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Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Opening Remarks — Governor Jerome H. Powell

It's been a month since the New York Fed hosted a very successful conference on Treasury market structure, and I'm eager to continue the conversation started there. I thought I'd start by discussing some of the main points I took from…

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

It's been a month since the New York Fed hosted a very successful conference on Treasury market structure, and I'm eager to continue the conversation started there. I thought I'd start by discussing some of the main points I took from the conference. There were certainly different points of view on a variety of issues between broker dealers, proprietary trading firms (PTFs), end users and others, but hearing a range of views was exactly the dynamic we were hoping for.

There was broad understanding that electronic and automated trading are here to stay. Indeed, a wide range of firms are engaged in these trading practices today. Participants on the PTF panel viewed their relative speed and efficiency as allowing them to provide tighter spreads and greater liquidity. One expressed the belief that his firm needed to be faster and more sophisticated because, unlike broker-dealers, they have no direct view of customer order flows. For their part, dealers noted that they provide a key service in helping their customers execute larger trades, and defended their internal matching of customer trades as a natural search for trading efficiencies.

There were differing views on the significance of what happened in Treasury markets on October 15, 2014. Many attendees voiced concern, but a number also expressed the view that the market worked as it was supposed to, and even that nothing extraordinary occurred that day. Although buy-side participants tended to believe that they were not directly affected given the short duration of the price swings that day, some noted that more frequent episodes of high volatility could lead them to demand larger risk premiums.

For my part, I do realize that a single 12-minute roundtrip episode may not mean that much in the end. But it isn't satisfying to me to say that the market worked as it was intended to. The events of October 15 were unusual both in the size and speed of the moves and in the absence of a fundamental driver. The real question is whether there are dynamics at play here that are likely to produce more episodes of sudden, outsized volatility without any obvious cause. Further episodes of this nature could cause more market participants to react in ways that reduce liquidity, and add to pressures for changes in market structure.

There were also areas of consensus. First, there was a general desire for more publicly available market data, particularly in the dealer-to-customer segment. It is striking that there is so little information on trading in this segment of our nation's Treasury market. The staff who worked on the October 15 report did a great job, but it took a mammoth effort on their part to gather detailed trade data for just that single day. As Antonio Weiss will discuss today, the agencies involved in the Joint Staff Report on October 15 are assessing the adequacy of publicly available information, and of the data available to the official sector for its own monitoring of these markets.1

A number of participants also expressed interest in continuing to try out a range of potential innovations to current market structures. Presenters at the academic sessions of the conference argued that the combination of a central limit order book and high speed trading can lead to higher liquidity risk and a race for speed. In the current structure, customer trades occur mainly off of public markets, except at times of market stress when dealers may be unable or unwilling to internalize them. That approach does not seem likely to provide good, stable liquidity in changing market conditions. One presenter at the conference outlined his idea that high frequency "batch auctions"--auctions held every millisecond or so rather than trading continuously--would increase market liquidity and limit the race for speed. There are several related ideas that have been proposed. In fact, trading platforms have already tried various innovations. For example, EBS has instituted latency floors and random batching lengths for messaging in its FX trading platform. I hope we will hear more about that today.

There may be other adaptations to the current market structure that could provide greater or more stable liquidity. A good way to find out if there are better solutions would be to try some of these ideas, at least on a small scale. Regulators are not necessarily well placed to dictate specific trading structures. I'd much rather see changes emerge from a process of experimentation and seeing what works. We should have strong evidence that any change in structure represents an improvement before implementing it on a wide scale.

But we will only be able to evaluate structural innovations if traders actually use them. And the market would need to include both dealers and PTFs. I'd be interested in hearing the panelists' views on this and whether there are things that regulators could do to encourage a cooperative, industry-wide approach.

