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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Don’t Chase the Needles: An Optimistic Assessment of the Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy — Vice Chairman for Supervision Randal K. Quarles

Thank you for having me.1 I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to this distinguished group and look forward to my discussion with Greg Ip. Now almost exactly a year into my appointment as Vice Chairman for Supervision, I…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you for having me.1 I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to this distinguished group and look forward to my discussion with Greg Ip. Now almost exactly a year into my appointment as Vice Chairman for Supervision, I have, as might be expected, spoken publicly most often about banking and the financial system more generally. However, supervision and regulation are not all that I do at the Federal Reserve, and I welcome this opportunity to speak to another part of my day job, as a member of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Today I would like to offer my take on the economic outlook, which is optimistic, and explain how I view my optimism as consistent with the continued gradual pace of policy tightening that many Committee participants have projected. In particular, I will explain how my views on potential growth help shape my outlook, both for the economy and for the appropriate path of monetary policy. Relatedly, I will discuss the uncertainties that arise when a central element of the outlook--in this case, the potential capacity of the economy--is unknown and largely unobservable. Such uncertainty can complicate policymaking in even what appears to be a very healthy economy, providing a further argument for gradualism.

Where We Are Now In previous remarks on the economic outlook, delivered at a National Association for Business Economics conference in February, I characterized the U.S. economy as being in a "good spot" and asked if the economy had reached a positive turning point following an extended period of post-crisis slow growth. I argued that while it might be too soon to call a turning point, there was a definite possibility of an upside surprise.2

So now that we are fairly deep into 2018, where do we stand overall? My view has not changed all that much from February. While many other forecasters had to revise up their forecasts over the course of the year, my own outlook is basically unchanged, because the economy is evolving essentially as I expected at the outset of the year. The economy remains in a good spot. Gross domestic product increased a robust 3‑1/4 percent in the first half of the year, and indicators suggest continued strong growth through the summer. Economic conditions are as close to meeting the Federal Reserve's dual mandate for monetary policy--maximum sustainable employment and price stability‑‑as they have been in a long time. Inflation is in line with the Committee's 2 percent objective, and the unemployment rate is at nearly a 50-year low.

How long can this strong growth be sustained? The answer depends largely on what form growth takes. Growth that is supported by increases in the productive capacity of the economy should be durable. However, if growth primarily reflects strong demand that stretches production beyond its sustainable capacity, the economy will run into constraints that will result in slower growth, higher prices, or a potentially destabilizing buildup of financial imbalances. So, which is it? Unfortunately, it is very difficult to tell. I will return to that question shortly.

That said, I see many reasons to be optimistic about the growth of the potential capacity of the economy over the next few years. In part, my optimism is rooted in the view that many of the factors that have been weighing on potential growth since the financial crisis could be lifting. So, have we reached the turning point? While I believe the issue remains unresolved, the recent evidence is encouraging.

Have We Reached a Turning Point? Why am I optimistic about the economy's supply potential? The growth of potential can, at the most basic level, be broken down into two factors: the supply of labor and the productivity of that labor. Productivity, in turn, is importantly affected by changes in the stock of capital--that is, machines and factories--as well as technological advances and improved production methods. I see reasons to be hopeful about both factors.

Let us start with labor. For some time, the contribution of the labor force to potential growth has been held down by the predictable drag of baby boomers moving into retirement. However, the decline in labor force participation following the financial crisis exceeded even what might be expected given this long-standing downward trend-- in particular, as the participation of prime-age workers (those between the ages of 25 and 54) fell and teenagers exited the workforce in droves. The reasons behind the fall in participation among non-retirement-age workers have been the subject of much debate. However, I see little reason to assume that it will be permanent, and we have already seen some signs of a turnaround. Thus, I think there is some potential for labor force participation to move up, perhaps as workers respond to the incentives of plentiful job opportunities and higher wages, thereby adding to the productive capacity of the economy and pushing back the constraints on growth.

