Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Monetary Policy Strategies and Tools When Inflation and Interest Rates Are Low — Governor Lael Brainard

I want to thank Anil Kashyap and the Initiative on Global Markets for inviting me, along with my colleague Raphael Bostic, to comment on this year's U.S. Monetary Policy Forum report by a distinguished set of authors.1 This year's…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Comments on Monetary Policy in the Next Recession?, a report by Stephen Cecchetti, Michael Feroli, Anil Kashyap, Catherine Mann, and Kim Schoenholtz

I want to thank Anil Kashyap and the Initiative on Global Markets for inviting me, along with my colleague Raphael Bostic, to comment on this year's U.S. Monetary Policy Forum report by a distinguished set of authors.1 This year's report addresses the challenges that monetary policy is likely to encounter in the next downturn. This topic is under active review by the Federal Reserve and our peers in many other economies.2

Looking Back The report explores the important question of whether the new monetary policy tools are likely to be sufficiently powerful in the next downturn. The report assesses how unconventional tools—including forward guidance, balance sheet policies, negative nominal interest rates, yield curve control, and exchange rate policies—have performed over the past few decades. It employs a novel approach by examining the effect on an index of financial conditions the authors construct. This approach adds to what we have learned from earlier papers that have examined the performance of unconventional policy tools with respect to individual components of financial conditions—most notably, long-term sovereign yields, but also mortgage rates, equities, exchange rates, and corporate debt spreads.3

Empirically assessing the question in the report is not only important, but also challenging, as the report readily acknowledges. There are a host of difficult endogeneity and omitted-variable issues, which the authors endeavor to address. The authors conclude that unconventional monetary policies worked during the crisis but did not fully offset a significant tightening in financial conditions. This finding leads the authors to conclude that these policies should be deployed quickly and aggressively in the future through a plan that is communicated in advance. This point is very important, so it will be the focus of my discussion.

Looking back at the international experience, the evidence suggests that forward guidance and balance sheet policies were broadly effective in providing accommodation following the financial crisis. But they were less effective when there were long delays in implementation or apparent inconsistencies among policy tools. It is important to distill key lessons from the past use of these tools in order to make them more effective in the future.4

First, in some cases around the world, unconventional tools were implemented only after long delays and debate, which sapped confidence, tightened financial conditions, and weakened recovery. The delays often reflected concerns about the putative costs and risks of these policies, such as stoking high inflation and impairing market functioning. These costs and risks did not materialize or proved manageable, and I expect these tools to be deployed more forcefully and readily in the future.5

Second, forward guidance proved to be vital during the crisis, but it took some time to recognize the importance of conditioning forward guidance on specific outcomes or dates and to align the full set of policy tools. In several cases, the targeted outcomes set too low a bar, which in turn diminished market expectations regarding monetary accommodation. In some cases, expectations regarding the timing of liftoff and asset purchase tapering worked at cross-purposes.

In addition, in some cases, it proved difficult to calibrate asset purchase programs smoothly over the course of the recovery. To the extent that the public is uncertain about the conditions that might trigger asset purchases, the scale of purchases, and how long the purchases might be sustained, it could undercut the efficacy of the policy. Furthermore, the cessation of asset purchases and subsequent balance sheet normalization can present challenges in communications and implementation.

Finally, in the fog of war, it was difficult for policymakers to distinguish clearly between temporary headwinds associated with the crisis and emerging structural features of the new normal. In part as a result, it took some time to integrate forward guidance and other unconventional policies seamlessly, and it took even longer to recognize that policy settings were unlikely to return to pre-crisis norms.

Looking Ahead The current generation of central bankers faces a different core challenge than the last generation, with substantially smaller scope for cutting interest rates to buffer the economy and inflation that is low and relatively unresponsive to resource utilization. With trend inflation running below the symmetric 2 percent objective, there is a risk that inflation expectations have slipped. With price inflation showing little sensitivity to resource utilization, policy may have to remain accommodative for a long time to achieve 2 percent inflation following a period of undershooting. With the equilibrium interest rate very low, the Federal Open Market Committee can cut the federal funds rate by only about half as much as it has done historically to buffer the economy from recession. Consequently, the policy rate is likely to be constrained by the lower bound more frequently, likely at times when inflation is below target and unemployment is elevated. The likelihood that the policy rate will be stuck at the lower bound more frequently risks eroding expected inflation and actual inflation, which could further compress the room to cut nominal interest rates in a downward spiral. Japan's experience illustrates the challenges associated with such a downward spiral.

