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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Monetary Policy: By Rule, By Committee, or By Both? — Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer

In recent years, reforms in the monetary policy decisionmaking process in central banks have been in the direction of an increasing number of monetary policy committees and fewer single decisionmakers‑‑the lone governor model.1 We are…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

In recent years, reforms in the monetary policy decisionmaking process in central banks have been in the direction of an increasing number of monetary policy committees and fewer single decisionmakers‑‑the lone governor model.1 We are only a few months away from the 20th anniversary of the introduction of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee, just a few years after the 300th birthday of the venerable Old Lady of Threadneedle Street. The Bank of Israel moved from a single policymaker to a monetary policy committee in 2010, while I was governor there; more recently, central banks in India and New Zealand have handed over monetary policy to committees.

The Federal Reserve is not part of this recent shift, however. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has been responsible for monetary policy decisions in the United States since it was established by the Banking Act of 1935, two decades after the founding of the Fed itself.2

The movement toward committees reflects the advantages of committees in aggregating a wide range of information, perspectives, and models. Despite the prevalence and importance of committees in modern central banking, the role of committees in the formulation of policy has not attracted nearly as much academic attention as has the research on monetary policy rules.3

The literature on monetary policy rules stretches back to at least Adam Smith and includes important contributions from David Ricardo, Knut Wicksell, and Milton Friedman.More recently, John Taylor has moved the research agenda forward with his eponymous rule, and a large number of academic papers have been written examining the effectiveness and robustness of policy rules.4 In contrast, as noted, study of the role of committees in making monetary policy has been fairly light, notwithstanding the insightful work of Alan Blinder and others.5

Committees and rules may appear to be in opposition as approaches to policymaking. One might even argue that if a central bank ever converged on a single monetary rule, there would be no need for a monetary policy committee. In practice, the Fed operates through a committee structure and considers the recommendations of a variety of monetary rules as we make monetary policy decisions. Our decision is typically whether to raise or reduce the federal funds rate or to leave it unchanged. Committees can aggregate large amounts of diverse information--not just data, but also anecdotes and impressions that would be hard to quantify numerically. Good committees also offer a variety of perspectives and underlying economic models for interpreting the economy. In contrast, a policy rule, strictly defined, is numerical and constrained to a single perspective on the economy.

Committees and rules each have their advantages. Committees embody a wider range of information and have a capacity for innovation. Rules can simplify central bank communications, a particularly important feature in forward-looking models of the economy. In contrast, the diversity of views that makes a committee work can sometimes pose a communications challenge, as the frequent complaints about the cacophony of messages coming out of the FOMC illustrate.6

In the remainder of my discussion, I would like to elaborate on some of the features of committees that have contributed to their prevalence in monetary policymaking. I will then discuss monetary policy rules and some of the difficulties in developing robust rules for policy.

Why Do Almost All Central Banks Make Their Monetary Policy Decisions in a Committee? Let us turn to central bank decisionmaking. One of the striking facts about the Fed is that it is the third central bank of the United States. Whereas the long-lived central banks of Europe‑‑the Riksbank and the Bank of England‑‑have survived for more than three centuries, the Fed has only recently become a centenarian.

Roger Lowenstein's book America's Bank convinces the reader that it was no easy matter to establish this third central bank. It also establishes for those coming to the issue for the first time that the major issues related to the Fed's structure were political. That is, underlying the disagreements about the establishment of the Federal Reserve was the concern that the central bank not upset the balance of economic power within the U.S. economy. Indeed, it was not until 1935 that the present structure of the FOMC was established, in which the 7 members of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C., who are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, vote along with 5 of the 12 Reserve Bank presidents at any given meeting.7

So, why policy committees? What makes them so special? There are several reasons to prefer decisionmaking by committee: For one thing, each committee member brings to the table his or her own perspective or view of the world, as well as valuable information that others on the committee haven't heard. Moreover, committees are less likely to take extreme positions‑‑discussion, deliberation, and voting tends to drive policy outcomes toward compromise. Committees also tend to be less volatile or activist, imparting an inertia to policymaking that could be desirable‑‑or perhaps undesirable when activism is required.8 Finally, academic studies have shown that a combination of forecasts is more accurate, over time, than a single forecast.9 Putting it all together, committees are, on average, likely to make better monetary policy decisions than individuals‑‑an assertion that has received support from academic experiments in which undergraduate students played a part.

