Welcoming Remarks (via prerecorded video) — Chair Jerome H. Powell
The Federal Reserve is strongly committed to stress testing as a cornerstone of our bank supervisory and financial stability missions. Stress testing is perhaps the most successful supervisory innovation of the post-crisis era. But if…
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System3 min read
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Good morning everyone and thank you to President Rosengren and the Boston Fed for hosting this conference.
The Federal Reserve is strongly committed to stress testing as a cornerstone of our bank supervisory and financial stability missions. Stress testing is perhaps the most successful supervisory innovation of the post-crisis era. But if stress tests are to continue to serve their critical function, they will need to evolve in the years ahead to keep pace with the ever-changing financial system, as they have since the first round of tests in 2009.
Before looking to the future, let me recall a bit of history. A little more than 10 years ago, the United States and the world teetered on the brink of economic catastrophe. What was urgently needed was a way to restore confidence in the financial system—a daunting challenge. Neither the banks, nor the regulators, nor the public had a reliable sense of the strength and resilience of our major banks. The announcement of forward-looking stress-testing results in May 2009 helped restore confidence and stabilize banks by providing a credible and independent picture of their finances.1 These original stress tests evolved into the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, or CCAR, program, which has served to institutionalize capital planning by firms, and supervision by the Fed, as a forward-looking endeavor.
Since 2009, large banks have added more than $800 billion in common equity capital, giving them a much thicker cushion to deal with losses. Banks have gotten much better at assessing and managing their risks, effectively tracking commitments across their organizations, anticipating capital needs, and planning for different scenarios.
The stress tests of the future—5 and 10 years from now—will need to continue to ensure that banks remain able, even in a severe downturn, to provide the credit that households and businesses depend on. As financial institutions and the financial system evolve, stress testing will need to keep up. When the next episode of financial instability presents itself, it may do so in a messy and unexpected way. Banks will need to be ready not just for expected risks, but for unexpected ones. Thus, the tests will need to vary from year to year, and to explore even quite unlikely scenarios.
If the stress tests do not evolve, they risk becoming a compliance exercise, breeding complacency from both supervisors and banks. We might also, inadvertently, encourage the development of a banking system where, over time, all banks would look much alike rather than the banking system we want and need, one with diverse institutions with different business models. We simply can't let these things happen.
The purpose of today's gathering is to help us think about how to ensure the tests continue to foster a dynamic banking system, financial stability, and a healthy and growing economy. We have invited a wide range participants—fellow regulators, bankers, analysts, academics, and community groups—with diverse perspectives. Because we do not claim a monopoly on knowledge or wisdom, we have invited many who have disagreed with us in the past. I strongly believe that diverse perspectives and healthy debate will sharpen our thinking and lead us to better answers.
I'm sorry I'm not able to be with you today. And I want to particularly thank all of the speakers, discussants, and other participants for helping us grapple with the challenges of ensuring that tomorrow's stress tests remain as effective and vigorous as they are today. Thank you.
Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.
MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context
The mortgage market around this release
This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.
Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing
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Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.
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What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan
At the publication reference$1,389.35/month
3.75% · Jul 3, 2019
At the later reference$1,363.94/month
3.60% · Aug 8, 2019
The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $25.41 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.
Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.
Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits
Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®: available observations from Apr 2, 1971 through Nov 5, 2026. Cached history snapshot. History retrieved or verified Nov 11, 2026.
U.S. Department of the Treasury: available observations from Jan 4, 2016 through Nov 10, 2026. Cached history snapshot. History retrieved or verified Nov 11, 2026.
The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.
Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.