and firms along with the filtered estimates from econometric models, can together provide valuable and reasonably robust foundations for real-time inference about the direction of travel in r* and expected inflation.

For example, a "straight read" of interest rate futures prices provides one source of high-frequency information about the destination for the federal funds rate expected by market participants. The destination for the federal funds rate implied by a straight read of futures prices is in turn the sum of the market-implied r* plus market-implied expected inflation. But these signals from interest rate futures are only a pure measure of the expected policy rate path under the assumption of a zero risk premium. For this reason, it is useful to compare policy rate paths derived from market prices with the path obtained from surveys of market participants, which, while subject to measurement error, should not be contaminated with a term premium. Market- and survey-based estimates of the policy rate path are often highly correlated. But when there is a divergence between the path or destination for the policy rate implied by the surveys and a straight read of interest rate derivatives prices, I place at least as much weight on the survey evidence—for example, derived from the surveys of primary dealers and market participants conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York—as I do on the estimates obtained from market prices. Finally, as another reality check, I, of course, always consult the latest estimate of r* produced by the Laubach and Williams (2003) unobservable components state-space model, which, I should point out, includes no information on asset prices other than the short-term nominal interest rate itself.6

Quotes from the Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) market can provide valuable information about both r* and expected inflation. TIPS market data, together with nominal Treasury yields, can be used to construct measures of "breakeven inflation" or inflation compensation that provide a noisy signal of market expectations of future inflation. But, again, a straight read of breakeven inflation based on TIPS curve forward real rates needs to be augmented with a model to filter out the liquidity and risk premium components that place a wedge between inflation compensation and expected inflation.

It is again useful to compare estimates of expected inflation derived from breakeven inflation data with estimates of expected inflation obtained from surveys—for example, the expected inflation over the next 5 to 10 years from the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. Market- and survey-based estimates of expected inflation are correlated, but, again, when there is a divergence between the two, I place at least as much weight on the survey evidence as on the market-derived estimates. Again, here I also consult time-series models of underlying inflation, such as Stock and Watson (2007) and Cecchetti and others (2017), presented at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum in 2017.7 At the Fed, the staff have estimated a state-space model decomposition of the common factor that drives a number of different measures of inflation expectations. State-space econometrics is one formal way to do model averaging. As I look at all of this evidence from market signals, surveys, and econometric models, I judge that inflation expectations reside at the low end of the range I consider consistent with our price-stability goal of 2 percent personal consumption expenditure inflation in the long run.

In both of the examples I have just discussed, the medium-frequency evolution of market-based, survey-based, and model-based estimates of r* and expected inflation have, over time, tended to move broadly together. When high-frequency market signals diverge from the survey- and model-based estimates, the potential benefit from increasing the weight on a signal derived from a forward-looking asset price versus backward estimates from models and slowly evolving surveys must be balanced against the cost of treating the noise in the asset price as a signal. There is no unique way to do this, and judgment is required.