Notwithstanding the shift toward monetary policy committees, each central bank and its institutional structure reflects the politics and culture of the country that it serves (or "countries" in the case of the European Central Bank). The Federal Reserve is no exception, as Lowenstein's book demonstrates. In the years before 1913, the United States suffered through a series of financial crises culminating in the Panic of 1907. That panic convinced many important stakeholders‑‑William Jennings Bryan, the leader of the Populist movement; Paul Warburg, a prominent financier; Nelson Aldrich, a powerful Republican senator; and Carter Glass, the Democratic chair of the House Committee on Banking and Currency‑‑that America needed a central bank. Our unique structure with the Board of Governors in Washington and the 12 Reserve Banks scattered around the country reflected a years-long struggle to balance a variety of competing interests: farmers in the heartlands and financiers on Wall Street; populists and federalists; and creditors and debtors. Our central bank and its policy committee importantly reflect the deal the Fed's founders struck to resolve those competing interests and create an institution representing America's economic and geographic diversity.10

I should add that I find the regional balance created by the membership of the FOMC to be a valuable feature of its structure. In the first round of policymaker discussion at a typical FOMC meeting, most of the presidents of the Reserve Banks start their presentations with a description of economic developments in their Federal Reserve District.11 From these presentations, one understands what a massive and diverse economy the United States is and why the politicians who established the Fed were right to require its decisions to be made by a committee.

Robust Rules for Monetary Policy I turn now to economic models and monetary policy rules. I recently gave a lecture at the University of Warwick entitled "I'd Rather Have Bob Solow Than an Econometric Model, But...," with the punch line quote from Paul Samuelson saved for the end: "I'd rather have Bob Solow than an econometric model, but I would rather have Bob Solow with an econometric model than without one."12 To summarize, the speech discussed the important role that models and policy rules play in FOMC discussions and decisionmaking.

Shortly after the speech, I received an e-mail from an old and esteemed colleague, Professor Athanasios Orphanides, with the subject line "I'd rather have Bob Solow with a model and a rule (following a careful evaluation process)." What does a careful evaluation process entail? I will paraphrase my correspondent at length.13

Professor Orphanides's recommendation is that the FOMC adopt a reference rule, based on a rigorous evaluation and paying particular emphasis to (1) robustness to model uncertainty, (2) robustness to natural rate uncertainty, (3) robustness to expectations formation, (4) robustness to the size of shocks and the effective lower bound, and (5) whatever else the Fed staff has identified as a gap in our knowledge that may matter in evaluation. He suggested that, ultimately, the FOMC could arrive at a simple rule that would serve as a good benchmark to guide policy.

My colleague certainly lays out an impressive work program for the Board's cadre of Ph.D. economists. However, I tend to agree with John Taylor and my Fed colleague John Williams when they write that "the search for better and more robust policy rules is never done."14

