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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Comments on the Resolution Framework for Banks and Bank Holding Companies in the United States — Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer

I'm grateful to the organizers for inviting me to participate in this conference. I would like briefly to describe the legal frameworks that exist for resolving banking organizations in the United States, the steps that the Federal…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

I'm grateful to the organizers for inviting me to participate in this conference. I would like briefly to describe the legal frameworks that exist for resolving banking organizations in the United States, the steps that the Federal Reserve and other U.S. regulators have taken to make global systemically important banking organizations (GSIBs) in the United States more resolvable, and a few of the criticisms of U.S. regulatory actions in this area, together with my responses to them.1

U.S. law provides several legal frameworks for resolving failed financial firms. In the United States, a failed depository institution is resolved by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) using a framework created by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The FDIC has acted as receiver for several thousand failed banks since 1934, including 465 from 2008 through 2012. Most of these failed banks were relatively small community banks, and all were considerably smaller than the most systemically important firms active today.2

While the Federal Deposit Insurance Act creates a special resolution framework for failed banks, a failed U.S. bank holding company--that is, a corporate entity that controls one or more banks--would generally be resolved under the same provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as would apply to other corporate debtors, such as industrial firms, in a proceeding overseen by a federal judge. During the recent crisis, fears about the systemic consequences that would follow from the bankruptcies of systemically important financial firms motivated extraordinary government actions to prevent such firms from failing. Unfortunately, the fears proved well founded: The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings--the largest bankruptcy filing in American history--significantly exacerbated the crisis.3

To increase the viability of the Bankruptcy Code as a framework for resolving failed financial firms without major systemic consequences, section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) requires large banking organizations to produce resolution plans, also known as living wills, demonstrating how they could be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code in an orderly fashion in the event of failure.

Although the Bankruptcy Code provides the default legal framework for the resolution of a failed bank holding company, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a backup resolution framework, called the orderly liquidation authority, to be used if the resolution of a failed financial company under the Bankruptcy Code would have serious adverse effects on U.S. financial stability. If that criterion and several others are met, Title II allows the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint the FDIC as receiver for the failed financial company as an alternative to a bankruptcy resolution overseen by a judge. The orderly liquidation authority has several features that could reduce the systemic effect of a financial company's failure relative to a bankruptcy resolution, including an orderly liquidation fund to provide government liquidity support for the failed firm and provisions to prevent the unwinding of the failed firm's derivatives and other qualified financial contracts while they are transferred to a solvent firm.

The Federal Reserve Board has recently proposed important new rules to increase the prospects for the orderly resolution of a GSIB with minimal effect on financial stability. Last October, the Board proposed a rule to subject the eight U.S. GSIBs to total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) and long-term debt requirements, building on the international TLAC standard established by the Financial Stability Board.4 The proposal would require these systemically important firms to maintain outstanding a large quantity of long-term debt that could be used to absorb losses and recapitalize the firm in an orderly resolution under either the Bankruptcy Code or the orderly liquidation authority.5

The proposal would also apply internal TLAC and long-term debt requirements to the U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign GSIBs in order to facilitate the recapitalization of a failed foreign GSIB's U.S. operations. Finally, the proposal would restrict the operations of GSIB holding companies (as distinct from their operating subsidiaries) so that those legal entities could go through a resolution proceeding without setting off short-term wholesale funding runs or otherwise jeopardizing financial stability.

In May of this year, the Board issued another proposal to make GSIBs more resolvable. This second proposed rule would impose restrictions on GSIBs' qualified financial contracts--including derivatives and repo agreements--to guard against the mass unwinding of those contracts during the resolution of a GSIB.6 The proposed restrictions are a key step toward GSIB resolvability because the rapid unwinding of a GSIB's qualified financial contracts could destabilize the financial system by causing asset fire sales and toppling other firms.

