Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Strengthening the Community Reinvestment Act by Staying True to Its Core Purpose — Governor Lael Brainard

Good morning. I am pleased to be here at the Urban Institute to discuss how to strengthen the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which is a key priority for the Federal Reserve. The CRA plays a vital role in bringing banks together with…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Good morning. I am pleased to be here at the Urban Institute to discuss how to strengthen the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which is a key priority for the Federal Reserve. The CRA plays a vital role in bringing banks together with community members, small businesses, local officials, and community groups to make investments in their community's future.1 That is why we are committed to getting CRA reform done right.

The Origins and Purpose of the CRA Any successful reform must be grounded in the origins of the CRA and its ongoing importance to low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods. The CRA was one of several landmark pieces of legislation enacted in the wake of the civil rights movement intended to address inequities in the credit markets. By passing the CRA, Congress aimed to reverse the disinvestment associated with years of government policies and market actions that deprived lower-income areas of credit by redlining—using red-inked lines to separate neighborhoods deemed too risky.2 By conferring an affirmative and continuing obligation on banks to help meet the credit needs in all of the neighborhoods they serve, the CRA has not only prompted banks to be more active lenders in LMI areas, but also important participants in multisector efforts to revitalize communities across the country.

Pursuant to guidance from the Board of Governors, each of our Federal Reserve Banks houses a group of dedicated community development professionals and CRA examiners to help banks meet their CRA obligations. We are proud of our work in familiarizing banks with the CRA's provisions, introducing banks to potential partners in their communities, and convening conferences to disseminate research and best practices.3

The CRA plays a vital role in the ecosystem supporting economic opportunity in LMI communities in both rural and urban areas. Rather than direct funds to specific projects, the CRA encourages banks to engage on the priorities identified by local leaders and more broadly serve credit needs of small businesses and residents of these communities. By being inclusive in their lending and investing, banks help their local communities to thrive, which in turn benefits their core business. The recognition of this mutually beneficial relationship between banks and their local communities is one of the core strengths of the CRA and the reason our effort to revise the CRA regulations must focus on local needs and stakeholder input.

What Have We Learned from Stakeholders? For several years, the federal banking regulators have been asking stakeholders for input on strengthening the CRA regulations to help banks better meet the credit needs of the local LMI communities they serve and more closely align with changes in the ways financial products and services are delivered. We also have heard calls from banking and community organizations for the use of metrics to provide greater upfront clarity about evaluation standards. We have heard that branches remain as important as ever to their local communities, even as the growth of mobile and online services has extended the geographic area that banks are serving.4 The one message we have heard most consistently is that banks and community organizations alike value the activities they undertake under the auspices of the CRA and have invested considerable time and effort in the associated processes and reporting.5 For that reason, stakeholders have asked the regulators to take care as we contemplate changes to the CRA.6

If the past is any guide, major updates to the CRA regulations happen once every few decades. So it is much more important to get reform right than to do it quickly. If we only have one opportunity for a few decades, I want to make sure CRA reform is based on the best analysis and ideas and the broadest input available. It is critical to analyze carefully the likely effects of any proposed changes on credit access and community development in LMI communities, as well as any additional reporting and procedural burdens for banks.

Last year, we set out several principles to guide our work on CRA reform.7 Revisions to the CRA regulations should reflect the credit needs of local communities and work consistently through the business cycle. They should be tailored to banks of different sizes and business strategies. They should provide greater clarity in advance about how activities will be evaluated. They should encourage banks to seek opportunities in distressed and underserved areas. And they should recognize that the CRA is one of several related laws to promote an inclusive financial sector.

Grounding Metrics in Analysis Based on Data Guided by stakeholder input, we evaluated how to strengthen the regulation by using metrics to provide greater certainty about how activities will be evaluated, while remaining faithful to the core purpose of the CRA to make credit and retail banking services available in local LMI communities. Proposed changes to the CRA regulation must be grounded in analysis and data to avoid unintended consequences.

Because consistent data on CRA-eligible activity were not readily available, our research staff set about creating a database based on over 6,000 written public CRA evaluations from a sample of some 3,700 banks of varying asset sizes, business models, geographic areas, and bank regulators.8 The database includes the location, number, and amount of CRA-eligible loans and investments and the ratings associated with each bank's performance. The data go back to 2005 in order to assess how CRA performance and the associated ratings vary across the economic cycle.

