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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Recent Economic Developments and Longer-Run Challenges — Governor Jerome H. Powell

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. My plan is to discuss the U.S. economy from three different perspectives. I will start by taking stock of the current expansion--a business cycle point of view. Then I will shift the…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. My plan is to discuss the U.S. economy from three different perspectives. I will start by taking stock of the current expansion--a business cycle point of view. Then I will shift the focus to some of the longer-term challenges we face in coming years. I will conclude with a discussion of monetary policy. As always, the views I express here today are mine alone.

The Current State of the Economy As you know, the Congress has tasked the Federal Reserve with achieving stable prices and maximum employment--the dual mandate. Today, we are not far from achieving those goals.

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has an objective of 2 percent for inflation, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures. The Committee sees this objective as symmetrical, so that minor deviations above or below 2 percent are treated alike.1 Inflation has consistently run below 2 percent since 2011, and is now at 1.2 percent over the past 12 months (figure 1). This headline measure of inflation has recently been held down by falling energy and food prices. We also monitor core inflation, which excludes the volatile energy and food components because they often send a misleading signal about underlying inflation pressures. Core inflation is running at 1.7 percent over the past 12 months. Both measures have gradually moved upward toward 2 percent.

U.S. inflation trended steadily lower after the Volcker disinflation of 1981 to 1982 and has been low and reasonably stable for many years. In fact, for the past several years inflation has run below policy targets in many parts of the world, including here in the United States. Many of us are old enough to remember when the only challenge was to keep inflation low. But too-low inflation can also be a serious problem. Below-target inflation increases the real value of debts owed by households and businesses and reduces the ability of central banks to respond to downturns.

The public's expectations about inflation are thought to be an important driver of actual inflation. Many measures of U.S. inflation expectations--both from surveys and from market-based readings--are still well below their pre-crisis levels, although some have moved up as of late. The only way to ensure that inflation expectations remain safely anchored near the FOMC's target is to keep inflation close to that target on a consistent basis. So, while the current shortfall may seem small, it is important that inflation continue to move up to 2 percent, as I expect it will.

The FOMC does not have a numerical goal for maximum employment because the long-run sustainable level of employment changes over time and is determined mainly by nonmonetary factors that are outside the Fed's control, such as evolving labor market practices, demographics, social change, and fiscal and regulatory policies. Nonetheless, four times each year FOMC participants write down their estimates of the longer-run normal level of the unemployment rate (the natural rate); at the September FOMC meeting the median estimate was 4.8 percent, very close to the current unemployment rate of 4.9 percent.

Other labor market measures are also healthy, including payroll job creation and labor force participation. Employers have been adding roughly 180,000 jobs per month so far this year--a pace a little below that of the past several years but significantly higher than underlying growth in the labor force (figure 2). Despite these strong job gains, the unemployment rate has flattened out this year after several years of sharp declines, thanks to welcome developments in labor force participation (figure 3).

The labor force participation rate represents the percentage of adults aged 16 and over who are in the labor force, which is defined to include only those who are employed or actively looking for work. When people enter or reenter the labor force and begin to search for a job, that is generally a good thing even though at the margin their entry tends to increase the unemployment rate (or prevent it from declining). Beginning in the 1960s, labor force participation rose steadily as women entered the paid workforce (figure 4). That trend ran its course as participation peaked around 2000 and has declined steadily since then as a result of the aging of our population and other longer-run trends, notably the decline in participation by men in the heart of their working-age years. Going forward, many analysts expect labor force participation to decline at a trend rate of roughly 0.3 percent per year as a result of these factors. However, participation fell much more sharply than that after the financial crisis. Some of those who left the labor force went back to school, but others moved onto disability, took early retirement, or just became discouraged and stopped seeking work. The sharp drop raised fears that the crisis might leave behind permanent damage to our labor force. Fortunately, since late 2013, the participation rate has remained about flat and thus has gradually moved back close to its estimated longer-term trend.2 On net, people have been entering and remaining in the labor market as job prospects have brightened, offsetting the natural decline from population aging.