In conclusion, while my colleagues and I are attuned to the potential for a hall of mirrors problem, in my experience this affliction is one the Federal Reserve guards against and does not suffer from. My colleagues and I do look at developments in asset markets, but never in isolation and always in the context of balancing asset market signals with complementary signals from surveys and econometric models. It is fair to say that when signals from all three sources line up in the same direction—as, for example, has been the case with market-, survey-, and model-based estimates of r*—the effect of those combined signals, at least on my thinking about the policy path, is more material than when the signals provide conflicting interpretations.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to hearing from the other panelists and to our discussion.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Feb 21, 2020.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJan 22, 2020Publication referenceFeb 21, 202030 days laterMar 22, 2020
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.65%Observed 3.49%Observed −16 bps vs. earlier reference3.65%Observed +16 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.77%Observed 1.46%Observed −31 bps vs. earlier reference0.92%Observed −54 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Nov 21, 2019 – May 21, 2020
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Feb 21, 2020Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.0.50%2.25%4.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Nov 21, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Nov 27, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Dec 5, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Dec 12, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Dec 19, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.74% · Dec 26, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.72% · Jan 2, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.64% · Jan 9, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Jan 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.60% · Jan 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.51% · Jan 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Feb 6, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.47% · Feb 13, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.49% · Feb 20, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Feb 27, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.29% · Mar 5, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.36% · Mar 12, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Mar 19, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.50% · Mar 26, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 2, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 9, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.31% · Apr 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.23% · Apr 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.26% · May 7, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.28% · May 14, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.24% · May 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 21, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 22, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Nov 25, 201910-year Treasury: 1.74% · Nov 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.78% · Nov 29, 201910-year Treasury: 1.83% · Dec 2, 201910-year Treasury: 1.72% · Dec 3, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Dec 4, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Dec 5, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Dec 6, 201910-year Treasury: 1.83% · Dec 9, 201910-year Treasury: 1.85% · Dec 10, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Dec 11, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 12, 201910-year Treasury: 1.82% · Dec 13, 201910-year Treasury: 1.89% · Dec 16, 201910-year Treasury: 1.89% · Dec 17, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 19, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 20, 201910-year Treasury: 1.93% · Dec 23, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 24, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Dec 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 30, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 31, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Jan 2, 202010-year Treasury: 1.80% · Jan 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jan 6, 202010-year Treasury: 1.83% · Jan 7, 202010-year Treasury: 1.87% · Jan 8, 202010-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jan 9, 202010-year Treasury: 1.83% · Jan 10, 202010-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jan 13, 202010-year Treasury: 1.82% · Jan 14, 202010-year Treasury: 1.79% · Jan 15, 202010-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jan 16, 202010-year Treasury: 1.84% · Jan 17, 202010-year Treasury: 1.78% · Jan 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.77% · Jan 22, 202010-year Treasury: 1.74% · Jan 23, 202010-year Treasury: 1.70% · Jan 24, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Jan 27, 202010-year Treasury: 1.65% · Jan 28, 202010-year Treasury: 1.60% · Jan 29, 202010-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jan 30, 202010-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jan 31, 202010-year Treasury: 1.54% · Feb 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Feb 4, 202010-year Treasury: 1.66% · Feb 5, 202010-year Treasury: 1.65% · Feb 6, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 7, 202010-year Treasury: 1.56% · Feb 10, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 11, 202010-year Treasury: 1.62% · Feb 12, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Feb 13, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 14, 202010-year Treasury: 1.55% · Feb 18, 202010-year Treasury: 1.56% · Feb 19, 202010-year Treasury: 1.52% · Feb 20, 202010-year Treasury: 1.46% · Feb 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.38% · Feb 24, 202010-year Treasury: 1.33% · Feb 25, 202010-year Treasury: 1.33% · Feb 26, 202010-year Treasury: 1.30% · Feb 27, 202010-year Treasury: 1.13% · Feb 28, 202010-year Treasury: 1.10% · Mar 2, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Mar 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Mar 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.54% · Mar 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Mar 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.82% · Mar 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Mar 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.94% · Mar 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · Mar 16, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 17, 202010-year Treasury: 1.18% · Mar 18, 202010-year Treasury: 1.12% · Mar 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Mar 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Mar 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.84% · Mar 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Mar 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.83% · Mar 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Mar 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Mar 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Mar 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Apr 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.75% · Apr 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.77% · Apr 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · Apr 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Apr 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Apr 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.61% · Apr 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Apr 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.58% · Apr 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.61% · Apr 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.60% · Apr 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Apr 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Apr 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · May 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · May 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · May 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · May 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · May 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · May 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · May 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · May 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · May 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · May 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · May 21, 2020Nov 21, 2019Feb 21, 2020May 21, 2020
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,345.46/month

3.49% · Feb 20, 2020

At the later reference$1,372.38/month

3.65% · Mar 19, 2020

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $26.92 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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