Today's new normal calls not only for a broader set of tools, but also a different strategy.6 We should clarify in advance that we will deploy a broader set of tools proactively to provide accommodation when shocks are likely to push the policy rate to its lower bound. Equally important, we should adopt a strategy that successfully achieves maximum employment and average inflation outcomes of 2 percent over time.

The lessons from the crisis would argue for an approach that commits to maintain policy at the lower bound until full employment and target inflation are achieved. This forward guidance could be reinforced by interest rate caps on short-term Treasury securities over the same horizon. To have the greatest effect, it will be important to communicate and explain the framework in advance so that the public anticipates the approach and takes it into account in their spending and investment decisions.

Forward guidance that commits to refrain from lifting the policy rate from its lower bound until full employment and 2 percent inflation are achieved is vital to ensure achievement of our dual-mandate goals with compressed conventional policy space.7 To strengthen the credibility of the forward guidance, interest rate caps could be implemented in tandem as a commitment mechanism. Based on its assessment of how long it is likely to take to achieve full employment and target inflation, the Committee would commit to capping rates out the yield curve for a period consistent with its expectation for the duration of the outcome-based forward guidance. Of course, if the outlook shifted materially, the Committee could reassess how long it will take to reach its goals and adjust policy accordingly.

One important benefit is that this approach would smoothly move to capping interest rates on the short-to-medium segment of the yield curve once the policy rate moves to the lower bound and avoid the risk of delays or uncertainty that could be associated with asset purchases regarding the scale and timeframe. The interest rate caps would transmit additional accommodation through the longer rates that are relevant for households and businesses in a manner that is more akin to conventional policy and more continuous than quantitative asset purchases.

Another important benefit is that the forward guidance and the yield curve caps would reinforce each other. Setting the horizon on the interest rate caps to reinforce forward guidance on the policy rate would augment the credibility of the yield curve caps and thereby diminish concerns about an open-ended balance sheet commitment. Once target inflation and full employment are achieved, and the caps expire, any short-to-medium-term Treasury securities that were acquired under the program would roll off organically, unwinding the policy smoothly and predictably. This approach should avoid some of the tantrum dynamics that have led to premature steepening of the yield curve in several jurisdictions.8

Today's low-inflation, low interest rate environment requires not only new recession-fighting tools but also a new strategy to address the persistent undershooting of the inflation target—and the risk to inflation expectations—well before a downturn. Various strategies have been proposed that seek to make up for past inflation deviations from target.9 To be successful, formal makeup strategies, such as an average-inflation-targeting rule, require that market participants, households, and businesses understand the policy in advance and find it credible. While formal average-inflation-targeting rules have some attractive properties in theory, they could be difficult to communicate and implement in practice due to time-inconsistency problems as well as uncertainty about underlying economic parameters.10

I prefer flexible inflation averaging that would aim to achieve inflation outcomes that average 2 percent over time. Flexible inflation averaging would imply supporting inflation a bit above 2 percent for some time to compensate for the inflation shortfall over previous years and anchor inflation expectations at 2 percent. Flexible inflation averaging would bring some of the benefits of a formal average-inflation-targeting rule, but it could be more robust and simpler to communicate and implement. Following several years when inflation has remained in the range of 1-1/2 to 2 percent, the Committee could target inflation outcomes in a range of 2 to 2-1/2 percent for a period to achieve inflation outcomes of 2 percent, on average, overall.

By committing to achieve inflation outcomes that average 2 percent over time, the Committee would make clear in advance that it would accommodate rather than offset modest upward pressures to inflation in what could be described as a process of opportunistic reflation.11 This approach will help move inflation expectations back to our 2 percent objective, which is critical to preserve conventional policy space.