Metrics that Make Sense So how can we use metrics to provide greater clarity about evaluations? I will sketch out a proposed approach that uses a set of tailored thresholds that are calibrated for local conditions. It starts by creating two tests: a retail test and community development test (figure 1). Broadly speaking, all retail banks would be evaluated under a retail test, which would assess a bank's record of providing retail loans and retail banking services in its assessment areas. Large banks, as well as wholesale and limited-purpose banks, would also be evaluated under a separate community development test that would evaluate a bank's record of providing community development loans, qualified investments, and services.

Using bank and other publicly available data, we would be able to provide a bank with a dashboard indicating how its retail lending activity compares to thresholds for presumptive satisfactory performance that reflect the activity of other lenders and credit demand in the local area. Separate metrics reflecting a bank's assessment area can be provided related to the evaluation of its community development performance.

Dividing evaluations into separate retail and community development tests is important. First, evaluating all retail banks under a stand-alone retail test is important to stay true to the CRA's core focus on providing credit in underserved communities in an assessment area. In contrast, an approach that combines all activity together runs the risk of encouraging some institutions to meet expectations primarily through a few large community development loans or investments rather than meeting local needs.

Second, having separate tests ensures that expectations are tailored for banks of different sizes and business models. Only larger banks would be expected to meet the community development test along with the full retail test. Similar to today, smaller banks would have the option of having their retail banking services and community development activities evaluated in order to achieve an "Outstanding" rating, but it would not be required. Moreover, small banks below some threshold might have the option to be evaluated under the existing methodology.

Third, separate retail and community development tests provide greater scope to calibrate the evaluation metrics to the opportunities available in the market, which can differ for retail lending and community development financing.

After analyzing ways to use metrics across the board, we concluded that the value of retail services and community development services to a local community do not lend themselves easily to a monetary value metric comparable to the monetary value of loans and investments. The value of these services may vary greatly from community to community. It is difficult to monetize this value in a consistent way relative to the value of lending and investment, thus introducing the risk of skewing incentives inadvertently. For example, the services and leadership provided by a small bank located in a rural community may be vital to the success of that community, even if the dollar value of those services is small compared with a branch in a large city. Because of this concern, we are inclined to propose a set of qualitative standards to evaluate retail services within the retail test, and a separate set of qualitative standards to assess community development services within the community development test.

Retail Test—Metrics for Retail Lending The core of the retail lending test would be to use widely available data to assess two clear objectives: how well a bank is serving LMI borrowers, small businesses, and small farms in its assessment area, and how well a bank is serving LMI neighborhoods in its assessment area. The metrics used to evaluate these two questions would rely on loan counts rather than dollar value in order to avoid inadvertent biases in favor of fewer, higher-dollar value loans.9 The metrics would be evaluated separately for each major product line in a bank's assessment area, which is important to tailor the use of metrics to a bank's business model.

The proposed approach measures a bank's performance in serving the needs of both low- and moderate-income borrowers (and small businesses and small farms) and LMI places in the community. For mortgage loans, an LMI borrower distribution metric would calculate the percentage of a bank's number of loans made to LMI borrowers relative to its overall mortgage originations, and assess this percentage against an assessment area threshold determined by local demographics and the aggregate lending of other in-market competitors. A separate LMI neighborhood distribution metric would evaluate the percentage of a bank's number of loans in LMI tracts to its overall loan count and assess this against a threshold determined by local demographics and the aggregate lending of other in-market competitors.

A bank that meets or exceeds both the LMI borrower and LMI neighborhood thresholds for each of its major product lines would be presumed to have a satisfactory-or-better level of retail lending performance in that assessment area. Using a customized dashboard, each bank could track its own activity against the threshold on an ongoing basis reflecting recent data, eliminating the lengthy uncertainty associated with the current evaluation methodology, which many banks have highlighted as the most important area for reform (figure 2).

Importantly, the CRA database we have constructed confirms that the proposed retail lending metrics correlate well with past ratings of bank performance (figure 3). The specific thresholds that would establish a presumption of satisfactory performance could be informed by current evaluation procedures but need not be set at the same level, and public input will be important.

The retail lending metrics would be tailored to the needs of the local community. This tailoring is not possible with a uniform benchmark that applies to all banks and all communities. The large differences between assessment areas illustrate the importance of tailoring thresholds. For example, in Morgan County, Ohio, LMI families are 49 percent of the population, compared with 31 percent in O'Brien County, Iowa (figure 4). We believe this tailored approach is empirically sound and avoids imposing arbitrary CRA performance measures on a bank and its community. In order to ensure it meets standards of safety and soundness, CRA lending must be evaluated in the context of the characteristics of the bank and its community.