Surveys of households and firms also suggest that we are near full employment (figure 5). For example, respondents are now more likely to say that jobs are plentiful than that they are hard to get--a response that has generally been seen when the economy is near full employment. Job vacancies are running at high levels, and firms report that it is getting harder to find employees to fill open positions. Moreover, wages are now rising faster than inflation, and faster than output per hour. Taken together, labor market indicators show an economy that is on solid footing and close to our mandate of maximum employment.

It is interesting to compare this expansion to past U.S. expansions, and also to recoveries of other countries since the end of the Global Financial Crisis. The picture is a mixed one. The current recovery has been under way since June 2009--nearly seven and a half years. It will soon be the third longest of the 20 recoveries since the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913. GDP, or output, is now 11 percent higher than its pre-crisis peak. Employment is now 6.5 million higher than its pre-crisis peak.

But this expansion has also had the slowest pace of GDP growth of any postwar recovery (figure 6). Given steady but modest growth, we have seen surprisingly large gains in employment and, until this year, a rapid reduction in the unemployment rate. Even though GDP growth has been slow, job gains during this recovery have been stronger than those during the previous expansion--the so-called jobless recovery of the early 2000s. The combination of weak growth and strong hiring in this expansion implies small increases in output per hour, or productivity. In fact, productivity has been increasing at a dismal pace, compared with virtually any period in the postwar era. I will return to productivity and growth in a moment.

More positively, our current recovery compares fairly well with those of other advanced economies (figure 7). Output has increased faster, and unemployment has declined faster, in the United States than in other major advanced economies. And the Fed's challenges in getting inflation back up to 2 percent are similar to, but not as severe as, those faced by some other major monetary authorities.

Turning to the near-term outlook, after a slow patch in the first half of this year, growth has clearly strengthened. I expect that the economy will continue on its path of the last few years, with real GDP growth of about 2 percent, strong job gains, a tightening labor market, and inflation moving up toward our 2 percent objective. The main risks I see to that outlook are from abroad. Growth and inflation are low around the world. With interest rates so low, we are not well positioned to respond to negative shocks, whatever the source.

Longer-Run Challenges Productivity and Growth

Let's turn to longer-run challenges, and start by asking why growth has been so slow, and how fast we are likely to grow going forward. This next slide shows the five-year trailing average annual real GDP growth rate (figure 8). By this measure, growth averaged about 3.2 percent annually through the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. But growth began to decline after 2000 and then nose-dived with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 and the slow expansion that followed. Since the financial crisis ended in 2009, forecasters have gradually reduced their estimates of long-run trend growth from about 3 percent to about 2 percent--a seemingly small difference that would make a huge difference in living standards over time.3

How much of this decline is just a particularly bad business cycle, and how much represents a long-run downshift? To get at that question, let's take a deeper look at the growth slowdown. We can think of economic growth as coming from two sources: more hours worked (labor supply) or higher output per hour (productivity). Hours worked mainly depends on growth in the labor force, which has been slowing since the mid-2000s as the baby-boom generation ages. As you can see, the labor force is now growing at only about 0.5 percent per year (figure 9). Another way to see this is through the sustained increase in the ratio of people over 65 to those who are in their prime working years (figure 10). This long-expected demographic fact has now arrived, and it has challenging implications for our potential growth and also for our fiscal policy.4

The unexpected part of the growth slowdown reflects weak productivity growth rather than lower labor supply. Labor productivity has increased only 1/2 percent per year since 2010--the smallest five-year rate of increase since World War II and about one-fourth of the average postwar rate (figure 11). The slowdown in productivity has been worldwide and is evident even in countries that were little affected by the crisis (figure 12). Given the global nature of the phenomenon, it is unlikely that U.S.-specific factors are mainly responsible.

A portion of the productivity slowdown is undoubtedly due to low levels of investment by businesses. The financial crisis and the Great Recession left firms with excess capacity, reducing incentives to invest. If businesses expect slower growth to continue, that will also hold down investment.

