Distinguished guests, I would like to welcome you to this conference on the "Regulation of Systemic Risk," which is jointly sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 1 It is the fourth…
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System2 min read
Historical sourceThis document reflects its original publication date and reporting period. It is not today’s rates or a current economic forecast.Today’s market brief →
Historical official Federal Reserve communication reproduced from its public-domain source. Original publication date and attribution are retained. Tables, charts, external images, footnotes and administrative controls are omitted; formatting is adapted for reading. These remarks describe the speaker’s views at the time and are not current mortgage quotes. Consult the linked official source for the complete document.
Distinguished guests, I would like to welcome you to this conference on the "Regulation of Systemic Risk," which is jointly sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 1 It is the fourth conference in a series that was initiated in 2005 and is held every two years. These conferences support original research on topics that are highly relevant for the Federal Reserve's public policy mission. Conference proceedings are subsequently published in special issues of the journal and disseminated to researchers at central banks and academic institutions worldwide.
While the previous three conferences focused on monetary policy issues, the papers presented at this conference relate to the Federal Reserve's duty to maintain financial stability and contain systemic risk. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act now requires the Federal Reserve to take a macroprudential approach to financial regulation--that is, to consider the health of the financial system as well as the health of individual firms and markets.
The recent financial crisis has spurred a great deal of research on its causes and, more broadly, on the topic of systemic risk and its regulation. This research is of critical importance. It can inform the design and implementation of macroprudential regulations and policies, and I suspect no one in this audience needs to be convinced that we must get this right. The nine papers at this conference make a variety of welcome contributions in this area. Two focus on an important aspect of the recent financial crisis--namely, the rise and fall of mortgage securitization and associated swings in real estate lending.2 Other papers study the causes and indicators of systemic risk more generally and look at how well macroprudential regulations and policies can address those causes.3 Finally, several papers examine specific regulations from a macroprudential perspective, including capital requirements and risk retention rules for securitization.4
The discussants' remarks, the general discussions, and the policy panel will surely be very helpful in identifying fruitful directions for further research. I welcome you to the Federal Reserve and wish you a stimulating and productive conference.
4. For papers related to capital requirements, see Ian Christensen, Césaire Meh, and Kevin Moran (2011), "Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics (PDF)," August 18; and Enrico Perotti, Lev Ratnovski, and Razvan Vlahu (2011), "Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (PDF)," July.
Archived Nov 14, 2026. Source reuse policy. Formatting has been adapted for reading; the source’s conclusions remain attributed to its publisher.
MortgageRates.news analysis · Historical context
The mortgage market around this release
This original analysis is separate from the source article. It compares observed benchmarks around ; historical averages and yields are not current mortgage offers.
Separate policy decisions from mortgage pricing
The federal funds target concerns overnight bank borrowing. A fixed mortgage reflects a longer-term loan and its own market pricing. Read the decision and accompanying statement together, and distinguish an announced action from expectations about future actions. The before-and-after observations include the rest of the month’s information as well; they are calendar comparisons, not an estimate of the announcement’s isolated impact. Federal Reserve: how monetary policy works.
Nearest published observation on or before each target date
UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.
UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.
UnavailableBefore available coverage, which starts Jan 4, 2016.
Calendar references, not an intraday reaction. A same-day market observation may have been published after a morning release. These figures do not show what was known at its exact publication time. One basis point (bp) is 0.01 percentage point; changes use the actual dated observations shown.
Six months around publication
Jun 15, 2011 – Dec 15, 2011
30-year fixed mortgage27 observations
Dots show published observations only. Missing dates remain blank, with no interpolation. The series have different publication schedules and measure different markets.
What that benchmark difference would mean for a $300,000 loan
At the publication reference$1,447.86/month
4.09% · Sep 15, 2011
At the later reference$1,453.08/month
4.12% · Oct 13, 2011
The illustrative principal-and-interest payment is $5.22 higher per month. This holds the loan amount and term constant to show the arithmetic effect of the benchmark difference.
Assumptions: two separate hypothetical $300,000 loans, each fully amortizing over 30 years with 360 monthly payments and its stated fixed interest rate. Excludes points, lender fees, taxes, insurance, association charges and other costs. PMMS is a national average, not an APR or a personalized rate offer. These are not two payments on one existing loan.
Sources, historical coverage and calculation limits
Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey®: available observations from Apr 2, 1971 through Nov 5, 2026. Cached history snapshot. History retrieved or verified Nov 11, 2026.
U.S. Department of the Treasury: available observations from Jan 4, 2016 through Nov 10, 2026. Cached history snapshot. History retrieved or verified Nov 11, 2026.
The 30-day comparisons use calendar days. Each cell selects the last published observation on or before its target; no rates are synthesized for missing dates. Gaps greater than seven days for daily Treasury data or fourteen days for weekly mortgage data are marked unavailable. Forward comparisons require the date to have arrived and source coverage to extend through it.
Historical files may contain revisions and do not reconstruct precisely what every market participant knew at the time. Freddie Mac changed its PMMS collection methodology in November 2022. Cross-period comparisons should account for that change. These windows include other news and cannot establish causation or forecast the next rate move.