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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Building on the Gains from the Long Expansion — Chair Jerome H. Powell

Over the past year, my colleagues and I on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have been conducting a first-ever public review of how we make monetary policy. As part of that review, we held Fed Listens events around the country…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Over the past year, my colleagues and I on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have been conducting a first-ever public review of how we make monetary policy. As part of that review, we held Fed Listens events around the country where representatives from a wide range of groups have been telling us how the economy is working for them and the people they represent and how the Federal Reserve might better promote the goals Congress has set for us: maximum employment and price stability. We have heard two messages loud and clear. First, as this expansion continues into its 11th year—the longest in U.S. history—economic conditions are generally good. Second, the benefits of the long expansion are only now reaching many communities, and there is plenty of room to build on the impressive gains achieved so far.

These themes show through in many ways in official statistics. For example, more than a decade of steady advances has pushed the jobless rate near a 50-year low, where it has remained for well over a year. But the wealth of middle-income families—savings, home equity, and other assets—has only recently surpassed levels seen before the Great Recession, and the wealth of people with lower incomes, while growing, has yet to fully recover.1

Fortunately, the outlook for further progress is good: Forecasters are generally predicting continued growth, a strong job market, and inflation near 2 percent. Tonight I will begin by discussing the Fed's policy actions over the past year to support the favorable outlook. Then I will turn to two important opportunities for further gains from this expansion: maintaining a stable and reliable pace of 2 percent inflation and spreading the benefits of employment more widely.

Monetary Policy and the Economy in 2019 We started 2019 with a favorable outlook, and over the year the outlook has changed only modestly in the eyes of many forecasters (figure 1). For example, in the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the forecast for inflation is a bit lower, but the unemployment forecast is unchanged and the forecast for gross domestic product (GDP) is nearly unchanged.2 The key to the ongoing favorable outlook is household spending, which represents about 70 percent of the economy and continues to be strong, supported by the healthy job market, rising incomes, and solid consumer confidence.

While events of the year have not much changed the outlook, the process of getting from there to here has been far from dull. I will describe how we grappled with incoming information and made important monetary policy changes through the year to help keep the favorable outlook on track.

As the year began, growth appeared robust, but the economy faced some risks flowing mainly from weakening global economic growth and trade developments. Foreign growth, which slipped in the second half of last year, slid further as 2019 progressed. While weaker foreign growth does not necessarily translate into similar weakness here, it does hurt our exporters and presents a risk that the weakness may spread more broadly. At the same time, business contacts around the country have been telling us that trade-related uncertainties are weighing on their decisions. These global developments have been holding back overall economic growth. Manufacturing output, which had only recently surpassed its level before the Great Recession, has declined this year and is again below its pre-recession peak. Business investment has also weakened.

In addition, inflation pressures proved unexpectedly muted this year. After remaining close to our symmetric 2 percent objective for much of last year, inflation is now running below 2 percent. Some of the softness in overall inflation is the result of a fall in oil prices and should not affect inflation going forward. But core inflation—which omits volatile food and energy prices—is also running somewhat below 2 percent.

The main themes of our deliberations this year have been a continuing favorable outlook founded on strength in the household sector, with a few yellow flags including muted inflation and weakness in manufacturing. In addition, global growth and trade have presented ongoing risks and uncertainties. We also faced some less prominent factors that always confront policymakers. Specifically, we never have a crystal clear real-time picture of how the economy is performing. In addition, the precise timing and size of the effects of our policy decisions cannot be known in real time.

In August, the Bureau of Labor Statistics previewed a likely revision to its count of payroll job creation for the 12 months ended March 2019. The preview indicated that job gains over that period were about half a million lower than previously reported. On a monthly basis, job gains were likely about 170,000 per month, rather than 210,000. While this news did not dramatically alter our outlook, it pointed to an economy with somewhat less momentum than we had thought.3