The other important factor is the decline in what economists call total factor productivity, or TFP, which is the part of productivity that is not explained by capital investment or increases in the skills of the labor force. TFP is thought to be mainly a function of technological innovation and efficiency gains.

There is no consensus about the future direction of productivity.5 The pessimists argue that the big paradigm-changing innovations, such as electrification or the advent of computers, are behind us. If that is so, then our standard of living will increase more slowly going forward. The optimists think that this slowdown is only a passing phase and that the age of robots and machine learning will transform our economy in coming decades. Still others argue that we are currently underestimating productivity and output because of the real difficulties we face in measuring GDP in a modern economy. For example, how do we measure the value-added of free digital services like Facebook or Twitter?6

The future is, as always, uncertain. But I would sum up the growth discussion as follows. Growth in the labor force has slowed, and we can estimate it with reasonable confidence to be only about 0.5 percent. Growth in productivity is both more important and much harder to predict. Productivity varies significantly over time, as figure 11 showed. If productivity growth returns to, say, 1.5 percent, then the U.S. economy could grow at about 2.0 percent over the long term. Actual growth may turn out to be weaker or stronger, and the choices we make as a society will have something to say about that.

Why Are Long-Term Interest Rates So Low?

Let's turn to the related question of why long-term interest rates are so extraordinarily low in advanced economies around the world. The yield on our own benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury security has increased lately, but at 2.3 percent it is still far below what was normal before the financial crisis. In fact, this next chart shows that, as growth and inflation have fallen, longer term interest rates have fallen as well over the past 35 years (figure 13).

So why are long-term interest rates so low? Many of you will no doubt be thinking, "They are low because you people at the Fed set them low!" While there is an element of truth there, that is not the whole story. The FOMC has considerable control over short-term interest rates. We have much less influence over long-term rates, which are set in the marketplace. Long-term interest rates represent the price that balances the supply of saving by lenders and demand for funds by borrowers, such as businesses needing to fund their capital expenditures. Lenders expect to receive a real return and to be compensated for inflation and for the risk of nonpayment. Meanwhile, borrowers adjust their demand for funds based on their changing assessment of the risks and expected returns of their investment projects. When desired saving rises or investment demand falls, then long-term interest rates will decline. Today's very low level of long-term rates suggests that both of these factors are at play.

Both expectations of slower growth and the aging of our population are having significant effects on desired saving and investment and are thus important causes of lower interest rates. If the economy is expanding more slowly, then the level of investment needed to meet demand will be lower. The lower path of growth reduces future income prospects of households, and they will tend to raise their saving. The pending retirement of baby boomers means higher saving, because people tend to save the most in the years just before their retirement. In addition, the lower rate of return on capital owing to lower productivity growth will lead to less investment and lower interest rates.

As with productivity, the factors behind the fall in U.S. interest rates include an important global component, as rates are low around the world. Indeed, although our rates are near historical lows, U.S. Treasury rates are among the highest among the major advanced economy sovereigns (figure 14).

Is This the New Normal?

What can we do to prevent low growth, low inflation, and low interest rates from becoming the new normal? We need to focus on ways to increase our long-term growth and spread that prosperity as broadly as possible. I hasten to add that these policies are, for the most part, outside the purview of the Federal Reserve. We need policies that support productivity growth, business hiring and investment, labor force participation, and the development of skills. We need effective fiscal and regulatory policies that inspire public confidence. Increased spending on public infrastructure may raise private-sector productivity over time, particularly with the growth of the stock of public infrastructure near an all-time low.7 Greater support for public and private research and development, and policies that improve product and labor market dynamism may also be fruitful.8 Monetary policy can contribute by supporting a strong and durable expansion in a context of price stability.

