Saturday, November 21, 2026Mortgage news · Rates & market context

Federal Reserve · ORIGINAL SOURCE COMMUNICATION

Remarks on Monetary Policy — Governor Jerome H. Powell

Thanks for the opportunity to speak to you today. In these brief remarks, I will discuss the progress of the economy and the path forward for monetary policy.1 The current expansion is almost six years old and is now one of the longest…

Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →

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Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.

Thanks for the opportunity to speak to you today. In these brief remarks, I will discuss the progress of the economy and the path forward for monetary policy.1 The current expansion is almost six years old and is now one of the longest since World War II. While the pace of improvement has at times been frustratingly slow, by some measures the recovery is now well advanced. By other measures, there is still room for improvement. Assessing the scope for further improvement will be important in judging the appropriate path for monetary policy.

After its most recent meeting in March, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) modified its forward guidance to say that an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate when the Committee has seen further improvement in the labor market and is reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2 percent objective over the medium term. Such an increase could come as soon as the June FOMC meeting. The timing of liftoff and the pace of subsequent rate increases will depend on incoming data and on realized and expected progress toward our congressionally mandated goals of stable prices and maximum employment. Monetary policy works with long and variable lags, so rate increases need to begin well before we reach those goals.

Let us turn to the two main economic conditions for liftoff that the Committee articulated. We have already seen a great deal of progress in the labor market, and I expect that progress to continue. Despite slowing in March, job creation has been particularly strong over the past two years. The unemployment rate has declined from 10 percent in October 2009 to 5.5 percent in March 2015, a level that is not far above many estimates of its natural rate. But the unemployment rate probably understates the amount of slack still remaining in the labor market. The labor force participation rate continues to be unusually low, suggesting that potential workers may be waiting on the sidelines for further improvements in job opportunities and wages. The number working part time who want full-time jobs also remains elevated. The low level of wage increases also suggests additional slack.

The Committee said that it will want to be reasonably confident that inflation will move back to 2 percent over the medium term. On a 12-month basis, headline inflation in February, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures price index, stood at 0.3 percent; meanwhile, core inflation, which excludes volatile energy and food components, was 1.4 percent. These low current readings are partly a consequence of two transient shocks--the dramatic decline in oil prices and the effect of the appreciation of the dollar on import prices. Before those shocks, both headline inflation and core inflation were running at about 1.5 percent. When the effects of these shocks pass, I expect that inflation will return roughly to those earlier levels and then rise gradually to our 2 percent objective over the medium term as labor and product markets tighten further. Despite the current low inflation readings, survey-based measures of inflation expectations in the United States have been stable. However, market-based readings on inflation compensation have declined significantly since mid-2014. I view this decline as more likely reflecting movements in risk premiums and other transitory factors, rather than shifts in longer-term inflation expectations. Still, it will be important to keep an eye on the performance of inflation breakevens.

I expect that economic conditions will support the first rate increase later this year. I do not expect that such an increase or the associated market reaction will materially restrain the progress of the economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, the precise timing of liftoff is less important than the path of subsequent additional rate increases. My view is that, if the economy continues on its expected path, it will be appropriate for a time to increase rates fairly gradually. Of course, if the economy improves faster or inflation increases more than expected, it will be appropriate to raise rates faster. And if economic performance disappoints or inflation remains lower than expected, it will be appropriate to delay liftoff or raise rates more slowly thereafter.

There are several reasons why it may be appropriate to raise rates somewhat gradually, including the proximity of the zero lower bound for interest rates and continuing economic headwinds in the wake of the crisis.2 I would like to explore a rationale that has received somewhat less attention, which is the unusually high level of uncertainty today about capacity measures such as the natural rate of unemployment.3 Uncertainty about the precise level of these indicators becomes more important for policy as the expansion continues and the economy approaches its potential, defined as the level of output that is consistent with stable prices.

All else equal, a decision to return interest rates to more-normal levels implies that the economy is nearing its capacity. The financial crisis did significant damage to the productive capacity of our economy, and the damage was of a character, extent, and duration that cannot be fully known today. Given this uncertainty, it is even more difficult than usual to assess how much slack remains. It seems plausible that at least part of this supply-side damage could be reversed if the economy enjoys a period of sustained growth.4 To encourage that outcome, as monetary policymakers consider removing accommodation, we should look for a little more proof than usual that labor markets are tightening or other supply-side constraints are binding. Of course, if the effects of the crisis prove difficult to reverse and, as a result, inflation pressures do emerge, the Federal Reserve will use its tools to contain them.