It is important to emphasize that for monetary policy to be effective, it will be key for policymakers to communicate their strategy clearly in advance to the public, to act early and decisively, and to commit to providing the requisite accommodation until full employment and target inflation are sustainably achieved. This was one of the important conclusions of this year's U.S. Monetary Policy Forum report.

Fiscal Policy Even with a revamped monetary policy strategy and expanded tools, there are risks. As the authors note, persistent very low levels of long-run rates could hamper the ability of monetary policy to support the economy in a downturn through the traditional mechanism of pushing down long-term rates.12 Moreover, the equilibrium interest rate or, possibly, inflation expectations could be lower than most current estimates, with the implication that unconventional policies would need to compensate for a larger reduction in the conventional policy buffer.13

Accordingly, in addition to a forceful response from monetary policy, robust countercyclical fiscal policy is vital. The reduced conventional monetary policy buffer makes the importance of fiscal support during a downturn even greater than it has been in the past, and the case for fiscal support is especially compelling in the context of very low long-term interest rates. Not only is fiscal policy more vital when monetary policy is constrained by the lower bound, but research suggests it is also more powerful.14

Whereas monetary policy is powerful but blunt, fiscal policy can be more targeted in its effects. This is especially important today, when a large share of American households have low liquid savings and are particularly vulnerable to periods of unemployment or underemployment.

The appropriate design of a more automatic, faster-acting countercyclical fiscal approach requires study and development. Just as monetary policymakers are actively reviewing their tools and strategies, now is the time to undertake a review of fiscal tools and strategies to ensure they are ready and effective.

Financial Stability Financial stability is central to the achievement of our dual-mandate goals. The new normal of low interest rates and inflation also has implications for the interplay between financial stability and monetary policy. In the decades when the Phillips curve was steeper, inflation tended to rise as the economy heated up, which would prompt the Committee to raise interest rates to restrictive levels. These interest rate increases would have the effect of tightening financial conditions more broadly, thereby naturally damping financial imbalances as the expansion extends.

With trend inflation persistently below target and a flat Phillips curve, not only is the policy rate expected be low for long due to the decline in the neutral rate, but the policy rate may also remain below the neutral rate for longer in order to move inflation back to target sustainably. The expectation of a long period of accommodative monetary policy and low rates, during a period with sustained high rates of resource utilization, is conducive to risk-taking, providing incentives to reach for yield and take on additional debt.

To the extent that the combination of a low neutral rate, a flat Phillips curve, and low underlying inflation may lead financial imbalances to become more tightly linked to the business cycle, it is important to use tools other than monetary policy to temper the financial cycle. In today's new normal, a combination of strengthened structural safeguards along with countercyclical macroprudential tools is important to enable monetary policy to stay focused on achieving maximum employment and target inflation.15 The countercyclical capital buffer, which was not available before the crisis, is particularly well designed to address financial imbalances over the cycle.

Conclusion With the policy rate more likely to be constrained by the lower bound, the core challenge facing the current generation of central bankers is different than the last generation. The authors of the report emphasize the importance of deploying an expanded toolkit proactively, avoiding costly delays, and communicating clearly to the public. To be fully effective, proactive use of an expanded toolkit needs to be coupled with a new strategy that achieves average inflation outcomes of 2 percent along with maximum employment over time.

1. I am grateful to Ivan Vidangos of the Federal Reserve Board for assistance in preparing this text. These remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.