Monetary Policy The low interest rate environment presents special challenges for monetary policy. In setting our target for the federal funds rate, a good place to start is to identify the rate that would prevail if the economy were at 2 percent inflation and full employment--the so-called neutral rate. "Neutral" in this context means that the rate is neither contractionary nor expansionary. If the fed funds rate is lower than the neutral rate, then policy is stimulative or accommodative, which will tend to raise growth and inflation. If the fed funds rate is higher than the neutral rate, then policy is tight and will tend to slow growth and reduce inflation.

But we can only estimate the neutral rate, and those estimates are subject to substantial uncertainty. Before the crisis, the long-run neutral rate was generally thought to be roughly stable at around 4.25 percent. Since the crisis, estimates have steadily declined, and the median estimate by FOMC participants stood at 2.9 percent in September. Many analysts believe that the neutral rate is even lower than that today and will only return to its long-run value over time.9 The low level of the neutral interest rate has several important implications. First, today's low rates are not as stimulative as they seem--consider that, despite historically low rates, inflation has run consistently below target and housing construction remains far below pre-crisis levels. Second, with rates so low, central banks are not well positioned to counteract a renewed bout of weakness. Third, persistently low interest rates can raise financial stability concerns. A long period of very low interest rates could lead to excessive risk-taking and, over time, to unsustainably high asset prices and credit growth. These are risks that we monitor carefully. Higher growth would increase the neutral rate and help address these issues.

Turning to the outlook for monetary policy, incoming data show an economy that is growing at a healthy pace, with solid payroll job gains and inflation gradually moving up to 2 percent. In my view, the case for an increase in the federal funds rate has clearly strengthened since our previous meeting earlier this month. Of course, the path of rates will depend on the path of the economy. With inflation below target, relatively slow growth, and some slack remaining in the economy, the Committee has been patient about raising rates. That patience has paid dividends. But moving too slowly could eventually mean that the Committee would have to tighten policy abruptly to avoid overshooting our goals.