Uncertainty about how our policies are affecting the economy also entered our discussions. As you know, we set our policy interest rate to achieve our goals of maximum employment and stable prices. In doing so, we often refer to certain benchmarks. One of these is the interest rate that would be neutral—neither restraining the economy nor pushing it upward. We call that rate "r*" (pronounced "r star"). A policy rate above r* would tend to restrain economic activity, while a setting below r* would tend to speed up the economy. A second benchmark is the natural rate of unemployment, which is the lowest rate of unemployment that would not create upward pressure on inflation. We call that rate "u*" (pronounced "u star"). You can think of r* and u* as two of the main stars by which we navigate. In an ideal world, policymakers could rely on these stars like mariners before the advent of GPS. But, unlike celestial stars on a clear night, we cannot directly observe these stars, and their values change in ways that are difficult to track in real time. Standard estimates of r* and u* made by policymakers and other analysts have been falling since 2012 (figure 2). Since the end of last year, incoming data—especially muted inflation data—prompted analysts inside and outside the Fed to again revise down their estimates of r* and u*.4 Taken at face value, a lower r* would suggest that monetary policy is providing somewhat less support for employment and inflation than previously believed, and the fall in u* would suggest that the labor market was less tight than believed.5 Both could help explain the weakness in inflation. As with the revised jobs data, these revised estimates of the stars were not a game changer for policy, but they provided another reason why a somewhat lower setting of our policy interest rate might be appropriate.

How did we add up all of these considerations? To help keep the U.S. economy strong in the face of global developments and to provide some insurance against ongoing risks, we progressively eased the stance of monetary policy over the course of the year. First, we signaled that increases in our short-term interest rate were unlikely. Then, from July to October, we reduced the target range for the federal funds rate by 3/4 percentage point. The full effects of these monetary policy actions will be felt over time, but we believe they are already helping to support consumer and business sentiment and boosting spending in interest-sensitive sectors, such as housing and consumer durable goods.

We see the current stance of monetary policy as likely to remain appropriate as long as incoming information about the economy remains broadly consistent with our outlook of moderate economic growth, a strong labor market, and inflation near our symmetric 2 percent objective. Looking ahead, we will be monitoring the effects of our policy actions, along with other information bearing on the outlook, as we assess the appropriate path of the target range for the federal funds rate. Of course, if developments emerge that cause a material reassessment of our outlook, we would respond accordingly. Policy is not on a preset course.

I will wrap up with two areas where we have an opportunity to build on our gains.

A Sustained Return of Inflation to 2 percent For many years as the economy recovered from the Great Recession, inflation averaged around 1.5 percent—below our 2 percent objective (figure 3). We had long expected that inflation would gradually rise as the expansion continued, and, as I noted, both overall and core inflation ran at rates consistent with our goal for much of 2018. But this year, inflation is again running below 2 percent.

It is reasonable to ask why inflation running somewhat below 2 percent is a big deal. We have heard a lot about inflation at our Fed Listens events. People are concerned about the rising cost of medical care, of housing, and of college, but nobody seems to be complaining about overall inflation running below 2 percent. Even central bankers are not concerned about any particular minor fluctuation in inflation.

Around the world, however, we have seen that inflation running persistently below target can lead to an unhealthy dynamic in which inflation expectations drift down, pulling actual inflation further down. Lower inflation can, in turn, pull interest rates to ever-lower levels. The experience of Japan, and now the euro area, suggests that this dynamic is very difficult to reverse, and once under way, it can make it harder for a central bank to support its economy by further lowering interest rates. That is why it is essential that we at the Fed use our tools to make sure that we do not permit an unhealthy downward drift in inflation expectations and inflation. We are strongly committed to symmetrically and sustainably achieving our 2 percent inflation objective so that in making long-term plans, households and businesses can reasonably expect 2 percent inflation over time.

Spreading the Benefits of Employment Many people at our Fed Listens events have told us that this long expansion is now benefiting low- and middle-income communities to a degree that has not been felt for many years. We have heard about companies, communities, and schools working together to help employees build skills—and of employers working creatively to structure jobs so that employees can do their jobs while coping with the demands of family and life beyond the workplace. We have heard that many people who in the past struggled to stay in the workforce are now working and adding new and better chapters to their lives. These stories show clearly in the job market data. Employment gains have been broad based across all racial and ethnic groups and all levels of educational attainment as well as among people with disabilities (figure 4).