2. See European Central Bank (2020), "ECB Launches Review of Its Monetary Policy Strategy," press release, January 23; Bank of Canada (2017), "Monetary Policy Framework Issues: Toward the 2021 Inflation-Target Renewal," workshop held at the Bank of Canada, Quebec, September 14; and Mark Carney (2020), "A Framework for All Seasons?" speech delivered at "The Future of Inflation Targeting," a research workshop held at the Bank of England, London, January 9.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Feb 21, 2020.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJan 22, 2020Publication referenceFeb 21, 202030 days laterMar 22, 2020
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.65%Observed 3.49%Observed −16 bps vs. earlier reference3.65%Observed +16 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.77%Observed 1.46%Observed −31 bps vs. earlier reference0.92%Observed −54 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Nov 21, 2019 – May 21, 2020
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Feb 21, 2020Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.0.50%2.25%4.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Nov 21, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Nov 27, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Dec 5, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Dec 12, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Dec 19, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.74% · Dec 26, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.72% · Jan 2, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.64% · Jan 9, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Jan 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.60% · Jan 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.51% · Jan 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Feb 6, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.47% · Feb 13, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.49% · Feb 20, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Feb 27, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.29% · Mar 5, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.36% · Mar 12, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Mar 19, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.50% · Mar 26, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 2, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 9, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.31% · Apr 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.23% · Apr 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.26% · May 7, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.28% · May 14, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.24% · May 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 21, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 22, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Nov 25, 201910-year Treasury: 1.74% · Nov 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.78% · Nov 29, 201910-year Treasury: 1.83% · Dec 2, 201910-year Treasury: 1.72% · Dec 3, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Dec 4, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Dec 5, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Dec 6, 201910-year Treasury: 1.83% · Dec 9, 201910-year Treasury: 1.85% · Dec 10, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Dec 11, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 12, 201910-year Treasury: 1.82% · Dec 13, 201910-year Treasury: 1.89% · Dec 16, 201910-year Treasury: 1.89% · Dec 17, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 19, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 20, 201910-year Treasury: 1.93% · Dec 23, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 24, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Dec 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 30, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 31, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Jan 2, 202010-year Treasury: 1.80% · Jan 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jan 6, 202010-year Treasury: 1.83% · Jan 7, 202010-year Treasury: 1.87% · Jan 8, 202010-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jan 9, 202010-year Treasury: 1.83% · Jan 10, 202010-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jan 13, 202010-year Treasury: 1.82% · Jan 14, 202010-year Treasury: 1.79% · Jan 15, 202010-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jan 16, 202010-year Treasury: 1.84% · Jan 17, 202010-year Treasury: 1.78% · Jan 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.77% · Jan 22, 202010-year Treasury: 1.74% · Jan 23, 202010-year Treasury: 1.70% · Jan 24, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Jan 27, 202010-year Treasury: 1.65% · Jan 28, 202010-year Treasury: 1.60% · Jan 29, 202010-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jan 30, 202010-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jan 31, 202010-year Treasury: 1.54% · Feb 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Feb 4, 202010-year Treasury: 1.66% · Feb 5, 202010-year Treasury: 1.65% · Feb 6, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 7, 202010-year Treasury: 1.56% · Feb 10, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 11, 202010-year Treasury: 1.62% · Feb 12, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Feb 13, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 14, 202010-year Treasury: 1.55% · Feb 18, 202010-year Treasury: 1.56% · Feb 19, 202010-year Treasury: 1.52% · Feb 20, 202010-year Treasury: 1.46% · Feb 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.38% · Feb 24, 202010-year Treasury: 1.33% · Feb 25, 202010-year Treasury: 1.33% · Feb 26, 202010-year Treasury: 1.30% · Feb 27, 202010-year Treasury: 1.13% · Feb 28, 202010-year Treasury: 1.10% · Mar 2, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Mar 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Mar 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.54% · Mar 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Mar 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.82% · Mar 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Mar 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.94% · Mar 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · Mar 16, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 17, 202010-year Treasury: 1.18% · Mar 18, 202010-year Treasury: 1.12% · Mar 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Mar 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Mar 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.84% · Mar 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Mar 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.83% · Mar 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Mar 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Mar 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Mar 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Apr 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.75% · Apr 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.77% · Apr 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · Apr 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Apr 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Apr 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.61% · Apr 16, 202010-year Treasury: 0.65% · Apr 17, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.58% · Apr 21, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 22, 202010-year Treasury: 0.61% · Apr 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.60% · Apr 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Apr 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 28, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 29, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · Apr 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.66% · May 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · May 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · May 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · May 8, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · May 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.69% · May 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · May 14, 202010-year Treasury: 0.64% · May 15, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · May 18, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · May 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · May 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.68% · May 21, 2020Nov 21, 2019Feb 21, 2020May 21, 2020
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,345.46/month

3.49% · Feb 20, 2020

At the later reference$1,372.38/month

3.65% · Mar 19, 2020

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $26.92 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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