Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Prospects for Emerging Market Economies in a Normalizing Global Economy — Governor Jerome H. Powell

Thank you for inviting me to speak here at the Institute of International Finance Annual Membership meeting. I am pleased to note that there have been signs lately that a sustainable global recovery may finally be materializing. This is…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

THE PRIMARY SOURCE

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you for inviting me to speak here at the Institute of International Finance Annual Membership meeting. I am pleased to note that there have been signs lately that a sustainable global recovery may finally be materializing. This is certainly good news, although significant risks and uncertainties remain. One important question is how the emerging market economies (EMEs) will fare as global monetary conditions normalize. In our intertwined world, prospects for these economies are a significant driver of prospects for the United States and other advanced economies. In my remarks today I will argue that, despite the risks and uncertainties, EMEs are likely to manage that normalization reasonably well.

As many observers have noted, EME economic prospects are strongly linked to the evolution of capital flows.1 Accordingly, I will first review the recent rebound in EME capital inflows and analyze the drivers of this rebound. Against this backdrop, I will then discuss how the prospects for EMEs depend on three factors: Vulnerabilities in the EMEs themselves; the evolution of advanced-economy monetary conditions, including those in the United States; and market responses to that evolution. As always, my comments here represent my own views.

The Rebound in Economic Growth and Capital Flows in Emerging Markets After real GDP growth plummeted in many EMEs during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), economic activity rebounded sharply (slide 1). But that recovery proved to be short lived and was followed by a notable, widespread fall in EME growth as advanced economies remained sluggish, economic imbalances in China mounted, and commodity prices plunged. Lately, however, the streak of weak growth in the EMEs appears to have been broken: The downward trend in Chinese growth has flattened, growth in other EMEs has picked up some, and Brazil seems to be moving into recovery mode. The factors that underlie the pickup in EMEs to a large extent represent a reversal of developments that led to the slowing. The improvement in the performance of the advanced economies has become more widespread. Chinese authorities have bolstered their economy by providing more credit stimulus. And commodity prices have bounced back from their lows in early 2016, bolstering activity and allaying financial stability concerns in commodity-exporting economies. These developments have also contributed to a modest reversal of the slowdown in global trade seen in recent years.2

A rebound in capital flows has come along with the pickup in economic performance in the EMEs. Slide 2 shows net private capital flows to EMEs--the difference between gross private inflows and gross private outflows. These private net inflows are quite volatile, as the experience of the past 10 years shows. Strong pre-GFC net inflows to major emerging markets (the black line)--hovering in the neighborhood of 3 to 4 percent of EME gross domestic product (GDP)--were interrupted by a collapse during the crisis, but inflows quickly recovered and stayed strong through 2010. After that, net inflows trended down for several years and turned negative by 2015. Part of this retrenchment reflected Chinese net inflows turning into net outflows due to what might be considered special circumstances--notably, changes in expectations of Chinese exchange rate policy. But even taking China out of the picture, as shown by the dashed blue line, there was a clear downward trend in net inflows.

Over the past couple of years, however, net inflows have recovered and have averaged, if China is excluded, 0.7 percent of GDP in 2016 and about 1-1/2 percent of GDP in early 2017. As shown in slide 3, other measures of capital flows, such as flows into EME investment funds, show an even sharper rebound.

The recent recovery of investor appetite for EME exposure has shown up in asset prices as well. Emerging-market credit spreads have declined, and equity prices have risen (slide 4). These developments are not occurring in isolation, but in the context of a general improvement in the global outlook and in investor risk sentiment. The improvement in economic fundamentals raises the following question: To what extent can the recent recovery in EME capital flows be explained by these better economic fundamentals?

One way to shed light on this question is to compare the recent behavior of EME capital flows with what we might expect from a model of these flows based on historical data. In a recent study, Federal Reserve staff regressed net private capital inflows into several key EMEs on measures of investment opportunities in these economies, monetary policy variables, and risk sentiment variables.3 As can be seen in slide 5, by comparing the solid and dashed lines, the model does a fairly good job overall of fitting the data.

It is instructive to look at what the model tells us about the slowing of flows between 2010 and 2015. Note that the falloff in commodity prices (the red portion of the bars) was the largest contributor to the slowdown in flows. The decline in economic growth differentials between the EMEs and advanced economies (the yellow portions) was also a major contributor. In fact, growth differentials became a slightly negative contributor in 2015 after being substantially positive in 2010.4 Monetary policies (the blue portions) also became less of a factor in 2015 in driving flows to EMEs.