Additionally, the proposed retail lending metric would automatically adjust to changes in the business cycle. As many commenters noted in response to the ANPR, a uniform ratio that does not adjust with the local business cycle could provide too little incentive to make good loans during an expansion and incentives to make unsound loans during a downturn, which could be inconsistent with the safe and sound practices mandated by the CRA statute. Industry commenters also expressed concern that discretionary adjustments to the uniform metric are likely to lag behind the economic cycle and undermine the certainty a metric purports to provide. By contrast, the proposed retail lending metrics are calibrated to contemporaneous changes in market conditions, thereby reducing the risk of providing unsound incentives (figure 5).

Finally, the proposed approach would continue to recognize local context in assessing a bank's CRA performance. If a bank receives the presumption of satisfactory by meeting or exceeding the thresholds, an examiner could consider performance context information, including the bank's responsiveness to the community's needs, in determining whether the bank's performance is outstanding at the assessment area level. Likewise, if a bank does not meet or exceed the thresholds, it would undergo a full examination, as it would currently, and could receive any level of rating, including possibly Outstanding, based on the full range of performance context considerations and clear qualitative criteria. The metrics would be designed to provide greater certainty, while avoiding rigidity.

Retail Test—Evaluating Retail Services Retail services can be extremely important to LMI communities, although they do not easily lend themselves to consistent, comparable metrics. It makes sense to use qualitative criteria related to the responsiveness of a bank's products and services and its delivery systems, which stakeholders highlighted as being particularly important in LMI areas.

In terms of delivery systems, we recognize the unique and important role that branches play in providing essential financial services to customers, particularly in underserved areas. Banks would be evaluated on their branch and ATM locations and how well they serve customers using online and mobile access channels. Providing a meaningful evaluation of all customer access channels is essential to ensuring that the CRA remains relevant as more banks adopt digital technology.

Recognizing that branches are important community assets, the proposed retail service test would compare a bank's distribution of branches, including any openings or closures, to broader patterns of activity in the region. A recent report on branch access in rural areas found that just over 40 percent of rural counties lost bank branches between 2012 and 2017, with 39 rural communities being "deeply affected" by the loss of more than half of their bank branches.10 In addition to the challenges associated with higher cost and less convenient access to banking services, community leaders described how branch closures diminished their access to important leadership from branch personnel that was important to their community's success.

Community Development Test—Measuring Lending and Investment Next, let's turn to the community development test for large retail banks, as well as wholesale and limited-purpose banks. The establishment of a separate community development test reflects stakeholder feedback emphasizing that the value of community development finance is distinct and not directly comparable to retail activity. A separate test also allows for a broader area to be taken into account for purposes of community development relative to retail lending.

Our analysis suggests there are a set of metrics that can be compared to appropriately tailored benchmarks to provide greater certainty regarding community development lending and investment. The proposed metric would aggregate loan and investment dollars that are originated or purchased during the evaluation period with the book value of all other community development loans and investments that are held on the bank's balance sheet (figure 6). Reflecting input from banks and community organizations that patient, committed funding has the greatest effect, this approach avoids the incentives under current practice to provide financing in the form of short-term renewable loans in order to receive CRA credit.11

The proposed test would compare the combined measure of a bank's community development financing relative to deposits in its local assessment area to a national average, set differently for rural and urban areas, and a local average in the bank's assessment area. The national comparator would be set differently for metropolitan statistical areas and rural areas to reflect the comparatively lower average levels of financial infrastructure in rural communities (figure 7). The use of a national rural/metro comparator in addition to an assessment area comparator is intended to avoid skewing incentives toward financially dense areas that are already hotly competitive and to reflect the value of community development in underserved areas. The use of these comparators would help provide consistency across evaluations and clarity regarding community development expectations for both banks and communities.

It is also important to recognize that community development financing is often provided in areas that do not neatly fit within a bank's assessment area. Community development financing opportunities are not always easy for banks to identify and often depend on working with local nonprofits or governments to help identify projects and put together the complex financing required to bring them to fruition. Stakeholder feedback emphasized banks' unique advantages in evaluating community development projects in the states and territories where they operate and providing the smaller-scale, more complex, and often more impactful, investments overlooked by institutional investors. For this reason, and to encourage more activity in underserved areas, it makes sense to give consideration to all of a bank's community development activities in a state or territory where it has an assessment area.12

Banks want to know in advance that they will get the benefit of CRA consideration in order to invest the time and effort necessary to evaluate and structure community development loans and investments. For that reason, we are sympathetic to requests for a timely process by which banks can seek conditional examiner review of particular activities before making financial commitments, particularly for activities that revitalize and stabilize targeted areas.

Our analysis suggests a community development finance metric along the lines outlined here will help to ensure greater predictability and consistency in achieving a Satisfactory rating. However, we also want to make sure that these metrics are supplemented with clear, qualitative standards to ensure that small-scale, high-impact community development activities are rewarded, along with a bank's responsiveness to local needs and priorities.