Some recent labor force trends have been promising. For example, the two-decade-long trend increase in the population not in the labor force on account of disability peaked in 2014 and has started to move down quite rapidly--again, for reasons that defy easy explanation but may reflect the general improvement in labor market opportunities.3

I will now turn to productivity. Labor productivity has averaged an annual growth rate of only 3/4 percent since 2011, far below the 2-1/4 percent pace that prevailed in the two decades before the financial crisis. Although there are competing theories, the productivity decline is not well understood, and a consensus explanation has yet to emerge. As such, the slowdown could reverse unpredictably as well. The most recent data have been moving in the right direction, but only haltingly, with labor productivity increasing about 1-1/4 percent over the past year.

There are reasons that productivity growth could shake off some of its recent torpidity. I would like to start with the capital stock. After a few years of abysmal business-sector investment spending, it appears as though the drought has broken. After picking up in 2017, business fixed investment climbed a robust 10 percent at an annual rate in the first half of this year, likely supported by lower corporate tax rates and other incentives in last year's tax bill. Also, indicators for investment, including orders and shipments of nondefense capital goods, point toward continued strength, and survey evidence points to high business optimism and solid capital expenditure plans. More capital should allow labor to be more productive.

I am also a bit of a techno-enthusiast. We are in the early stages of a more widespread application of a wave of new technologies, such as 5G communications, AI (artificial intelligence) and machine learning, and 3-D printing. It might be that the productivity gains associated with these and other new technologies are embodied in new capital equipment and will only now start to become apparent as the investment drought of recent years comes to an end. A tighter economy could also create incentives for firms to revamp their production methods to save on scarce labor resources.

To summarize, the economy has been doing very well. Whether this performance is sustained will be importantly determined by whether growth is supported by increases in the economy's potential. I am hopeful that potential growth, and particularly productivity, could accelerate from its relatively anemic pace of late, sustaining growth without overheating the economy. The more the economy's potential growth increases, the more gradual we can be in our removal of monetary policy accommodation. Thus, an assessment of the pace of potential growth will be an important input into what I view as the appropriate path of policy to achieve our objectives of maximum sustainable employment and price stability.

The Difficulty in Identifying Potential The tricky thing, as I pointed out earlier, is that potential output is unobserved and can only be inferred from the behavior of other measured economic indicators. Traditionally, as taught in Econ 101, inflation provides a signal on whether the economy is operating above or below its potential level. If inflation moves up in a sustained manner, not just because of temporary shocks, then the economy is likely operating above its productive capacity, as firms have the leeway to raise prices given the strength of demand. Likewise, if inflation moves down persistently, then the economy is likely operating with some slack, as firms restrain prices to sell their products in the face of weak demand.

If inflation is the primary indicator of the economy's position relative to potential, how confident can we be in the quality of the signal? It has been noted--quite frequently, I might add--that the relationship between inflation and the tightness of the economy has gotten weaker, which is to say that inflation appears to be less affected by movements in economic slack or tightness, traditionally measured by the unemployment rate, than in the past. As the role of slack in explaining inflation has diminished, inflation expectations have assumed greater importance. However, it is reasonable to ask, if inflation is, in fact, now largely a reflection of inflation expectations, is inflation still a good indicator of the cyclical state of the economy? Or, more directly, can we count on inflation to warn us in time if the economy is overheating?

To be a little controversial, perhaps what we are witnessing with inflation is an application of what has been called Goodhart's law, named after Charles Goodhart, the distinguished scholar of central banking at the London School of Economics.4 The law can be summarized as the idea that if an indicator becomes a target of policy, that indicator loses its value as a gauge of the state of the economy. Rather, the indicator becomes a signal of the public's belief in the competence and commitment of the government agency that is targeting the indicator.

