Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Remarks on the U.S. Economy — Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer

The Fed's dual mandate aims for maximum sustainable employment and an inflation rate of 2 percent, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Employment has increased impressively over the past six years…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

The Fed's dual mandate aims for maximum sustainable employment and an inflation rate of 2 percent, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Employment has increased impressively over the past six years since its low point in early 2010, and the unemployment rate has hovered near 5 percent since August of last year, close to most estimates of the full-employment rate of unemployment. The economy has done less well in reaching the 2 percent inflation rate. Although total PCE inflation was less than 1 percent over the 12 months ending in June, core PCE inflation, at 1.6 percent, is within hailing distance of 2 percent--and the core consumer price index inflation rate is currently above 2 percent.1

So we are close to our targets. Not only that, the behavior of employment has been remarkably resilient. During the past two years we have been concerned at various stages by the possible negative effects on the U.S. economy of the Greek debt crisis, by the 20 percent appreciation of the trade-weighted dollar, by the Chinese growth slowdown and accompanying exchange rate uncertainties, by the financial market turbulence during the first six weeks of this year, by the dismaying pothole in job growth this May, and by Brexit--among other shocks. Yet, even amid these shocks, the labor market continued to improve: Employment has continued to increase, and the unemployment rate is currently close to most estimates of the natural rate.

During that period, the decline in the price of oil changed from being regarded as a simple reduction in the cost of living of almost all households--and thus an unmitigated blessing--to also being a source of concern, as it was understood that the decline in investment in the production and installation of drilling equipment mitigated the blessing, as did the decline in U.S. oil production.

And there have been other issues of concern to those particularly interested in monetary and macroeconomic policy, though probably of less explicit concern to the public: The decline in estimates of r*--the neutral interest rate that neither boosts nor slows the economy--which is related to the fear that we are facing a prolonged period of secular stagnation; the associated concerns that (a) the short-term interest rate will be constrained by its effective lower bound a greater percentage of time in the future than in the past, and (b) that the U.S. economy could find itself having to contend at some point with negative interest rates--something that the Fed has no plans to introduce; the fear that very low interest rates present a threat to financial stability; and concerns that low rates of real wage growth are increasing inequality in the distribution of income.

Primarily, I believe it is a remarkable, and perhaps underappreciated, achievement that the economy has returned to near-full employment in a relatively short time after the Great Recession, given the historical experience following a financial crisis.2 To be sure, it was a slow and difficult time for many, in part because growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) has been slow by historical standards. As can be seen in table 1, part of the slower output growth was due to smaller increases in aggregate hours worked, primarily reflecting demographic factors such as the aging of the baby-boom generation. But, as shown in table 2, there was also a major decline in the rate of productivity growth--to which I will return shortly.

Turning briefly to recent developments, the pattern of high employment growth and low productivity growth that we have seen in recent years has continued this year. So far in 2016, nonfarm payroll gains have averaged about 185,000 per month--down from last year's pace of 230,000, but still more than enough to represent a continued improvement in labor market conditions. Estimates of monthly job gains needed to keep the unemployment rate steady range widely, from around 75,000 per month to 150,000 per month, depending on what happens to labor force participation among other things.

Output growth has been much less impressive. Over the four quarters ending this spring, real GDP is now estimated to have increased only 1-1/4 percent. This pace likely understates the underlying momentum in aggregate demand, in part because of a sizable inventory correction that began early last year; even so, GDP growth has been mediocre at best.

The combination of strong job gains and mediocre GDP growth has resulted in exceptionally slow labor productivity growth. Most recently, business-sector productivity is reported to have declined for the past three quarters, its worst performance since 1979. Granted, productivity growth is often quite volatile from quarter to quarter, both because of difficulties in measuring output and hours and because other transitory factors may affect productivity. But looking at the past decade, productivity growth has been lackluster by post-World War II standards. Output per hour increased only 1-1/4 percent per year on average from 2006 to 2015, compared with its long-run average of 2-1/2 percent from 1949 to 2005. A 1-1/4 percentage point slowdown in productivity growth is a massive change, one that, if it were to persist, would have wide-ranging consequences for employment, wage growth, and economic policy more broadly. For example, the frustratingly slow pace of real wage gains seen during the recent expansion likely partly reflects the slow growth in productivity.3

Let me highlight a few topics from the growing volume of research on this topic. The first is that the productivity slowdown reflects mismeasurement, because the official statistics have failed to capture new and better products or properly account for changes in prices over time.4 Given how often we meet new technologies in our daily activities, even in classes of products that have been in operation for many years--from driving an automobile, to flying, to medicines and medical equipment, to our communications, and far more--it is easy to persuade ourselves that technological advances play a major part in improving our lives. However, some of these gains are conceptually outside the scope of GDP, and most recent research suggests that mismeasurement of output cannot account for much of the productivity slowdown.5

Another explanation is that business investment has been relatively modest during the current expansion, and so increases in capital per worker have been smaller than in previous decades. Part of the modest pace of investment is likely because the effective labor force that will use this new capital has been expanding much less rapidly than in previous decades, but it is also possible that investment has been restrained by the subdued outlook for growth and profits, thereby generating less demand for expanding productive capacity.6

However the slow growth in capital per worker has been quantitatively less important--accounting for only one-fourth of the slowdown in productivity compared with its long-run average--than the decline in the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP), the portion of productivity that is not accounted for by measurable inputs to production. Indeed, TFP growth has averaged less than 1/2 percent per year in the past 10 years, well below its long-run average of 1-1/4 percent. Pinning down the exact causes of this slowdown is difficult, and there are many possibilities. For instance, it may reflect a slowdown in technological innovations, which may be persistent, as some have argued, or may be a temporary phenomenon, as I am inclined to believe.7