Community Development Test—Evaluating Services It is also important to evaluate services qualitatively at the assessment-area level as part of the overall community development test. Volunteer and other services provided by banks can provide meaningful support to communities whose value is unlikely to be adequately captured on a comparable basis using aggregative dollar value metrics. In areas with a low density of financial services, a bank officer on the board of local community organizations could provide considerable value to the community that is not accurately reflected by monetizing volunteer hours based on their compensation.

Tailoring This approach to assessing CRA performance would tailor performance metrics to bank size and business strategy, as well as to local and cyclical conditions. The approach would tailor to banks' business models by establishing separate thresholds for substantially different lending products, such as mortgage loans and small business, small farm, and consumer loans, as well as separate retail lending and community development financing metrics.

The proposed metrics would also be tailored for different bank sizes. This is facilitated in part by allowing very small banks to retain the current evaluation procedures and in part by creating a separate community development test that would apply only to large banks. Tailoring is also an important consideration in data collection and reporting requirements. The proposed retail lending approach is designed so that it can be implemented in significant part with data that are readily available. In designing the community development approach, we have been mindful of burden as we consider any additional data that might be required to implement certain metrics.

Finally, as previously noted, the metrics are tailored for local conditions and cyclical considerations. The proposed threshold for each type of activity is calibrated to local conditions as they evolve over the cycle, and the community development finance metric uses an additional time-varying national rural or urban comparator.

The Path Ahead Staff across the Federal Reserve System have devoted substantial time and effort to engaging with the other banking agencies in the CRA reform process. The analysis, data, and proposals I have discussed today have all been shared in greater detail with our counterparts at the other banking agencies in an effort to forge a common approach. We were hopeful our proposed approach could be incorporated into the proposed rulemaking that was released last month in order to seek public comment on a range of options.

Based on the best available data, we concluded that CRA metrics tailored to local conditions and the different sizes and business models of banks would best serve the credit needs of the communities that are at the heart of the statute. This tailored approach using targeted metrics also yielded more consistent and predictable overall ratings than any comprehensive uniform metric. Our analysis did not find a consistent relationship between CRA ratings and a uniform comprehensive ratio that adds together all of a bank's CRA-eligible activities in an area. Moreover, we want to be attentive to possible unintended consequences: Because a uniform comprehensive ratio would not reflect local conditions, which can vary greatly between communities and over the cycle, a bank could exert the same amount of effort in different areas or different points in the economic cycle with very different outcomes.

We continue to believe that a strong common set of interagency standards is the best outcome. By sharing our work publicly, we hope to solicit public input on a broader set of options for reform and find a way toward interagency agreement on the best approach. The process of sharing the data and analysis informing regulatory proposals and seeking public feedback on them is critical to the regulatory process. Given that reforms to the CRA regulations are likely to set expectations for a few decades, it is more important to get the reforms done right than to do them quickly. That requires giving external stakeholders sufficient time and analysis to provide meaningful feedback on a range of options for modernizing the regulations.