Something along these lines could be happening to inflation, especially given the important role of expected inflation in the behavior of actual inflation. Perhaps inflation is just sending a signal of people's trust in the Fed's ability to meet its inflation objective. If so, no complaints here. That is a good thing. However, a problem does arise if the Fed remains reliant on inflation as our only gauge of the economy's position relative to its potential. There are risks in pushing the economy into a place it does not want to go if we limit ourselves to navigating by what might be a faulty indicator. Anchored inflation expectations might mask the inflation signal coming from an overheated economy for a period, but I have no doubt that prices would eventually move up in response to resource constraints. The ultimate price, from the perspective of the dual mandate, would be an unanchoring of inflation expectations.

Of course, I view this more as a risk than my baseline expectation. As I have said, I am optimistic about potential growth, and I expect that even relatively strong growth can be met without running into economic constraints. However, I also think that we should pay attention to other indicators of tightness and overheating in addition to inflation. There are other signs of potential besides inflation, including, but not limited to, direct measures of labor utilization or indications of shortages and bottlenecks in production.

Policy Considerations How should these thoughts affect monetary policy? I began my remarks by noting that there may be reason to think that the productive capacity of our economy could be accelerating, which would allow a more gradual withdrawal of accommodation without overheating. But I have noted as well that there may be reason to think that resource constraints could be more binding than current inflation measures would traditionally indicate, which would call for a more athletic response. Moreover, there is today a higher degree of uncertainty about many of these factors--measures of labor slack, the relation between labor slack and inflation, the sensitivity of current inflation measures to actual resource constraints, and the future growth of productivity, to name a few--than there has been for many years. In such an environment, some have argued that this greater uncertainty leaves policymakers without a clear guide and market participants without a firm anchor, meaning policy itself could drift--perhaps dangerously.

I do not think that is the case at all. Instead, I think this situation reinforces and supports the importance of a clear, steady strategy and a gradual, predictable approach to the removal of accommodation as we continue to monitor the data. The analogy I frequently use is the old pilot's adage of "Don't chase the needles." The control panel of any airplane has an instrument to guide your course: a circular gauge with a vertical bar, or "needle," running through the center of it. If the bar moves sideways to the left, you are drifting off course and should change course to the left until the bar comes back into the center of the circle; if it moves to the right, you change course to the right. Today these instruments get their inputs from the plane's GPS (Global Positioning System) and are fairly sensitive and accurate, but decades ago, when I was a young man first learning to fly in the clouds, they got their information from radio beacons stationed on the ground and were quite squirrelly. The bar could wander from side to side for a while for any of a number of reasons--distance from the beacon, the angle you were approaching it from, interference from other instruments on the panel, sunspots, or rain--and because of this uncertainty, the first rule taught to us as young pilots was, "Don't chase the needles."

Precisely because of the uncertainty around the course inputs, the right strategy was to set a course based on your knowledge of the destination, winds, and performance of your plane; communicate that course clearly to air traffic control so everyone knew what you were doing; and then stick to that course steadily even as the course needle might waver from side to side across your instrument. If the needle moved to one side substantially and stayed there pretty consistently, then you would make a small, firm correction--but even then, only gradually and with clear communication about what you were doing. In a world where you had great confidence in the sensitivity of your instrument, such as in today's GPS-based avionics, you could respond immediately to moment-to-moment changes in your course readings, but in the world of radio beacons and sunspots, "chasing the needles" would at best lead to inefficient fishtailing across the sky, and at worst to a substantial deviation from your destination.