Acting in conjunction with the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board has also sought to increase GSIB resolvability through its review of the firms' living wills. In April this year, the Board and the FDIC announced the results of their review of the eight U.S. GSIBs' 2015 resolution plans, which evaluated the plans based on the firms' capital, liquidity, governance mechanisms, operational capabilities, legal entity rationalization, derivatives and trading activities, and responsiveness to prior agency feedback.7

The agencies found that five of the GSIBs' plans fell short of the Dodd-Frank Act's standard and required those firms to fix the deficiencies in their plans by October of this year or potentially face more stringent prudential requirements. The agencies also identified less-severe shortcomings in the plans of all eight GSIBs, which the GSIBs are expected to address in their next round of resolution plan submissions, due in July 2017. The deficiencies and shortcomings identified by the agencies touched on most of the categories I have just listed, especially liquidity, governance mechanisms, operational capabilities, and legal entity rationalization.

I want to end by briefly addressing several criticisms that have been made of the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation authority and the Board's TLAC proposal. One criticism is that there is no need for the backup orderly liquidation authority because the Bankruptcy Code provides an adequate framework for the resolution of any financial company. As Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act recognizes, however, the Bankruptcy Code may not be adequate to minimize the systemic impact of the resolution of a systemically important financial firm. The Bankruptcy Code does not direct the judge to take financial stability into account in making decisions, and it does not provide other important stabilizing features of the orderly liquidation authority, such as government liquidity support and stay-and-transfer treatment for qualified financial contracts.

A related line of criticism holds that the orderly liquidation authority enshrines "too big to fail" and provides for taxpayer bailouts of systemically important firms through the orderly liquidation fund. However, under the Board's proposed TLAC rule, a failed GSIB would be recapitalized by its private-sector long-term creditors (whose debt claims would be converted into equity), not by the government. The orderly liquidation fund would be used only to provide liquidity support, not to inject capital, and in the unlikely event that the fund does incur losses, the Dodd-Frank Act provides that these losses would be covered by assessments on major financial companies and would not be passed on to taxpayers. I also note that credit rating agencies have recognized public-sector efforts to end the too-big-to-fail phenomenon. The rating agencies no longer assume that the U.S. government will take extraordinary actions to prevent the failure of systemically important U.S. financial firms.

Finally, one criticism that has been leveled at our TLAC proposal is that imposing long-term debt requirements on GSIBs will lead those firms to increase their leverage and thereby raise their probability of failure, and that they should instead be required to hold higher levels of equity capital. I agree that equity capital plays a key role in preventing financial firm failures, and we have raised equity capital requirements for banking organizations--especially GSIBs--substantially since the crisis. But to protect financial stability, we must reduce not only the probability that a GSIB will fail, but also the damage that its failure could do if it were to occur. At the point of failure, a banking firm's equity capital is likely to be zero or negative, so to improve GSIB resolvability, our proposal requires GSIBs to have a thick tranche of gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity to ensure that resolution authorities will have the necessary raw material to manufacture fresh equity and recapitalize and stabilize the firm.8 That is the role played by the proposal's long-term debt requirements. And we expect that firms would generally come into compliance with the proposed requirements by replacing existing ineligible liabilities with eligible long-term debt rather than by increasing their leverage. At any rate, even if a firm were to come into compliance in part by increasing the size of its balance sheet, it would remain subject to our robust equity capital requirements and leverage limits, which are designed to ensure a very low probability of failure. Finally, the existence of a thick tranche of loss-absorbing long‑term debt should reduce a GSIB's probability of failure by reducing its short-term creditors' incentives to run at the first sign of distress.

In short, we and other U.S. regulators are working hard to address the too-big-to-fail problem by improving the prospects for the orderly resolution of a GSIB in the United States. The Dodd-Frank Act gave us tools to reduce the probability of failure of our largest and most complex banking firms and to significantly reduce the damage that the failure of such a firm would do to the U.S. financial system and the broader economy. We have made a lot of progress toward accomplishing these goals, leaving the U.S. banking system fundamentally safer and stronger, and our work in this area will continue.