I will conclude by noting that the high level of engagement and commitment on the part of banks, community organizations, and other important stakeholders give me confidence that we will succeed in strengthening the CRA's core purpose of helping banks affirmatively meet the credit needs of their local LMI communities.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jan 8, 2020.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierDec 9, 2019Publication referenceJan 8, 202030 days laterFeb 7, 2020
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.68%Observed 3.72%Observed +4 bps vs. earlier reference3.45%Observed −27 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.83%Observed 1.87%Observed +4 bps vs. earlier reference1.59%Observed −28 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Oct 8, 2019 – Apr 8, 2020
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jan 8, 2020Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.0.50%2.25%4.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.57% · Oct 10, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.69% · Oct 17, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.75% · Oct 24, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.78% · Oct 31, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.69% · Nov 7, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.75% · Nov 14, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Nov 21, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Nov 27, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Dec 5, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Dec 12, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Dec 19, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.74% · Dec 26, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.72% · Jan 2, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.64% · Jan 9, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Jan 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.60% · Jan 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.51% · Jan 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Feb 6, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.47% · Feb 13, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.49% · Feb 20, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Feb 27, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.29% · Mar 5, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.36% · Mar 12, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Mar 19, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.50% · Mar 26, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.33% · Apr 2, 202010-year Treasury: 1.54% · Oct 8, 201910-year Treasury: 1.59% · Oct 9, 201910-year Treasury: 1.67% · Oct 10, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 11, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 15, 201910-year Treasury: 1.75% · Oct 16, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 17, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Oct 21, 201910-year Treasury: 1.78% · Oct 22, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 23, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 24, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Oct 25, 201910-year Treasury: 1.85% · Oct 28, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Oct 29, 201910-year Treasury: 1.78% · Oct 30, 201910-year Treasury: 1.69% · Oct 31, 201910-year Treasury: 1.73% · Nov 1, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Nov 4, 201910-year Treasury: 1.86% · Nov 5, 201910-year Treasury: 1.81% · Nov 6, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Nov 7, 201910-year Treasury: 1.94% · Nov 8, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Nov 12, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Nov 13, 201910-year Treasury: 1.82% · Nov 14, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Nov 15, 201910-year Treasury: 1.81% · Nov 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Nov 19, 201910-year Treasury: 1.73% · Nov 20, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 21, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 22, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Nov 25, 201910-year Treasury: 1.74% · Nov 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.78% · Nov 29, 201910-year Treasury: 1.83% · Dec 2, 201910-year Treasury: 1.72% · Dec 3, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Dec 4, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Dec 5, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Dec 6, 201910-year Treasury: 1.83% · Dec 9, 201910-year Treasury: 1.85% · Dec 10, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Dec 11, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 12, 201910-year Treasury: 1.82% · Dec 13, 201910-year Treasury: 1.89% · Dec 16, 201910-year Treasury: 1.89% · Dec 17, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 19, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 20, 201910-year Treasury: 1.93% · Dec 23, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 24, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Dec 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 30, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 31, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Jan 2, 202010-year Treasury: 1.80% · Jan 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jan 6, 202010-year Treasury: 1.83% · Jan 7, 202010-year Treasury: 1.87% · Jan 8, 202010-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jan 9, 202010-year Treasury: 1.83% · Jan 10, 202010-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jan 13, 202010-year Treasury: 1.82% · Jan 14, 202010-year Treasury: 1.79% · Jan 15, 202010-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jan 16, 202010-year Treasury: 1.84% · Jan 17, 202010-year Treasury: 1.78% · Jan 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.77% · Jan 22, 202010-year Treasury: 1.74% · Jan 23, 202010-year Treasury: 1.70% · Jan 24, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Jan 27, 202010-year Treasury: 1.65% · Jan 28, 202010-year Treasury: 1.60% · Jan 29, 202010-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jan 30, 202010-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jan 31, 202010-year Treasury: 1.54% · Feb 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Feb 4, 202010-year Treasury: 1.66% · Feb 5, 202010-year Treasury: 1.65% · Feb 6, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 7, 202010-year Treasury: 1.56% · Feb 10, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 11, 202010-year Treasury: 1.62% · Feb 12, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Feb 13, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 14, 202010-year Treasury: 1.55% · Feb 18, 202010-year Treasury: 1.56% · Feb 19, 202010-year Treasury: 1.52% · Feb 20, 202010-year Treasury: 1.46% · Feb 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.38% · Feb 24, 202010-year Treasury: 1.33% · Feb 25, 202010-year Treasury: 1.33% · Feb 26, 202010-year Treasury: 1.30% · Feb 27, 202010-year Treasury: 1.13% · Feb 28, 202010-year Treasury: 1.10% · Mar 2, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 4, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Mar 5, 202010-year Treasury: 0.74% · Mar 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.54% · Mar 9, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Mar 10, 202010-year Treasury: 0.82% · Mar 11, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Mar 12, 202010-year Treasury: 0.94% · Mar 13, 202010-year Treasury: 0.73% · Mar 16, 202010-year Treasury: 1.02% · Mar 17, 202010-year Treasury: 1.18% · Mar 18, 202010-year Treasury: 1.12% · Mar 19, 202010-year Treasury: 0.92% · Mar 20, 202010-year Treasury: 0.76% · Mar 23, 202010-year Treasury: 0.84% · Mar 24, 202010-year Treasury: 0.88% · Mar 25, 202010-year Treasury: 0.83% · Mar 26, 202010-year Treasury: 0.72% · Mar 27, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Mar 30, 202010-year Treasury: 0.70% · Mar 31, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 1, 202010-year Treasury: 0.63% · Apr 2, 202010-year Treasury: 0.62% · Apr 3, 202010-year Treasury: 0.67% · Apr 6, 202010-year Treasury: 0.75% · Apr 7, 202010-year Treasury: 0.77% · Apr 8, 2020Oct 8, 2019Jan 8, 2020Apr 8, 2020
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury125 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,384.24/month

3.72% · Jan 2, 2020

At the later reference$1,338.77/month

3.45% · Feb 6, 2020

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $45.47 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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