The strong labor market is also encouraging more people in their prime working years—ages 25 to 54—to rejoin or remain in the labor force, meaning that they either have a job or are actively looking for one. This is a welcome development. For several decades up until the mid-1990s, the share of prime-age people in the labor force rose, as an influx of women more than offset some decline in male participation. In the mid-1990s, however, prime-age participation began to fall, and the drop-off became steeper in the Great Recession and the early years of the recovery (figure 5). Between 2007 and 2013, falling participation by both men and women contributed to a 2 percentage point overall decline. Our falling participation rate stands out among advanced economies. While the United States was roughly in the middle of the pack among 32 economies as of 1995, in 2018 we ranked near the bottom (figure 6). Fortunately, in the strong job market since 2014, prime-age participation has been staging a comeback. So far, we have made up more than half the loss in the Great Recession, which translates to almost 2 million more people in the labor force. But prime age participation could be still higher.

Income growth of low- and middle-income households has shown a pattern similar to that of participation, with two decades of disappointing news turning to better news during the past few years. According to Census data, inflation-adjusted incomes for the lowest 20 percent of households declined slightly over the two decades through 2014, and income for the middle 20 percent rose only modestly. Since then, incomes for these groups have risen more rapidly, as wage growth has picked up—and picked up most for the lower-paying jobs (figure 7).

Recent years' data paint a hopeful picture of more people in their prime years in the workforce and wages rising for low- and middle-income workers. But as the people at our Fed Listens events emphasized, this is just a start: There is still plenty of room for building on these gains. The Fed can play a role in this effort by steadfastly pursuing our goals of maximum employment and price stability. The research literature suggests a variety of policies, beyond the scope of monetary policy, that could spur further progress by better preparing people to meet the challenges of technological innovation and global competition and by supporting and rewarding labor force participation.6 These policies could bring immense benefits both to the lives of workers and families directly affected and to the strength of the economy overall. Of course, the task of evaluating the costs and benefits of these policies falls to our elected representatives.