Conclusion To wrap up, since the end of the Great Recession in 2009, our economy has recovered slowly but steadily. Today, we are reasonably close to achieving full employment and our 2 percent inflation objective. But we face real challenges over the medium and longer terms. Our aging population will mean slower growth, all else held equal. If living standards are to continue to rise, we need policies that will support productivity and allow our dynamic economy to generate widespread gains in prosperity.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Nov 29, 2016.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierOct 30, 2016Publication referenceNov 29, 201630 days laterDec 29, 2016
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.47%Observed 4.03%Observed +56 bps vs. earlier reference4.32%Observed +29 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.86%Observed 2.30%Observed +44 bps vs. earlier reference2.49%Observed +19 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Aug 29, 2016 – Feb 28, 2017
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Nov 29, 2016Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.1.50%3.00%4.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.46% · Sep 1, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.44% · Sep 8, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.50% · Sep 15, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.48% · Sep 22, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.42% · Sep 29, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.42% · Oct 6, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.47% · Oct 13, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.52% · Oct 20, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.47% · Oct 27, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.54% · Nov 3, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.57% · Nov 10, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Nov 17, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.03% · Nov 23, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.08% · Dec 1, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.13% · Dec 8, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.16% · Dec 15, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.30% · Dec 22, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.32% · Dec 29, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 4.20% · Jan 5, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.12% · Jan 12, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.09% · Jan 19, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.19% · Jan 26, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.19% · Feb 2, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.17% · Feb 9, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.15% · Feb 16, 201730-year fixed mortgage: 4.16% · Feb 23, 201710-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 30, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Aug 31, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Sep 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Sep 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Sep 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.54% · Sep 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.61% · Sep 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.67% · Sep 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.68% · Sep 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Sep 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Sep 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.69% · Sep 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.66% · Sep 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.63% · Sep 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Sep 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Sep 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Sep 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Sep 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Sep 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Sep 30, 201610-year Treasury: 1.63% · Oct 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.69% · Oct 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.72% · Oct 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · Oct 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Oct 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Oct 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · Oct 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.80% · Oct 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · Oct 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.74% · Oct 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Oct 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · Oct 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.86% · Oct 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.84% · Oct 31, 201610-year Treasury: 1.83% · Nov 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.81% · Nov 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.82% · Nov 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Nov 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.83% · Nov 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.88% · Nov 8, 201610-year Treasury: 2.07% · Nov 9, 201610-year Treasury: 2.15% · Nov 10, 201610-year Treasury: 2.23% · Nov 14, 201610-year Treasury: 2.23% · Nov 15, 201610-year Treasury: 2.22% · Nov 16, 201610-year Treasury: 2.29% · Nov 17, 201610-year Treasury: 2.34% · Nov 18, 201610-year Treasury: 2.33% · Nov 21, 201610-year Treasury: 2.31% · Nov 22, 201610-year Treasury: 2.36% · Nov 23, 201610-year Treasury: 2.36% · Nov 25, 201610-year Treasury: 2.32% · Nov 28, 201610-year Treasury: 2.30% · Nov 29, 201610-year Treasury: 2.37% · Nov 30, 201610-year Treasury: 2.45% · Dec 1, 201610-year Treasury: 2.40% · Dec 2, 201610-year Treasury: 2.39% · Dec 5, 201610-year Treasury: 2.39% · Dec 6, 201610-year Treasury: 2.34% · Dec 7, 201610-year Treasury: 2.40% · Dec 8, 201610-year Treasury: 2.47% · Dec 9, 201610-year Treasury: 2.49% · Dec 12, 201610-year Treasury: 2.48% · Dec 13, 201610-year Treasury: 2.54% · Dec 14, 201610-year Treasury: 2.60% · Dec 15, 201610-year Treasury: 2.60% · Dec 16, 201610-year Treasury: 2.54% · Dec 19, 201610-year Treasury: 2.57% · Dec 20, 201610-year Treasury: 2.55% · Dec 21, 201610-year Treasury: 2.55% · Dec 22, 201610-year Treasury: 2.55% · Dec 23, 201610-year Treasury: 2.57% · Dec 27, 201610-year Treasury: 2.51% · Dec 28, 201610-year Treasury: 2.49% · Dec 29, 201610-year Treasury: 2.45% · Dec 30, 201610-year Treasury: 2.45% · Jan 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.46% · Jan 4, 201710-year Treasury: 2.37% · Jan 5, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Jan 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Jan 9, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Jan 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Jan 11, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Jan 12, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Jan 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.33% · Jan 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Jan 18, 201710-year Treasury: 2.47% · Jan 19, 201710-year Treasury: 2.48% · Jan 20, 201710-year Treasury: 2.41% · Jan 23, 201710-year Treasury: 2.47% · Jan 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.53% · Jan 25, 201710-year Treasury: 2.51% · Jan 26, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Jan 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Jan 30, 201710-year Treasury: 2.45% · Jan 31, 201710-year Treasury: 2.48% · Feb 1, 201710-year Treasury: 2.48% · Feb 2, 201710-year Treasury: 2.49% · Feb 3, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Feb 6, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Feb 7, 201710-year Treasury: 2.34% · Feb 8, 201710-year Treasury: 2.40% · Feb 9, 201710-year Treasury: 2.41% · Feb 10, 201710-year Treasury: 2.43% · Feb 13, 201710-year Treasury: 2.47% · Feb 14, 201710-year Treasury: 2.51% · Feb 15, 201710-year Treasury: 2.45% · Feb 16, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Feb 17, 201710-year Treasury: 2.43% · Feb 21, 201710-year Treasury: 2.42% · Feb 22, 201710-year Treasury: 2.38% · Feb 23, 201710-year Treasury: 2.31% · Feb 24, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Feb 27, 201710-year Treasury: 2.36% · Feb 28, 2017Aug 29, 2016Nov 29, 2016Feb 28, 2017
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury124 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,437.44/month

4.03% · Nov 23, 2016

At the later reference$1,488.14/month

4.32% · Dec 29, 2016

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $50.70 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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