As for the recent rebound in flows, over the past year the model's predicted net inflows (the dashed line) have actually been significantly above actual net inflows (the solid line), suggesting that there is some room for flows to increase further without raising concerns. The model attributes the recovery of flows primarily to the turnaround in commodity prices and, to a substantially lesser extent, to improvements in risk sentiment (as seen by some waning of the negative contribution from the slashed green bars). The growth differential is not playing a major role because the rise in EME growth has been accompanied by a rise in advanced-economy growth.5

All in all, this evidence suggests that the recent pickup of capital flows to EMEs has not outrun its fundamental determinants, which provides some encouragement that these flows will not reverse themselves and endanger EME prospects, a situation that is also encouraging for U.S. prospects.

Risks to Emerging Market Economy Prospects from the Future Course of Monetary Policy Some observers have noted that the risk of a reversal of EME capital flows may become more pronounced as U.S. and global interest rates return to more normal levels. These developments could encourage capital to return to the advanced economies and, by raising domestic interest rates and putting downward pressures on emerging market currencies, could also enlarge EME debt burdens. In assessing this risk, as I mentioned earlier, three elements are important: first, the vulnerabilities in the EMEs themselves; second, the evolution of advanced-economy monetary policies; and, third, how markets might respond to that evolution. Let me discuss each of these elements in turn.

Emerging Market Economy Vulnerabilities There is clear empirical evidence that the response of EME financial markets to different shocks, including changes in U.S. interest rates, depends importantly on the state of economic fundamentals in the EMEs themselves. For example, Bowman and coauthors document in their study that a deterioration in a country's economic conditions significantly increases its vulnerability to adverse effects from changes in U.S. interest rates.6 A case in point is the so-called taper tantrum in 2013, when rises in sovereign bond spreads were significantly greater in those EMEs with greater relative vulnerabilities.

There is little doubt that over the past couple of decades, EME macroeconomic fundamentals and policy frameworks have improved substantially. One way you can see this improvement is through an index of aggregate EME vulnerability (the black line in slide 6), which is based economic data on a variety of variables from 13 major economies.7 According to this index, EME vulnerabilities today stand well below those in the 1990s--a period during which financial crises in EMEs were much more prevalent.

That said, the vulnerability index has been trending up since 2008. Part of this increase in the vulnerability index can be attributed to a run-up in bank credit to the private sector, which brings me to a key risk for EME prospects: the position of EME corporates. Observers have been expressing concerns about the mounting levels of corporate debt and the risk that a normalization of global conditions could exacerbate debt service burdens of EME corporations--particularly those with elevated levels of dollar-denominated debt--by raising global interest rates, boosting the value of the dollar, and perhaps damping economic activity. Given the prominence of this risk, I will discuss EME corporates in a bit more detail.

Since 2008, the debt of EME nonfinancial corporations has tripled in dollar value, reaching roughly $27 trillion in the first quarter of 2017. As a share of GDP, as shown by the black line in slide 7, it has nearly doubled, to over 100 percent of GDP. China's situation is distinct from many other EMEs. On the one hand, as can be seen by the red line, its corporate debt, at 170 percent of GDP now, is much higher than most other EMEs and substantially above the level we saw in East Asia before the Asian crisis. On the other hand, Chinese corporates are much less exposed to changes in exchange rates and global interest rates.

But the rising amount of debt by itself does not tell us whether this debt is excessive and how vulnerable EME corporates are to global monetary and market shocks. For that assessment we need to drill down deeper into the health of the corporate sector. In a recent study, Beltran and coauthors undertake such an analysis using a common metric of debt service capacity--the interest coverage ratio, or ICR, which is the ratio of earnings to interest expense.8 All else being equal, this ratio is lower for firms that are less profitable, more leveraged, and have a higher cost of borrowing. Using firm-level data, the authors classify the debt of those firms with an ICR of less than 2 as "debt-at-risk."9 They find, as shown by the black line in slide 8, that this measure of risky EME corporate debt has almost tripled since 2011 to about 30 percent of GDP. But this share is still considerably lower than the 46 percent of GDP debt-at-risk in East Asia on the eve of the Asian crisis (the horizontal dashed black line in the chart). For China, though, the debt-at-risk now exceeds what we saw in East Asia before the Asian crisis. Outside of China (the dashed blue line), EME debt-at-risk, at about 10 percent of GDP, seems much more manageable. However, as can be seen by the blue portions of the bars in slide 9, debt-at-risk in a number of EMEs, including South Korea, India, Turkey, and Brazil exceeds that average level.

How will EME corporate debt fare going forward as global normalization proceeds? The results of the study I just discussed imply that a 1 percentage point increase in EME corporate borrowing costs by itself would not be so problematic, at least outside of China.10 What this shock would do to debt-at-risk is shown by the red cross‑hatched portions of the bars in the chart. But it would be a bigger deal if the rise in borrowing costs was accompanied by a more generalized adverse turn of events in EMEs, modeled here as a 20 percent earnings reduction and a 20 percent hit to the value of EME currencies against the dollar. The estimated effects of these additional shocks on debt-at-risk are shown by the slashed red portions of the bars.11 In this case, aggregate EME debt-at-risk rises from about 30 percent of GDP to around the level seen prior to the Asian financial crisis.12 Notably, the increase comes mainly from China, where debt‑at‑risk jumps to about 85 percent of GDP. Outside of China, risky debt also rises substantially but seemingly not to levels that would be considered unmanageable.