My take is that rules are extremely useful reference tools, but they are likely to work best as inputs into a committee decision. Why? Let me reiterate some points I made in Warwick. First, the economy is very complex, and models that attempt to approximate that complexity can sometimes let us down. A particular difficulty is that expectations of the future play a critical role in determining how the economy reacts to a policy change. Moreover, the economy changes over time-‑this means that policymakers need to be able to adapt their models promptly and accurately in real time. And, finally, no one model or policy rule can capture the varied experiences and views brought to policymaking by a committee. All of these factors and more recommend against accepting the prescriptions of any one model, policy rule, or policymaker.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Mar 3, 2017.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierFeb 1, 2017Publication referenceMar 3, 201730 days laterApr 2, 2017
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®4.19%Observed 4.10%Observed −9 bps vs. earlier reference4.14%Observed +4 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury2.48%Observed 2.49%Observed +1 bps vs. earlier reference2.40%Observed −9 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Dec 3, 2016 – Jun 3, 2017
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Mar 3, 2017Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.2.00%3.25%4.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 4.13% · Dec 8, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.16% · Dec 15, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.30% · Dec 22, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.32% · Dec 29, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.20% · Jan 5, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.12% · Jan 12, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.09% · Jan 19, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.19% · Jan 26, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.19% · Feb 2, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.17% · Feb 9, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.15% · Feb 16, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.16% · Feb 23, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.10% · Mar 2, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.21% · Mar 9, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.30% · Mar 16, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.23% · Mar 23, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.14% · Mar 30, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.10% · Apr 6, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.08% · Apr 13, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.97% · Apr 20, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.03% · Apr 27, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.02% · May 4, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.05% · May 11, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.02% · May 18, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.95% · May 25, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Jun 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.39% · Dec 5, 201610-year Treasury: 2.39% · Dec 6, 201610-year Treasury: 2.34% · Dec 7, 201610-year Treasury: 2.40% · Dec 8, 201610-year Treasury: 2.47% · Dec 9, 201610-year Treasury: 2.49% · Dec 12, 201610-year Treasury: 2.48% · Dec 13, 201610-year Treasury: 2.54% · Dec 14, 201610-year Treasury: 2.60% · Dec 15, 201610-year Treasury: 2.60% · Dec 16, 201610-year Treasury: 2.54% · Dec 19, 201610-year Treasury: 2.57% · Dec 20, 201610-year Treasury: 2.55% · Dec 21, 201610-year Treasury: 2.55% · Dec 22, 201610-year Treasury: 2.55% · Dec 23, 201610-year Treasury: 2.57% · Dec 27, 201610-year Treasury: 2.51% · Dec 28, 201610-year Treasury: 2.49% · Dec 29, 201610-year Treasury: 2.45% · Dec 30, 201610-year Treasury: 2.45% · Jan 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.46% · Jan 4, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Jan 5, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Jan 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Jan 9, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Jan 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Jan 11, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Jan 12, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Jan 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Jan 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Jan 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.47% · Jan 19, 201710-year Treasury: 2.48% · Jan 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.41% · Jan 23, 201710-year Treasury: 2.47% · Jan 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.53% · Jan 25, 201710-year Treasury: 2.51% · Jan 26, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Jan 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Jan 30, 201710-year Treasury: 2.45% · Jan 31, 201710-year Treasury: 2.48% · Feb 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.48% · Feb 2, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Feb 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Feb 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Feb 7, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Feb 8, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Feb 9, 201710-year Treasury: 2.41% · Feb 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.43% · Feb 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.47% · Feb 14, 201710-year Treasury: 2.51% · Feb 15, 201710-year Treasury: 2.45% · Feb 16, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Feb 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.43% · Feb 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Feb 22, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Feb 23, 201710-year Treasury: 2.31% · Feb 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Feb 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Feb 28, 201710-year Treasury: 2.46% · Mar 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Mar 2, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Mar 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Mar 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.52% · Mar 7, 201710-year Treasury: 2.57% · Mar 8, 201710-year Treasury: 2.60% · Mar 9, 201710-year Treasury: 2.58% · Mar 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.62% · Mar 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.60% · Mar 14, 201710-year Treasury: 2.51% · Mar 15, 201710-year Treasury: 2.53% · Mar 16, 201710-year Treasury: 2.50% · Mar 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.47% · Mar 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.43% · Mar 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Mar 22, 201710-year Treasury: 2.41% · Mar 23, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Mar 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Mar 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Mar 28, 201710-year Treasury: 2.39% · Mar 29, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Mar 30, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Mar 31, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Apr 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Apr 4, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Apr 5, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Apr 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Apr 7, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Apr 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.32% · Apr 11, 201710-year Treasury: 2.28% · Apr 12, 201710-year Treasury: 2.24% · Apr 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.26% · Apr 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.18% · Apr 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.21% · Apr 19, 201710-year Treasury: 2.24% · Apr 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.24% · Apr 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.28% · Apr 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.35% · Apr 25, 201710-year Treasury: 2.32% · Apr 26, 201710-year Treasury: 2.30% · Apr 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.29% · Apr 28, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · May 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.29% · May 2, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · May 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · May 4, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · May 5, 201710-year Treasury: 2.39% · May 8, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · May 9, 201710-year Treasury: 2.41% · May 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.39% · May 11, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · May 12, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · May 15, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · May 16, 201710-year Treasury: 2.22% · May 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.23% · May 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.23% · May 19, 201710-year Treasury: 2.25% · May 22, 201710-year Treasury: 2.29% · May 23, 201710-year Treasury: 2.26% · May 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.25% · May 25, 201710-year Treasury: 2.25% · May 26, 201710-year Treasury: 2.21% · May 30, 201710-year Treasury: 2.21% · May 31, 201710-year Treasury: 2.21% · Jun 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.15% · Jun 2, 2017Dec 3, 2016Mar 3, 2017Jun 3, 2017
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury124 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,449.60/month

4.10% · Mar 2, 2017

At the later reference$1,456.56/month

4.14% · Mar 30, 2017

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $6.97 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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