Let us take a brief look at the implications of severe financial crises for economies generally. Studies document that severe financial crises around the world have typically left behind large and sustained reductions in the level of output.5 The recent crisis is no exception, and figure 1 shows such an effect for the U.S., U.K., euro-area and Canadian economies since 2008. The underlying pattern is an interesting one. Economists and policymakers have tended at first to view a decline in output as a cyclical shock to demand and to realize only gradually over time that a crisis has done substantial and lasting damage to the productive capacity of the economy.6 As a result, estimates of the gap between actual and potential output often narrow over time, partly through higher actual output but also through lower estimates of potential. For example, figure 2 shows that the Congressional Budget Office has made a series of downward revisions to its estimates of potential output in recent years.7

This supply-side damage has typically appeared both in the labor market and in the capital stock.8 Long spells of unemployment cause skills to atrophy and make it more difficult for workers to find new jobs, raising the natural rate of unemployment for those who do remain in the labor force and causing others to throw in the towel and drop out. Extended periods of weak demand appear to cause companies to invest less in plant and technology, which slows the growth of the productivity of the workforce. The number of new business formations declines sharply, perhaps because of reduced credit availability, which may depress hiring, productivity, business innovation, and hence trend output.9 Corporate spending on research and development has also been strongly procyclical, which may have similar effects.10

Turning to the recent U.S. experience, many economists now estimate that substantially more than half of the shortfall in gross domestic product relative to its pre-crisis trend represents a reduction of potential output and not just a shortfall in demand.11 U.S. labor force damage likely accounts for some part of the shortfall.12 The greater part appears to have resulted from lower trend labor productivity due to reduced capital investment and "multifactor productivity," which is often thought of as capturing the effects of technological innovation.13 The employment rebound suggests that strong measures--such as those the Fed took during and after the crisis--can prevent even sharp job losses from becoming permanent. But the productivity slowdown suggests that monetary policy cannot, by itself, avert all of the damage.

This consideration raises the question I mentioned a moment ago. Should we think of this supply-side damage as permanent or temporary? In many previous episodes around the world, post-crisis reductions in output have proved permanent. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that at least part of the damage can be reversed. As business confidence improves, employers may be more willing to take a chance on someone with an extended spell of unemployment. A stronger job market and rising wages may encourage more potential workers to join the labor force.14 Over a longer period, stronger demand can produce higher capital investment, driving higher productivity. A long expansion could also produce higher productivity as companies strive to get more out of every dollar of capital and hour of work and as the strong economy encourages entrepreneurship and innovation.

To give us the best chance to recover lost ground, we need policies that support labor force participation, business and household confidence, hiring and investment, and productivity growth--policies, I hasten to add, that are, for the most part, outside the remit of the Federal Reserve. Monetary policy also has a role to play by continuing to support the expansion as long as inflation expectations remain stable and realized inflation stays close to our 2 percent objective. Indeed, in the current circumstances, accommodative policy may not only help restore some of our economy's potential, but should also help return inflation to our 2 percent objective more expeditiously.

There is no risk-free path for monetary policy. The biggest risk of tightening too early or too fast is that the economy may weaken more than expected, forcing the central bank to reverse course. The record of central banks lifting off from the zero lower bound suggests caution in this regard. A second risk is that we could prematurely truncate the process of healing damage from the crisis, thereby ensuring that the admittedly severe cyclical effects become permanent.

Overly accommodative monetary policy also poses risks. First, the economy could overheat, and rising inflation could require the Committee to raise rates faster, which--if overdone--could produce a damaging recession. For now, I would be more concerned with a second risk, which is that more-accommodative policy could lead to frothy financial conditions and eventually undermine financial stability. While I do not see a troubling buildup of these risks today, tighter monetary policy might eventually be necessary if such risks do appear.

Conclusion To wrap up, with the support of extraordinary monetary accommodation, our economy has made substantial progress. As the FOMC moves to return monetary policy to a more normal footing, it makes sense to me to move fairly gradually as long as the incoming data evolve about as expected. Doing so would, among other benefits, give our economy the best chance to make up lost ground.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Originally published Apr 8, 2015.

Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.

MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context

The mortgage market around this release

This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.

Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing

The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.

Nearest published observation on or before each target date
Benchmark30 days earlierMar 9, 2015Publication referenceApr 8, 201530 days laterMay 8, 2015
30-year fixed mortgageNational weekly averageFreddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®3.75%Observed 3.70%Observed −5 bps vs. earlier reference3.80%Observed +10 bps vs. publication reference
10-year TreasuryDaily par yieldU.S. Department of the TreasuryUnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.

Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.

Six months around publication

Jan 8, 2015 – Jul 8, 2015
Historical mortgage and Treasury observations around Apr 8, 2015Each dot is a published observation. No missing values are estimated. The dashed vertical line marks the article’s publication calendar date. Rates and yields are percentages.3.50%4.00%4.50%Publication date30-year fixed mortgage: 3.73% · Jan 8, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Jan 15, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.63% · Jan 22, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Jan 29, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.59% · Feb 5, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.69% · Feb 12, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.76% · Feb 19, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.80% · Feb 26, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.75% · Mar 5, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.86% · Mar 12, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.78% · Mar 19, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.69% · Mar 26, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.70% · Apr 2, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.66% · Apr 9, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.67% · Apr 16, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.65% · Apr 23, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.68% · Apr 30, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.80% · May 7, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.85% · May 14, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.84% · May 21, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.87% · May 28, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 3.87% · Jun 4, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 4.04% · Jun 11, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 4.00% · Jun 18, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 4.02% · Jun 25, 201530-year fixed mortgage: 4.08% · Jul 2, 2015Jan 8, 2015Apr 8, 2015Jul 8, 2015
30-year fixed mortgage26 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.

What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan

At the publication reference$1,380.85/month

3.70% · Apr 2, 2015

At the later reference$1,397.87/month

3.80% · May 7, 2015

The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $17.02 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.

Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.

Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits

The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.

Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.

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