Conclusion Monetary policy is now well positioned to support a strong labor market and return inflation decisively to our symmetric 2 percent objective. If the outlook changes materially, policy will change as well. At this point in the long expansion, I see the glass as much more than half full. With the right policies, we can fill it further, building on the gains so far and spreading the benefits more broadly to all Americans.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Nov 25, 2019.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierOct 26, 2019Publication referenceNov 25, 201930 days laterDec 25, 2019
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.75%Observed 3.66%Observed −9 bps vs. earlier reference3.73%Observed +7 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.80%Observed 1.76%Observed −4 bps vs. earlier reference1.90%Observed +14 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Aug 25, 2019 – Feb 25, 2020
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Nov 25, 2019Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.1.00%2.50%4.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.58% · Aug 29, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.49% · Sep 5, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.56% · Sep 12, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Sep 19, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.64% · Sep 26, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Oct 3, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.57% · Oct 10, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.69% · Oct 17, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.75% · Oct 24, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.78% · Oct 31, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.69% · Nov 7, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.75% · Nov 14, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Nov 21, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Nov 27, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Dec 5, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Dec 12, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Dec 19, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.74% · Dec 26, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 3.72% · Jan 2, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.64% · Jan 9, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Jan 16, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.60% · Jan 23, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.51% · Jan 30, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Feb 6, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.47% · Feb 13, 202030-year fixed mortgage: 3.49% · Feb 20, 202010-year Treasury: 1.54% · Aug 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.49% · Aug 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.47% · Aug 28, 201910-year Treasury: 1.50% · Aug 29, 201910-year Treasury: 1.50% · Aug 30, 201910-year Treasury: 1.47% · Sep 3, 201910-year Treasury: 1.47% · Sep 4, 201910-year Treasury: 1.57% · Sep 5, 201910-year Treasury: 1.55% · Sep 6, 201910-year Treasury: 1.63% · Sep 9, 201910-year Treasury: 1.72% · Sep 10, 201910-year Treasury: 1.75% · Sep 11, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Sep 12, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Sep 13, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Sep 16, 201910-year Treasury: 1.81% · Sep 17, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Sep 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Sep 19, 201910-year Treasury: 1.74% · Sep 20, 201910-year Treasury: 1.72% · Sep 23, 201910-year Treasury: 1.64% · Sep 24, 201910-year Treasury: 1.73% · Sep 25, 201910-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.69% · Sep 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.68% · Sep 30, 201910-year Treasury: 1.65% · Oct 1, 201910-year Treasury: 1.60% · Oct 2, 201910-year Treasury: 1.54% · Oct 3, 201910-year Treasury: 1.52% · Oct 4, 201910-year Treasury: 1.56% · Oct 7, 201910-year Treasury: 1.54% · Oct 8, 201910-year Treasury: 1.59% · Oct 9, 201910-year Treasury: 1.67% · Oct 10, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 11, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 15, 201910-year Treasury: 1.75% · Oct 16, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 17, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Oct 21, 201910-year Treasury: 1.78% · Oct 22, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 23, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 24, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Oct 25, 201910-year Treasury: 1.85% · Oct 28, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Oct 29, 201910-year Treasury: 1.78% · Oct 30, 201910-year Treasury: 1.69% · Oct 31, 201910-year Treasury: 1.73% · Nov 1, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Nov 4, 201910-year Treasury: 1.86% · Nov 5, 201910-year Treasury: 1.81% · Nov 6, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Nov 7, 201910-year Treasury: 1.94% · Nov 8, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Nov 12, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Nov 13, 201910-year Treasury: 1.82% · Nov 14, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Nov 15, 201910-year Treasury: 1.81% · Nov 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Nov 19, 201910-year Treasury: 1.73% · Nov 20, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 21, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 22, 201910-year Treasury: 1.76% · Nov 25, 201910-year Treasury: 1.74% · Nov 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Nov 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.78% · Nov 29, 201910-year Treasury: 1.83% · Dec 2, 201910-year Treasury: 1.72% · Dec 3, 201910-year Treasury: 1.77% · Dec 4, 201910-year Treasury: 1.80% · Dec 5, 201910-year Treasury: 1.84% · Dec 6, 201910-year Treasury: 1.83% · Dec 9, 201910-year Treasury: 1.85% · Dec 10, 201910-year Treasury: 1.79% · Dec 11, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 12, 201910-year Treasury: 1.82% · Dec 13, 201910-year Treasury: 1.89% · Dec 16, 201910-year Treasury: 1.89% · Dec 17, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 18, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 19, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 20, 201910-year Treasury: 1.93% · Dec 23, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 24, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 26, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Dec 27, 201910-year Treasury: 1.90% · Dec 30, 201910-year Treasury: 1.92% · Dec 31, 201910-year Treasury: 1.88% · Jan 2, 202010-year Treasury: 1.80% · Jan 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jan 6, 202010-year Treasury: 1.83% · Jan 7, 202010-year Treasury: 1.87% · Jan 8, 202010-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jan 9, 202010-year Treasury: 1.83% · Jan 10, 202010-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jan 13, 202010-year Treasury: 1.82% · Jan 14, 202010-year Treasury: 1.79% · Jan 15, 202010-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jan 16, 202010-year Treasury: 1.84% · Jan 17, 202010-year Treasury: 1.78% · Jan 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.77% · Jan 22, 202010-year Treasury: 1.74% · Jan 23, 202010-year Treasury: 1.70% · Jan 24, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Jan 27, 202010-year Treasury: 1.65% · Jan 28, 202010-year Treasury: 1.60% · Jan 29, 202010-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jan 30, 202010-year Treasury: 1.51% · Jan 31, 202010-year Treasury: 1.54% · Feb 3, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Feb 4, 202010-year Treasury: 1.66% · Feb 5, 202010-year Treasury: 1.65% · Feb 6, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 7, 202010-year Treasury: 1.56% · Feb 10, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 11, 202010-year Treasury: 1.62% · Feb 12, 202010-year Treasury: 1.61% · Feb 13, 202010-year Treasury: 1.59% · Feb 14, 202010-year Treasury: 1.55% · Feb 18, 202010-year Treasury: 1.56% · Feb 19, 202010-year Treasury: 1.52% · Feb 20, 202010-year Treasury: 1.46% · Feb 21, 202010-year Treasury: 1.38% · Feb 24, 202010-year Treasury: 1.33% · Feb 25, 2020Aug 25, 2019Nov 25, 2019Feb 25, 2020
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury124 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,374.07/month

3.66% · Nov 21, 2019

At the later reference$1,385.94/month

3.73% · Dec 19, 2019

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $11.87 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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