U.S. Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy — Vice Chair Richard H. Clarida
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this CFA Institute conference on fixed-income management. Before we begin our conversation, I would like to share a few thoughts about the outlook for the U.S. economy and monetary policy.1
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System5 min read
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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this CFA Institute conference on fixed-income management. Before we begin our conversation, I would like to share a few thoughts about the outlook for the U.S. economy and monetary policy.1
The U.S. economy is in a good place, and the baseline outlook is favorable. The median expectation from Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants' most recent Summary of Economic Projections is for GDP growth to be around 2 percent in 2019, for growth to continue near this pace next year, and for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation to rise gradually to our symmetric 2 percent objective.2 The unemployment rate, at 3.5 percent, is at a half-century low, and wages are rising broadly in line with productivity growth and underlying inflation. There is no evidence to date that a strong labor market is putting excessive cost-push pressure on price inflation.
But despite this favorable baseline outlook, the U.S. economy confronts some evident risks in this the 11th year of economic expansion. Business fixed investment has slowed notably since last year, exports are contracting on a year-over-year basis, and indicators of manufacturing activity are weakening. Global growth estimates continue to be marked down, and global disinflationary pressures cloud the outlook for U.S. inflation.
U.S. inflation remains muted. Over the 12 months through August, PCE inflation is running at 1.4 percent, and core PCE inflation, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, is running at 1.8 percent.
Turning now to monetary policy, at both its July and September meetings, the FOMC voted to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points.3 With these decisions, the current target range for the federal funds rate is 1.75 to 2 percent, which compares with the range of 2.25 to 2.5 percent that prevailed between December 2018 and July 2019. The Committee took these actions to provide a somewhat more accommodative policy in response to muted inflation pressures and the risks to the outlook I mentioned earlier.
Looking ahead, monetary policy is not on a preset course, and the Committee will proceed on a meeting-by-meeting basis to assess the economic outlook as well as the risks to the outlook, and it will act as appropriate to sustain growth, a strong labor market, and a return of inflation to our symmetric 2 percent objective.
Turning now to the framework under which the Federal Reserve operates in financial markets, in September of this year, shocks in the repurchase agreement (repo) market put upward pressure on money market rates, and these pressures spilled over into the federal funds market. In response to these developments, the Federal Reserve on September 17 initiated a program of repurchase operations to provide liquidity sufficient to keep the federal funds rate within the desired target range. These operations have been successful in achieving this goal.
As the FOMC announced in January 2019, the Committee seeks to operate with a level of bank reserves that is sufficiently ample to ensure that control of the federal funds rate is achieved primarily by the setting of our administered rates and is not, over the longer term, reliant on frequent and large open market operations.4 In July, the FOMC concluded the program of balance sheet reduction in place since October 2017 and indicated then that, after a time, it would commence increasing its securities holdings to maintain reserves at a level consistent with an ample-reserves regime.
The FOMC announced on October 11 that it would seek to maintain, over time, a level of bank reserves at or somewhat above the level that prevailed in early September, a level that we believe is sufficient to operate an ample-reserves regime.5 This week, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York began a program of purchasing Treasury bills in the secondary market. This program will continue at least into the second quarter of next year and is designed to achieve—and, over time, maintain—ample reserve balances at or above the level that prevailed in early September. In addition, the Federal Reserve will continue to conduct term and overnight repo operations at least through January to ensure that the supply of reserves remains ample even during periods of temporary, but pronounced, increases in our nonreserve liabilities, and to mitigate the risk that money market pressures adversely affect monetary policy implementation.
It is important to note that the open market operations we have announced are technical, "Central Banking 101" operations and should not be conflated with the large-scale asset purchase programs that the Federal Reserve deployed after the financial crisis. In those programs, the Federal Reserve was seeking to ease financial conditions by lowering term premiums via its purchases of long-term Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities. By contrast, the program announced on October 11 will concentrate its purchases in Treasury bills. The technical measures we are undertaking do not represent a change in the stance of monetary policy, which we continue to implement by adjusting the target range for the federal funds rate.
Finally, I would like to say a few words about the monetary policy framework review we are undertaking this year. This review of our monetary policy strategy, tools, and communications is the first of its kind for the Federal Reserve. Public engagement, unprecedented in scope for the Fed, is an important part of this effort. Through our Fed Listens events, we have been hearing a diverse range of perspectives not only from academic experts, but also from representatives of consumer, labor, business, community, and other groups. We will draw on these insights as we assess how best to achieve and maintain maximum employment and price stability in the most robust fashion possible. In July, we began discussing issues associated with the review at our FOMC meetings. We will continue reporting on our discussions in the meeting minutes and share our conclusions when we finish the review during the first half of next year.6
Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.
MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context
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This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.
Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing
The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.
Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.
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What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan
At the publication reference$1,379.15/month
3.69% · Oct 17, 2019
At the later reference$1,389.35/month
3.75% · Nov 14, 2019
The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $10.19 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.
Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.
Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits
Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®: available observations from Apr 2, 1971 through Nov 5, 2026. Cached history snapshot. History retrieved or verified Nov 11, 2026.
U.S. Department of the Treasury: available observations from Jan 4, 2016 through Nov 10, 2026. Cached history snapshot. History retrieved or verified Nov 11, 2026.
The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.
Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.