Overall, based on this analysis, I would conclude that corporate debt represents a moderate degree of vulnerability for EME prospects. The situation is not alarming, but risks are significant and bear close watching, especially in China.

The Evolution of Federal Reserve Policy What of the evolution of monetary conditions in the advanced economies? I will confine myself here to Fed policy. One factor that favors easier adjustment in EMEs is that U.S. monetary policy normalization has been and should continue to be gradual, as long as the U.S. economy evolves roughly as expected.

Since the start of normalization in December 2015, the federal funds rate has risen to about 1‑1/4 percent from its effective lower bound (slide 10). The median projections of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants (the blue dots) have it rising to 2.9 percent by the end of 2020, fairly close to what is regarded by the median participant as its long-run value and significantly below its average value in the years prior to the GFC. As reflected in the FOMC's recent communications, the shrinkage of the Fed's balance sheet is also expected to proceed quite gradually, with slowly phased-in increases in caps on the monthly reductions in the Federal Reserve's security holdings.

The expectation of gradual policy normalization should reduce the likelihood of outsized movements in interest rates. Indeed, even if we add, say, a 50 basis point term premium to the expected long-run federal funds rate, this value would still leave long-term U.S. interest rates (shown in slide 11) well below their pre-GFC averages. As long as global financial conditions normalize in an orderly fashion, EMEs should have sufficient time to adjust. And, as we saw earlier, interest rate changes of this magnitude should not lead to generalized corporate distress in EMEs, although undoubtedly some corporates are more exposed and could experience difficulties.

Market Response All that said, market movements can be noisy, which brings me to what I believe is the most uncertain element--the potentially volatile behavior of markets even in an environment of relatively contained EME vulnerabilities and of gradual and clearly communicated advanced-economy monetary policies.

So far, markets have behaved in a manner consistent with a relatively benign scenario for EMEs: Risk sentiment is holding up, credit spreads in emerging markets have been declining, equities are up, long-term yields have hardly budged, and the dollar has been declining. Markets, however, can turn on a dime, and reactions can be outsized. This concern may be especially relevant at present, given the low level of volatility and elevated asset prices in global markets, which may increase the likelihood and severity of an adjustment.

Most of the time bouts of market turbulence lead to relatively quick corrections that leave markets more resilient without substantially depressing global growth. The taper tantrum of 2013 that I mentioned earlier is a good example. Ultimately, the policy adjustments made by some of the most affected economies, along with the more realistic appraisal of risks by global investors, likely left the global economy in a somewhat better position than before the episode. That said, however, market tantrums pose complex economic and financial challenges, and such episodes carry a significant risk of snowballing into something bigger that more substantially threatens the economic expansion.

Conclusion To conclude, I have suggested that the most likely outcome is that the challenges posed to EMEs by the normalization of global financial conditions will be manageable.13 So far, capital flows have been moving in line with market fundamentals. Although, EME vulnerabilities have been rising, they are still well below the levels of the crisis-prone years of the 1980s and 1990s. Global monetary conditions are expected to normalize only gradually, as the Federal Reserve and other advanced-economy central banks continue to stress clear communication and transparency. And the reaction of EME financial markets so far has been benign. But significant risks of more adverse scenarios remain. The corporate debt situation in EMEs has been worsening, particularly in China, and market reactions to even small surprises can be unpredictable and outsized.