Treasury repo markets are also undergoing structural changes, which brings me to the third area of consensus at the conference. The repo panel I moderated included an asset manager, a broker dealer and one of the triparty clearing banks. There was agreement on the panel that expanded repo clearing would be positive for the market. That said, there was also a consensus that the current private sector initiatives in this area face demanding regulatory requirements related to capital and liquidity. We are carefully considering these proposals and are open to solutions that would satisfy regulatory requirements while bringing the benefits of central clearing. I'd welcome panelists' views on proposals for expanded repo clearing as well.

I look forward to the conversations today, and I hope we'll keep having them. Treasury markets are important to all of us. The financial market participants represented here have special reasons to care. As one of the panelists at the conference put it, we've built our entire prudential regulatory framework, indeed our entire financial framework, around the ability to quickly and efficiently transform Treasury securities in to cash liquidity. These markets need to keep functioning at a high level, and we all have a stake in making sure that they do.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Nov 20, 2015.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierOct 21, 2015Publication referenceNov 20, 201530 days laterDec 20, 2015
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.82%Observed 3.97%Observed +15 bps vs. earlier reference3.97%Observed Unchanged vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the TreasuryUnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Aug 20, 2015 – Feb 20, 2016
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Nov 20, 2015Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.1.50%3.00%4.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.93% · Aug 20, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.84% · Aug 27, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.89% · Sep 3, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.90% · Sep 10, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.91% · Sep 17, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.86% · Sep 24, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.85% · Oct 1, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.76% · Oct 8, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.82% · Oct 15, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.79% · Oct 22, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.76% · Oct 29, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.87% · Nov 5, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.98% · Nov 12, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.97% · Nov 19, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.95% · Nov 25, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.93% · Dec 3, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.95% · Dec 10, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.97% · Dec 17, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.96% · Dec 24, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 4.01% · Dec 31, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.97% · Jan 7, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.92% · Jan 14, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.81% · Jan 21, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.79% · Jan 28, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.72% · Feb 4, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Feb 11, 201630-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Feb 18, 201610-year Treasury: 2.24% · Jan 4, 201610-year Treasury: 2.25% · Jan 5, 201610-year Treasury: 2.18% · Jan 6, 201610-year Treasury: 2.16% · Jan 7, 201610-year Treasury: 2.13% · Jan 8, 201610-year Treasury: 2.17% · Jan 11, 201610-year Treasury: 2.12% · Jan 12, 201610-year Treasury: 2.08% · Jan 13, 201610-year Treasury: 2.10% · Jan 14, 201610-year Treasury: 2.03% · Jan 15, 201610-year Treasury: 2.06% · Jan 19, 201610-year Treasury: 2.01% · Jan 20, 201610-year Treasury: 2.02% · Jan 21, 201610-year Treasury: 2.07% · Jan 22, 201610-year Treasury: 2.03% · Jan 25, 201610-year Treasury: 2.01% · Jan 26, 201610-year Treasury: 2.02% · Jan 27, 201610-year Treasury: 2.00% · Jan 28, 201610-year Treasury: 1.94% · Jan 29, 201610-year Treasury: 1.97% · Feb 1, 201610-year Treasury: 1.87% · Feb 2, 201610-year Treasury: 1.88% · Feb 3, 201610-year Treasury: 1.87% · Feb 4, 201610-year Treasury: 1.86% · Feb 5, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · Feb 8, 201610-year Treasury: 1.74% · Feb 9, 201610-year Treasury: 1.71% · Feb 10, 201610-year Treasury: 1.63% · Feb 11, 201610-year Treasury: 1.74% · Feb 12, 201610-year Treasury: 1.78% · Feb 16, 201610-year Treasury: 1.81% · Feb 17, 201610-year Treasury: 1.75% · Feb 18, 201610-year Treasury: 1.76% · Feb 19, 2016Aug 20, 2015Nov 20, 2015Feb 20, 2016
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations10-year Treasury33 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,427.06/month

3.97% · Nov 19, 2015

At the later reference$1,427.06/month

3.97% · Dec 17, 2015

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is unchanged. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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