Low-to-middling TFP growth might also reflect the downward trend in business dynamism, as evidenced by a notable slowdown in gross job creation and destruction. Diminished dynamism has been linked to a marked slowdown in the reallocation of labor and capital from low-productivity establishments and firms to high-productivity ones, especially in innovative sectors like high tech.8 Both phenomena are closely related to the declining trend in new business creation.9

Are we doomed to slow productivity growth for the foreseeable future? We don't know.10 On the encouraging side, the technological frontier appears to be advancing rapidly in some sectors, and there are hints that the firm start-up rate is improving.11 On the more discouraging side, investment continues to disappoint--and so the current capital stock is smaller and embodies fewer frontier technologies than might otherwise be the case--and the productivity slowdown is a global phenomenon, suggesting that it may not be easily or quickly remedied.

Let me conclude by mentioning briefly one aspect of the low interest rate and low productivity growth problems--the fact that the Fed has been close to being "the only game in town," as Mohamed El-Erian and others have described it.12 At least one part of the solution can be found in the observation that overall macroeconomic policy does not have to be confined solely to monetary policy. In particular, monetary policy is not well equipped to address long-term issues like the slowdown in productivity growth. Rather, the key to boosting productivity growth, and the long-run potential of the economy, is more likely to be found in effective fiscal and regulatory policies.13 While there is disagreement about what the most effective policies would be, some combination of improved public infrastructure, better education, more encouragement for private investment, and more-effective regulation all likely have a role to play in promoting faster growth of productivity and living standards--and also in reducing the probability that the economy and particularly the central bank will in the future have to contend more than is necessary with the zero lower bound.

12. See Mohamed El-Erian (2016), The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse (New York: Random House).

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Aug 21, 2016.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierJul 22, 2016Publication referenceAug 21, 201630 days laterSep 20, 2016
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.45%Observed 3.43%Observed −2 bps vs. earlier reference3.50%Observed +7 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.57%Observed 1.58%Observed +1 bps vs. earlier reference1.69%Observed +11 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

May 21, 2016 – Nov 21, 2016
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Aug 21, 2016Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.1.00%2.50%4.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.64% · May 26, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Jun 2, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.60% · Jun 9, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.54% · Jun 16, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.56% · Jun 23, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.48% · Jun 30, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.41% · Jul 7, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.42% · Jul 14, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Jul 21, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.48% · Jul 28, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.43% · Aug 4, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Aug 11, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.43% · Aug 18, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.43% · Aug 25, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.46% · Sep 1, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.44% · Sep 8, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.50% · Sep 15, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.48% · Sep 22, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.42% · Sep 29, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.42% · Oct 6, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.47% · Oct 13, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.52% · Oct 20, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.47% · Oct 27, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.54% · Nov 3, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.57% · Nov 10, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.94% · Nov 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.84% · May 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.86% · May 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.87% · May 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.83% · May 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · May 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.84% · May 31, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jun 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jun 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Jun 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Jun 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.72% · Jun 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Jun 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.68% · Jun 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.64% · Jun 10, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Jun 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.67% · Jun 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Jun 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.69% · Jun 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.74% · Jun 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.46% · Jun 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.46% · Jun 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 30, 201610-year Treasury: 1.46% · Jul 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.38% · Jul 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.40% · Jul 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.43% · Jul 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.53% · Jul 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.48% · Jul 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.53% · Jul 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Jul 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Jul 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Jul 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Jul 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jul 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jul 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Jul 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jul 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.52% · Jul 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.52% · Jul 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.46% · Jul 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.51% · Aug 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.51% · Aug 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Aug 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Aug 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.50% · Aug 10, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.51% · Aug 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Aug 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.53% · Aug 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Aug 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Aug 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Aug 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Aug 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 30, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Aug 31, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Sep 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Sep 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Sep 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.54% · Sep 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.61% · Sep 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.67% · Sep 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.68% · Sep 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Sep 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Sep 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.69% · Sep 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.66% · Sep 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.63% · Sep 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Sep 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Sep 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Sep 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Sep 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Sep 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Sep 30, 201610-year Treasury: 1.63% · Oct 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.69% · Oct 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.72% · Oct 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · Oct 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Oct 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Oct 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · Oct 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.80% · Oct 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · Oct 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · Oct 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.74% · Oct 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Oct 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Oct 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · Oct 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.86% · Oct 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.84% · Oct 31, 201610-year Treasury: 1.83% · Nov 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.81% · Nov 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.82% · Nov 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Nov 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.83% · Nov 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.88% · Nov 8, 201610-year Treasury: 2.07% · Nov 9, 201610-year Treasury: 2.15% · Nov 10, 201610-year Treasury: 2.23% · Nov 14, 201610-year Treasury: 2.23% · Nov 15, 201610-year Treasury: 2.22% · Nov 16, 201610-year Treasury: 2.29% · Nov 17, 201610-year Treasury: 2.34% · Nov 18, 201610-year Treasury: 2.33% · Nov 21, 2016May 21, 2016Aug 21, 2016Nov 21, 2016
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations10-year Treasury126 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,335.44/month

3.43% · Aug 18, 2016

At the later reference$1,347.13/month

3.50% · Sep 15, 2016

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $11.70 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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