Even with these risks, however, the best thing the Federal Reserve can do--not just for the United States, but for the global economy at large--is to keep our house in order through the continued pursuit of our dual mandate. Finally, it bears remembering that Fed policy normalization is occurring not in isolation, but in the context of a solid U.S. economic recovery, which should benefit all economies around the world.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Oct 12, 2017.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierSep 12, 2017Publication referenceOct 12, 201730 days laterNov 11, 2017
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.78%Observed 3.91%Observed +13 bps vs. earlier reference3.90%Observed −1 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury2.17%Observed 2.33%Observed +16 bps vs. earlier reference2.40%Observed +7 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jul 12, 2017 – Jan 12, 2018
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Oct 12, 2017Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.2.00%3.25%4.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 4.03% · Jul 13, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.96% · Jul 20, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.92% · Jul 27, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.93% · Aug 3, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.90% · Aug 10, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.89% · Aug 17, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.86% · Aug 24, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.82% · Aug 31, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.78% · Sep 7, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.78% · Sep 14, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.83% · Sep 21, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.83% · Sep 28, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.85% · Oct 5, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.91% · Oct 12, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.88% · Oct 19, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Oct 26, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Nov 2, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.90% · Nov 9, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.95% · Nov 16, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.92% · Nov 22, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.90% · Nov 30, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Dec 7, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.93% · Dec 14, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Dec 21, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.99% · Dec 28, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.95% · Jan 4, 201830-year fixed mortgage: 3.99% · Jan 11, 201810-year Treasury: 2.33% · Jul 12, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Jul 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Jul 14, 201710-year Treasury: 2.31% · Jul 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.27% · Jul 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.27% · Jul 19, 201710-year Treasury: 2.27% · Jul 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.24% · Jul 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.26% · Jul 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Jul 25, 201710-year Treasury: 2.29% · Jul 26, 201710-year Treasury: 2.32% · Jul 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.30% · Jul 28, 201710-year Treasury: 2.30% · Jul 31, 201710-year Treasury: 2.26% · Aug 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.27% · Aug 2, 201710-year Treasury: 2.24% · Aug 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.27% · Aug 4, 201710-year Treasury: 2.26% · Aug 7, 201710-year Treasury: 2.29% · Aug 8, 201710-year Treasury: 2.24% · Aug 9, 201710-year Treasury: 2.20% · Aug 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.19% · Aug 11, 201710-year Treasury: 2.22% · Aug 14, 201710-year Treasury: 2.27% · Aug 15, 201710-year Treasury: 2.23% · Aug 16, 201710-year Treasury: 2.19% · Aug 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.19% · Aug 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.18% · Aug 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.22% · Aug 22, 201710-year Treasury: 2.17% · Aug 23, 201710-year Treasury: 2.19% · Aug 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.17% · Aug 25, 201710-year Treasury: 2.16% · Aug 28, 201710-year Treasury: 2.13% · Aug 29, 201710-year Treasury: 2.15% · Aug 30, 201710-year Treasury: 2.12% · Aug 31, 201710-year Treasury: 2.16% · Sep 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.07% · Sep 5, 201710-year Treasury: 2.10% · Sep 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.05% · Sep 7, 201710-year Treasury: 2.06% · Sep 8, 201710-year Treasury: 2.14% · Sep 11, 201710-year Treasury: 2.17% · Sep 12, 201710-year Treasury: 2.20% · Sep 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.20% · Sep 14, 201710-year Treasury: 2.20% · Sep 15, 201710-year Treasury: 2.23% · Sep 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.24% · Sep 19, 201710-year Treasury: 2.28% · Sep 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.27% · Sep 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.26% · Sep 22, 201710-year Treasury: 2.22% · Sep 25, 201710-year Treasury: 2.24% · Sep 26, 201710-year Treasury: 2.31% · Sep 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.31% · Sep 28, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Sep 29, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Oct 2, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Oct 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Oct 4, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Oct 5, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Oct 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Oct 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Oct 11, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Oct 12, 201710-year Treasury: 2.28% · Oct 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.30% · Oct 16, 201710-year Treasury: 2.30% · Oct 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Oct 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Oct 19, 201710-year Treasury: 2.39% · Oct 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Oct 23, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Oct 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.44% · Oct 25, 201710-year Treasury: 2.46% · Oct 26, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Oct 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Oct 30, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Oct 31, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Nov 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Nov 2, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Nov 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.32% · Nov 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.32% · Nov 7, 201710-year Treasury: 2.32% · Nov 8, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Nov 9, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Nov 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Nov 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Nov 14, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Nov 15, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Nov 16, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Nov 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Nov 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Nov 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.32% · Nov 22, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Nov 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.32% · Nov 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Nov 28, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Nov 29, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Nov 30, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Dec 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Dec 4, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Dec 5, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Dec 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Dec 7, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Dec 8, 201710-year Treasury: 2.39% · Dec 11, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Dec 12, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Dec 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Dec 14, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Dec 15, 201710-year Treasury: 2.39% · Dec 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.46% · Dec 19, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Dec 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.48% · Dec 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.48% · Dec 22, 201710-year Treasury: 2.47% · Dec 26, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Dec 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.43% · Dec 28, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Dec 29, 201710-year Treasury: 2.46% · Jan 2, 201810-year Treasury: 2.44% · Jan 3, 201810-year Treasury: 2.46% · Jan 4, 201810-year Treasury: 2.47% · Jan 5, 201810-year Treasury: 2.49% · Jan 8, 201810-year Treasury: 2.55% · Jan 9, 201810-year Treasury: 2.55% · Jan 10, 201810-year Treasury: 2.54% · Jan 11, 201810-year Treasury: 2.55% · Jan 12, 2018Jul 12, 2017Oct 12, 2017Jan 12, 2018
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury128 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,416.72/month

3.91% · Oct 12, 2017

At the later reference$1,415.00/month

3.90% · Nov 9, 2017

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $1.72 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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