Today uncertainty around many of the macroeconomic inputs to monetary policy decisions argues for just the same approach to navigation. Rather than meaning that policy will drift because of this uncertainty, it means that policymakers should chart a course that is stable, gradual, and predictable; communicate it clearly; and then follow that course through the temporarily shifting and sometimes conflicting signs from the economy unless some strong and steady signal requires a firm but moderate correction. Given that the economy has performed fundamentally as I expected at the outset of this year, the right strategy is to maintain the gradual course that I have thought appropriate for some time now. Put another way, while I think that there is enough reason to think that the productive capacity of our economy might be increasing so that we should not feel compelled to accelerate our pace, I also think there is enough doubt about current inflation as an infallibly reliable measure of current resource constraints that the continued gradual removal of accommodation is appropriate. Like pilots back in the days of radio beacons, don't chase the needles.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 18, 2018.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 18, 2018Publication referenceOct 18, 201830 days laterNov 17, 2018
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®4.60%Observed 4.85%Observed +25 bps vs. earlier reference4.94%Observed +9 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury3.05%Observed 3.17%Observed +12 bps vs. earlier reference3.08%Observed −9 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 18, 2018 – Jan 18, 2019
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 18, 2018Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.2.50%3.75%5.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 4.52% · Jul 19, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.54% · Jul 26, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.60% · Aug 2, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.59% · Aug 9, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.53% · Aug 16, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.51% · Aug 23, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.52% · Aug 30, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.54% · Sep 6, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.60% · Sep 13, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.65% · Sep 20, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.72% · Sep 27, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.71% · Oct 4, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.90% · Oct 11, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.85% · Oct 18, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.86% · Oct 25, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.83% · Nov 1, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.94% · Nov 8, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.94% · Nov 15, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.81% · Nov 21, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.81% · Nov 29, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.75% · Dec 6, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.63% · Dec 13, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.62% · Dec 20, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.55% · Dec 27, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 4.51% · Jan 3, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 4.45% · Jan 10, 201930-year fixed mortgage: 4.45% · Jan 17, 201910-year Treasury: 2.88% · Jul 18, 201810-year Treasury: 2.84% · Jul 19, 201810-year Treasury: 2.89% · Jul 20, 201810-year Treasury: 2.96% · Jul 23, 201810-year Treasury: 2.95% · Jul 24, 201810-year Treasury: 2.94% · Jul 25, 201810-year Treasury: 2.98% · Jul 26, 201810-year Treasury: 2.96% · Jul 27, 201810-year Treasury: 2.98% · Jul 30, 201810-year Treasury: 2.96% · Jul 31, 201810-year Treasury: 3.00% · Aug 1, 201810-year Treasury: 2.98% · Aug 2, 201810-year Treasury: 2.95% · Aug 3, 201810-year Treasury: 2.94% · Aug 6, 201810-year Treasury: 2.98% · Aug 7, 201810-year Treasury: 2.96% · Aug 8, 201810-year Treasury: 2.93% · Aug 9, 201810-year Treasury: 2.87% · Aug 10, 201810-year Treasury: 2.88% · Aug 13, 201810-year Treasury: 2.89% · Aug 14, 201810-year Treasury: 2.86% · Aug 15, 201810-year Treasury: 2.87% · Aug 16, 201810-year Treasury: 2.87% · Aug 17, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 20, 201810-year