Thank you.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Jun 22, 2016.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierMay 23, 2016Publication referenceJun 22, 201630 days laterJul 22, 2016
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.58%Observed 3.54%Observed −4 bps vs. earlier reference3.45%Observed −9 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the Treasury1.84%Observed 1.69%Observed −15 bps vs. earlier reference1.57%Observed −12 bps vs. publication reference

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Mar 22, 2016 – Sep 22, 2016
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Jun 22, 2016Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.1.00%2.50%4.00%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.71% · Mar 24, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.71% · Mar 31, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.59% · Apr 7, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.58% · Apr 14, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.59% · Apr 21, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Apr 28, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.61% · May 5, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.57% · May 12, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.58% · May 19, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.64% · May 26, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Jun 2, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.60% · Jun 9, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.54% · Jun 16, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.56% · Jun 23, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.48% · Jun 30, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.41% · Jul 7, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.42% · Jul 14, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Jul 21, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.48% · Jul 28, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.43% · Aug 4, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.45% · Aug 11, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.43% · Aug 18, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.43% · Aug 25, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.46% · Sep 1, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.44% · Sep 8, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.50% · Sep 15, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.48% · Sep 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.94% · Mar 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.88% · Mar 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.91% · Mar 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.89% · Mar 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.81% · Mar 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.83% · Mar 30, 201610-year Treasury: 1.78% · Mar 31, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Apr 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.78% · Apr 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Apr 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · Apr 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Apr 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.72% · Apr 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Apr 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Apr 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · Apr 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.80% · Apr 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · Apr 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.78% · Apr 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · Apr 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · Apr 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.88% · Apr 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.89% · Apr 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.91% · Apr 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.94% · Apr 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.87% · Apr 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.84% · Apr 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.83% · Apr 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.88% · May 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.81% · May 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · May 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · May 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.79% · May 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · May 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.77% · May 10, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · May 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · May 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · May 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · May 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · May 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.87% · May 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · May 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · May 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.84% · May 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.86% · May 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.87% · May 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.83% · May 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · May 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.84% · May 31, 201610-year Treasury: 1.85% · Jun 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.81% · Jun 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Jun 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Jun 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.72% · Jun 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Jun 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.68% · Jun 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.64% · Jun 10, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Jun 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Jun 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.67% · Jun 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Jun 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.69% · Jun 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.74% · Jun 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jun 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.46% · Jun 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.46% · Jun 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.50% · Jun 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.49% · Jun 30, 201610-year Treasury: 1.46% · Jul 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.38% · Jul 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.40% · Jul 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.37% · Jul 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.43% · Jul 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.53% · Jul 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.48% · Jul 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.53% · Jul 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Jul 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Jul 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Jul 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Jul 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jul 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jul 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Jul 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Jul 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.52% · Jul 27, 201610-year Treasury: 1.52% · Jul 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.46% · Jul 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.51% · Aug 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.51% · Aug 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Aug 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.59% · Aug 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.50% · Aug 10, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.51% · Aug 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Aug 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.53% · Aug 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Aug 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 22, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Aug 23, 201610-year Treasury: 1.56% · Aug 24, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Aug 25, 201610-year Treasury: 1.62% · Aug 26, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Aug 30, 201610-year Treasury: 1.58% · Aug 31, 201610-year Treasury: 1.57% · Sep 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.60% · Sep 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.55% · Sep 6, 201610-year Treasury: 1.54% · Sep 7, 201610-year Treasury: 1.61% · Sep 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.67% · Sep 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.68% · Sep 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.73% · Sep 13, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 14, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Sep 15, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.70% · Sep 19, 201610-year Treasury: 1.69% · Sep 20, 201610-year Treasury: 1.66% · Sep 21, 201610-year Treasury: 1.63% · Sep 22, 2016Mar 22, 2016Jun 22, 2016Sep 22, 2016
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury129 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,353.84/month

3.54% · Jun 16, 2016

At the later reference$1,338.77/month

3.45% · Jul 21, 2016

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $15.07 lower per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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