Treasury: 2.85% · Aug 21, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 22, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 23, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Aug 24, 201810-year Treasury: 2.85% · Aug 27, 201810-year Treasury: 2.88% · Aug 28, 201810-year Treasury: 2.89% · Aug 29, 201810-year Treasury: 2.86% · Aug 30, 201810-year Treasury: 2.86% · Aug 31, 201810-year Treasury: 2.90% · Sep 4, 201810-year Treasury: 2.90% · Sep 5, 201810-year Treasury: 2.88% · Sep 6, 201810-year Treasury: 2.94% · Sep 7, 201810-year Treasury: 2.94% · Sep 10, 201810-year Treasury: 2.98% · Sep 11, 201810-year Treasury: 2.97% · Sep 12, 201810-year Treasury: 2.97% · Sep 13, 201810-year Treasury: 2.99% · Sep 14, 201810-year Treasury: 2.99% · Sep 17, 201810-year Treasury: 3.05% · Sep 18, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Sep 19, 201810-year Treasury: 3.07% · Sep 20, 201810-year Treasury: 3.07% · Sep 21, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Sep 24, 201810-year Treasury: 3.10% · Sep 25, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Sep 26, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Sep 27, 201810-year Treasury: 3.05% · Sep 28, 201810-year Treasury: 3.09% · Oct 1, 201810-year Treasury: 3.05% · Oct 2, 201810-year Treasury: 3.15% · Oct 3, 201810-year Treasury: 3.19% · Oct 4, 201810-year Treasury: 3.23% · Oct 5, 201810-year Treasury: 3.21% · Oct 9, 201810-year Treasury: 3.22% · Oct 10, 201810-year Treasury: 3.14% · Oct 11, 201810-year Treasury: 3.15% · Oct 12, 201810-year Treasury: 3.16% · Oct 15, 201810-year Treasury: 3.16% · Oct 16, 201810-year Treasury: 3.19% · Oct 17, 201810-year Treasury: 3.17% · Oct 18, 201810-year Treasury: 3.20% · Oct 19, 201810-year Treasury: 3.20% · Oct 22, 201810-year Treasury: 3.17% · Oct 23, 201810-year Treasury: 3.10% · Oct 24, 201810-year Treasury: 3.14% · Oct 25, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Oct 26, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Oct 29, 201810-year Treasury: 3.12% · Oct 30, 201810-year Treasury: 3.15% · Oct 31, 201810-year Treasury: 3.14% · Nov 1, 201810-year Treasury: 3.22% · Nov 2, 201810-year Treasury: 3.20% · Nov 5, 201810-year Treasury: 3.22% · Nov 6, 201810-year Treasury: 3.22% · Nov 7, 201810-year Treasury: 3.24% · Nov 8, 201810-year Treasury: 3.19% · Nov 9, 201810-year Treasury: 3.14% · Nov 13, 201810-year Treasury: 3.12% · Nov 14, 201810-year Treasury: 3.11% · Nov 15, 201810-year Treasury: 3.08% · Nov 16, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 19, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 20, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 21, 201810-year Treasury: 3.05% · Nov 23, 201810-year Treasury: 3.07% · Nov 26, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 27, 201810-year Treasury: 3.06% · Nov 28, 201810-year Treasury: 3.03% · Nov 29, 201810-year Treasury: 3.01% · Nov 30, 201810-year Treasury: 2.98% · Dec 3, 201810-year Treasury: 2.91% · Dec 4, 201810-year Treasury: 2.87% · Dec 6, 201810-year Treasury: 2.85% · Dec 7, 201810-year Treasury: 2.85% · Dec 10, 201810-year Treasury: 2.89% · Dec 11, 201810-year Treasury: 2.91% · Dec 12, 201810-year Treasury: 2.91% · Dec 13, 201810-year Treasury: 2.89% · Dec 14, 201810-year Treasury: 2.86% · Dec 17, 201810-year Treasury: 2.82% · Dec 18, 201810-year Treasury: 2.77% · Dec 19, 201810-year Treasury: 2.79% · Dec 20, 201810-year Treasury: 2.79% · Dec 21, 201810-year Treasury: 2.74% · Dec 24, 201810-year Treasury: 2.81% · Dec 26, 201810-year Treasury: 2.77% · Dec 27, 201810-year Treasury: 2.72% · Dec 28, 201810-year Treasury: 2.69% · Dec 31, 201810-year Treasury: 2.66% · Jan 2, 201910-year Treasury: 2.56% · Jan 3, 201910-year Treasury: 2.67% · Jan 4, 201910-year Treasury: 2.70% · Jan 7, 201910-year Treasury: 2.73% · Jan 8, 201910-year Treasury: 2.74% · Jan 9, 201910-year Treasury: 2.74% · Jan 10, 201910-year Treasury: 2.71% · Jan 11, 201910-year Treasury: 2.71% · Jan 14, 201910-year Treasury: 2.72% · Jan 15, 201910-year Treasury: 2.73% · Jan 16, 201910-year Treasury: 2.75% · Jan 17, 201910-year Treasury: 2.79% · Jan 18, 2019Jul 18, 2018Oct 18, 2018Jan 18, 2019
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury126 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,583.08/month

4.85% · Oct 18, 2018

At the later reference$1,599.48/month

4.94% · Nov 15, 2018

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $16.41 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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